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PhD Thesis
Medical Harm and Patient Empowerment in the NHS: Some Critical
Perspectives
Abstract
This thesis will look at the occurrence of medical harm and its impact and argue that 
conceptually it is a contested phenomenon that is difficult to pin down, but appears to 
be widespread in healthcare. It will be argued that in a context where the occurrence 
of medical harm has become fiercely contested by patients, self-help and consumer 
groups, it is important to be aware of how the medical profession and dominant 
biomedical definitions and views have shaped the debate. Looking at the issues firom a 
patient’s perspective, the thesis will highlight some key aspects of a biomedical model 
and its focus on health and illness and then explore some critical sociological 
arguments loosely associated with a firamework of ideas referred to as ‘medical 
imperialism’. Drawing upon a range of critical sociological perspectives, it will be 
argued that a model of medical harm that focuses predominantly upon the clinical 
markers and individual agency, associated with a medical model, operates to obscure 
a range of social processes connected with medical harm. These processes connected 
to the power and dominance of the medical profession and the activities of a wider 
state and commercial apparatus are seen to be a major part of the harm that impacts 
upon patients in healthcare, which is further compounded by its concealment. 
Therefore in order to address these complex issues, it is argued that a broader 
conceptual firamework is needed for looking at medical harm. This firamework should 
incorporate both the medical and social processes associated with medical harm and 
also address wider issues of patient and public involvement in healthcare, based upon 
a model of patient empowerment.
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Preface
The context to my research is important in so far as it was undertaken as a result of 
my own personal experience of medical harm. Because of this experience, I became 
involved in working with victims of harm more generally and began to realise that 
there was a need to look at the concept and process of medical harm from a patient's 
perspective. My research also forms part of a CASE studentship concerned with 
research with victims of medical harm and looking at patient empowerment. The 
partner in the studentship along with the University of Surrey is the voluntary 
association Action against Medical Accidents (AvMA). The studentship ran from 
October 2003 until September 2006. AvMA is a registered charity that promotes 
better patient safety and justice for people who have been affected by medical 
accidents. Given the sensitive nature of its work, my appointment as a Case student 
was welcomed not only because of my considerable experience in the field of medical 
harm and patient safety, but also because I had personal experience of medical harm 
due to its impact upon a close relative.
During my time with AvMA it was decided that it would be most useful if I could 
concentrate on developing links with those affected by medical harm and the range of 
patient organisations working with these individuals. I was particularly keen to work 
with what I have called self-help groups, made up solely of those directly affected by 
medical harm and to help these groups develop their own network. AvMA in turn, 
were particularly interested in supporting the goal of building a national network of 
self-help and support groups in order to enable individuals and patients' organisations 
to become more involved with patient safety work at a local and national level. Given 
these interests, during the three years of my studentship, I was primarily involved 
with building and supporting what became known as the Medical Harm Self-Help 
Network (MHSHN).
Due to the importance given by AvMA to this work, funding was secured to continue 
some work with the groups after my studentship finished. The work with the
MHSHN, was incorporated into a project called The Patients for Patient Safety (PfPS) 
Project. This was funded by the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) and run in 
partnership with AvMA for two years from April 1®^ 2006 until March 31®^ 2008. I 
was successful in being appointed to co-manage the project with Louise Price 
AvMA's case manager.
As mentioned above, my personal experience of medical harm has formed an 
important backdrop to my undertaking a PhD in this subject area. In this respect it has 
not only provided an important basis for my thinking about ideas, questions and 
concepts, but has also been responsible for the way that I chose to construct the 
methodology for the research.
My personal story in brief, is that my 17-year old daughter Krista, died suddenly and
unexpectedly at home in bed on December 5* 1996, whilst under the care of the
Royal Brompton Hospital. Her sudden death in this way led me to spend many years
searching and campaigning for answers to try and gain a truthful explanation as to the
circumstances surrounding her death. I was eventually led to the conclusion that
Krista had died of medical negligence, but struggled to prove this and gain any type of
%accountability through using the NHS investigative systems available to me. Over a 
period of 10 years, these systems included the Coroner's Courts, the NHS Complaints 
Procedures, a wider NHS Inquiry, the Civil Courts, the European Court of Human 
Rights, the Parliamentary Ombudsman's Office and the General Medical Council. As 
a result of the failure of these systems to provide me with an independent 
investigation into my daughter's death and any kind of justice, I eventually started to 
become involved in trying to change various systems in the NHS that deal with issues 
when things go wrong with healthcare. This led me to start to explore how a new 
patient safety culture could be developed, which involved not only healthcare 
professionals, but also those affected by medical harm and patients more generally 
working together in a true spirit of partnership.
This has led me on a journey, which I can only describe as taking me from 'victim', to 
survivor of medical harm and which I have described in chapter four of this thesis.
This chapter sets out my personal story of medical harm and illustrates how my 
campaign for justice for my daughter eventually began to run alongside other 
activities that looked at issues of medical harm and patient safety on a much broader 
level. In 2001 I became involved in an Inquiry set up by the Royal Brompton [The 
Evans Inquiry] to look at concerns raised by a number of families about the care of 
their children (including my daughter). I was then invited by the hospital to sit on a 
committee to implement the inquiry findings. I was to sit on this committee for three 
years and then went on to become chair of the Patient's Forum for the hospital.
As part of my role in the forum, I began to become much more actively involved in 
the area of patient safety. This led me to sit both on the Board of the Royal Brompton 
and to sit on their main patient safety committee. Audit and Risk Committee as well 
as the Complaints Committee and Equality and Diversity Committee. Through this 
work and through other activities connected to working with those affected by harm, 
what came to seem most important to me in this area, was the need to create a new 
patient safety culture by working in partnership with patients and the public. I also 
came to believe that there was a need to take on board the many issues harmed 
patients were raising both in terms of preventing medical harm but also in addressing 
issues of justice and accountability. My thesis has therefore focussed on looking at the 
concept of medical harm fi*om a patient's perspective and exploring issues of both 
learning and accountability and what this means within a model of patient 
empowerment.
In terms of my field research I chose to draw upon a methodology that would allow 
me to get at the subjective experiences of those who had been affected by medical 
harm. This meant using a research methodology based upon participatory action 
research, which has involved gathering research data whilst taking action at the same 
time and involving the research respondents in a process of change. I believed this 
type of methodology was important to empower individuals involved in the research 
and to seek to give them a voice and an opportunity to try and change things fi’om 
their perspectives.
My field research was therefore structured into a number of different parts. The first 
strand concentrated on documenting the experiences of a number of self-help groups
set up as a result of different experiences of medical harm, who were involved in a 
number of different ways in campaigning for changes to the system. The second 
strand concentrated on drawing upon data emerging from a support initiative for 
individuals affected by medical harm called the Break Through Programme. This 
allowed me to gather data that covered the emotional and psychological consequences 
of medical harm for individuals, as well as changes they wanted to see to the system. 
And, lastly, I chose to gather data from the work I was still involved with at the Royal 
Brompton. In this sense I used the Brompton as a case study to document how a 
victim of harm [myself], went on to become both a survivor, health activist and action 
researcher in the field of patient safety. Then I explored what this meant in terms of 
developing a new patient safety culture in the NHS from a patient's perspective.
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Introductory Chapter
For the purposes of this PhD, the terms medical harm, adverse event (AE) or patient 
safety incident (PSI) are used as umbrella terms interchangeably to cover a range of 
adverse effects of the medical process. These terms are used to mean any unintended 
injury or complication causing disability, death or prolongation of hospital stay that 
occurs as a result of healthcare management, rather than the patient's underlying 
disease process or condition being treated. This can include where the care has been 
negligent, but does not necessarily mean that it was.
This thesis basically consists of four main arguments about the occurrence of medical 
harm and its impact as set out in the abstract. It is argued firstly, that medical harm is 
a contested phenomenon that is difficult to pin down, but appears to be widespread in 
healthcare. Secondly, that in a climate where a range of actors are contesting the 
concept, including a range of user groups, it is important to understand how 
biomedical views and definitions have shaped the debate. Thirdly, that a range of 
critical sociological perspectives has long challenged the dominance of a biomedical 
model in health and illness. It is argued however, that these critiques have not been 
successful in exposing the way that a dominant medical model continues to obscure 
the range of social processes connected with medical harm, which ultimately result in 
more harm to patients because of this lack of exposure. Lastly, it is argued that there 
is a need for a new approach to looking at medical harm that incorporates both the 
medical and social aspects associated with this process. This new model also needs to 
address the need for user perspectives and involvement in looking at the issues 
associated with medical harm, based upon a model of patient empowerment.
These arguments raise a number of key questions and cross cutting themes that run 
consistently throughout the PhD and are subsequently explored in specific chapters of 
the thesis as indicated below.
The first and a key theme of the thesis has been to seek to broaden the debate about 
medical harm and its impact. This has been done by suggesting that the concept of 
medical harm is a contested one and one in which the victims of harm and user groups
are frequently excluded from the debate and see the issues differently to the medical 
profession. In this context, it is argued that the concept of medical harm is mainly 
defined and constructed by the medical profession drawing upon a biomedical 
viewpoint. In seeking to open up a broader debate about the issues associated with 
medical harm the thesis concentrates on looking at the issues from a patient's 
perspective. These perspectives are explored by carrying out a sociological 
investigation into the experiences of a range of self-help groups and individuals that 
have been affected by (or the group set up as a result of) medical harm. This 
investigation is based upon a Participatory Action Research model. This methodology 
was chosen in order to allow me to get at both the subjective experiences of those 
affected by medical harm, whilst providing a framework for empowering individuals 
involved in the research process to tell their stories whilst trying to change things 
from their perspectives.
A second theme has been to illustrate the ways in which a dominant biomedical model 
in healthcare operates in the process of constructing medical harm. In this respect a 
range of sociological critiques loosely associated with a body of ideas about 'medical 
imperialism', are highlighted to show that health and illness do not just have their 
origins in the body, but also in wider processes about socio-political and commercial 
issues of profits, power and control. These sociological critiques are then drawn upon 
more specifically to make visible some of the complex social processes involved in 
the way that medical harm is constructed and how issues of power, medical 
dominance and control manifest on both an individual and structural level to create 
medical harm and to compound it. Key examples of this process will focus on: the 
imbalance of power that exists between doctors and patients in healthcare and how 
this imbalance manifests itself in various ways in causing harm to patients. How 
processes make it difficult for individuals affected by harm to resolve the issues by 
getting a fair and independent investigation into their concerns. The ways in which the 
medical profession and wider systems can dismiss victims concerns and label and 
pathologise the victims as a problem. The way in which the complaints system and 
state regulatory bodies and the courts can work in favour of the medical professional 
and to the detriment of victims of medical harm. And lastly how victim and patients 
perspectives can be excluded from the process of learning about why harm has 
occurred and in addressing the issues to make health care safer in the future.
Lastly, given the issues identified above, some thought is given to considering 
whether a broader paradigm of knowledge is needed that incorporates alternative 
views to the medical model about the issues associated with medical harm. An 
emphasis on a broader approach will look at the need for new and more radical ways 
for looking at patient involvement in patient safety and systems of regulation and 
accountability within a more critical theoretical firamework based upon patient 
empowerment. The aim here is to show how a new broader model is needed for 
looking at medical harm that incorporates both the medical and social processes 
involved and which also includes patients' perspectives and how they can be included 
in the process of looking at the issues. It will be illustrated in the PhD how dominant 
medical processes operate to exclude, silence and dis-empower those affected by 
medical harm, thereby ultimately preventing a holistic approach to developing a new 
patient safety culture that incorporates patients and the public and both issues of 
learning and accountability.
What is seen as key to this new approach is the need to create real partnerships with 
patients and the public that genuinely involve them in the process of change and 
which empower them to participate in the process by addressing barriers to 
involvement. These barriers are seen to cover a range of issues, not least the 
limitations of the current model of patient and public involvement in health (PPIH) 
which currently exists to enable patient participation in health care. Given the 
emphasis in the PhD on empowerment, it was specifically decided to adopt a research 
model that was empowering for research participants and which enabled them to 
participate both in generating research data and being part of a process of change 
developed firom their perspectives. This led to my decision to choose a participatory 
action research design that focussed on gathering data fi*om groups set up to address 
issues of medical hami and patient safety and also firom individuals affected directly 
by medical harm.
The intention with the research data gathered is to enable policy makers and NHS 
employees to leam more about the issue of medical harm firom the perspectives of 
patients and those directly affected by medical harm. In addition, it is hoped that the 
material can contribute towards changing systems within the NHS and beyond
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regarding patient safety, regulation and accountability and to contribute towards some 
critical ideas for better patient involvement, based upon empowerment, in this area.
In the section below, a short outline is provided of each chapter of the thesis.
Chapter One: Medical Harm a Contested Concept: Data and Definitions
This chapter in opening up the debate about medical harm aims to illustrate that 
medical harm is a widespread phenomenon in healthcare and yet there are 
considerable difficulties in establishing the specific scale of the problem and how to 
define the concept. This chapter will therefore look at three main areas: defining 
medical harm and the difficulties of establishing a reliable classification in this area; 
some key empirical data on medical harm and the international context and the 
concept of clinical negligence. In conclusion it will be argued that the occurrence of 
medical harm and its impact is a contested phenomenon, but one whose nature is 
increasingly being challenged by patients, self-help and consumer groups. In this 
context, the contention will be that there is a need for a much wider debate about the 
scale and nature of medical harm and its impact that goes beyond the dominant 
perspective of a medical model. It is argued that this will also need to include the 
views and perspectives of users of healthcare services and those affected by medical 
harm within the NHS.
Chapter Two: Medical Harm: Some Critical Sociological Perspectives
This chapter begins to open up in more detail a theoretical sociological fi*amework for 
analysing the concept of medical harm. It sets out some existing sociological 
arguments about the changing context of medicine and the crisis of confidence in the 
professions including medicine. It then goes on to look at a range of critical 
sociological arguments loosely referred to as 'medical imperialism' which incorporate 
both social constructionist and political economy perspectives about health and 
illness. These perspectives seek to challenge a biomedical viewpoint that routinely 
associates health and illness with the body, rather than locating its origins in wider 
processes that are firequently about socio-political and commercial issues of profits, 
power and control. These perspectives are then used as the basis for looking at
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medical harm and for arguing that a wider framework is needed for analysing medical 
harm that is based upon clinical and social markers and which reflect the issues from 
a patient's perspective. The chapter also illustrates a range of ways in which medical 
harm is connected to wider socio-economic and political interests which work against 
the interests of patients and which are currently obscured by the widespread 
dominance of a medical model in defining the issues.
Chapter Three: The Changing Policy Context and Developing a New Patient 
Safety Culture in the NHS
This chapter of the PhD will follow on from the previous one by looking at the rapidly 
changing policy landscape that has taken place in relation to the area of medical harm 
and patient safety particularly over the last ten years. The chapter will focus firstly on 
two major government inquiry reports that are widely seen as an important catalyst in 
changing the policy landscape in this area. These reports are The Report of the Public 
Inquiry into children's heart surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995' (2001), 
(subsequently referred to as The Bristol Report) and the 'The Shipman Inquiry Fifth 
Report. Safeguarding Patients: Lessons from the Past - Proposals for the Future 
(2005), (subsequently referred to as The Shipman Inquiry Report).
In looking at the reports mentioned above, the aim will be to highlight some key 
conclusions and to explore any evidence related to arguments made previously about 
the way in which dominant medical perspectives obscure a range of social processes 
cormected to medical harm. The chapter will then focus on looking at a range of other 
more recent reports and reviews regarding different areas connected to patient safety. 
The purpose in doing this will be to explore what progress has been made post Bristol 
and Shipman in developing a new patient safety culture within the NHS. In making 
the assessment about progress, a key issue will be to look at the evidence for moving 
from a culture based upon an individuaUst medical model to one that embraces a 
wider systems approach to tackling patient safety.
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Chapter Four: The Royal Brompton Case Study
This chapter has been included in my PhD for a number of reasons. The chapter maps 
the different stages of my journey from 'victim' of medical harm to survivor and as a 
campaigner, activist, health advocate, patient representative and action researcher 
looking at the subject of medical harm. This journey has thrown up many issues about 
what medical harm means from a user perspective. The journey has also come to 
illustrate to me, not only what it means to be a survivor of medical harm, but what it 
means to create a new safety culture in the NHS which involves 'victims' of harm, 
patients and the public as part of an empowerment agenda. The case-study on the 
Brompton is therefore an opportunity to look at some of my experiences as an 
individual affected by medical harm and those of other families and groups I worked 
with as part of my campaign for justice. However, the study also shows how I 
gradually moved through a process into looking at wider issues of medical harm and 
patient safety, becoming a participant observer and then a researcher in action. This 
meant being involved, whilst also becoming more detached so that I could look at the 
issues more critically and strategically. In this respect capturing and constructing a 
process in my role as both insider and outsider on the issues concerned. In setting out 
this journey a number of themes have been identified which relate to issues of 
accountability, learning from adverse events, discrimination and the imbalance of 
power between doctors and patients. In analysing these themes, I have sought to 
explore what they might mean in developing a new patient safety agenda and in 
particular to look at the implications for doing this in partnership with patients as part 
of a new model of patient participation based upon patient empowerment.
Chapter Five: A Participatory Action Research (PAR) Approach
Chapter five of the PhD looks at the methodology used for carrying out my field 
research and ties into two subsequent chapters that look at my research findings. In 
exploring the theory and methods underlying my research, the chapter starts off by 
looking at the historical context to action research and a number of different action 
research approaches. The chapter then comes on to look at participatory action 
research (PAR) which is identified as the methodology guiding my field research. 
This section outlines what PAR is, the historical context to the approach and key
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components and methods of PAR methodology. The last section of the chapter then 
comes on to look at my field research, starting first of all with some reflections on my 
journey from victim of medical harm to action researcher. Then looking at the key 
aims and objectives of my research and the academic context, the research design and 
ethical considerations and finally getting ethical approval for the research.
Chapter Six: Research Data: The Medical Harm Self-help Network (MHSHN)
This chapter looks at the findings from my field research, which is divided into two 
slightly different strands looking at medical harm from a user perspective. The first 
strand covered in this chapter, looks at the experiences of a number of self-help 
groups set up as a result of individual members experiences of medical harm. As part 
of my CASE studentship at AvMA, I agreed to lead on the setting up of a user 
network. The aim of the network was to bring together a number of self-help groups 
and other organisations campaigning for change in the patient safety field, for proper 
regulation of the medical profession and for more justice and accountability for 
victims of medical harm. As a result of leading on this work I decided to draw upon 
this experience and to make it part of my field research and to use a PAR model to 
generate data whilst enabling the groups to take action at the same time. This chapter 
sets out the key findings from working with the network over two and a half years and 
also illustrates some of the dynamics of working with the network as both an insider 
(someone affected by medical harm and campaigning for change) and an outsider 
researcher.
Chapter Seven: Research Data: The Break Through Programme
This chapter contains the findings from the second strand of my field research. The 
research was based upon generating data from individuals (rather than groups) 
directly affected (or a family member) by medical harm. The research was again tied 
into my work with AvMA and linked to my involvement helping to run support 
workshops for those affected by harm. As part of this work, a weekend residential 
programme was organised for individuals to come and talk about their experiences 
and how they had or could begin to move forward in recovering from what had 
happened to them. My research consisted of asking participants to fill in a
14
questionnaire about their personal experiences of what had happened to them and to 
document data emerging from participants whilst on the programme. I also agreed to 
write up some of the participants stories (for those who were interested in doing this) 
for publication in a newsletter (paid for from my research grant). The aim of the 
newsletter was to distribute it at an AvMA conference for users on patient safety and 
justice in which members of the medical profession and regulatory bodies had been 
invited to come along and listen to the issues from a user perspective. The newsletter 
was about empowering individuals to speak and to tell their stories from their 
perspectives. The newsletter also covered more general issues about changes to the 
system that had emerged at the residential weekend.
Chapter Eight: Medical Harm and Reflections upon a Participatory Action 
Research Journey
This chapter reflects upon the challenges of undertaking participatory action research 
in the thesis. This is done by looking at the processes concerned with gathering the 
empirical evidence at the Brompton and through the Medical Harm Self-Help 
Network and the Break Through Programme. In illustrating these processes a number 
of themes are explored in the chapter that arose in the research. These relate to the 
difficulties of managing the different strands of the field research and the challenges 
that arose in the different areas and in meeting the requirements of the PhD and the 
needs of the research participants. The chapter also looks at the nature of 
empowerment as practised in the thesis and gives some account of the relationship 
between knowledge and power. An important issue explored at the outset, is the 
nature of my own transition from Victim' to action researcher and what this meant in 
terms of developing the qualities of self-reflection needed for this role as an action 
researcher in the field. Related to this, some consideration is also given to the 
challenges arising from my dual role as insider and outsider in the research and how 
these tensions were managed. In looking at this issue at the Brompton, the chapter 
then looks in more detail at the challenges involved in building the Medical Harm 
Self-Help Network and developing a dialogue incorporating different perspectives. It 
then reflects upon the learning processes involved in the Break Through Programme 
and how this was facilitated.
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Chapter Nine: the Research Evidence and Findings
This chapter concludes the thesis by looking at the nature of the evidence used in the 
thesis and the contribution of the research conducted to the current understanding and 
knowledge in the area of medical harm.
In doing this, consideration is first given to looking at a number of areas. These relate 
to the nature of the data gathered through the research methods and the strengths and 
limitations of these as evidence. The significance of recent policy reviews included as 
evidence in the thesis alongside the research material and any critiques that can be 
made of them in a thesis critical of expert opinion. Some thought is also given to 
looking at how different strands of the data were combined in the analysis and in the 
process of continual engagement between theory and practice. The chapter then 
comes on to look at the specific contribution of the research findings to a better 
understanding of the nature of medical harm and the need for a new patient safety 
culture in the NHS. This includes thinking about the implications of the research 
findings for the existing literature on the medical profession and the context in which 
medical harm occurs and is dealt with. In particular the question is explored as to 
whether the research findings provide evidence of the continuing dominance of 
medicine as a profession as described by Freidson in relation to medical harm and of 
any additional evidence broadening the debate concerning processes linked to a wider 
political and legal apparatus.
In the light of these arguments the chapter finishes by setting out some conclusions on 
the need for a new holistic model for looking at medical harm and patient safety based 
upon patient empowerment.
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Chapter One
Medical Harm a Contested Concept: Data and Definitions 
Introduction
This chapter, in opening up the debate about medical harm, aims to illustrate that 
medical harm is a widespread phenomenon in healthcare and yet there are 
considerable difficulties in establishing the specific scale of the problem and how to 
define the concept. This chapter will therefore look at three main areas: defining 
medical harm and the difficulties of establishing a reliable classification in this area; 
some key empirical data on medical harm and the international context and the 
concept of clinical negligence. In conclusion it will be argued that the occurrence of 
medical harm and its impact is a contested phenomenon, but one whose nature is 
increasingly being challenged by patients, self-help and consumer groups. In this 
context, the contention is that there is a need for a much wider debate about the scale 
and nature of medical harm and its impact, which goes beyond the dominant 
perspective of a medical model to include the views and perspectives of those who 
use and have been harmed by healthcare.
Defining Medical Harm
What is evident fi*om the academic and policy discourse in this area is that there is no 
standard way of defining medical harm and that the nomenclature of harm throws up a 
confusing array of different terms. For example medical: harm, error, mistake, 
accident, mishap, hazard, malpractice, negligence, clinical negligence, malpractice; 
iatrogenic illness, comiogenic illness, adverse event etc. The term patient safety is 
now also used widely as synonymous in many respects with the concept of medical 
harm.
This has led to a number of academics in the field to call for a more consistent 
classification and methodology to be developed which would allow for more reliable 
ways of measuring medical errors and comparing data on adverse events (AEs) 
(Weingart et al 2003:6; Brennan 2000; Bezruchka 2001; Rubin 2001; 
Woloshynowych et al 2003; Kohn et al 1999). The difficulties concerning the use of a
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consistent methodology have been acknowledged by Vincent et al (2001) in his study 
of AEs, which is seen as one of the most comprehensive studies of AEs in the British 
context. He argues that ‘comparisons between the adverse event rates in different 
countries are premature until a more robust methodology is developed' (2001:6). 
Having said this, whilst recognising the limitations of comparing different studies on 
AEs, other writers point to the importance (Alberti 2001) of the Harvard Medical 
Practice Study (HMPS) and the Quality in Australian Health Care Study (QAHCS) as 
unrivalled (Weingart et al 2003) and reflecting a similarity of methods and definitions 
used (McNeil et al 1995), in providing important benchmarks for analysing the 
epidemiology of AEs.
On a policy level, the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA), a Special Health 
Authority, was set up in July 2001 to co-ordinate the efforts of the entire country to 
report and leam from adverse incidents in the NHS and how this learning could be 
used to build a new patient safety context. The NPSA was established following 
recommendations from the Chief Medical Officer in his report on learning from AEs, 
'An organisation with a memory' (DOH 2000). A follow up report 'Building a Safer 
NHS for Patients' (DOH 2001) was then published, setting out the governments plans 
for promoting patient safety and implementing it within the NHS Plan (DOH 2000).
In recommending the setting up of a mandatory-reporting scheme for adverse health 
care events and specified near misses, an integral part of that scheme was seen as 
developing a detailed standardised categorisation of different types of AEs. In a 
document arising out of two seminars held jointly by the NHS Confederation and the 
NPSA, they acknowledged that there was 'enormous variation' in how adverse 
incidents are classified, with 'no consistency in reporting processes' (The NHS 
Confederation 2003:11). In order to tackle the problem of a lack of reliable data, a key 
objective of the NPSA has been to set up a National Reporting and Learning System 
(NRLS) to enable all NHS Tmsts to report patient safety incidents when they occur. 
The system is intended to enable the NPSA to produce more accurate data for 
benchmarking and comparisons over the next few years.
By 31 December 2004 the NPSA had put a system into place to allow all 607 NHS 
organisations the capability to report patient safety incidents to the NRLS. However a
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Select Committee on Public Accounts report in 2006 found that there were still 
problems with the lack of a consistent classification system used by the NRLS for 
identifying and reporting NHS adverse incidents. The report noted in its 
recommendations that:
'The taxonomy o f the National Reporting and Learning System differs from 
many local trust descriptions and classifications o f incidents and also from 
taxonomies used by other countries. The World Health Organisation is 
developing an international taxonomy. The National Patient Safety Agency 
should either adopt this taxonomy or align its taxonomy toit.... '.
(Select Committee on Public Accounts Fifty-First Report 2006)
In terms of the background to this work, in 2005, the World Alliance for Patient 
Safety assembled a panel of experts in the fields of patient safety, classification theory 
and development, health informatics, consumer advocacy, law and medicine to build a 
classification which could be used to compare patient safety information and data at 
an international level. The panel recognised that while many patient safety 
classifications existed, no one classification was suitable to be used for global use. 
Therefore in order to develop this work, the panel has met officially four times 
between October 2005 and June 2007 and information on this work notes:
'The International Classification for Patient Safety (ICPS) aims to define, 
harmonize and group patient safety concepts into an internationally agreed 
classification in a way that is conducive to learning and improving patient 
safety across systems'.
(WHO Patient Safety Website 2007)
Further it notes that:
"The ICPS is not a reporting system; it is a logically oriented hierarchical 
framework o f concepts and definitions designed to translate patient safety 
incident data collected from a range o f sources into a standardized common 
terminology'.
(WHO Patient Safety Website 2007)
Once the ICPS has been completed and critically reviewed, the aim is to field test its 
implementation with a view to the WHO promoting the adoption of the ICPS globally 
by the end of the first quarter 2009.
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Medical Harm: A Working Définition
With regard to the terminology used to describe an adverse event, the NPSA use the 
term patient safety incident (PSI), which is defined as:
'any unintended or unexpected incident which could have or did lead to harm 
for one or more patients receiving NHS funded healthcare. This is also 
referred to as an adverse event/incident or clinical error, and includes near 
misses'.
(NPSA 2003)
This term is used widely within the NHS, in conjunction with other terms such as 
adverse event or incident.
Therefore for the purposes of this PhD, the terms medical harm, adverse event (AE) 
or patient safety incident (PSI) are used as umbrella terms interchangeably to cover a 
range of adverse effects of the medical process. These terms are defined below to 
mean:
unintended injury or complication causing disability, death or prolongation 
o f hospital stay that occurs as a result o f healthcare management, rather than 
the patient's underlying disease process or condition being treated.
Drawing upon the definition in Vincent et al (2001), medical management can be seen 
to include 'both the actions of an individual member of staff or the overall health care 
system' (Vincent 2001: 1). It also includes both 'acts of omission (for example, failure 
to diagnose or treat) and commission (incorrect treatment)' (Vincent 2001: 1).
Medical harm is also not viewed as an occurrence that is avoidable in all 
circumstances and can therefore be further sub-divided into harm that is avoidable or 
preventable and harm that is caused by negligence. The Institute of Medicine (1999: 
24) have classified an adverse event attributable to error as a preventable adverse 
event. An error is defined as:
'the failure o f a planned action to be completed as intended (i.e., error o f  
execution) or the use o f a wrong plan to achieve an aim (i.e., error o f  
planning) '.
(Institute of Medicine (lOM) 1999: 46)
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However, Brennan (2000) has argued that whilst it is possible to classify adverse 
events into preventable and non-preventable adverse events, there is not necessarily 
any general agreement on how to do this and whether preventable adverse events are 
caused by errors (Brennan 2000: 2).
The second sub-set of harm relates to preventable harm that satisfies legal criteria 
used to determine medical negligence. This category of harm is determined in the UK 
by a claimant in a medical negligence action proving four elements: the existence of a 
duty of care; a breach of that duty (negligence); that the injury or harm was caused by 
the breach (causation); and the extent of the damage.
The term patient safety is now also used frequently in the policy literature when 
looking at medical harm. It is therefore useful to clarify what this means. At its 
simplest Vincent argues that, patient safety can be defined as:
'The avoidance, prevention and amelioration o f adverse outcomes or injuries 
stemming from the process o f healthcare'
(Vincent 2006: 14).
This definition is used as a good starting point within the thesis, for understanding the 
processes currently taking place within the NHSA to create safer healthcare.
Classifying Adverse Events: the data
To understand the debate about classifying medical harm in more detail, it is useful to 
look at the data in the Harvard Medical Practice Study (HMPS) (Brennan et al 1991; 
Leape et al 1991) and The Quahty in Australian Health Care Study (QAHCS) 
(McNeil & Leeder 1995), two of the most widely quoted international studies on 
adverse events. These provide some opportunity for further broadening our 
understanding of the nomenclature of different types of AEs.
The Harvard study defined an adverse event 'as an injury that was caused by medical 
management (rather than the underlying disease), that prolonged the hospitalization, 
produced a disability at the time of discharge or both' (Brennan et al 1991: 370). A 
negligent adverse event was classified more specifically as 'care that fell below the
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standard expected of physicians in their community' (Brennan et al 1991:370). The 
study further classified all AEs into preventable and non-preventable.
The QAHCS used a similar basic definition as the Harvard study. For example 
defining an AE as causing: '!) an unintended injury or complication, 2) which results 
in disability, death or prolongation of hospital stay, and 3) is caused by health care 
management rather than the patient's disease' (Wilson 1995:461). To meet the criteria 
for an adverse event, the first two elements numbered above had to be satisfied. In 
addition, in order to establish whether healthcare management caused the harm, as 
opposed to the underlying disease, causation was established by use of a scale 
numbered 1-6, which included acts of omission (failure to diagnose or treat) and acts 
of commission (incorrect treatment or management). Lastly, the concept of 
negligence was replaced with the term preventability, defined as "an error in 
management due to failure to follow accepted practice at an individual or system 
level" (Wilson 1995: 461). Accepted practice was defined as "the current level of 
expected performance for the average practitioner or system that manages the 
condition in question" (Bates et al 1995 cited in Wilson et al 1995: 461). 
Preventability was also scored on a scale of 1-6 and divided into three categories of 
no preventability, low preventability and high preventability.
With the QAHCS study, it is easier to categorise an adverse event into two categories 
rather than three. For example; 1) caused by medical management and therefore able 
to be prevented and 2) preventable in the sense of equivalent to negligence. This study 
also used the prefix 'unintended' before injury. The study carried out by Vincent et al 
(1999) mentioned earlier, used a similar definition to the ones used in the Harvard and 
QAHCS, but did not look at negligent AEs.
However Troyen Brennan one of the authors of the Harvard study does raise some 
issues about the term preventability. He argues that preventability is difficult to 
determine because it is often influenced by decisions about expenditure. In the 
Harvard study, he pointed out that the authors had agreed amongst themselves about 
whether events should be classified as preventable or non-preventable. These 
decisions were therefore not necessarily seen as reflecting the views of the average 
physician and certainly did not mean that all preventable AEs could be classified as
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blunders (2000:2). Clearly as part of this debate it is important to recognise and 
acknowledge that not all adverse events can be prevented, that it is difficult to 
determine the ones than can and that medical harm on some level will always be a 
part of health care systems (DOH 2000).
An Epidemiology of Error
A number of writers (Kohn et al 1999, Rubin 2001, Weingart 2000, Alberti 2001) 
have raised issues about the problems of fully understanding the nature of AEs 
because of the lack of a clear picture in terms of an epidemiology of errors. Brennan 
goes as far as to argue that the 'reliability of identifying errors is methodologically 
suspect', and that unless the epidemiologic science of error detection improves, there 
is a danger that the prevention of errors may deteriorate into a marketing ploy, 
especially after the relatively easy solutions have been dealt with (2000:4).
Other writers raise issues about omissions in terms of the data. Sington and Cottrell 
point out that the Vincent study did not mention the role of Necropsy in the collection 
of corroborative evidence in reporting medical error. This was seen as important 
given what their own data showed and is highlighted in other studies, 'showing 
divergence in cause of death recorded on the death certificate and at necropsy, 
including rates of up to 75% for previously undisclosed and clinically important 
findings' (2001:511). This was seen as very worrying by the author, particularly in the 
light of the decline in necropsies requested in hospital. Other writers such as 
Bezruchka (2001) want to see an expanded definition of AEs that goes much wider 
than events noted in a hospital record to include data on other events that he argues 
may also end in death.
These definitions therefore introduce into the nomenclature of AEs the element of 
error and its place within a definition of an adverse event. Charles Vincent argues that 
'patient safety is beset by difficulties with terminology and the most intractable 
problems occur when the term error is used' (Vincent 2006: 81).
Most of the major studies have made a distinction in the data between preventable 
AEs and non-preventable events. In the major US report 'To Err is Human', produced
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by the Institute of Medicine (lOM), (1999), a preventable adverse event is defined as 
one attributable to error, which provides a further way of understanding the cause of 
these types of events and therefore providing an opportunity to look at devising 
solutions to them in terms of patient safety. The report drew on the work of James 
Reason (1990) in looking at human error and its role in causing multiple accidents, to 
develop the definition of error. The report defines error as: 'the failure of a planned 
action to be completed as intended (i.e., error of execution) or the use of a wrong plan 
to achieve an aim (e.g., error of planning)' (lOM Report 1999: 46).
Reason emphasises that the operative word when understanding error, is "intention" 
and that it has no meaning when applied to unintentional behaviours. This is because 
error is seen to depend on two kinds of failure: actions that do not go as intended or 
the intended action is not the correct one. In the first scenario, the desired outcome 
may or may not be achieved and in the second, it cannot be achieved. Reason also 
makes a distinction between different types of error. A slip or lapse was seen to occur 
when the action carried out, was not what was intended. These were seen as errors of 
execution. A slip was defuied as an observable event, e.g. pushing the wrong button 
on a machine, or selecting the correct medicine, but writing the incorrect level of 
dosage to that intended. In other words the intention was correct, but the action did 
not proceed as planned. A lapse was not seen as an observable event and therefore 
could occur as a result of failing to recall something from memory. An error 
categorised as a mistake was seen as arising as a result of an action that proceeded as 
planned but did not achieve its intended outcome, because the planned action was a 
wrong one. For example, there might have been an incorrect assessment, with the 
wrong drug chosen because the diagnosis was wrong or inadequate levels of 
knowledge or information involved in making a key decision. In other words with a 
mistake, the original intention is flawed and there is a failure of planning involved. An 
important point noted was that a slip should not automatically be equated with 
something minor, as patients could just as easily die from a slip as from a mistake 
(Reason 1990 cited in lOM Report 1999: 46).
Vincent (2006) also discusses what he refers to as 'violations' which he argues are 
distinct from errors, which by definition are unintended in that individuals do not 
want to make them. Violations by contrast are defined as intentional acts that occur
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when individuals deliberately deviate 'from safe operating practices, procedures, 
standards or rules' (Vincent 2006: 89). Vincent does argue however, that this is not to 
say that individuals deliberately intend that there should be a bad outcome, as in the 
case of intentional sabotage of equipment etc. They may instead hope the violation 
will not be significant or hope it might even help to get the job completed quicker. 
Reason distinguishes between three types of violation. Routine violations may occur 
as a result of someone cutting comers for differing reasons, such as to save time for 
example. Necessary violations may occur because a person has decided to flout a mle 
to get a job done and optimizing violations are seen to occur for personal gain, either 
for a simple reason as finishing work early or for more sinister motives (cited in 
Vincent 2006: 89). Vincent has argued that it is important to note that violations differ 
in important respects from errors. In this respect errors are seen as more closely linked 
to human limitations in thinking and remembering, whereas violations are seen as 
more closely linked to attitudes, motivation, or the workplace environment. Therefore 
addressing the latter is seen to require an approach linked to addressing attitudes as 
well as the culture of the wider organisation (Vincent 2006: 89).
Classifying Errors
Given the debate about defining errors, a numbers of classification systems have 
emerged in relation to medical errors. Vincent argues one of the most detailed 
classification systems, incorporating many of the features of previous systems is the 
one used in the Predictive Human Error Analysis (PHEA) technique as set out below:
PHEA classification of errors 
(adapted from Hollnagel 1998)
Planning errors
•  Incorrect plan executed
•  Correct but inappropriate plan executed
•  Correct plan, but too soon or too late
•  Correct plan, but in the wrong order
Operation errors
• Operation too long/too short
• Operation incorrectly timed
• Operation in wrong direction
• Operation too little/too much
25
• Right operation, wrong object
• Wrong operation, right object
• Operation omitted
• Operation incomplete
Checking errors
• Check omitted
• Check incomplete
• Right check on wrong object
• Wrong check on right object
• Check incorrectly timed
Retrieval errors
• Information not obtained
• Wrong information obtained
• Information retrieval incomplete
Communication errors
• Information not communicated
• Wrong information communicated
• Information communication incomplete
Selection Errors
• Selection omitted
•  Wrong selection made
(Vincent 2006:74)
What is also noticeable from the review of different studies on AEs is the dominance 
of drug errors amongst AEs. The administration of drugs is a highly complex area, 
involving many different organisations and professionals from different disciplines. 
Nadzam et al 1991 cited in (lOM Report 1999: 32) have categorised the many 
different errors that can occur in the process of administering medication. This is 
shown in the box below, covering errors of commission (e.g., administration of 
improper drug), and errors of omission (e.g., failure to administer a drug that was 
prescribed). What is apparent from the studies in this area is that many medical errors 
are preventable, although achieving this reduction will require multiple interventions 
(lOM Report 1999).
Medication Use Processes 
Prescribing
•  Assessing the need for and selecting the correct drug
•  Individualizing the therapeutic regimen
•  Designating the deshed therapeutic response
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Dispensing
•  Reviewing the order
•  Processing the order
•  Compounding and preparing the drug
•  Dispensing the drug in a timely manner
Administering
•  Administering the right medication
•  Administering medication when indicated
•  Informing the patient about the medication
•  Including the patient in administration
Monitoring
• Monitoring and documenting patient's response
• Identify and report adverse drug events
• Re-evaluate drug selection, regimen, frequency and duration
Systems & Management Control
• Collaborating and communicating amongst caregivers
•  Review and manage patient's complete therapeutic drug regimen
Source: Nadzam, Deborah., M Development of medication-use indicators by the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Health Care Organisation. AJHP. 48:1925-1930,1991.
How Patients Experience Adverse Events
In addition to classifying adverse events on the grounds of severity, it is also useful to 
gain a sense of how adverse incidents are experienced by patients. The Department of 
Health Report (2000) 'An Organisation with a memory' identified four main ways that 
patients could experience adverse outcomes of care, which were potentially avoidable, 
as set out below.
Firstly, through a sudden catastrophic event (e.g. the injection of the wrong drug). 
This might occur as a result of a patient being given the wrong drug, or an incorrect 
medication dosage, resulting in serious injury or death. The drug Vincristine being 
injected by mistake into the spine has been found to be a frequently occurring error in 
hospitals world wide, at least 23 incidents of this type have occurred worldwide. 
Almost all proving fatal (Toft 2001 cited in Making Amends 2003:22). This type of 
error has continued to recur over a long period of time, despite the recognised danger 
of administering this drug incorrectly and despite procedures in place to prevent this 
occurrence. These incidents should be entirely avoidable, but have not been 
eliminated (DOH 2000:15).
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Secondly, patients could be treated by a service performing sub-optimally over a 
period of time (e.g. diabetes being inadequately controlled). This means patients with 
similar conditions may be subjected to poorer standards of care in some places and 
parts of the country than in others. For example services provided for patients with 
heart conditions can vary to the extent that services performing below standard 
jeopardise the condition of the patient and therefore allows the disease to progress 
faster. This was well illustrated in the Inquiry Report on the Bristol Royal Infirmary. 
A key question that needs to be explored is whether services vary for patients with the 
same condition and who are treated by the same services, dependent on their 
background in terms of variables such as social class, race, gender, disability etc.
Thirdly, patients might suffer a recognised complication of care (e.g. a drug side 
effect or an infection after surgery). Given that no health care procedure or treatment 
is entirely risk free and side-effects and complications can occur, patients clearly need 
to be given full information about the risks associated with the treatment and to be 
fully part of the decision making process in terms of treatment options. This is even 
more vital given the evidence that services can vary greatly in the way that risks or 
complications are contained in relation to patients with similar levels of severity of 
their disease. What is also vital to establish here is that all patients, no matter what 
their background, are able to access the same quality of service and are treated in 
ways that empower them to make the decisions that are optimal to their health and 
well-being.
Fourthly, patients could be failed by not being able to gain access to a service using 
evidence-based best practice (e.g. not receiving 'clot busting' drugs quickly enough for 
a heart attack). This relates to the importance of patients being able to access services 
with the most up to date clinical management of their condition and where the best 
outcomes are consistently achieved. In this respect patients will increasingly have 
more access to information about treatment and services which will enable them to 
use services where evidence-based practice is the norm. Again a concern here, is that 
research data in the field of health inequalities, shows that a number of groups are 
denied access because of their backgrounds. Black and minority ethnic communities 
and many other groups have been found to be in less powerful positions in terms of
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understanding and making sense of information and using this to gain the best 
services available.
Overall the debate about defining medical harm shows that a number of different 
factors come into, play in the process of defining harm. These factors relate to 
differences in the use of terminology, how harmful events are classified and in the 
consistency of definitions used in studies on adverse events. All of these factors make 
it difficult to measure the scale of medical harm in healthcare and therefore to devise 
patient safety solutions that accurately tackle the issues at hand.
Adverse Events: The Empirical Data
If we come on to look at studies on the incidence of adverse events (AEs) within 
health care generally, it is clear that there are few comprehensive studies in this area. 
Those that do exist tend to cover AEs in hospital settings, rather than the primary care 
sector. Until recently the most comprehensive report to date on learning firom AEs in 
the British health service, was the report of an expert group chaired by the Chief 
Medical Officer, entitled 'An organisation with a memory' (DOH 2000). The data in 
this report was based mainly upon a study by Vincent et al (2001), covering a 
retrospective review of 1014 medical & nursing records at two acute hospitals in the 
Greater London area.
The report attempted to document the nature of AEs, but conceded that there was little 
reliable information which made possible any systematic attempt to quantify the scale 
of the problem. Drawing upon data from existing incident reporting and recording 
systems within the NHS, the point was made that this data only provides a partial and 
incomplete picture of service failures and that not all of the figures cited will 
necessarily reflect an adverse incident as opposed to an unavoidable death. The data 
was therefore seen as useful in providing some insight into the situation concerning 
AEs in healthcare 'but must be regarded as a serious underestimate of the size of the 
problem' (DOH 2000:9).
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The Vincent Study:
This study found that:
110 (10.8%) patients experienced an adverse event, rising to 11.7% if multiple events 
were included. Half the events were judged preventable (53 or 48%) and a third led to 
moderate or greater disabihty or death. 'Seventy-three (66%) patients who suffered an 
adverse event had minimal impairment or recovered within one month; 37 (34%) 
patients developed an injury or complication that resulted in moderate impairment (21 
patients; 19%) or permanent impairment (seven patients; 6%) or contributed to death 
(nine patients; 8%)' (Vincent et al 2001: 3). No significant differences were found on 
the grounds of sex, although patients experiencing AEs were older than those who did 
not.
A broad extrapolation to the NHS, fi*om the Vincent study (based on 8.5 million 
impatient episodes a year) suggests some 850,000 AEs takes place each year 
including up to *70,000 deaths (based upon the 8% figure for deaths in the study). 
Half of these adverse incidents are seen as preventable. If one extrapolates from the 
higher figure for multiple events of 11.7%, (994,500), as many as one million AEs 
could easily be occurring each year within the NHS.
*It should be noted in looking at the extrapolated figures, that they need to be used as an estimate as the Vincent 
study, only considered just over 1,000 medical records in 2 London hospitals. Therefore multiplying the figures up 
could introduce considerable errors, particularly regarding numbers of deaths. There were only 9 deaths in the 
Vincent study and the study did not specify whether the adverse event caused the death, or whether it was a 
contributory factor. (NPSA 2005)
The authors concluded (although they could not extrapolate with any precision), that 
their findings strongly suggested that patients admitted to hospitals in England and 
Wales each year, who experienced preventable AEs, were estimated to lead to an 
additional 3 billion bed-days costing the NHS £lbn a year in extra bed-days alone. 
AEs were therefore seen not only as a serious source of harm to patients but also to 
have massive economic consequences as well (Vincent et al 2001: 3).
Extrapolating to the NHS from the definitive International (HMPS and QAHCS) 
studies tabled below, it was estimated that between 60,000-255,000 potential 
instances of permanent disability or death might also occur with cases of adverse 
events every year;
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Table 1.1 United States and Australian research into adverse events in hospitals
Harvard Medical Practice study, 1991 Quality in Australian Health Care 
Study, 1995
Proportion of inpatient episodes 
leading to harmful adverse events
3.7% 16.6% (halfpreventable)
Proportion of impatient episodes 
resulting in permanent disability or 
death in which harm was also 
caused*
0.7% 3%
Broad extrapolation of findings to the 
NHS based on 8.5m impatient 
episodes a year 4-
314, 000 potential adverse events
60,000 potential instances of 
permanent disability or death in cases 
where adverse events occurred*
1,414,000 potential adverse events
255, 000 potential instances of 
permanent disability or death in cases 
where adverse events occurred*
*It is important to emphasise that adverse events will not always be a causal or contributory factor in 
these cases. Many of the patients involved will have been terminally ill, and adverse events may not 
have played a part in causing their disability or death.
-(-Extrapolated by the expert group for the purposes of the present report, not in association with the 
original studies.
Source: Brennan et. al. 1991, Leape et. al. 1991, Wilson et. al. 1995 cited in An 
organisation with a memory 2000: 11)
A more recent study (Aylin et al 2004) on adverse events carried out for the National 
Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) (although criticised in some quarters for its 
methodology), examined hospital episode statistics over four years (1999-2000 to 
2002-3) and found that on average some 2.2% of all episodes (about 277, 000 per 
year) included a code for an adverse event. Misadventures were found in 0.03% of 
episodes (3980 per year) and events were more likely to occur in men, older people 
and in emergency admissions. The rate of adverse events recorded in each Trust 
ranged from 0% to 15% and with misadventures the rate recorded ranged from 0% to 
1.02%. The study found considerable under-reporting of adverse events and noted that 
they had missed out a number of areas such as some conditions arising out of 
complications of treatment, hospital acquired infections were poorly represented and 
obstetric complications.
The Health Protection Agency (2005) has also in recent years raised the issue of the 
alarming way in which deaths from MRSA have multiplied over the last few years, 
with the deaths officially reported, likely to represent a considerable under-estimate of 
the problem. Recent figures issued by National Statistics show that deaths involving 
the two most common hospital infections have continued to rise over some years.
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Death certificates in England and Wales for Staphylococcus Aureus infection have 
shown an increase each year from 2001 to 2005, from 1,211 to 2,083, with the 
percentage of these deaths specified as meticillin resistant (MRSA) rising from 61% 
in 2001 to 78% in 2005. With Clostridium Difficile the number of death certificates 
mentioning this infection has increased from 1,214 in 2001 to 3,807 in 2005, whilst 
the number of deaths between 2004-2005 increased by 69% (National Statistics 
2007).
On the wider issue of hospital acquired infections of which there has been much 
publicity over the last few years, a comprehensive report from the National Audit 
Office (NAO) in 2004 showed that:
• At any one time 9% of hospital patients has an infection caught in hospital
• There are at least 300,000 hospital acquired infections a year
• They are estimated to cost the NHS around £1 billion a year
• They can mean 11 extra days in hospital (2.5 times longer than uninfected 
patients)
• The old and young and those with weakened immune systems due to illnesses are 
most at risk of catching one
• The two strongest risk factors are the degree of underlying illness and the use of 
medical devices
• There has been an increase in the number and frequency of infections resistant to 
common antibiotics for example the proportion of Staphylococcus Aureus blood 
isolates resistant to methicillin (i.e. MRSA) was almost 40% in 2003, compared 
with just over 2% in 1992 and is amongst the highest levels in Europe
• Hospital acquired infections may kill: on crude estimates, as many as 5000 
patients annually (death certificates mentioning MRSA as a cause increased from 
53 in 1993 to 800 in 2002)
• Not all hospital acquired infection is preventable but in the NAO report 2000, it 
was noted that infection control teams believed that they could be reduced by up 
to 15%, avoiding costs of some £150 million
• The degree of improvement has been small, for example trend data on over 60,000 
operations in six categories of surgery, collected between 1997-2003 shows that 
while 12% of hospitals had reduced their rates of surgical site infections, 3% had 
increased and the vast majority whilst there was no evidence of trend, most had 
close to or below the pooled mean.
(Source: National Audit Office 2004, Health Protection Agency and London School 
of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine cited in NAO 2004)
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The National Audit Office study
Perhaps the most reliable data on adverse events comes from the National Audit 
Office (NAO) Study (2005), which was based on actual rather than extrapolated 
survey data from hospital Trusts. This data represents the first systematic attempt to 
determine and analyse the extent of patients safety incidents (PSIs) in NHS hospital 
Trusts. The study showed that patient safety incidents (PSIs) occurring in NHS 
hospitals were actually even higher than the estimates suggested in 'An organisation 
with a memory' (DOH 2000). The NAO found in a survey of 256 NHS acute, 
ambulance and mental health trusts in 2003-04, that 885,832 PSIs, including near 
misses were recorded and in a follow-up survey in 2004-05, found around 974,000 
reported incidents and near misses. Few trusts had included hospital acquired 
infections in their data, which are estimated to increase PSI figures by around 300,000 
incidents (around 30 per cent of which may be preventable). Only 169 trusts were 
able to provide data on the number of deaths occurring as a result of a PSI, but this 
data showed that in 2004-05, some 2,181 deaths were recorded. These figures 
however, represent a significant under-reporting of deaths and serious incidents, with 
other published estimates suggesting a range from 840 to 34,000. The NAO report 
acknowledges that in truth the NHS simply does not know the true figures (NAO 
2005: 1).
The NAO also found that the most common incidents reported were: injuries to 
patients due to falls, followed by medication errors, equipment-related incidents, 
record documentation error and communication failure. PSIs were estimated to cost 
the NHS £2 billion a year in extra bed days, with hospital acquired infections adding a 
further billion to these costs. An international review of nine retrospective studies of 
patient records found adverse incidents were about 8.9% (ranging from 3.8-16.6%) 
(NAO 2005:1).
Despite this data, under-reporting of patient safety incidents clearly remains an issue. 
In a recent Select Committee Report on Public Accounts they found that 'on average 
around 22% of incidents and 39% of near misses go un-reported, and that medication 
errors and incidents leading to serious harm are the least likely to be reported' (House 
of Commons 2006). The report also strongly criticised the NPSA's National Reporting 
and Learning system for failing to address these reporting issues.
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Community Based Studies
Very few studies have looked at AEs outside of hospitals. Research carried out for the 
DOH Report 'Making Amends' (DOH 2003) souÿit to gather information directly 
from the general population. A community-based sample of people was asked about 
injuries or harm that they believed had occurred during medical care. Out of 8000 
people interviewed, approximately 400 (just under 5%) felt that they had suffered 
injury or other adverse effects as a direct result of medical care. Although over half of 
the respondents said that the impact on their health or work was insignificant, 28% 
reported a temporary or permanent major disability and almost 30% claimed that the 
event had had a permanent impact on their health. 55% of these AEs happened in 
NHS hospitals and 25% in primary care. (Mori Survey 2002 commissioned for 
Making Amends Report).
The Select Committee on Public Accounts Report mentioned earlier, found that GPs 
did not have information on PSI's taking place in their practice and neither did 
information on adverse incidents exist in independent provider organisations. The 
only information on safety available to GP's was found to be on MRSA bacteraemia 
rates and from 2006, information from the Healthcare Commission on achievements 
against the Standards for Better Health (House of Commons 2006: 83105).
The 'Making Amends' Report also highlighted the area of medication error as a major 
source of AEs. Reinertsen defines this sort of error as 'the most common single 
preventable cause of patient injury' (2000:1). Drawing upon an international survey, 
which covered five countries including the UK, they found that 18% of respondents 
had experienced a medication error, with the figure for the UK slightly lower than for 
the other countries. The majority of respondents said that the error had had serious 
consequences for their health (source 2002 Commonwealth Fund International Health 
policy survey; Harvard/Commonwealth Fund/Harris Interactive, Oct 2002 cited in 
Making Amends 2003: 34).
Despite these figures on AEs, the report 'An organisation with a memory' (2000) 
concluded that the vast majority of NHS care is carried out to a high clinical standard, 
with serious failures uncommon. However one could argue that this conclusion seems 
rather complacent given the growing evidence in this area and concern from patients
34
groups about the scale of the problem. It also seems to contradict an important point 
made in the report, that although errors can never be completely eliminated, 'research 
focused on healthcare systems suggests that as many as 70% of adverse events are 
preventable' (2000: 26). Another report by the Chief Medical Officer in setting out 
proposals to reform the approach to clinical negligence in the NHS, shows that risks 
will always be present in healthcare. In particular in certain high technology areas of 
medicine, such as intensive care units, operating theatres, transplantation and cardiac 
surgery etc. But the report also conceded that in the past the health service has 
unwittingly tolerated much higher levels of risk than would be acceptable in other 
sectors serving the public. The report quoting fi-om a seminal US study, notes that 'the 
level of error 'tolerated' in health care equates to quite staggering levels of risk in 
other industries' (Making Amends 2003 :35).
An important point to make in this context is that it is difficult to see how AEs can be 
properly tackled when a reliable system has yet to be developed to report and record 
these incidents. This issue was strongly made in the report from the Select Committee 
on Pubhc Accounts (2006) mentioned earlier. This report seriously criticised the 
failure of the NPSA to establish its National Reporting and Learning System (2006). 
In a patient safety review commissioned by the Chief Medical Officer following the 
publication of the Public Accounts report, entitled 'Safety First' (2006), the conclusion 
about NRLS was also reinforced. The review found that the National Reporting and 
Learning System is not yet delivering high-quality, routinely available information on 
patterns, trends and underlying causes of harm to patients' (2006:6). The review 
recommended that for the future, the role of the NPSA should be refocused on 
collecting and analysing patient safety data, with the present NRLS redesigned to 
make it more effective (Safety First 2006: 26).
The International evidence
As well as looking at the scale of AEs in Britain, it is also useful to get a sense of 
what the situation is in other countries.
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In an international review of nine retrospective studies of patient records, it was found 
that the average incidence of adverse events was 8.9% (ranging in scale from 3.8 to 
16.6%) as set out below (NAO 2005: 1).
Table 1.2 Adverse events in acute hospitals in seven countries
Study Number
of acute Date of Number of Adverse
care admissions hospital event rate
hospitals admissions (%)
California Insurance 23 1974 20864 4.65*
Feasibility Study 
Harvard Medical 51 1984 30195 3.7
Practice Study 
(HMPS)
Utah-Colorado study 28 1992 14052 2.9
(UTCOS)
Quality in Australian 28 1992 14179 16.6
Health Care Study 
(QAHCS)
United Kingdom 2 1999 1014 10.8
Denmark 17 1998 1097 9.0
New Zealand 13 1998 6579 11.2
France** 7 2002 778 14.5
Canada 20 2000 3745 7.5
*The California study assessed 'potentially compensable events' 
** Figures from France are from the pilot study not the full study
(Table cited in Vincent 2006: 42)
If we look at the United States, which has often been compared to the UK, Ivan Illich
has pointed to the huge scale of the problem of medical errors. He highlights data
from The United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare that shows:
• 7% of all patients suffer compensable injuries while hospitalised; though few of 
them do anything about it.
• The frequency of reported accidents in hospitals is higher than in all industries but 
mines and hi^-rise construction.
• Accidents are the major cause of death of American children, in proportion to the 
time spent there, accidents seem to occur more often in hospitals than in any other 
kind of place. One in 50 children admitted to a hospital suffers an accident, which 
requires specific treatment.
• University hospitals are relatively more pathogenic or ' sickening'. It is argued that 
one out of every five patients admitted to a typical research hospital' acquires an 
iatrogenic disease, sometimes trivial, usually requiring special treatment, and in 
one case in thirty leading to death. Half of these episodes results from
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complications from drug therapy and one in ten comes from diagnostic 
procedures.
(Illich 2001: 267)
Illich concludes that if a military officer had a similar level of performance he would 
be removed from his command or in the case of a restaurant or amusement centre it 
would be closed down. He points out that it is no wonder with a record like this that 
the health industry tries to shift the blame for the damage caused onto the victim and 
that the 'dope-sheet' of a multinational pharmaceutical concern tells its readers that 
'iatrogenic disease is almost always of neurotic origin' (Illich 2001: 267-8).
Two of the most significant retrospective studies of hospital case records are The 
Harvard Medical Practice Study (HMPS) (Brennan et al 1991; Leape et al 1991) and 
the Quality in Australian Health Care Study (QAHCS) (Wilson et al 1995). These 
studies differ somewhat, largely due to differences in the methodology used to gather 
the data, but provide important information on the scale and composition of adverse 
events in hospitals. With the Harvard Study, the main results showed that: amongst 
the 2,671,863 patients discharged from New York Hospitals in 1984, some 98,609 
AEs were estimated to have occurred, with 27,179 events involving negligence. This 
represented 3.7% of hospitalisations, with 58% of them classified as preventable 
errors, nearly half of which 27.6% were attributed to negligence. The majority of 
these events, 70.5% resulted in disability lasting less than 6 months, however 2.6% 
(2550) of these events led to permanent total disability and 13.6% (13,451) caused 
death (Brennan et al 1991; Leape 1991).
With the Australian Study, the main findings were that: 14,179 admissions to 28 
hospitals in two States (New South Wales and South Australia) were reviewed in two 
stages for adverse events. Extrapolating the data to all hospitals in Australia (some 
2.82 million patients were admitted to public and private acute-care hospitals in 
Australia in 1992), this indicated that about 470,000 admissions, were associated with 
adverse events, accounting for 3.3 million bed-days, of which 1.7 million were for 
AEs with high preventability. This represented 16.6% of admissions associated with 
an AE, half of them, 8.3%, judged to have high preventability (the term used instead 
of negligence). 46% of AEs were found to cause minimal disability, in 77.1% of AEs
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the disability resolved itself within 12 months, however 13.7% of AEs resulted in 
permanent disability and 4.9% in death (Wilson et al 1995: 459).
In analysing the data from the studies, some general and important observations can 
be made. The QAHCS was modelled on the HMPS and with some modifications, 
used very similar methods. However it is noticeable that the numbers of AEs appears 
to be much higher for the Australian study. The authors of the QAHCS study 
accounted for this, to some extent, as a methodological difference in the way that AEs 
were estimated, but also raised the possibility that the Harvard Study had 
underestimated the AE rate. McNeil and Leeder argue, accounting for methodological 
differences, a figure of about 8% could be used in comparison with the Harvard study, 
but argue that this is still a significant difference. They point out, although any 
reasonable review of the Australian study would acknowledge its key findings, 
nevertheless important questions must be considered when looking at the data on AEs 
in the Harvard and Australian studies, and the accuracy of the estimates which 
carefully considers the differing views when it comes to defining an adverse event 
(McNeil and Leeder 1995).
A further difference between the two studies concerned the determination of 
negligence. The Harvard Study defined this according to medical malpractice tort law 
as substandard 'care that fell below the standard expected of physicians in their 
community' (Brennan et al 1991:370). The term negligence was replaced in the 
QAHCS study with the term preventability, which in practice meant the same thing. 
The rationale for using this term was apparently in order to enable the study to be 
conducted in a positive and constructive manner, rather than in a negative or 
antagonistic way (Wilson et al 1995:458). Preventability of an error was defined as 
"an error in management" occurring as a result of a failure to follow established 
practice either at an individual or system level. Acceptable practice was seen as "the 
current level of expected performance for the average practitioner or system that 
manages the condition in question" (Wilson et al 1995: 461).
Despite the above-mentioned differences between the studies, both studies showed 
that most AEs resulted in temporary disability (HMPS 70.5% & QAHCS 77%). They 
also both highlighted the issue of age as a risk factor in experiencing an adverse event.
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In the HMPS study this was compounded by the susceptibility of the over-65s to 
negligent injury, whereas in the QAHCS, patient age was not only a predictor of more 
serious disabilities resulting from AEs, but for the over-65s also placed them at more 
risk of preventable AEs causing death. Both studies found no significant differences 
between the sexes in terms of AEs. The importance of the findings on age highlight 
the need for more research into why older people may be more at risk and how much 
this is connected to greater illness as opposed to mismanagement of their care. It is 
also important to identify any other patient groups who may be at increased risk of 
AEs and negligence and whether for example the well documented inequalities that 
Black and minority ethnic groups face in health is translated in any way into 
mismanagement of their care and substandard or negligent treatment.
It is important to note that whilst the two studies discussed above are important in 
their own right, in defining some of the territory when exploring the key issues 
concerning AEs. The data is not out of line with other major research in the United 
States, which in many respects reinforces and builds upon many of the key findings in 
the HMPS and QAHCS studies.
The report 'To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System' (1999), carried out by 
the Institute of Medicine (lOM), looked at medical errors as part of a larger project 
examining the quality of health care in America. In an extensive review of the 
literature and the definitive studies carried out into AEs in the US, they concluded that 
'Health care is not as safe as it should be' and that a 'Substantial body of evidence 
points to medical errors as a leading cause of death and injury' (lOM Report 1999:22). 
They cite the findings of a study of AEs which are seen to corroborate the Harvard 
study findings. This study carried out in 1992, reviewed the medical records of a 
random sample of 15,000 discharges from a representative sample of hospitals in the 
states of Colorado and Utah.
AEs were found to occur in 2.9% of hospitalisations in each state, (The lOM Report 
1999 point out that other studies suggest these figures may be an under-estimate of 
preventable AEs given, amongst other factors, the high threshold used to determine 
harmful injuries and preventable and negligent harm) with four out of five of AEs 
occurring in hospital as opposed to non-hospital settings, 29.2% constituting negligent
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injury and some 53% seen as preventable. As in the HMPS study, the majority of 
events, (50%) were made up of minor temporary injuries, with 8.8% of injuries 
resulting in death, compared to 13.6% in the HMPS study (lOM Report 1999: 25-26).
It is worth mentioning as of particular note in the report To Err is Human', the figures 
on medication-related error. A review of several studies suggests that these types of 
errors may well be the most common types of AEs and although deaths and serious 
injury are seen to happen infirequently, errors are sizeable given the extensive use of 
drugs both inside hospitals and in non-hospital settings. In a review of death 
certificates between 1983 and 1993, it was found that some 7,391 individuals had died 
in 1993 from medication errors (defined as accidental poisoning by drugs, 
medicaments and biologicals that resulted from acknowledged errors by patients or 
medical personnel). This represented a 2.57% increase on 1983 (Phillips et al 1998 
cited in The lOM Report 1999: 27-28). Outpatient deaths due to medication error in 
comparison, rose by 8.48-fold during the same ten-year period. The lOM Report 
estimated that the cost of preventable drug errors in hospitals was probably about $2 
billion. Therefore it was argued that given that hospital drug errors represented only a 
fraction of the errors that occurred, medication errors represented a considerable 
source of avoidable morbidity which was likely to increase in the future with the 
introduction of new drug therapies (1999: 23).
Overall, extrapolating the results of the Colorado and Utah study to the over 33.6 
million admissions to hospitals in the United states in 1997, the lOM Report 
concluded that some 44,000 Americans and perhaps as many as 98,000, die each year 
in hospitals as a result of preventable medical errors. These figures were seen to 
exceed the deaths 'attributable to motor vehicle accidents (43,458), breast cancer 
(42,297) or aids (16,516)' (lOM 1999:22). These figures must also be viewed in the 
light of the massive economic costs of AEs. These were estimated (including total 
national costs for lost income, lost household production, disability healthcare costs) 
to be between $37.6 billion and $50 billion for AEs and between $17 and $29 billion 
for preventable AEs in the United States (Thomas et al 1999 cited in The lOM Report 
1999: 22).
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Clinical Negligence
If we come on now to look at an important subset of medical errors, those legally 
classified as negligent, these are useful to look at as they provide an important marker 
for looking at the most serious AEs.
In the UK, allegations of clinical negligence are mainly dealt with under civil 'tort' 
law. A tort is an act or omission that causes harm to an individual's property, 
reputation or interests. In extreme cases however, where a mistake causes the death of 
a patient, it is possible that the health care professional involved could be prosecuted 
for manslaughter.
With a clinical negligence action, a claimant must prove four elements: the existence 
of a duty of care by the individual or organisation being sued, at the time the victim 
suffered damage; a breach of that duty of care (i.e. negligence) in which there was a 
failure to reach the standard of care required by law. The legal standard, known as the 
'Bolam test' set out in a court judgement in the mid 1950s, states that a doctor "is not 
guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with the practice accepted as proper 
by a responsible body of medical opinion" (Making Amends 2003: 10); it must be 
shown that the injury or damage suffered by the victim was caused on the balance of 
probability by the breach of care or that the breach materially contributed to the 
damage (a process known as causation); and the extent of the damage suffered. The 
standard of proof is different from the maxim in use in criminal cases - 'beyond 
reasonable doubt", instead, 'on the balance of probabilities' governs negligence 
decisions. The legal phrase known as the 'Bolam test', provides the precedent for 
deciding whether clinical negligence has taken place, and must generally be apphed to 
all elements of a negligence claim. Montgomery has argued that the Bolam legal test 
is widely seen as a very difficult test for claimants to overcome and illustrates the 
ability of the medical profession to set its own standards (Montgomery 2003). Lord 
Chief Justice Woolf, in a review of the civil justice system in 1996 acknowledged that 
medical negligence cases differed from other personal injury cases in terms of the 
difficulties of proving causation. He also pointed to the difficulties of finding a 
medical opinion to support a claim when doctors and other healthcare professionals
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have traditionally been reluctant to criticise each other (Department for Constitutional 
Affairs (DCA) 1996).
In 1998, the 'Bolam test' was modified by another authoritative judgement in the case 
of Bolitho V City and Hackney Health Authority, to the effect that the standard of care 
which is sought is that which can be supported by a responsible body of opinion, 
provided that this is able to withstand logical analysis (Making Amends 2003: 52). 
This judgement was seen as redressing the balance to some extent for claimants, in 
affirming that the courts had the right to set standards and challenge medical opinions. 
However, Montgomery has argued that because judges have been given this power it 
doesn't necessarily mean that they will use it. He argues that English malpractice law 
as it continues to revolve around the Bolam test, even with the limited scope provided 
by Bolitho, "is not generally able to render the health professions accountable to their 
patients and clients" (2003: 189).
In looking at the area of clinical negligence, what is significant is that it is even harder 
to find accurate figures for the scale of the problem, than AEs generally. Whilst no 
organisations collects data for the numbers of negligent AEs occurring across the 
health service, the National Health Service Litigation Authority (NHSLA), which 
deals with claims against the NHS, publishes the numbers of negligent clinical 
negligence claims annually. In 2006-07 there were 5,426 claims of clinical negligence 
made against the NHS, in 2005-06, there were 5,697 claims, in 2004-5, 5,609 legal 
claims, in 2003-04 there were 6,251 claims and in 2002-03 there were 7,798 claims. 
(National Health Service Litigation Authority (NHSLA) Website 5-10-07). These 
figures show that claims for clinical negligence have been falling for a number of 
years in line with reductions in the number of cases being approved for legal aid. The 
cost of settled clinical negligence claims in 2005/06 was £560.309 million and in 
2006/07 was £579.3 million. This figure includes both damages paid to patients and 
the legal costs borne by the NHS. These figures compare with the 3 billion costs 
incurred annually by the NHS as a result of the extra bed-days associated with patient 
safety incidents (NAO 2005: 1). The NHSLA website also shows that 96% of cases 
are settled out of court through a variety of methods of "alternative dispute resolution" 
(ADR), with less than 50 clinical negligence cases a year contested in court.
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In order to get a broader picture of clinical negligence, it is interesting to extrapolate 
from data on negligence from the international studies. At an AVMA conference in 
1999 the Harvard study figures of 3.7% for AEs and 27.6% for negligent AEs were 
used to calculate the situation for the NHS based on a UK equivalent of 8 million in­
patient hospital admissions a year. This translated as an estimated 300,000 AEs within 
the NHS, with 82,800, negligent events. These figures were compared with the 15,000 
legal actions taken out for negligence each year. The point was made that in reality if 
all the estimated 82,000 were to litigate, then the system would be in a lot more 
trouble than it was currently in. But it also meant that thousands of people damaged 
by the failure of those treating them to come up to an acceptable standard, were going 
without compensation, often desperately needed and all too frequently any sense of 
justice and accountability.
If one extrapolates from the Harvard and Australian study to the most recent NAO 
(2005) figures of approximately one million AEs occurring within the NHS, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that a quarter of AEs (250,000) occurring in England may be 
negligent. Given the number of legal claims for 2006-07, of 5,426, this suggests that 
these claims represent only a tiny fraction of clinical negligent incidents occurring 
each year in the NHS.
The above figures clearly show that many people are harmed by their experiences 
within the NHS, but little is said publicly about the way that people are treated once 
this harm takes place. In the important DOH report 'Making Amends' (2003) on 
reforming the approach to clinical negligence, it was found that clinical negligence 
cases actually represent only a very 'small proportion of all the personal injury claims 
reported to the Compensation Recovery Unit, at less than 1.5% in 2001/02. This 
compared with an estimated 0.2% at the end of the 1970's' (DOH 2003: 59). Further it 
was shown that most claims (60-70%) did not proceed beyond initial contact with a 
solicitor or perhaps disclosure of medical records. Of those that did proceed beyond 
this stage, 95% of the claims settled by the NHSLA up to September 2002 were 
settled out of court. Also of note was that 90% of clinical negligence cases received 
legal aid. To qualify for legal aid, claimants must meet stringent financial eligibility 
criteria and satisfy the Legal Services Commission (LSC) that their case has clear 
prospects of success and that likely damages will exceed costs. In cases valued at less
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than £10,000 (bereavement damages of £10,000 are set by statute with the death of a 
child), assistance with investigation may be refused. In 2001/2002, 53% of cases were 
not funded beyond the initial investigation stage (DOH 2003).
These figures show that access to justice will therefore be strongly determined by 
whether one can get legal aid funding. It is also evident that further restrictions on 
legal aid (set out in the consultation document 'A New Focus Civil Legal Aid -  
encouraging early resolution, discouraging unnecessary litigation' 2004) are likely. 
This comes at a time when alternative sources of funding for clinical negligence cases 
through conditional fee agreements or related insurance are not being taken up, 
because they tend to be extremely expensive.
Therefore for people who consider that they have suffered from clinical negligence, it 
is actually very difficult for them to get justice and redress via the legal route. This is 
particularly the case for smaller claims. This issue of proper access to justice has long 
been highlighted in reviews about clinical negligence (Department for Constitutional 
Affairs 1996; NAO 2001; DOH 2003), however this issue appears to be getting worse 
not better.
Yet, paradoxically, all too often it is those affected by harm, who are demonised in the 
debate about clinical negligence, which is frequently dominated by claims that victims 
are litigious and part of a growing compensation culture aimed at attacking its 
helpless victims in the medical profession (Mulcahy 2000). Yet, if  one examines the 
evidence objectively, it is clear that very few victims of medical harm will ever get 
access to justice and paradoxically will often be further harmed by the very processes 
designed to investigate what caused the harm in the first place (Ocloo 2007). I return 
to this theme later on in the thesis.
In Conclusion
The report 'An organisation with a memory' made the point that the vast majority of 
NHS care is carried out to a high clinical standard, with serious failures uncommon, 
despite a number of patient safety incidents occurring each year. However it is argued
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that this conclusion may have been premature, given the growing evidence about 
medical harm and concerns from patients' groups about the scale of the problem.
The growing concern about the level of AEs was echoed in the Bristol Inquiry Report 
(2001), a defining report in looking at medical harm and patient safety in recent years. 
The chair of the Inquiry, Professor Ian Kennedy concluded in relation to adverse 
events that 'if the estimate for Britain is broadly accurate and further work is urgently 
needed to establish the full extent of the problem, then we face a profoundly alarming 
state of affairs' (BRI Inquiry Report 2000). This concern was also reflected in 
comments made by Alberti (2001), President of the Royal College of Physicians at the 
time of the Bristol Report. He referred to the 'frightening extrapolation' of the data in 
the Vincent et al study (2001) to the NHS and to the fear that 'actual recorded AEs are 
the tip of the iceberg' (Alberti 2001: 501). He has called along with Vincent et al 
(2001), for a major study to be undertaken looking at AEs in the NHS, which allows 
for much greater analysis of a range of issues.
Given these arguments, it would seem legitimate to argue that there is a pressing need 
for more transparency and openness in acknowledging the scale of the problem. This 
issue however, is not just seen to be about conducting more research to establish the 
scale of the problem, given comments from writers like Ivan Illich (2001) who argue 
that the facts about medical harm are 'obvious, well documented, and well repressed' 
(cited in Davey et al 2001: 264). It is therefore argued that in order to address the 
myriad of issues surrounding medical harm, it is important to open up a new and more 
radical debate, which allows patients to be part of defining the issues and in shaping 
the process of change. This chapter shows that defining medical harm is not 
unproblematic and is currently dominated by the perspectives of the medical 
profession, frequently to the exclusion of a patient's perspective. This can result in the 
experiences of those who have been harmed, being distorted, omitted or 
misrepresented.
The following chapters of this thesis will therefore explore a number of different areas 
connected to medical harm and illustrate that the construction of medical harm is 
influenced by a range of social and political factors, as well as biomedical 
considerations. Given this situation, it is argued that there is a need for a new holistic
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model to highlight and address the issues concerned. This model should draw not only 
upon clinical markers, but also take into account a range of social indicators and 
importantly be based upon a model of patient empowerment.
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Chapter Two
Medical Harm: Some Critical Sociological Perspectives
In this chapter, I attempt to build upon the preceding debate in chapter one about 
defining medical harm. In order to do this, the first part of this chapter will attempt to 
look at the construction of medical harm by looking at it from a critical sociological 
perspective. As part of this analysis, some arguments will firstly be looked at that 
focus on the issue of medical dominance and the professions and the emergence of a 
biomedical model in Western medicine. In exploring these arguments, some counter 
arguments will be examined about the way that medical knowledge has been socially 
constructed and influenced by wider socio-political and economic imperatives. In the 
second part of the chapter, it will be argued that a dominant medical model is still 
very much in operation when looking at medical harm and that this helps to obscure 
and compound the social and political processes that create and shape that harm. This 
point will be illustrated by looking at some arguments fi-om a social constructionist 
and political economy perspective and relating them to different aspects of medical 
harm. In conclusion it will be argued that a new and wider conceptual framework is 
needed to understand the complex social processes involved in the phenomenon of 
medical harm that goes beyond the limited boundaries of a biomedical framework. 
This framework should also incorporate perspectives from patients and the pubhc and 
be based upon a model of patient empowerment.
A Critical Sociology of Health and Illness
A useful starting point into this debate is to clarify what is meant by a critical 
sociology when looking at health and illness. On a broader sociological level, 
Freidson when referring to the notion of a critical perspective points to an 'intellectual 
movement' transcending conventional academic borders which seeks to expose 
fundamental and underlying contradictions within society through critical analysis, fri 
terms of methodology, critical perspectives are seen to incorporate a range of 
ideologically loose groupings, which eschew positivist notions that sociology, can be 
neutral or value free. Instead the emphasis tends to be on the need through praxis, for
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theory to develop linked to action and emanating from involvement in a political 
process of change (1983:212).
Linked to health and illness, Freidson points out that 'only by adopting the perspective 
of a critical outside observer of medicine can one approach it in a way closely attuned 
to the public good, for while medicine has a foundation in scientific knowledge, its 
characteristics as a social institution lead it inevitably to have a distorted view of 
itself, its knowledge, and its mission. Collaborating with medicine in its 
institutionalized tasks requires adopting that distorted view with all its deficiencies. 
Studying it as an outsider allows one to see medicine as one of a number of human 
institutions, reflecting merely one of many intellectual points of view, one of many 
moral standpoints, and expressing the material interests and ideological commitments 
of only one of many organized groups in our society' (Freidsonl970: 42).
Conrad and Kern (1986) argue when looking at the sociology of health and illness 
that:
’A critical perspective is one that does not consider the present fundamental 
organization o f medicine as sacred and inviolable. Nor does it assume that 
some other particular organization would necessarily be a panacea for all our 
health-care problems. A critical perspective accepts no "truth" or "fact" 
merely because it has hitherto been accepted as such. It examines what is, not 
as something given or static, but as something out o f which change and 
growth can emerge’.
(Conrad & Kern 1986:4)
Therefore a critical sociology of health & illness relates disease and medical care to 
the structure of society and to societal and personal values that must be considered 
and made explicit if they are to be properly addressed (Conrad & Kem 1986: 2).
This thesis is concerned with looking at the issue of medical harm from a patient's 
perspective, fri this respect, Freidson's rationale for a critical perspective in sociology 
is important. He suggests that in the past sociological studies have tended to have a 
medical rather than sociological orientation focusing on various aspects of patient or 
prospective patient behaviour as problematic. What unified them was 'their 
preoccupation with the layman as a social problem - whether or not he should be 
under medical treatment and, if he is not, why not. There is comparatively little
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concern with the extent to which it is not the layman but the physician, not lay but 
medical institutions, which are problems' (Freidson 1970: 42).
A critical perspective will therefore be used to explore how a medical model based 
upon medical dominance and control is able to obscure the imbalance of power that 
exists between healthcare professionals and patients which it is argued helps to 
produce medical harm and to reinforce it. This chapter will therefore look more 
closely at the issue of medical dominance and control, by focusing on the power of 
the medical profession. It will look at how this connects to a wider biomedical 
discourse within medicine and to a wider process of médicalisation (Szasz 1961; 
Freidson 1970; Illich 1974; Conrad 2005, 2007) that goes beyond the power and 
control of doctors and the medical profession. In this respect, incorporating what Peter 
Conrad refers to as the 'shifting engines of médicalisation', where:
'Doctors are still gatekeepers for medical treatment, but their role has become 
more subordinate in the expansion or contraction o f médicalisation. 
Médicalisation is now more driven by commercial and market interests than 
by professional claims-makers'.
(Conrad 2005: 3)
It will therefore be argued that it is important to look at a range of processes, to see 
how they may impact upon patients and consumers in terms of medical harm and 
therefore what this means in terms of creating a new model of patient empowerment 
in this area.
Medical Dominance and the Professions
In looking at the issue of medical dominance, Blane takes as an important starting 
point in the debate, sociological arguments that have emerged about the very nature 
and effects of the professions and their role in the provision of healthcare. These 
concerns are seen to sit alongside fears about rising costs and litigation against 
doctors, the nature of large industrial and financial institutions in hospital 
construction, instrument manufacture, pharmaceutical production and medical 
insurance representing powerful new vested interests and growing protests from 
patient groups (Blane 1991: 230). These problems it is argued have come to provide 
the basis for curbing the autonomy of the medical professions, and the traditional
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dominance, control and authority of doctors, through management's attempts to 
control costs, capitals attempts to ensure profits and attempts to challenge the 
traditional imbalance of power between doctors and patient groups (Blane 1991: 230; 
Freidson 1983: 209).
In exploring the issue further of a crisis in confidence in the professions, the 1960's 
are seen to mark a turning point in thinking about the professions and professional 
knowledge. Schon (1991) has argued that, up until this period, sociologists tended to 
place a widespread emphasis on the success and positive virtues of the professions 
and what they could contribute to the successful fimctioning of society. In this 
respect, the professions tended to be seen as essential to the very functioning of 
society, with society's main business carried out through specialists operating through 
key institutions such as schools, hospitals, and government agencies. It is argued, 
society looked to professional experts to solve its problems through their claim of 
having special knowledge in key areas and in return were prepared to grant them 
extraordinary rights and privileges.
Schon argues that in the mid-1960s and early 1970s, an erosion of public confidence 
began to take place about professional experts and their expertise. This was seen to 
arise as a result of professional scandals and abuse, a loss of faith in professional 
judgements and the questioning of the validity of expert claims to specialised 
knowledge and whether this had been used inappropriately to promote self-interest 
and to preserve the interests of powerful professional elites over the rest of society. 
Schon claimed that whilst society was wholly dependent on the professions, there 
were now increasing signs of a crisis of confidence in these groups (1991: 5). This 
crisis of confidence was seen as based upon two key areas, the ability of the 
professions to deliver competent services based upon specialist knowledge. And, the 
way in which professionals themselves had begun to see professional knowledge as 
'mismatched to the changing character of the situations of practice - the complexity, 
uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and value conflicts which are increasingly 
perceived as central to the world of professional practice' (1991: 14).
These questions are pertinent to arguments put forward in this thesis, that a new 
model is required when looking at the issue of medical harm that addresses the
50
imbalance of power between doctors and patients, by empowering patients through 
working in partnership with them. But for now it is important to explore in more 
detail how some of the issues raised above, relate to the medical profession and its 
ability to address and competently meet the needs of its key constituents - its patients. 
This will he done by looking at some key areas such as the structural or social basis of 
medical power and dominance in society. How medical dominance over a number of 
other professions was achieved historically by hard fought campaigns by the medical 
profession and the emergence and impact of a dominant biomedical model in western 
societies. The last section of the chapter will then look at how these elements are 
inextricably connected to and part of the social construction of medical harm, which 
can only be tackled by recognising these components and by developing solutions that 
address them.
The Social Basis of Medical Dominance
Freidson in his seminal book on the subject of professional dominance written in 1970 
argued, perhaps controversially, that 'professional dominance is the analytical key to 
the present inadequacy of the health services' (Freidson 1970: xi). This claim was 
based upon the contention that in matters of health, the opinions of'laymen' are very 
likely to be subordinated to the opinions of professional experts. This subordination is 
seen as based upon the assumption 'that a professional has such special esoteric 
knowledge and humanitarian intent that he and he alone should be allowed to decide 
what is good for the layman' (Freidson 1970: xi). Freidson challenges this contention 
by arguing that it is based upon a common-sense individualism within the medical 
profession to the care of the sick, the origins of disease and to the professions view of 
itself and its work. This approach he argues is:
'predicated on the aim o f changing the quality o f individuals, the assumption 
being first that social pathologies connected with medical care, like illnesses 
connected with mankind, are 'caused' by the characteristics o f the individuals 
providing the care rather than by the environment in which those individuals 
provide care, and second that they are best treated by treating the individuals 
rather than the environment'.
(Freidson 1970: 61)
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This approach is seen as fundamentally flawed and to mask the fact that it is the 
organisation of health services that determines how those services are presented and 
carried out by doctors and other workers. In this respect, the organisation of health 
services is seen as key to giving shape, substance and meaning to the experiences of 
.patients seeking and receiving those services. This thesis will argue that this 
assumption clearly has implications for thinking about the impact of medical harm on 
individuals and their subsequent treatment. A point to which I will return to later in 
the chapter. It is therefore useful to explore the specific arguments about individual 
and structural explanations of society a bit further.
Individual and Structural Explanations
In relation to his critique of individualism, Freidson argued that there was a tendency 
to instinctively 'analyse the human world by reference to individual motives, values 
and knowledge rather than by reference to the organization of the human world itself. 
Thus, in attacking what is wrong in the world our inclination is to emphasize what is 
wrong in the individual and pour our efforts into ways of changing the individual 
rather than his environment' (Freidson 1970: 63). Freidson argues this viewpoint is 
carried over from lay habits of thought and 'intensified even further by medicine's 
characteristic preoccupation with the human being as a discrete, individual organism' 
(Freidsonl970: 59). In this sense the individual body is seen as the prime unit of 
analysis and the prime unit of explanation with performance explained by the way the 
body and 'mind' function e.g. by physical impairments or mind function. In this 
respect, 'the 'illness' of the patient is explained by the characteristics of the disease 
entity found in him, and the disease is treated to remedy the difficulty' (Freidson 
1970: 60).
Such common-sense individualism is seen by Freidson to be based upon two flawed 
assumptions. Firstly, the idea that since the world is made up of individuals there is no 
such thing 'as a relatively stable, structured, social environment that constrains, limits, 
and channels an individual's behaviour regardless of his personal qualities' (Freidson 
1970: 64). This was seen as 'simply empirically untrue' (p64). This is because, 'Both 
the social and the physical environments limit the resources and opportunities for 
choice available to him quite independently of his own individual desires and
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capacities' (Freidson 1970: 64). The second flawed assumption is seen as the notion 
that individual characteristics are formed at a particular point in time into a fixed and 
unchanging bundle of knowledge, motives and values that then influences the person 
no matter what their environment, Freidson argued this flew in the face of all of the 
evidence that showed that 'the average person is at best only mildly influenced, 
independently of his social environment, by his education, his religion, or his 
psychotherapy' (Freidson 1970: 66).
Adopting a structuralist perspective, Freidson argued that he could not think of 
anything worse than the traditional approach to the management of doctor's 
performance to ensure standards. This was seen to consist largely of recruiting 
intellectually capable students, training and licensing them and then 'turning them 
loose to practice' (1970: 73). Such management was seen to rest upon untenable 
assumptions about the stability and strength of motives and values and knowledge 
absorbed within a limited period of formal education. Medical practice, organised in 
this way was seen to systematically encourage the average doctor to give indifferent 
medical care in a climate where the pressures of the system were directed toward 
increasing the number of services and decreasing the professional quality of those 
services.
In breaking with this tradition to focus on the social structure and human behaviour 
unconnected to biological illness, Freidson looked at the performance of the doctor 
which he saw as critical to the treatment of illness and the central problem in 
improving the quality of medical care. In concentrating upon the doctor's 
performance, Freidson deliberately moved away from concentrating on changing the 
patient as key to treatment. This approach is taken as central to the view that it is the 
environment created by the organisation of medical practice that encourages the 
doctor to behave one way rather than another. Therefore to achieve real change, one 
would need to 'modify the structure of medical practice to improve the quality of care' 
(Freidson 1970: 75).
Freidson argued, the problem was to keep doctors accountable in some way to and 
dependent upon their patients' approval while their work was at the same time 
observed and stimulated by professional colleagues oriented to keeping up with
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current technical standards (Freidson 1970: 75). A central issue was seen as the way 
that the medical profession had been able to constitute themselves as a special form of 
organisation, in a special position of dominance within a broader set of occupations 
providing healthcare. These structural characteristics of the profession were seen to 
have far more influence on medical practice in the US than any other factor, enabling 
medicine as a profession to successfully gain freedom from control by outsiders, thus 
controlling their own performance. This was seen as having important implications in 
terms of how 'freedom & autonomy can be joined with responsibility' (Freidson 1970: 
88).
This internal control of performance was seen to manifest itself in two main ways - in 
the bureaucratic structure of medical practice and in relation to direct work with 
clients. In the former it was argued that large bureaucratic organisations rather than 
solo practice, provided the best means of enabling colleague dependent practice where 
a doctor's performance is observable and dependent on other colleagues, therefore 
providing the best opportunity for conformity with professiorial standards. However, 
Freidson concluded that the problem with this professional organisational context was 
that:
'What slender evidence there is suggests that rather less influence over 
performance is exercised than the organization o f practice actually allows, 
and that the little regulation that does exist has properties that establish and 
maintain organized differences in performance standards'.
(Freidson 1970: 94)
Despite a lack of empirical studies in these areas, he found evidence showed where 
supervisory inspection of performance was routine, the exercise of control over 
performance was quite loose and permissive. He argued, that if this existed in 
hierarchically organised practice settings, this situation would be even worse in 
informal small-scale community practice, representing the norm in medical practice, 
which would be 'even less amenable to social control mechanisms' (Freidson 1970: 
533). The consequences being:
'that a single profession can contain within itself, and even encourage, 
markedly different ethical and technical standards o f performance, 
performance limited in a very superficial way by the minimal standards
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imposed by selective recruiting, a basic core o f training required for licensing,
' and the writings o f the leaders o f the medical profession'.
(Freidson 1970: 102)
Freidson suggested the issue was basically one of a lack of social control over the 
medical profession, 'which has gained freedom from regulation by others, regulates 
itself in ways whose effectiveness is not self-evident' (Freidsonl970: 95).
The second area that Freidson saw as contentious was the relationship between doctor 
and patient, which was seen as inherently problematic. This he argued was the case 
because both were engaged in a relationship, which came to a problem and looked at 
ways of managing this problem from different perspectives. The difference in 
perspective was seen partially as a function of the doctor coming at the issue from a 
perspective based upon occupational experience and from holding specialised 
knowledge arising from practice and training.
In analysing this situation, Freidson, drawing upon the work of Everett Hughes, 
makes a distinction between science and the profession. Freidson argued that in the 
case of science, similarly knowledgeable colleagues constitute the consumers of the 
practitioner's special skill, while in the profession, the consumers are lay clients. Thus 
in a profession, but not in science, professionals might on occasion be 'required in
some measure to yield judgement of what is wanted t o  amateurs who receive the
services' (Hughes 1958: 54 in Freidson 1970: 107). To protect both the professional 
and the client from the consequences of this, Hughes observes, 'the profession 
maintains secrecy in its affairs and orders its practice through such formal institutions 
as state licensing' (Hughes 1958: 54 in Freidson 1970: 107). In contrast, science is 
seen to require full and honest reporting relying on informal controls within certain 
professional boundaries. 'Secrecy and institutional sanctions thus arise in the 
profession as they do not in the pure science' (Hughes 1958: 142 in Freidson 1970: 
107).
Thus the type of influence or authority exercised over clients by professionals is seen 
as quite different from that exerted by the scientist over other professional colleagues. 
The consequence of this situation Freidson argued was that because professionals had 
'authority' based on knowledge', and lacked the power and sanctions that go with
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having 'authority' based on office, the professions, including the medical profession 
had to get clients to obey in theory through persuasion. This however was seen as 
presenting a problem because, 'Unlike colleagues, lay clients do not necessarily share 
the professional's universe of discourse' (Freidson 1970: 109) and by virtue of being 
clients were seen as likely to differ from the professional in both educational, 
experiential, cultural and status terms. The solution had therefore been for the 
professional to gain authority through the use of formal institutional means in which 
the professional had 'himself designated as the expert in such a way as to exclude all 
other claimants, his designation being official and bureaucratic insofar as it is 
formally established by law' (Freidson 1970: 117).
The power and sanction seen to lie in this situation is the profession's ability to 
capture exclusive control over a particular skill and access to valued goods and 
services, with the layperson likely to feel obligated in deferring to the management of 
their problem, regardless of independent expert advice. 'By becoming a gatekeeper to 
what is popularly valued the professional gains the additional sanction of being able 
to make taking his advice a prerequisite for obtaining a good or service valued 
independently of his advice' (Freidson 1970: 117). Freidson argues these 
arrangements act to minimise the need on the part of the professional to influence lay 
people by persuasion and:
'the alternative desired - even demanded - by the profession is that the client 
obey because he has faith in the competence o f his consultant without 
evaluating the grounds o f the consultant's advice. Indeed, members o f 
consulting occupations attempt to avoid persuading their client to follow their
advice' (Freidson 1970: 118).......................................'Stress is placed on the necessity o f faith
or trust in the practitioner -  in short, on imputed rather than demonstrated 
competence. A professional's advice should be obeyed because it is a 
professional who gives it, not because the advice is or can be evaluated on its 
evidential merits. Here we find the special source o f the authority o f the 
profession-incumbency in an expert status'.
(Freidson 1970:119-120)
Freidson throws up two final but important questions in the debate about professional 
and medical dominance. He asks why governing bodies in society would decide to 
institutionalise the position of an occupation, to allow them the authority described
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and why lay people would place their lives in the hands of someone without being 
clear about their competence? Freidson answers:
"The formal institutionalized status o f profession is granted by society on the 
basis o f having been persuaded that an occupation is competent and 
responsible. The interaction between client and practitioner is seen as another 
matter and to arise not on the basis o f persuasion or the evidence available to 
a client, but rather because alternatives have been closed off which leave little 
choice for the practitioner 'to rely upon the authority o f incumbency in a 
status to which competence has been imputed'.
(Freidson 1970:122-123)
Ultimately in Freidson's analysis, the professional organisation of medical practice 
contains in-built pathologies in the system that can work against the public good and 
the interests of clients. These pathologies were seen to push professionals from a 
wider course of social responsibility to a practice of responsibility aimed much more 
closely at achieving their own personal ends. In this context, he argued, clients can be 
handled like objects, 'given little information or opportunity for choice' (Freidson 
1970: 143) and be subjected to 'an array of differentially supported services that may 
not be adequate' (Freidson 1970: 148) for their needs and interests.
The arguments above raise important questions about the autonomy the medical 
profession have been able to gain from external control over their performance and 
whether this operates in the public interest and to properly enable patient protection. 
Light et al (1988) however have argued for the need to go beyond an understanding of 
the concept of professionalism emphasising autonomy in the Freidson sense, to 
develop a wider framework incorporating the historical and contemporary features of 
healthcare in modem complex societies. They argue that more research is needed to 
develop this framework, and identify three theoretical concepts (deprofessionalisation, 
proletarianisation and corporatisation) that need to be explored more as part of this 
debate. These concepts are summarised briefly below.
Wider Perspectives on Medical Dominance
Light et al (1988) point to the work of Marie Haug (1973), in highlighting the trend 
towards deprofessionalisation in the future. This is defined as the professions losing 
'their monopoly over knowledge, public belief in their service ethos, and expectations
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of work autonomy and authority over the client' (Haug 1973, 197 in Light 1988: 14). 
These processes, in the sense of the bureaucratisation of professional practice were 
seen to carry within them the seeds of their own destruction (Light et al 1988: 14).
In terms of the proletarianisation debate, Freidson has been criticised for a number of 
reasons. For not addressing the relationships between the medical profession and 
capitalism, the class interests behind professionalism and the political and economic 
consequences of médicalisation when medicine is deemed to have had only a modest 
impact on health (Mckinlay 1977 cited in Light et al 1988: 16). In this context, 
Mckinlay and Arches (cited in Light et al 1988: 16) highlight the way that capitalist 
expansion has led to the type of bureaucratic social control that has led physicians to 
take salaried positions in bureaucratic, hierarchical organisations, that drive the shape 
and delivery of healthcare. Specialisation and sub-specialisation, is seen to 'carry the 
seeds of "deskilling" - a key capitalist technique for paying workers less, making them 
more replaceable, and extracting more surplus value out of their labor' (Light et al 
1988: 16).
Light et al conclude however that there appears to be little evidence of the actual 
"deskilling" of physicians who appear to have actively pursued technological 
advances to increase their clinical skills, meet the needs of patients and in the process 
increase their own incomes (Light et al 1988: 16-17). They argue 'a much more 
differentiated analysis remains to be done on how different types of medical careers 
relate to capital, surplus value, and the means of production, which goes well beyond 
the proletarianization debate' (Light et al 1988: 19).
The last concept concerning corporatisation, is seen as relating to the experiences of 
workers (both the working class and managers) as being exposed to different types of 
corporate control involving such things as quahty reviews, pay structures and other 
organisational structures. Corporatisation is seen as double sided, both causing 
medical professionals to lose control over the products of their work, whilst becoming 
increasingly incorporated into the professional side of their work through market 
driven processes. Light et al argue in relation to this area that ultimately more 
research is needed to understand how new corporate structures affect professional 
work and physician autonomy within it.
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What is clear from this analysis of the character of the medical profession, is that the 
theoretical concepts of deprofessionalisation, proletarianisation and corporatisation 
are seen to need much more research to understand their impact upon the medical 
profession. However they are seen as 'interconnected in ways that provide a new 
perspective distinct from Freidson' (Light et al 1988: 25). Gabe et al (1994) also 
contributes to this debate in contemporary Britain, by focusing on a number of distinct 
areas which he argues provide evidence of challenges to medical dominance. Some 
examples of these challenges come from areas such as management and their role in 
taking over responsibility from healthcare professionals in delivering health care. 
Threats to medical hegemony from professionals such as lawyers and journalists and 
from lay perspectives and social movements. I shall briefly comment on these areas 
below to see what issues these throw up in terms of possible changes to medical 
dominance.
In terms of the issue of management, the research carried out by Waring (2007) 
provides important evidence of the way that doctors have continued to resist changes 
to their professional autonomy in the field of medical harm and patient safety. In 
exploring current patient safety reforms in the NHS through the introduction of 
incident reporting and root cause analysis and their impact upon medical regulation. 
Waring argues this pohcy agenda represents new opportunities in medical/managerial 
relations in providing managers with the tools and legitimacy to scrutinise medical 
performance. However in drawing upon the findings of an ethnographic case study in 
one hospital, he concluded that:
'as with other organisational and managerial reforms, doctors are resisting 
managerial prerogatives through seeking to subvert and 'capture' components 
of reform. I  describe this as 'adaptive regulation' to account for how doctors 
seek to maintain their regulatory monopoly and limit managerial 
encroachment'.
(Waring 2007: 163)
In relation to the two other areas, on the threat posed from other professionals and 
from social movements, this thesis provides a range of evidence to show that a 
number of problems exist with these challenges. With the former, as illustrated in 
chapter one, the data shows that medical negligence legal claims have now been
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falling for a number of years and that in practice only tiny numbers of people 
damaged by medical harm can resort to legal action. This evidence about the impact 
of claims is reinforced later in this chapter when looking at the social construction of 
medical harm and how medical knowledge mediates social relations. Here it is argued 
that contrary to the myths about there being a litigious culture driven by greedy 
lawyers, malicious patients or promoted by over zealous journalists, in reality the 
legal system is constructed 'to present considerable barriers to people pursuing a claim 
for compensation' (Allsop and Mulcahy 2002: 16).
In this context, Mulcahy (2000) has noted the considerable power of doctors to be 
able to construct medical negligence claims as a crisis, which she argues, has served 
as a strategy to deflect blame away from the medical profession (Mulcahy 2000: 97). 
Despite this situation however, she notes the emergence of lay challenges that are 
beginning to challenge a dominant medical perspective on issues of medical harm. 
This conclusion is reinforced by the findings of this thesis which suggest that lay 
perspectives are beginning to emerge that present an alternative knowledge critique to 
dominant medical perspectives. The thesis also suggests however that the medical 
profession continue to have considerable power to dictate the agenda when it comes 
to looking at the issue of medical harm.
Lastly, in chapter three, the findings (outlined in chapter three, page 110) from Davies 
& Shields (1999) research into media reporting after the GMC hearing into the events 
at Bristol Royal Infirmary, provide some evidence about the power of professions like 
journalism to challenge the dominance of the medical profession. What the findings 
from Davis & Shields present is 'a bleak picture of hostility and falling public regard 
towards doctors, concern about widespread (but largely hidden) failures in quality, 
and a rejection of professional self-regulation in favour of external monitoring of 
performance' (1999: 340). It is therefore argued that this research suggests that it is 
the call for more accountability by patients and the public more generally, that has 
acted as a driver in challenging the medical profession rather than the actions of the 
media to drive change independently as a professional grouping.
In conclusion it is argued that in looking at some of these challenges in terms of 
medical harm, to date, there is still considerable evidence that the medical profession
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has been able to hold onto much of their power base to determine the issues in their 
own interests. However, this situation does raise a number of questions about whether 
this position will remain in the future in the light of these challenges to the medical 
profession and given the huge number of changes taking place in this area of 
healthcare.
Gabe et al (1994) concluded in their book collection of essays entitled 'Challenging 
Medicine', that:
'while none of the authors in this collection predict the impending 
emasculation of the power of medicine as a result of the challenges surveyed, 
they all point to changes taking place in society that are likely to bring about a
reconfiguration of professional power  While these developments offer
little support to the deprofessionalisation and proletarianisation theses they 
do, at the very least, suggest the need for a re-examination and reworking of 
our traditional ideas about professional dominance'.
(Gabe et al 1994: xxvi)
Larkin (1993) in looking at the arguments for whether there has been a continuity of 
professional dominance or a disestablishment of medical professional authority, in the 
British context, also reinforce the conclusions above. Larkin also contributes to the 
debate about medical dominance, by highlighting how in the British context, 'medical 
authority over the past century has been both state sponsored and state circumscribed 
through a complex relationship of developing autonomy and control' (Larkin (1993: 
82). This relationship is therefore seen by Larkin to have resulted in a situation with 
the state whereby:
'The medical profession is then employed in a managerial role within an 
expanding but also subordinated relationship, subject to neither a complete 
empowerment nor any opposite process of complete disestablishment'.
(Larkin (1993: 91)
These conclusions therefore suggest that whilst there is no definitive and conclusive 
view that the medical profession has lost its position of medical dominance, evidence 
also suggests that the powers of the medical profession are subjected to and mediated 
by much wider economic and political influences. The evidence for this is looked at in 
more detail later in the chapter when looking at how medical harm is socially 
constructed, the médicalisation thesis and some political economy perspectives. In
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chapter nine further consideration will then be given to whether the research findings 
in the thesis on medical harm contribute any further to the debate on whether medical 
dominance has changed in the way described by Freidson to incorporate broader 
aspects of socio-economic and political control. In the second part of this chapter, 
further consideration will also be given to how theoretical arguments such as 
Freidson's are relevant to looking at issues of medical harm and to ideas about the 
creation of a new patient safety culture in healthcare.
Medical Imperialism
In exploring further, the idea about how the social structure has impacted upon 
medical practice, it is also useful to look at how a more specific thesis emerged within 
sociological debate, from the seventies referred to loosely as medical imperialism. 
This debate whilst covering a range of ideas, broadly critiqued the role of the 
professions and a loss of confidence which was seen to have taken place in them.
Some of these arguments are explored further below.
Strong (1979) has argued that as part of the debate on medical imperialism, this has 
led some sociologists to strongly attack the power and privileges of professional 
experts (1979: 199). However he also points out that whilst a variety of movements 
broadly agree about this general thesis, there is no such agreement about the nature of 
the society in which the expansion of medical imperialism occurs, or agreement on 
the ultimate cause and significance of the phenomenon (Strong 1979: 199). What is 
clear is that many of these arguments tie in with the views expressed by Freidson as 
well as touching upon broader issues.
These arguments can be summarised firstly as the tendency by society to produce 
ever-growing bureaucracies with their attendant army of professionals. These 
professionals are then assigned the task of dealing with social problems which can 
lead to individual professions seeking to develop a monopoly concerning service 
provision or problem solving, which in turn excludes activity by other types of 
professionals and lay people. Secondly, this type of claims making is seen to run the 
danger of never ending professional expansion. Thus agencies responsible for 
addressing particular types of needs, (e.g. poverty, social work) can become
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instrumental in the constant discovery and growth of these needs, which creates the 
scope for limitless expansion of professional bureaucracies.
Thirdly, in relation to clients, the process described above is seen to run the danger of 
producing service provision that expands beyond predefined agendas set by clients. 
This in turn is dominated and controlled by the professional group within that area, 
which then develops the criteria forjudging the performance of the service. Ivan Ilhch 
(1976) has argued about the health service, this situation creates clients who become 
dependant upon professionals which is not just to do with a doctor created culture, but 
also to do with deluded or misguided patients. Fourthly, it is also argued that there is a 
tendency by professions to obscure the nature of social problems by concentrating on 
the individual aspects of them. This is seen to combine with modem professions in a 
preoccupation with science and its power to deal with social concerns. Professional 
groupings (doctors, psychiatrists, biologists, psychologists), even where they do not 
directly come into contact with 'clients' are then seen to exert influence over those 
professions involved in direct care and therefore to 'médicalisé' service provision. A 
failure to make transparent these processes is seen to cover up the social nature and 
history of the problem and frequently the role of both the state and the professions and 
therefore to depoliticise social problems.
(Strong 1979: 199-200)
fri looking at the history of the professionalisation of healthcare, Blane (1991) 
reinforces some of these criticisms about the role and behaviour of the professions. In 
examining some of the key advantages and disadvantages of the professionalisation of 
healthcare he concludes that the care available to patients is profoundly influenced by 
the stmggles of its providers to increase their authority, status and income (Blane 
1991: 234). This is illustrated by looking at four key historical aspects in the 
professionalisation of medicine and the way that each successful stage of the process 
is accompanied by an increase in doctor's income. The success of this approach is 
seen to have encouraged other health care workers to use similar strategies, although 
without the same level of success because of the way the boundaries of the division of 
labour have already been drawn in favour of doctors. Blane acknowledges that whilst 
the process of professionalisation, has had some positive effects, with patients 
benefiting from this situation in terms of the development of skills, competency and
63
the ethical behaviour of those who care for them, they may also suffer from more 
negative effects. These relate to issues such as poor teamwork, poor communication 
between professionals and from priorities reflecting professional rather than patient 
need. These problems are ultimately seen to require a different model of patient care 
and changes to the structure of healthcare, as part of wider social change, similar to 
that which took place in healthcare in the nineteenth century (Blane 1991:234).
All of these arguments throw up a range of issues about medical dominance that are 
explored in more detail in the rest of the chapter. In the next section however, I look 
at the emergence in medicine of a wider biomedical model. I then come on to look at 
how these various elements have created the basis for obscuring the very real social 
and political processes that create medical harm and compound its impact upon 
victims of harm.
The Emergence of a Dominant Biomedical Model
In exploring further the concept of medical dominance, it is important to look more 
closely at the dominant epistemology of medical practice and how this may have 
played a part in underpinning the claims to superiority of the medical profession. In 
terms of its knowledge base the biomedical model represents the dominant discourse 
in Western modem medicine. This model can be located in what Schon (1991) has 
described as the emergence of a scientific worldview linked historically to the 
industrial revolution. This was seen to produce a form of professional expertise based 
upon the rigours of ’instrumental problem solving made rigorous by the application of 
scientific theory and technique' (Schon 1991: 21), which became embedded in 
professions such as medicine and the law.
The section below explores some elements of a biomedical model and key 
sociological criticisms of this way of thinking. An interesting starting point is to look 
at the comments made by George Engel in 1977 in a paper entitled. The Need for a 
New Medical Model: A Challenge for Biomedicine. He raised questions similar to 
Schon in arguing that medicine was in crisis, because of its reliance on a medical 
model that he saw as no 'longer adequate for medicine' Engel 1977: 196).
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So let us explore further what a biomedical model is. In simple terms biomedicine can 
be defined as 'the branch of medical science that applies biological and physiological 
principles to clinical practice' (wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn). Ludwig provides 
a more detailed definition in which the medical model premises 'that sufficient 
deviation from normal represents disease, that disease is due to known or unknown 
natural causes, and that elimination of these causes will result in cure or improvement 
in individual patients' ((1975: 603). 'Natural' is defined as 'biological brain 
dysfunction, either biochemical or neurophysiological in nature' (Ludwig 1975: 603).
Engel (1977) sets out a number of key components associated with this model. He 
describes the biomedical model as the dominant model of disease in modem Westem 
society with molecular biology as its basic scientific foundation. This model he argues 
was devised by medical students for the study of disease and constituted a scientific 
model, based upon shared assumptions and mles of conduct, which provided a 
blueprint for research (Engel 1977: 130). The central assumption of the medical 
model is that disease is accounted for through 'deviations from the norm of 
measurable biological (somatic) variables' (Engel 1977: 130), which leave no room 
for social, psychological or behavioural explanations for disease. In this respect, the 
model is seen to be reductionist in its assumptions not only that disease be dealt with 
separate from social behaviour, but that any social aberrations be explained by virtue 
of the presence of 'disordered somatic (biochemical or neurophysiological) processes' 
(Engel 1977: 130). Reductionism is defined as the view that complex phenomena 
derive from a single primary principle, based on the physical and the view that the 
framework of chemistry and physics will be sufficient to explain all biological 
phenomena (Engel 1977: 130). The biomedical model is also seen to embrace a mind- 
body dualism, based on a view that the mind and body can be treated separately 
(Nettleton 1995). This way of thinking tends to explain health and disease by focusing 
on biological factors and changes, which are seen as naturally occurring in the body.
Sharpe and Faden argue that from this point of view, there is a normal or healthy state 
for the human organism that can be assessed through certain clinical markers, 
physical signs or objective measures such as blood, temperature, cardiac output or 
outcome measures which also include 'mortality, morbidity (2001: 120), and such 
'paraclinical' outcomes as laboratory values, radiographic, and cytology results
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(Feinstein 1987 cited in Sharpe and Faden 2001; 120). It is argued that these clinical 
values are learnt through clinical education, training and practice. They also provide 
the basis for evaluating particular states as healthy or diseased and for evaluating 
particular effects as beneficial or harmful (Sharpe and Faden 200:120).
Other assumptions cormected with a medical model assume that the body can be 
treated in much the same way as a machine, treating medical problems in much the 
same way as one would repair a mechanical dysfunction on a machine. This Nettleton 
(1995) has argued, can lead to an overemphasis on technical solutions resulting within 
medicine of the adoption of a technological imperative.
A further assumption has been the idea that medicine is scientifically objective and 
value free, effectively providing the only valid and legitimate way of understanding 
illness and disease. This claim is seen to have become embedded through the medical 
profession charting its own history, which is presumed to have an almost unbroken 
linear progression towards medical progress (Wright and Treacher (1982) and an 
increasingly accurate understanding of disease patterns.
Critiques of Biomedicine
Within the context of an increasingly critical sociology of health and illness, a range 
of critical views have emerged about the biomedical model. Paul Higgs has argued 
that in order to fully understand 'the workings of medicine in the modem world we 
must look at the circumstances in which medical knowledge comes about. We must 
also examine how people understand and are influenced by medical knowledge' 
(Higg's in Scambler 2003: 182). Higg's sees as central to these questions the role of 
science in modem medicine and the historical dominance that has developed of 
Westem scientific medicine. People like Freidson as part of a wider debate that first 
began to emerge in the 1970's, also began to raise questions about the value base of 
medicine generally, which was seen to be congment with and supportive of the 
patriarchal and capitalist society in which it was located. Nettleton has also argued 
that in recent years both sociology and medicine have shifted towards more of a focus 
on the body, which is no longer seen as 'the passive anatomical frame that was the
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focus of biomedicine, but the body that is capable of social action and its 
interpretation' (Nettleton 1995: 11).
Below I explore some of these critiques and then analyse them in relation to medical 
harm.
The Dominance of Western Medicine
In his book 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions' (1962), Thomas Kuhn called into 
question the whole scientific enterprise by questioning the objectivity of assessing 
scientific evidence. Kuhn saw scientific knowledge as based more upon the culture of 
scientists than adherence to a specific method, with identified paradigms defining the 
areas of acceptable knowledge, that could only be replaced through a crisis in the 
existing theory, which would then usher in a new paradigm of scientific knowledge. 
Jewson also sets out the idea that scientific knowledge can be understood and applied 
to the development of medicine, as a series of successive paradigms each new one 
replacing the previous.
Jewson traces the development of a dominant medical model back to the 
industrialisation process in Westem Societies. This he argues saw 'a dramatic 
transformation in the form of medical cosmology' (1976: 229) which started in the 
first half of the nineteenth century, with the introduction of a new mode of production 
of medical knowledge called Hospital Medicine. The concept of medical cosmologies 
is used to illustrate the way that medical knowledge is constmcted and are defined as:
'conceptual structures which constitute the frame of reference within which all 
questions are posed and all answers are offered. Such intellectual gestalt 
provide those sets of axioms and assumptions which guide the interests, 
perceptions, and cognitive processes of medical investigators'.
(Jewson 1976: 226)
Jewson argues that Bedside Medicine was the dominant mode of production in 
Westem Europe firom the 1770s to the 1800s. This is characterised as a viewpoint that 
united the distinctions found in modem medicine of psyche and soma and was based 
upon two elements, phenomenological nosology and speculative pathology. These 
elements were seen to generate a large range of mutually contradictory theories.
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which generated medical knowledge based upon diverse schools of thought (1976: 
227). However, within this disarray, Jewson argues that a common set of 
cosmological principles could be discerned. For example: the emphasis on defining 
disease according to both external and subjective manifestations rather than its 
internal and hidden causes (Jewson 1976: 227); the focus in medical investigation on 
the whole person; and in locating the general underlying predisposition to ill-health in 
the context of the whole body system, rather than in any particular organ or tissue. 
The spiritual and emotional aspects were identified as important, as well as the 
physical. And, because of the view that each individual has their own unique bodily 
pattern, the 'practitioner was expected to adopt an active therapeutic role, intervening 
in the pathological processes afflicting his clients through the heavy application of 
heroic remedies' (Jewson 1976: 229).
In contrast to this medical cosmology. Hospital Medicine, prevalent from the 1800s to 
the 1840s, ushered in a number of new defining characteristics. This led medical 
investigators to concentrate more on 'accurate diagnosis and classification of cases 
rather than upon the prognosis and therapy of symptom complexes' (Jewson 1976: 
229). This point Jewson argued, refers to Foucaults view of Bedside Medicine relating 
to health, whilst Hospital Medicine related to, 'normality'. Hospital Medicine was also 
seen to focus on eliminating disease through correlating external symptoms with 
internal lesions. Symptoms were demoted as the focal defining point of disease to a 
more secondary status and diagnosis came to be based more on physical examination, 
than on the verbal feedback of symptoms and experiences from patients. The role of 
pathology also took on an enhanced status focusing on identifying specific morbid 
events within tissues rather than identifying problems in the wider constitution of the 
individual as a whole (Jewson 1976: 229-230).
Foucault argued that with the establishment of the hospital came a different way of 
constructing disease and illness. This he suggests was not so much about a new 
scientific method, but through what he called the 'clinical gaze'. This he argued did 
not mean that doctors now 'listened to reason rather than to imagination; it meant that 
the relation between the visible and invisible-which is necessary to all concrete 
knowledge-changed its structure, revealing through gaze and language what had 
previously been below and beyond their domain' (1976: xii).
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Lastly from the 1840's to the 1870’s, a further transformation in cosmology was seen 
to occur, which developed medical knowledge within 'Laboratory Medicine', based 
upon the application of the concepts and methodology of the natural sciences to 
solving medical problems (Jewson 1976: 229-230).
What is interesting to note about these cosmologies in terms of medical practice, 
Jewson argues, is that the eclipse of Bedside Medicine by first Hospital Medicine and 
then Laboratory Medicine represented a shift from a person orientated approach to an 
object orientated one. Concepts of person and object orientation are used to refer to 
the basic organising assumptions within a cosmology. From this perspective 
cosmologies are 'regarded as constellations of meanings, generated within the 
structure of relationships which constitute the mode of production of medical 
knowledge' (Jewson 1976: 229-231). Person orientated cosmologies are characterised 
by joint decision-making, negotiation and discussion between group members, 
generating judgements based upon the individual attributes of people, rather than their 
formal status. Bedside Medicine represented a person oriented approach, because in 
this context the doctor had a close interpersonal relationship with their clients who 
because of the fee-paying nature of the relationship were able to exert considerable 
influence over the medical situation. This also meant that medical knowledge 
developed in a diverse way as doctors adapted their approach to accommodate their 
fee-paying clients.
In contrast, Jewson argues. Hospital Medicine saw a shift of the patient into a hospital 
environment. This allowed a new professional elite (hospital clinicians) to have 
control not only over the technical production of medical knowledge, but to gain 
authority on the basis of their occupational role, rather than proven medical 
achievements. These relationships are seen as characterised by an object-orientated 
cosmology in which processes of decision-making are dictated by the formal status of 
members and hierarchical relationships. These relationships are defined by the social 
categories that people belong to and a clear separation of roles, powers and privileges, 
precisely and specifically designated between patients and physicians. In this new 
situation the sick person assumes a new status as 'patient', 'a passive and uncritical 
role in the consultative relationship' (Jewson 1976: 235), in which the doctor is now in
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charge. The 'study of medicine in this context is focussed upon the recurring, 
objective, quantitative, characteristics of categories of the sick rather than upon the 
unique, subjective, quahtative differences between individuals' (Jewson 1976: 229- 
232).
Lastly, the final phase of laboratory medicine ushered in the production of specialist 
scientific knowledge. This it is argued continued the process of the objectification of 
medical relations, away from the holistic model of Bedside Medicine to the 
construction of the sick person as a material object and 'network of anatomical 
structures' (Jewson 1976: 229-232). This process is seen to have occurred only once 
the mode of production had changed, which allowed the doctor sufficient 
independence firom the demands of the sick. This new context allowed the further 
erosion of the patient from medical discourse and ultimately as the dominant party in 
the production of medical knowledge.
This analysis raises a number of questions about how medicine has evolved and 
throws up issues not only about the biomedical basis of medical practice but also 
suggests that there are a number of other factors which have enabled medicine to 
progress in Westem Societies. These factors relate in particular to issues of power, 
control and dominance in medical relations, but also raise questions about the social 
construction of medical knowledge and how this impacts upon medicine and the 
doctor patient relationship.
The Social Construction of Medical Knowledge
Arguments about the social constmction of medical knowledge are particularly 
pertinent to this debate, as the various different writings in this field, all make the 
same basic point that 'medical knowledge tv q  less than medical practice is socially 
constmcted. fri turn, it is argued, medical knowledge contributes to the shaping of 
social relations' (Bury 1986: 137). fri the section below I look at some of the issues 
raised by constmctionists about the social constmction of medical knowledge. I then 
come on to show specifically in relation to three main strands of constmctionism, 
(highlighted by Bury (1986), The 'problematising of reality’, the 'mediating of social
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relations' and 'médicalisation', how these arguments relate to issues of medical harm 
and its impact.
Wright and Treacher engage with the debate about the social construction of medical 
knowledge, by pointing to a distinctive and unquestioned pattern of usually unnoticed 
assumptions about medical knowledge, which at its heart see medicine as possessing a 
core of veracious knowledge about the natural world which is distinct from anything 
social (Wright & Treacher 1982: 5).
They outline these traditional assumptions about medical knowledge in four key 
ways. Firstly, the tendency to take the idea of medical knowledge as self-evident, 
simply transmitted through medical schools or diffused by professional journals and 
textbooks. In this context the emphasis is placed upon medicine's greatest 
achievements as one of unbroken progress, with almost no attention given to the 
experiences of patients or the innumerable ways that care has been given outside 
orthodox and unlicensed practice. The second assumption relates to the idea that 
modem medical knowledge is distinctive, because it is built upon the findings of a 
neutral and unbiased modem science, which is effective in its application. A third 
assumption is seen to relate to the idea of disease as a completely natural 
manifestation, existing prior to and independently of identification by doctors - simply 
a biological reality waiting to be discovered. The last assumption relates to the part 
ascribed to social factors in accounts of the history of medicine. It is argued not only 
were social forces ignored, but that 'society and medical knowledge were regarded as, 
by their very nature, independent and autonomous domains' (Wright & Treacher 
1982:5).
Wright and Treacher critique these assumptions by arguing that in recent years these 
assumptions have increasingly been called into question eroding the view that 
medicine is clearly and distinctly separate from social forces. Firstly they point to the 
way that the boundaries of medicine are not fixed at any given time, but depend upon 
the outcome of negotiations between different social forces. For example they argue 
the distinction between medicine and the law has shifted as a result of court cases that 
have shifted and re-negotiated the boundaries between these professions. Secondly, 
they argue that a frequent strategy of medicine and other professions has been to
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claim that their activities and knowledge are not simply specialised knowledge 
available to all, but rather, has a special technical status. This is seen to set it apart 
from everyday life and because of its 'scientific' basis leave it un-open to challenge. 
Wright and Treacher argue that claims such as this provide considerable advantages 
for a professional group in terms of assuming a special status of having technical 
expertise. Power and knowledge they argue are clearly linked, with possession of 
power enabling a group to redefine what is knowledge, which in turn results in 
increased power. Thus they claim that it is no longer possible to claim that the nature 
of medicine is self-evident or unaffected by the struggles that take place between 
interested parties for status.
So what does this mean when talking about the construction of Medical harm?
The Social Construction of Medical Harm
In chapter one a range of information was covered relating to the way that medical 
harm is defined and the data on the scale and severity of AE's. What is evident from 
looking at this information, is that there are a number of gaps in the data and the way 
it is collated and constructed. Given this situation, it is useful to look from a 
sociological perspective, at the way that a dominant medical model has influenced the 
debate on defining medical harm. In doing this, the purpose is also to show how a 
range of social factors involved in the construction of harm and its impact upon those 
affected by it, can be omitted or obscured in this process.
The Problematisation of Reality
The problematisation of reality mentioned by Bury as the first and main proposition 
of social constructionism, provides one way of looking at medical knowledge as 
problematic and challenging 'taken-for granted realities' (1986: 140) in knowledge 
construction. A particular criticism from sociologists in this area has been in relation 
to the nature and definition of disease, fri this respect Bury (1986: 137) has argued 
that diseases are not stable realities of human bodies, but rather fabrications or 
inventions, rather than discoveries. (The former suggesting that disease is socially 
created through certain types of investigation that confirm its reality, with the latter 
implying that disease is there simply waiting to be found). Medical knowledge in this 
sense is seen to describe the body as well as to construct it at the same time.
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Freidson reinforces this view by arguing that as well as the medical profession having 
achieved 'a monopoly over its work, medicine has also obtained a well-nigh exclusive 
jurisdiction over determining what illness is and therefore how people must act in 
order to be treated as ill' (Freidson .1988: 205). Freidson saw himself as going much 
further than Parsons, who argued that medicine had the power to legitimise the sick 
role. Instead, he argued that medicine had the power and authority not only to 
determine what was accepted as an illness, but to socially create it, officially sanction 
it and, on occasion to administratively impose it on lay people (1988: 206). From this 
perspective, the view of illness as deviating hrom a biological norm was seen as too 
limited and to ignore the social realities involved in the process. A process that treated 
illness as a social deviance involving both a human and social evaluation of what was 
normative, right and proper. In this context, key questions were seen to require not so 
much an explanation of the cause of a particular behaviour, but the meaning attached 
to it and perhaps just as importantly to require 'studying those who impute deviance 
fully as much as it requires studying the deviants' (Freidson 1988: 216).
These arguments clearly raise wider questions about the social creation of medical 
knowledge and the power of the medical profession to promote them as 
unquestionable and unchallengeable to the detriment of their patients. Nettleton has 
argued that this situation is also compounded by treating any alternative explanations 
of disease that fall outside of the 'dominant paradigm' as bizarre (Nettleton 1995: 22) 
and therefore with 'victims' of medical harm frequently pathologising and labelling 
their experiences and behaviour as vexatious, litigious or both.
The subjective basis of medical knowledge and the way it is socially constructed is 
analysed very clearly by Sharpe and Faden (2001) when looking at the concept of 
medical harm. They have called for a guiding framework for the evaluation of 
medical harm and the imposition of risk that is based upon a more patient centered 
ethos (2001: 115). They argue that the process of defining medical harm is not value 
free, but mainly determined by the medical profession and can be seen, as a reflection 
of the doctor's perspective of harm, which they argue is treated as an inevitable 
consequence of medical progress. What is seen to be omitted from this definition is 
the patient’s perspective on medical harm, which might well include 'non-clinical or
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non-disease-specific outcomes' (2001: 116). Sharpe and Faden argue that for doctors, 
implicit in the notion of harm is a positive or normative concept of proper functioning 
or wellbeing and positive value. However, this is seen to provide a false assumption 
that the concept of harm has a neutral and simple factual base, with doctors having a 
'monopoly on values'. They argue that this is epistemologically incorrect and in 
addition paternalistic (2001: 119-120) It can also be argued that this leads to the 
danger of presenting values that all too often become transformed into facts and 
therefore in the process totally obscure the social origins of their nature.
Sharpe and Faden point out that it is only over the last few decades that broader health 
outcomes such as energy levels, sleep, concentration levels, anxiety, job performance 
etc relating to quality of life, health and illness have been included in clinical 
assessment outcomes (2001: 120-121). This expanded notion of assessment outcomes 
is seen to warrant a broader conceptualisation of medical harm and new tools for its 
identification.
The definition of iatrogenic harm (iatros meaning originating with the doctor) is now 
seen as inadequate by Sharpe and Faden. They argue the term iatrogenic is not wide 
enough to encompass the diversity of operators within healthcare settings. In other 
words doctors are not the only source of patient care and harm is seen to arise from 
exposure to a whole range of health care professionals (doctors, nurses, dentists, 
pharmacists, technicians, administrators, support staff etc). Therefore they propose the 
alternative concept of 'comiogenic harm or comiogenic adverse effect, to encompass a 
broader notion of harm that originates with the care of patients in healthcare settings 
or by healthcare providers' (Victoria Pedrick cited in Sharpe and Faden 2001: 117). It 
is also argued that recent work in the philosophy of medicine highlights an important 
distinction between the concepts of illness and disease (Caplan et al 1981 cited in 
Sharpe and Faden 2001: 122). Illness is described as the human experience of the 
sufferings and unwelcome symptoms associated with the body. By contrast 
classifications of disease are interpretive tools that help to explain illness in terms of 
theories of disorder (Keinman 1988 cited in Sharpe and Faden 2001: 122).
A definition of comiogenic illness, as opposed to comiogenic adverse effect, is 
therefore seen to provide a conceptual framework, for referring to the patient's lived
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experience of the negative effects of care and treatment. Comiogenic illness refers to 
an experience, whose significance is expressed through the patient's subjective and 
personal story, which transcends the technical boundaries associated with the 
application of scales, checklists or measures. Patient suffering and illness is therefore 
seen as affected not only by painful or debilitating, treatment but also by providers 
who are insensitive, uncaring or unresponsive. Thus to place patients at the centre of 
care is not simply to avoid medical harm in a technical sense, but also to mitigate the 
suffering, anxiety and powerlessness of patients as subjectively and experientially 
defined by them, who are vulnerable in the medical process (Sharpe and Faden 
2001:122).
A broader conceptualisation based upon a combination of biological and social 
markers is therefore seen as much more likely to produce a more comprehensive and 
representative picture of the risks and harms associated with medical care. Sharpe and 
Faden argue that the foundations for this type of thinking is already in place regarding 
the importance of the patient's perspective in decision making though the principle of 
informed consent. However they argue a similar shift in terms of the evaluation of 
medical harm is also seen as important in underscoring obligations to tell a patient if a 
serious adverse event has taken place and in the importance of taking seriously the 
patient's view of acceptable risk and their own subjective experiences of any adverse 
effects associated with their care.
A further issue concerning the problematic construction of medical knowledge, 
follows on fi*om Freidson's earlier arguments about the importance of a structuralist 
approach to looking at medical performance. Sharpe and Faden (2001) argue that 
traditionally, fi*om a moral point of view and from a quality assurance perspective the 
evaluation of medical error has emphasised individual agency. It is argued that under 
a socialisation process in medicine that emphasises perfection, and infallibility, 
mistakes are viewed as unusual, unacceptable and indicative of a flawed character. 
Leape has pointed out that this view is deeply embedded in the culture of medicine 
(cited in Buerhaus 2004).
Sharpe and Faden argue that although few would deny the importance of the integrity 
and competence of the doctor, these things in themselves are insufficient to guarantee
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quality and are seen essentially to belie the empirical evidence regarding quality 
failures, where many immediate aspects of patient care are beyond the individuals 
power to control. Sharpe and Faden point to research by clinicians such as Leape et al 
1995 (cited in Sharpe and Faden: 138) who in a study of hospital AE’s found that 
system failures accounted for 78% of harmful errors. This amongst other research is 
seen to point to the primary locus of quality failures as not the fault of the individual, 
but rather the design of systems, processes and policies. System failure and poor 
system or job design is seen to contribute significantly to harmful error by providing 
the conditions under which error thrives.
Sociologists such as Bosk however, have traditionally put much more emphasis on the 
cause of medical errors as being to do with the individual actions of doctors. In 
looking at the training and lives of young surgeons in his book 'Forgive and 
Remember', he argued that a surgeon's attempts to explain preventable failure may be 
divided into four categories: technical error; judgmental error; normative error; quasi- 
normative error. He acknowledged that other interpretations of failure exist, but saw 
the four categories as the ones that dealt directly with the issue of 'physician 
competence and the social control of performance' (2003: 37). He saw other 
explanations to locate responsibility outside of the surgeon's control as of 
'questionable legitimacy', due to what he saw as the highly developed ethic of 
responsibility among surgeons.
In his later writings however. Bosk places much more emphasis on factors affecting 
individual medical performance as much more to do with systems. In 'Continuity and 
Change in the Study of Medical Error' (2005), he argued that the culture and 
complexity of the workplace needed to be looked at much more when tackling 
preventable adverse events.
James Reason's seminal work in his book 'Human jError'provides the cornerstone text 
for looking at how medical errors should be addressed in healthcare. Reason's model 
of organisational accidents was originally developed for use in complex industrial 
systems, based upon the "human factors" approach, a hybrid discipline focusing on 
the human element within complex socio-technical systems, but has now been 
adapted for use in medical settings (Vincent 1998: 2). Reason alongside individuals
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such as Charles Perrow (1984) has pointed to the importance of looking at the role of 
systems and their design in causing error. Reason has argued that looking at human 
error can be done in two ways, either through the Persons Approach or the System's 
Approach. Both of these approaches are seen to have their own basis for establishing 
the causes of error, which in turn give rise to different philosophies on how to manage 
these errors. Reason argues that the differences in the two approaches have 'important 
practical implications for coping with the ever-present risk of mishaps in clinical 
practice' (Reason 2000: 1). In what he terms high reliability organisations, a culture of 
safety is seen as based upon a systems approach to dealing with errors. In these 
organisations there is an expectation that errors will occur, but that systems have been 
put in place to comprehensively manage a range of areas such as: 'the person, the 
team, the task, the workplace, and the organisation' (Reason 2000: 4).
It is usefiil to look at what Reason has identified as some of the key aspects of a 
persons approach and a systems approach. He argues that the persons approach is the 
dominant tradition in medicine and in other places and incorporates a number of key 
assumptions about dealing with errors. This approach posits that errors basically occur 
in organisations through the unsafe and individual acts of employees on the fi-ontline 
such as nurses, doctors, surgeons, pharmacist's etc. These acts are seen to arise fi*om 
'aberrant mental processes such as forgetfiilness, inattention, poor motivation, 
carelessness, negligence, and recklessness' (Reason 2000: 2). Reason argues, the 
response to dealing with these issues has been based on a moralistic approach based 
upon blame and fear, reinforced with the use of measures such as disciplinary 
procedures, the threat of litigation, retraining and the production of more procedures.
In contrast, a systems approach is characterised by an assumption that errors will 
always occur in organisations and are the consequences of recurrent and systemic 
organisational processes. This situation requires a range of organisational measures to 
be implemented and embedded, rather than just a focus on deficits in human nature. 
The aviation industry has been seen as an important example of the way that a 
comprehensive system based approach can work in an industry with a similar 
emphasis on hands on activity to medicine and where the majority of quality lapses 
are judged to be blameless (Reason 2000: 2). Therefore in implementing a systems 
based approach, a number of developments are seen to be required which are
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illustrated by Reason through what he terms the 'Swiss Cheese Model'. This concept 
sees various defences, barriers and safeguards as occupying an important role in a 
systems model. High technology systems are seen to have many defensive layers, 
some engineered through mechanisms such as alarms, physical barriers or shut down 
procedures, others reliant on individuals and a third layer dependant on various 
administrative and procedural controls. Whilst these systems are meant to protect 
against hazards, it is argued that there are always weaknesses in these defensive layers 
of controls. These weaknesses are compared to slices of Swiss cheese with many 
holes, which continually open, shut or shift their location.
Whilst a number of holes in one 'slice' is not necessarily seen to cause a bad outcome, 
the danger is deemed to lie in a situation when the holes in a number of layers 
'momentarily line up to permit a trajectory of accident opportunity - bringing hazards 
into damaging contact with victims' (Reason 2000: 3). The holes in these defences are 
seen to arise for two reasons, namely active failures and latent conditions. Most 
adverse events are seen to involve a combination of these two sets of factors involving 
human decisions and actions. Active failures are committed by individuals in direct 
contact with patients or the system whose unsafe acts may take a variety of forms; 
slips, lapses, mistakes, violations (defined by Reason in his book 'Human Error' and 
discussed in more detail in chapter one of this thesis). These acts are deemed usually 
to have a direct and short-term effect on defensive layers, which are then firequently 
not explored or analysed any further or in any depth by followers of the person 
approach.
In contrast, latent conditions are characterised as the 'inevitable 'resident pathogens' 
within a system. They can arise fi-om decisions made by designers, builders, 
procedures writers, and top-level management' (Reason 2000: 3) and all have the 
potential for introducing pathogens into the system. Latent conditions are also seen to 
create two kinds of adverse effects either through error-provoking conditions within 
the workplace such as time factors, staff shortages, poor equipment etc, or to create 
more deep-seated weaknesses in defence layers via unworkable procedures, alarms, or 
design and construction deficiencies. Vincent et al (1998) reinforces these arguments 
by setting out a fi*amework incorporating a hierarchy of factors that may influence 
clinical practice related to institutional context, organisational and management
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factors, work environment, team factors, individual (staff) factors and patient 
characteristics (Vincent et al 1998: 4-5).
It is clear when looking at the literature on addressing patient safety concerns that 
taking a systems-based approach is seen as vital in addressing the issues. However, 
whilst this thesis will argue that this is the correct approach, it is also argued that a 
systems based approach also needs to be applied to dealing with the issues related to 
monitoring individual medical practice and competence. This approach is seen to go 
beyond a model that just concentrates on individuals and holds them responsible 
personally for errors. Instead it recognises, as highlighted by Freidson earlier, that the 
professional organisation of medical practice contains in-built pathologies in the 
system that can work against the public good and the interests of clients if not 
properly regulated. This view since Freidson published his work in the 1970's has 
since come to be strongly reinforced by other sociologists such as Stacey and Davies 
as set out below.
Margaret Stacey's research in this area, between 1976-1984 as a lay member on the 
GMC did much to highlight the need for reform in the medical regulation of doctors. 
Stacey (1993) focused on the tensions the Council experienced in maintaining the 
unity of the profession on the one hand and protecting the public on the other hand as 
part of a statutory duty laid upon it. She pointed out that the GMC was important, not 
only because of the powers vested in it, but because it was the gatekeeper between the 
state and the medical profession and between the profession and the public. It was 
ultimately 'the organisation which defines the bottom line of acceptable medical 
practice, in which it alone speaks for the whole profession' (Stacey 1993: 157). She 
argued that as far back as the late eighties, the balance had tipped too far in favour of 
the profession.
Celia Davies (1999, 2003) has also argued that given the barrage of criticism against 
the medical profession as a result of perceived malpractice by the public, 'both the 
practice and principles of self-regulation are doubt' (Davies 2003). She has argued 
that the power of the medical profession to command the sort of state supported self­
regulation, that doctors were able to unquestionably demand in the past because of 
their professional status, has passed. In highlighting the importance of external
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medical regulation, in holding organisations independently to account, she calls for 
root and branch reconsideration of what is needed of today's professional and how 
they can be both supported and held to account (Davies 1999: 6).
These critiques on the need for the proper regulation of medical performance throw 
up a number of important questions about the patient safety agenda and the role 
individual medical practitioners can play in harming patients. This suggests therefore, 
that in building a new patient safety culture the regulation of medical performance is 
important and should be a key factor in the safety agenda. In this respect, it is argued 
that regulation should involve systems that both investigate patient safety incidents 
and wrongdoing and offer accountability to individuals affected by harm. It is 
therefore interesting to look at what evidence exists in practice, that these systems are 
in place and working to protect patients.
In the next chapter when looking at the policy context in relation to medical harm, a 
number of examples will be given of policy reviews in the context of patient safety. 
These will illustrate that the dominance of a medical model is still very much in 
operation in healthcare with a number of problems in implementing a wider systems 
approach, which seem to be particularly problematic in the failure to put in place 
systems for regulating medical performance. In setting out my research findings in 
chapters four, six and seven, similar conclusions in this respect are also highlighted.
Therefore what is clear from this section is that the way medical knowledge is 
created, and therefore the nature of disease, is problematic and cannot be taken for 
granted and to date has been considerably influenced by the dominant perspectives of 
the medical profession. The next section looks at some of the implications this can 
have for patients affected by medical harm and how lay challenges have started to 
emerge in recent years to challenge dominant medical perspectives.
Medical knowledge mediates social relations
Drawing upon the section above, one can see how medical knowledge through the 
creation of a pseudo scientific basis, can be used to reproduce and reinforce existing 
social structures and values. In other words social relations contribute to the creation
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of diseases, and the language of disease, which is presumed to be 'natural' and 
therefore serves to conceal the nature of social relations - a process of reification 
(Taussig, 1980 cited in Nettleton: 26).
Writers such as Nettleton have argued that this raises questions about disease 
categories not simply as an outcome of scientific endeavour but also emerging as a 
consequence and connected to a process of social and political struggles (Nettleton 
1995: 24). In the field of medical harm, this process can be seen through the 
emergence of a movement of self-help groups and individuals who have begun to 
organise themselves collectively to develop their own understanding and perspectives 
on the issues. A particular area of dispute that has arisen between groups representing 
patients and the medical establishment, when talking about medical harm, is the 
notion of blame, responsibility and accountability. This debate raises important 
questions about the limitations of viewing health and illness through a limited bio­
medical model, rather than drawing upon wider explanations for interpreting 
medicine, health and healing, reflecting the wider social and structural context of 
society.
Mulcahy (2000) has illustrated this situation in looking at clinical negligence claims. 
She throws up some interesting arguments not only in relation to how the medical 
profession have influenced this area in their own interests, but also how lay challenges 
have emerged in recent years to provide a very different perspective on the issues.
In examining the challenge posed by medical negligence claims, Mulcahy has argued 
that the way in which the debate is conceptualised as a crisis 'can serve to enhance the 
interests of the medical profession' (Mulcahy 2000: 82). She argues that whilst 
medical negligence claims do have the potential to threaten the medical profession, 
when placed in context, the threat is much less daunting than is often suggested. She 
points out in relation to negligence claims, that 'the cost of medical negligence is 
relatively low when seen as a percentage of the NHS budget (Dingwall & Fenn in 
Mulcahy 2000: 95).
In analysing data from the Department of Health's mediation pilot scheme, 2,406 
cases were looked at (amounting to 83% of the data held on the databases). It was
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found that the risk of medical negligence claims was located mainly in specific 
surgical specialities such as obstetrics and gynaecology, with most other speciahties 
having a low incidence of claims. Key findings showed that the majority of claims 
were abandoned at a very early stage of proceedings. This was often before a doctor 
had been notified of the claim and that the vast majority of claimants who pursued a 
case beyond the issue of proceedings settled their claims out of court, thus ensuring 
they could not be held up to public scrutiny. Lastly four fifths of claims were found to 
involve no payment whatsoever and where payment was made, this amounted on 
average to £11,095. Mulcahy argues ultimately, that the cost of claims amounted to 
much less than 1% of total NHS expenditure in these two clinical areas (Mulcahy 
2000: 97).
Mulcahy therefore asks the question: 'Why has the claims rate been constructed as a 
crisis and prompted so much activity firom the profession?' (Mulcahy 2000: 97). She 
concludes that at least part of the response to why claims represent such a symbolic 
threat to the profession is explained by reference to clinicians' views of what causes 
disputes. She argues doctors commonly discuss the root causes of grievances as a 
manifestation of the illness being experienced and a way of patients coming to terms 
with bad news, which is projected onto the doctor. Such accounts, Mulcahy argues, 
'have a tendency to deflect blame away fi-om the medical profession' (2000: 97). 
Pointing to more 'sociologically orientated' explanations, Mulcahy argues, that what 
may actually trigger disputes between patients and doctors may result fi-om more 
fimdamental disagreements about the nature of illness, which may be experienced 
significantly differently from a patient lay perspective (Mulcahy 2000: 99).
This viewpoint has been has been reinforced by writers such as Annandale (1989) 
who in a paper on 'The malpractice crisis and the doctor-patient relationship' 
identified the strong stereotyping of 'suit-prone' patients in the literature about medical 
malpractice, aimed at helping doctors avoid being sued. This she argues has led 
doctors to attribute to these patients a whole range of negative personality traits.
Annandale, also pointed to the work done by Millmann (1977) on what is referred to 
as 'suit-prone' patients. Millmann in observing hospital mortality reviews argued that 
one way doctors found to demonstrate why their actions had led to error, was to shift
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the blame away from themselves onto either the unusual circumstances of a case, or to 
the patient, fri this respect, it is argued that if "blame is shifted to the patient it can 
involve pointing to certain social and psychological characteristics which misguided 
the physician' (Annandale 1989: 14). The implications of this tactic on the part of 
doctors to avoid blame for medical errors, was seen as very detrimental to patients, as 
illustrated in the quote below:
'The implications of such patient stereotypes are not difficult to discern; they 
carry the clear potential for discrimination and for practice that is motivated 
not by what the physician perceives to be the patient's best interest, but by 
avoiding a malpractice suit'.
(Aimandale 1989: 14)
Contrary to the negative stereotyping by doctors of patients affected by medical harm, 
as somehow having problems pathological in origin, a number of other studies 
challenge this assumption. They show that harmed patients are actually further 
harmed and traumatised after an adverse incident as a result of the negative way they 
are treated by health professionals and those dealing with their complaint (DOH 2003; 
Church and Vincent 1996).
Vincent (2006) reinforces the conclusions of these studies by noting:
'Many people harmed by their treatment suffer further trauma through the 
incident being insensitively and inadequately handled. Conversely, when staff 
come forward, acknowledge the damage and take the necessary action, the 
support offered can ameliorate the impact both in the short and long term'.
(Vincent 2006: 124)
A number of studies also tell a very different story from doctors about the motives of 
individuals after they have been affected by medical negligence. For example 
Vincent's study of patients and relatives taking legal action found four main themes. 
These were:
'concern with standards of care-both patients and relatives wanted to prevent 
similar incidents in the future; the need for an explanation-to know how the 
injury happened and why; compensation-for actual losses, pain and suffering 
or to provide care in the future for an injured person; and accountability-a 
belief that the staff or organisation should have to account for their actions'.
(Vincent et al 1994)
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Other studies show that taking legal action for financial compensation was found not 
to be the primary motive of individuals when something went wrong with their care. 
A key factor causing disputes to escalate was the inability of families to be able to get 
adequate explanations to their concerns (Daniel et al 1999; Lloyd-Bostock 1999; 
Association of Personal Injury Lawyers 2000; DOH 2003; Parliamentary and Health 
Service Ombudsman 2005). In a definitive report produced for the CMO's Advisory 
Group on Complaints and Clinical Negligence, Allsop and Mulcahy found that:
'Even when there have been poor outcomes, a number of research studies 
across the different settings of family practice and hospitals, and using 
different methodologies, have shown that most people place an emphasis on 
non-financial remedies. These include: to be taken seriously; to be given 
sympathy and reassurance; to make an explanation or apology; to have a 
decision reversed, something done more quickly, a loss made good, or 
something put right; a waiver or reduction of fees; the payment of monies due; 
the restoration of possessions; or remedial treatment. Very few complainants 
said they wanted someone punished or that they wanted compensation'.
(Allsop and Mulcahy 2002: 18)
Commentators in the legal field such as Montgomery also suggest that the issue of 
accountability is an important factor when people experience an adverse healthcare 
event. In this respect he has argued that people turn to litigation as a tool for making 
healthcare professionals accountable for their actions alongside the NHS complaints 
procedure and other disciplinary avenues for the profession (Montgomery 2003). In 
this respect, Annandale (1989) argues contrary to mainstream opinion in this area, 
litigation plays some part in empowering patients and in holding the medical 
profession to account when something goes wrong with healthcare. She points out:
'malpractice can be seen as an indicator of threats to professional hegemony 
and self-control. It is also leading to reforms in the doctor-patient relationship 
where calls are being made for the patient to be given more information and 
an active role in decision-making about treatment. In this way, malpractice 
can be seen to hasten some of the very changes that sociologists have argued 
are essential to improvements in patient care'.
(Annandale 1989: 2)
Felstiner et al in (1981) in thinking outside of the box about resolving disputes 
legally, ultimately concludes that legal action is not necessarily a problem in 
addressing grievances. They note, 'a healthy social order is one that minimizes
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barriers inhibiting the emergence of grievances and disputes and preventing their 
translation into claims for redress' (Felstiner et al 1980-1981: 654).
It can therefore be argued from a patient's perspective, that the way that medical 
negligence claims have been presented in the mainstream as emanating from 
malicious and vexatious litigants, driven by the compensation culture and a desire to 
unjustly attack doctors, represents a false and one-sided picture of the situation. This 
misrepresentation of the issues is seen to further multiply the harm that patients have 
already experienced (Ocloo 2007), because of the way that a dominant medical 
profession through the use of a biomedical perspective can falsely justify their claims.
The contentious issue of medical litigation therefore presents an important area for 
illustrating the way in which social issues of power and control are mediated in the 
knowledge and practice of medicine. In the area of medical harm, this situation has 
been brought to the fore with the emergence of a number of groups in recent years, 
made up of individuals directly affected by medical errors. These groups have 
increasingly begun to highlight and challenge the way that the process of medical 
harm is understood and its impact upon individuals (see Allsop et al 2004). This 
situation is also further illustrated later in the thesis with my research with individuals 
and groups affected by medical harm discussed in chapters four, six and seven. These 
chapters set out an alternative knowledge critique on medical harm, emerging out of 
the personal and political struggles for justice and accountability from those who are 
affected by medical harm and who frequently see the issues very differently from the 
medical profession, wider state and legal institutions.
The Médicalisation Thesis
Lastly, in looking at some of the critical arguments thrown up by social 
constructionists about health and illness, the area of the médicalisation of society has 
become an increasingly important one. This debate about the increasing 
medicahsation of society and the adverse effects of this process has existed at least 
since the 1970's. Medicahsation can be seen to have occurred 'when previously non- 
medical problems are defined and treated as medical problems, usually in terms of 
illnesses or disorders' (Conrad and Leiter 2004). The medicahsation debate has
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suggested that medicine as a powerful and dominant institution in society has 
medicalised large aspects of everyday life. This has led to biomedical or technical 
solutions being promoted and given in areas previously functioning as 'normal and 
often with harmful side-effects' (Conrad 2005; Illich 1974; Freidson 1970). With 
medical expansion, it has been argued, this has led to 'medicine becoming a major 
institution of social control nudging aside, if not incorporating the more traditional 
institutions of religion and the law' (Zola 1972: 487).
Writers in this area suggest that this phenomenon is now increasingly evident in all 
areas of public life. For example in overzealous medical intervention in childbirth 
with little evidence of effectiveness (Johnson et al 2002) and with forced and 
oppressive psychiatric intervention (Szasz 1961; 2002) and through the misuse and 
dangerous over-prescribing of ante-depressants for depression (Medawar 2004). It is 
of note that the area of childbirth, long criticised as the target of médicalisation, is 
also identified as one of two clinical specialities (obstetrics and surgical specialities) 
accounting for nearly two thirds of all clinical negligence legal claims (Making 
Amends 2003: 38).
Nettleton argues that the medicahsation thesis also places a strong emphasis on 
inequalities of power inherent in the social processes and interactions that are seen to 
determine definitions of illness. Differences of power between individuals when it 
comes to the social construction of reality are seen to privilege professionals, who are 
more able to define what counts as sickness. Thus she argues 'the scope for social 
regulation is considerable because if matters come to be defined as medical concerns, 
health authorities have authority to monitor, intervene and pass judgements upon 
them' (1995: 27). In this context. Brown and Zavestoski have pointed to the role of 
health social movements (HSM’s) as an important political force for shaping 
healthcare and for achieving broader social change (Brown & Zavestoski 2004). 
Critics of biomedicine have argued that it is vital to recognise that lay people have 
their own valid interpretations of health and illness that are essential to the process of 
treatment and care.
This has led to specific arguments over a number of years from a range of different 
groups in society. For example, the Women's Health Movement has raised
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considerable concerns about the medicahsation of childbirth (Oakley 1976; Donnison 
1977; Tew 1990). Disability groups have put forward critiques rejecting a medical 
model as a source of oppression and called for an alternative 'social' model of 
disability (Shakespeare 1993). Writers such as Rogers & Pilgrim (1991) have also 
highlighted the importance of the emergence of a British Mental Health User 
Movement (MHUM) and the way in which this movement has produced a new 
conception of the patient 'at odds with both the medical model and certain 
constructivist positions within sociological accounts of psychiatry' (Rogers & 
Pilgriml991: 146).
These critiques have therefore challenged the more traditional and paternalistic 
doctor-patient relationships defined by sociologists such as Talcott Parsons (1951). 
This has seen calls for new types of medical relationships in which the patient is more 
active (Gabe et al 2005) and which embrace more informed and shared models of 
treatment and decision-making (Freidson 1970; Charles et al 1999; Rutter at al 2004). 
This debate has also included wider arguments about the limitations of a consumer 
model of patient or community involvement in health services and calls for more 
radical citizen approaches to involving the public in their healthcare (Hogg 1999; 
Calnan & Gabe 2001). But despite this debate, writers such as Suschnigg have argued 
that there is still little sign of a shift in power away from professionals to their patients 
or clients and a decline in the dominance of a medical model (2001).
fri an important analysis of the medicahsation hterature however, Conrad (2005) 
points out that earlier writings in this area tended to be concerned with three factors: 
the power dominance and authority of the medical profession and the expansion of its 
jurisdiction. The way that medicahsation could occur through social movements 
fighting to get a medical diagnosis for specific problems. For example with alcohol 
addiction and lastly the way that certain professional activities were directed towards 
promoting medicahsation such as with obstetricians and midwives with childbirth and 
in the treatments of hyperactivity and the menopause with drugs such as Ritalin or 
HRT. However by the 1980's he argues, the debate about medicahsation had begun to 
see some profound changes that have had important consequences for health generally 
(Conrad 2005: 4-5). Conrad concludes that three major changes have now taken place 
in medical knowledge and organisation that 'have engendered a shift in the engines
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that drive medicalization in Western societies: biotechnology, consumers and 
managed care' (Conrad 2005: 5).
Whilst doctors are still seen as the gatekeepers in terms of access to many drugs, it is 
argued that it is the pharmaceutical companies that have now become the major 
drivers in médicalisation, in aggressively promoting their products to doctors and 
directly to the public (Conrad 2004, 2005). These products are seen to target a wide 
spectrum of areas, from impotence to depression, children's hyperactivity and 
treatments aimed at older people. Also with current rapid developments in gene 
therapy and genetic testing, this is seen to create the potential for biotech companies 
to médicalisé new areas, but also 'to expand medical surveillance (Armstrong 1995) 
and the medical gaze' (Conrad 2005: 8). In the US, Managed Care organisations are 
also seen as having commercialised medicine and to have encouraged medical care 
organisations and doctors to have emphasised 'profits over patient care' (Conrad 2005: 
10). fri this changing medical system, Conrad argues, consumers are also major 
players, who in a more commodified health arena, subject to market forces, are both 
targets for products such as cosmetic surgeries, health insurance etc as they are 
aggressive consumers of products, through, in particular, the use of the internet.
In the light of the changes in the medicahsation process, Conrad issues a challenge to 
sociologists to shift their attention in analysing the issues, to study the new and 
emerging shifting engines of medicahsation. This he argues, means 'supplementing 
our social constructionist studies with political economic perspectives' (Conrad 2005: 
12).
A Political Economy Perspective
Given the comments above by Conrad, it is therefore important to look at a range of 
critical perspectives and how they relate to medical harm, to note the connections 
between health and the wider social structure. Conrad & Kern argue that in order to 
do this one has to 'investigate how social factors such as the political economy, the 
corporate structure, the distribution of resources and the use of political, economic 
and social power influence health and illness and society's response to health and 
illness' (1986: 2).
Mckinlay provides one critique, from a political economy perspective and argues that:
'One can conceive of medical care-related activities as the game among a 
group of highly trained players, carefully selected for the affinity of their 
interests with the requirements of capitalist institutions, which is watched by a 
vast number o f spectators (involving all of the people) some o f the time and, 
increasingly, some of the people all the time). And surrounding this game 
itself, with its interested public, is the capitalistic state (setting the rules by 
which the game ought to be played before the public), the presence of which 
ensures the legitimacy of the game and guarantees, through resources derived 
from spectators, that the prerogatives and interests of the park (finance and 
industrial capital) are always protected and advanced'.
(Mckinlay 1977: 464-5 cited in Annandale 1998:12)
This analysis suggests that not only is healthcare activities affected by vested interests 
such as that of doctors, but goes much wider to involve the vested interests of the 
market and capitalistic state interests and institutions and often involving the public as 
passive spectators. This view is reinforced by Robert Alford's 'structural interest' 
perspective, which Hunter (2004) argues remains as critical today in understanding 
the organisational life of health care systems as it was when it first appeared almost 
thirty years ago. According to Alford's political perspective:
'powerful interests benefit from the healthcare system (any health care system) 
precisely as it is. This applies regardless of whether it is a US style market 
system or an UK national health system. In either model, the 'dominant' 
interests (clinicians-the 'professional monopolists') manage to do rather nicely 
and exercise considerable power to preserve their privileges. For their part, 
the challenging interests (managers-the 'corporate rationalisers') are party to 
a constant expansion of their functions, powers and resources justified by the 
need to control the professional monopolists. Meanwhile, the goal of easily 
accessible, low cost and equitable health care remains elusive'.
(Hunter 2004: 51)
In Alford's depiction of the tensions in health care reform, manifest between the 
dominant and challenging interests. Hunter argues, that this situation only serves 'to 
reinforce the powerlessness of the repressed interests - namely, the general 
population' (Hunter 2004: 52). Hunter argues that whilst there is some evidence that 
governments are trying to empower communities, through the language of choice and 
devolved decision-making. 'It is far to early to conclude whether such a shift of power 
will or can occur, or whether the resilience of the dominant interests, to which the
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challenging interests may well ally themselves, will prevail and frustrate attempts at 
consciousness-raising among the public' (Hunter 2004: 52).
In looking at broader influences on healthcare, it is also of note that subsequent 
criticisms of Freidson's depiction of medical autonomy have been criticised for over­
simplifying professional dominance and of neglecting to mention broader issues such 
as gender and the role of the state (Gabe et al 2005: 174). In chapter nine of the thesis, 
I explore what evidence exists from my research findings for these critiques. Larkin 
(1993) has also argued, at least in looking at the British situation, that the state was 
always more influential in dictating the autonomy of the medical profession, than 
Freidson's account suggested (in Gabe et al 2005: 174). This argument is substantiated 
to some degree in the next chapter when looking at the policy context and medical 
harm.
Given some of these arguments, it is therefore interesting to look at what evidence 
exists for this type of wider socio-political analysis, when looking at medical harm.
Ivan Illich (1974) provides perhaps one of the most radical critiques of modem or 
industrialised medicine in an analysis written more than half-a century ago. In relation 
to medical or iatrogenic harm in particular, Illich has argued that an expanding 
proportion of new diseases emerging over the last fifteen years have arisen as the 
result of pathogenic medical intervention, which is iatrogenic or doctor-made. He 
argues 'These facts are obvious, well documented, and well repressed' (Illich 2001). 
The proliferation of a medical enterprise is seen to inflict upon the general population, 
pain, anguish, disability and dysfunction rivalling that of modem traffic, industrial 
and even war related activities. This is seen to make the impact of modem medicine 
one of the most rapidly spreading epidemics of our time (Illich 2001: 266-267).
Iatrogenic illness is defined on three levels: clinical iatrogenic disease is seen as 
comprising all clinical conditions for which remedies, physicians or hospitals are the 
pathogens, or 'sickening' agents. However the undesirable side effects of contact with 
the medical profession are seen as just the first level of pathogenic medicine, which 
Illich argues is compounded by 'those other torts that result from the doctors attempt 
to protect himself against the possibility of a suit for malpractice. Such attempts to
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avoid litigation and persecution may now do more damage than any other iatrogenic 
stimulus' (Illich 2001: 268).
Social Iatrogenic disease is seen to be expressed through the various symptoms of 
what is seen as social over-medicalisation, amounting to what Illich describes as the 
expropriation of health. In this sense, sickness is seen to be sponsored by medical 
practice that encourages people to become consumers of curative, preventive, 
industrial and environmental medicine. This is seen to leave people on the one hand 
surviving in larger numbers, but fit only for institutional care. Whilst on the other 
hand leaving people medically exempt firom the industrial work that removes them 
firom the arena of political struggle which might reshape the very society that has 
made them sick in the first place (2001: 268).
On a third level, cultural iatrogenesis is distinguished by the way the healthcare 
profession is seen to undermine the natural potential of people to deal with their own 
weaknesses and firailties in a personal and autonomous way. It is argued it is the 
ultimate backlash to hygienic progress that paralyses healthy responses to suffering, 
impairment and death in favour of a managed attempt to package healthcare as a 
sanitised commodity.
Given these arguments, it is interesting to look at what evidence exists for Illich's 
claims about medicahsation, by looking at the role of the pharmaceutical industry in 
the UK and its role in causing medical harm to patients.
Charles Medawar et al in 'Medicines out of Control?' (2004), about medicine and the 
pharmaceutical industry, sets out the way that the pharmaceutical industry has 
historically encouraged an unhealthy dependence by the public on drugs prescribed 
for anxiety, insomnia, depression and related mental stress. The book shows the scale 
of secrecy involved in market driven medicine and the way that drug companies have 
covered up the evidence of drug addiction, dependency and harm. Commercial 
sponsorship is also shown to have undermined the reputation and independence of 
pohtical, professional and academic institutions, drug regulatory systems and even 
patient organisations and the World Health Organisation (WHO). In this context, 
science is not seen as neutral, but inextricably tied up with economic, political and
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professional imperatives. Medawar et al conclude below that it was only the evidence 
from those directly affected by the adverse effects of ante-depressants that finally 
forced the regulators to do something.
'The UK drug regulators still eschew reports from patients, in the absence of 
'medical interpretation'. Ironically, but predictably, it was the wealth of 
evidence from antidepressant users that finally caused the regulators to 
confront the reality: a substantial risk of dependence, among other damaging 
drug effects'.
(http://www.socialaudit.org.uk/60403162.htm)
The evidence from Medawar, is also backed up by other important information. A 
recent House of Commons Health Committee Report (2005) entitled 'The influence of 
the Pharmaceutical Industry' (2005) also confirms the power and influence of the 
medicines industry economically. It found the industry was the third most profitable 
economic activity after tourism and finance in the UK. The report also highlighted 
significant concerns connected to the medicahsation process and the level of adverse 
effects from drugs. Key findings from the report showed that adverse drug reactions 
were responsible for about 5% of all admissions to hospitals in the UK; that there was 
an increasing medicahsation of society and that inappropriate prescription of 
medicines by GP’s was a particular concern (House of Commons 2005: 3-4).
The report also stated, perhaps most worryingly, that despite the concerns about the 
adverse effects of the industry, sufficient safeguards were not in place to protect the 
public. As stated below:
'An effective regulatory regime to ensure that the industry works in the public 
interest is essential. Unfortunately, the present regulatory system is failing to 
provide this \
(The House of Commons 2005: 3)
However in the light of the issues raised about the role of market driven big business 
in the activities of medicine, one has to argue whether a focus simply on regulating 
healthcare professionals is sufficient to protect the public.
If we now refer back to the quote by McKinlay, we can see that the above cases with 
the pharmaceutical industry provide some examples of how the game McKinlay refers
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to, could be played out: 'medical care-related activities', comprising various drug 
therapies such as anti-depressants are accused of causing harm to patients in the 
course of health care treatment. However when harm occurs, it could be argued that 
the drugs companies and state sponsored regulatory bodies, in effect, 'a group of 
highly trained players', frequently act against patients interests, and often in ways that 
appear to suggest these 'players' are not neutral.
It could be argued that rather than independently ensuring the 'interested public' is 
protected from the commercial interests and exploitation of big business, through 
independent and robust regulatory bodies, the public is vulnerable because regulatory 
bodies have failed to protect patients, in favour of protecting doctors and the medical 
status quo (as will be argued in the next chapter), fri this scenario, one could argue 
that there is some evidence of a game in which 'the capitalistic state', including 
regulatory bodies, '(setting the rules by which the game ought to be played before the
public' 'ensures the legitimacy of the game and guarantees, through resources
derived from spectators, that the prerogatives and interests of the park (finance and 
industrial capital) are always protected and advanced'.
Conclusion:
In summary, a number of arguments have been covered in this chapter which raise a 
whole range of key issues about the construction of medical harm. What begins to 
emerge when one examines these issues surrounding medical harm in more detail, is 
the way in which a dominant medical perspective has driven the debate. This has 
been illustrated by looking at a range of sociological critiques that show how the 
medical profession has been able to achieve a position of medical dominance in 
healthcare, which has been used to enhance their interests. This position is seen to 
have occurred both through campaigns fought by the medical profession to increase 
their powers, as well as through the use of a biomedical model, promoted as 
scientifically objective and value free and therefore providing the only valid and 
legitimate way of understanding illness and disease.
In exploring a number of arguments from a social constructionist and political 
economy perspective and linking them to the issue of medical harm, this chapter has 
aimed to show how a range of wider socio-political and economic processes
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influences healthcare. It has been argued that these processes have operated to cause 
harm to patients and to compound that harm and that these issues have been obscured 
both by the dominance of medical perspectives, whilst also being driven by the wider 
vested interests of the market, the state and its associated institutions.
Therefore given this situation and drawing upon the issues to emerge from my field 
research looking at medical harm from a patient's perspective, this thesis will argue 
that a much wider conceptual framework is needed for looking at the complex forces 
associated with medical harm. The contention is that this framework needs to 
incorporate both the medical processes associated with medical harm, but also to deal 
with the complex social processes involved in this phenomenon. Tackling these issues 
is seen to require an approach that goes well beyond an individualist, medical model, 
to provide a comprehensive systems approach to dealing with the issues that deals 
with both preventing harm, accountability for wrongdoing and empowering patients 
and the public affected by the process.
fri the subsequent chapters of this thesis, these arguments are looked at in more detail 
through the data thrown up by my research findings. However chapter three continues 
this debate by looking at the changing policy context in relation to medical harm and 
patient safety and progress towards developing a new patient safety culture in the 
NHS. In doing so a range of policy evidence is highlighted to illustrate that a 
dominant medical model continues to operate in the NHS and that this model 
continues to prevent medical harm from being properly addressed. This situation is 
therefore seen to require a new and holistic systems based approach for addressing 
medical harm that deals with improvement, prevention and wrongdoing and addresses 
the imbalance of power that continues to exist between health professionals and their 
patients.
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Chapter Three
The Changing Policy Context and Developing a New Patient Safety 
Culture in the NHS
This chapter of the PhD will follow on from the previous one by looking at the rapidly 
changing policy landscape that has taken place in relation to the area of medical harm 
and patient safety particularly over the last ten years. The chapter will focus firstly on 
two major government inquiry reports that are widely seen as an important catalyst in 
changing the policy landscape in this area. These reports are 'The Report of the Public 
Inquiry into children's heart surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995' (2001), 
(subsequently referred to as The Bristol Report) and the 'The Shipman Inquiry Fifth 
Report. Safeguarding Patients: Lessons from the Past - Proposals for the Future 
(2005), (subsequently referred to as The Shipman Inquiry Report).
In looking at the reports mentioned above, the aim will be to highlight some key 
conclusions and to explore any evidence related to arguments made previously about 
the way in which dominant medical perspectives obscure a range of social processes 
connected to medical harm. The chapter will then focus on looking at a range of other 
more recent reports and reviews regarding different areas connected to patient safety. 
The purpose in doing this will be to explore what progress has been made post Bristol 
and Shipman in developing a new patient safety culture within the NHS. In making 
the assessment about progress, a key issue will be to look at the evidence for moving 
from a culture based upon an individuahst medical model to one that embraces a 
wider systems approach to tackling patient safety.
The Bristol Story
It is widely recognised that the events at the Bristol Royal Infirmary marked a turning 
point in forcing the NHS to look at medical harm and to confront the need to examine 
the multiple causes of medical error and how a new patient safety agenda could be 
developed in healthcare. This meant that on the 18 June 1998, Frank Dobson MP, 
Secretary of State for Health, announced to Parliament the establishment of the 
Bristol Inquiry. Its terms of reference were:
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'To inquire into the management o f the care of children receiving complex 
cardiac surgical services at the Bristol Royal Infirmary between 1984 and 
1995 and relevant related issues; to make findings as to the adequacy of the 
services provided; to establish what action was taken both within and outside 
the hospital to deal with concerns raised about the surgery and to identify any 
failure to take appropriate action promptly; to reach conclusions from these 
events and to make recommendations which could help to secure high-quality 
care across the NHS'.
(BRI Inquiry Final Report 2001:1)
The Public Inquiry was conducted between October 1998 and July 2000 and was 
chaired by Professor Ian Kennedy. Right from the outset, the Bristol Inquiry Report 
made clear that the Bristol story was not one about bad people or those who did not 
care or who deliberately caused harm to their patients. Ultimately healthcare 
professionals in Bristol were seen to be victims of a combination of circumstances 
connected to more general failings within the health service as much as to do with any 
individual failings.
Taken together the issues at Bristol led to around one-third of all the children who 
underwent open-heart surgery at the hospital, to receive less than adequate care. More 
children also died than was typical of other paediatric cardiac units. During the period 
1991 to 1995 between 30 to 35 more children under 1 died after open-heart surgery in 
the Bristol Unit, than might be expected of other units in England during the same 
period.
A number of key issues emerged in the inquiry. These related to the paediatric open- 
heart surgery offered at Bristol, which was seen as problematic because it was split 
between two sites, had no dedicated paediatric intensive care beds, no full-time 
paediatric cardiac surgeon and too few paediatric trained nurses. There was also no 
agreed means for assessing the quality of care and no standards existed for evaluating 
performance. A 'club culture' was seen to exist within the hospital and an imbalance 
of power, which left too much control residing in the hands of to few individuals. The 
system of hospital care was also found to be poorly organised and beset with 
uncertainty, to the point that when concerns were raised it took years for them to be 
taken seriously.
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Given this situation the Bristol Inquiry Report made the following recommendations 
that related riot only to Bristol but also to the wider context of health care:
In the future sick children should be cared for in a child-centred environment, by 
appropriately trained staff and for a national director for children's healthcare services 
to be appointed. In order for safe practice to be achieved it was recommended that a 
number of barriers should be addressed. These might relate to the poor state of 
physical infrastructure, as well as addressing issues concerned with promoting a 
culture of openness that acknowledged errors and enabled lessons to be learned from 
adverse events. In addition it was argued that all healthcare professionals should have 
a duty of candour to patients, that clinical negligence litigation should be abolished 
and for a non-executive member of every trust board to lead on the issue of safe care;
In terms of performance it was recommended that all healthcare professionals' 
contract with a trust and that GP terms of service, should include the requirement to 
undergo appraisal, continuing professional development and revalidation to ensure 
that all healthcare professionals remained competent to do their job. It was also seen 
as important to create healthcare environments where doctors, nurses and managers 
worked together as a team, with comparable and equitable employment conditions 
and clear lines of accountability to provide the best possible patient care;
It was also recommended that wider standards of clinical care should be produced and 
published for health care professionals to comply with so that patients and the public 
were clear about what they could expect. This would include standards to be produced 
for hospital trusts in which compliance with them would form the basis for trusts 
being allowed to provide services within the NHS. These standards would then be 
monitored and reviewed by an independent system to identify good and failing 
performance;
Lastly, in terms of information, Bristol was found to have been awash with data and 
information available from the late 1980's that showed that questions should have 
been raised both internally and externally about mortality rates. Little of this 
information was available to parents or the public and where it was, it was partial and
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confusing. For the future it was recommended that there should be openness about 
clinical performance, with patients able to gain appropriate information about the 
performance of hospitals, or a particular service or unit within them.
(Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry Final Report 2001:1-3)
Learning the Lessons from Bristol
In analysing the range of issues to come out of the Bristol Report, what jumps out 
most starkly and is reflected in the government's response to the Bristol report below, 
is the issue of system failure.
'The BRI Inquiry Report provides us with a powerful analysis of the 
organisation and culture of the NHS in the years up to 1995. It highlights poor 
organisation, failure of communication, lack of leadership, paternalism and a 
'club culture' and a failure to put patients at the centre o f care. It draws 
attention to the lack of standards for evaluating performance in the NHS and 
for assessing the quality of care, and a lack of clarity about where the 
responsibility for such assessment lay, at both the local and national level. The 
failure to accord children's services a sufficient priority in Bristol and 
elsewhere in the NHS resulted in the unnecessary death and damage of a 
number o f very young children. They were failed by the system that was 
supposed to make them well' [my emphasis].
(DOH2002: 1)
Ian Keimedy in the foreword of the report also made the sobering statement that 
Bristol could easily happen again. He noted in this respect. Unless lessons are 
learned, it certainly could happen again, if not in the area of paediatric cardiac 
surgery, then in some other area of care' (BRI Inquiry Final Report 2001). Given this 
statement, I look at three main themes identified in the report, which were seen as an 
absolute pre-requisite for creating a new patient safety agenda for the future.
Developing a Patient Safety Culture in the NHS
Perhaps the most important theme identified by the Bristol Report was the need for 
the NHS to develop a wider patient safety culture. This culture it was suggested, 
should be open and transparent and incorporate clear systems for learning and taking 
remedial action when something goes wrong with patient care. Change of this nature, 
was seen as vital, in a context in which healthcare although seen as generally safe.
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increasingly comprised a complex and risky business with avoidable error costing the 
NHS billions. This context was also one in which patients were seen to falsely take 
for granted safety issues. Kennedy argued, however, that 'Bristol teaches us that this 
trust may be misplaced' (BRI Final Report 2001: 352).
In understanding the components of safe care, the Bristol report specifically 
highlighted the importance of developing an understanding of the multiple causes of 
error and the division between components related to an individual healthcare 
professional's ability to determine safe clinical care and components related to wider 
systems. The former relating to professional competency (skills, knowledge, values 
etc) and the latter relating to the way that healthcare professionals work within a 
system. This system can be linked not only to levels of resourcing, fimding and the 
physical environment, but to working arrangements, that can include long hours and 
heavy demands and the way that people work together in teams and communicate 
with each other and take decisions under pressure regarding complex information. 
'Any number of these surrounding factors, or latent conditions, can give rise to error' 
(BRI Final Report 2001: 353).
The Bristol Report showed that in the past, little existed in the way of learning from 
adverse events and that there was no understanding of the way that the wider 
organisational context impacted upon the issues. Safety tended to be seen not as an 
issue to do with clinical care, but to do with non-clinical matters such as health and 
safety. It was also noted that much of the information required to help to prevent 
adverse events was either not collected at all, or was to be found in a patchwork of 
over 1,000 unconnected and different systems. (BRI Final Report 2001: 357).
What was seen as central to creating a new safety culture was to create an open and 
non-punitive reporting environment in which health care professionals felt safe 
enough to report adverse incidents. It was envisaged that in the future, adverse events 
throughout the NHS would be reported to a new national independent body, the 
National Patient Safety Agency (NFSA). However, in order to encourage people to 
use this system freely, in an environment free of hlame and fault finding Kennedy 
recommended that the system of clinical negligence, seen as the biggest disincentive 
to openness, should be abolished.
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Kennedy was of the view that the legal system did not meet the needs of people 
seeking financial compensation or meet its other stated aim to deliver accountahility 
and act as a deterrent to medical harm. He felt this occurred because of the arbitrary 
way in which many of the more obviously negligent cases were settled quietly, thus 
preventing any pubhc airing or learning about the issues involved. Whilst in other 
cases these might not be settled, but come to light in the media even though he 
argued, they might well be more borderline.
He argued that a proper system of accountability required a more systematic approach 
to the analysis of error, which enabled performance to be properly assessed against 
clearly identifiable standards. This meant abolishing clinical negligence litigation by 
taking it out of the courts, as this system was seen to prevent any systematic 
opportunity to leam lessons, hy providing a clear disincentive to healthcare 
professionals not to report errors. Kennedy therefore called for a wide-ranging review 
to identify a replacement system that would ensure that effective learning firom errors 
could take place. This system would also need to address 'needs arising from harm, 
both financial and emotional, and how they should be compensated' (BRI Final 
Report 2001: 367).
Developing Care of an Appropriate Standard
Another key issue that Kennedy raised in his report was that until well into the 1990's, 
the notion that explicit standards that all health care professionals and hospitals should 
meet, did not exist. Thus clinical standards were left largely up to the discretion of 
individual doctors which remained the norm throughout the health service. This 
situation was seen as rooted in the historical origins of the NHS in which the 
Department of Health saw quality of care as something best left to health 
professionals and outside their remit. In this respect, healthcare professionals at a 
local level were left to monitor their own work with few national comparators for 
judging standards. Various Royal colleges and specialist associations of health care 
professionals were found to issue guidance on a range of matters, but this was 
advisory in nature. Exceptions to this situation, in providing data that could help 
clinicians reflect upon quahty of care and performance (such as the four national
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Confidential Enquiry reports and mortality data from The Society of Cardiothoracic 
Surgeons) was also found to be partial and incomplete.
To address these problems the tool of clinical audit was also seen as very problematic 
as it tended to rely on individuals to keep up to date with their knowledge and 
practice. An attempt in 1989 to introduce a national system and make it more 
systematic was seen largely by the Inquiry Report to be a failure not only because of 
the way it was resourced, but also because the system was largely seen hy healthcare 
professionals as a tool of managerial control.
As a response to the above issues the Bristol Report did note a number of more recent 
developments in this area such as increased resources to address directly quality of 
patient care, placing upon trusts and health authorities in 1999, for the first time a 
statutory duty to establish and maintain arrangements for monitoring and improving 
the quality of healthcare. This has led to the monitoring of performance through 
inspections by the Commission for Health Improvement (CHI) of trusts every four 
years to review clinical governance arrangements). The decision to set national 
standards for clinical care in the form of clinical guidelines developed by the National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) and through National Service Frameworks 
(NSF's) developed by the DOH.
However, whilst Kennedy saw these developments as a belated attempt to start 
improving the quality of care, he believed that more attention needed to be given to 
the proper development of national standards and independent monitoring of 
compliance with them. This he believed would surmount what he saw as the 
continuing dangers of a lack of co-ordination in setting standards and the absence of 
'mechanisms for surveillance' to ensure that those standards were met. He also 
recommended that 'with regard to patients treated in the private sector and fimded by 
the NHS, the approach adopted by the National Care Standards Commission should 
replicate that which applied to patients treated within the NHS' (BRI Final Report 
2001: 392).
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Public Involvement through Empowerment
In developing this new system Kennedy called for patients and the public be fully 
involved in the process. This was seen as the only way to move beyond a culture 
based upon continued secrecy and anonymity, to creating a better quality health 
service that gave patients a much greater degree of ownership over their own health 
care. To be involved it was argued the public had to be empowered. Public 
empowerment meant: 'a public that is sufficiently informed as to be able to formulate 
meaningful views about quality and direction in the planning and delivery of 
healthcare; which views are listened to and acted on by commissioners and providers 
of NHS health care at the core of their decision making' (The NHS Primary Group 
Alliance in BRI Final Report 2001: 400).
The key challenge was seen as not only how to embed key principles of patient and 
public involvement (PPI) in the NHS, but also how to devise mechanisms to ensure 
these principles became a reality. This was seen as a major challenge given past 
experience of PPI in healthcare. Kennedy pointed to previous attempts at involvement 
relating to the Community Health Councils, and lay involvement with regulatory 
bodies, hospital management committees and trust boards as largely of tokenistic 
value which had not been successful in empowering patients (BRI Final Report 2001: 
401). A lack of empowerment he argued was still the case despite the publication of 
the NHS Plan which showed that 'Too many patients feel talked at, rather than 
listened to' (NHS Plan 2000: 88).
This situation was seen as having occurred for a number of reasons such as: the lack 
of real power of bodies set up within the NHS to give the public a voice, thus turning 
these bodies into talking shops without the ability to effect any action; the 
involvement of patients and the public in bodies in which they were heavily 
outnumbered by healthcare professionals or where lack of clarity about their role 
rendered them ineffective; public consultation in which the public found their views 
ignored or where they were presented with a 'fait accompli', leading to frustration, 
distrust and subsequent disengagement; healthcare professionals increasingly tending 
to regard PPI involvement as at best tokenistic and not to be taken seriously and at 
worst a troublesome nuisance. Given these factors, Kennedy argued that a change in
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culture that involved a shift in power, was the only way to move forward and long 
overdue (BRI Final Report 2001: 402).
Four principal areas were seen as crucial regarding the involvement of the public 
arising from a commitment to a patient centred NHS. These related to: the 
development and planning of services; the operation and delivery of services; the 
competence of healthcare professionals; and the protection of vulnerable groups. All 
of these different aspects were seen to warrant the involvement of the public at all 
levels both nationally and on a local level. In particular this was seen to require PPI in 
processes designed to ensure the competence of healthcare professionals, such as 
those bodies responsible for setting standards and continuing professional 
development.
In looking at these key areas in the Bristol Report, what is clear is that the issues 
raised and the recommendations made go well beyond the boundaries of looking at 
healthcare practice through the lens of an individualist approach related to a medical 
model. In this respect, the report set out in relation to patient safety, the need for a 
comprehensive systems-based approach for dealing with the issues. This related both 
to regulating individual medical performance as well as the need to develop core 
standards of care that could be monitored on a regular basis. In looking at the need for 
a systems based approach, it was acknowledged that for too long no explicit standards 
of care had existed and that clinical standards had largely been left to the discretion of 
individual doctors. Crucially Kennedy also identified the problems created in terms of 
patient safety by not involving patients and the public in their own healthcare.
Later on in the chapter, when considering some key themes running through all of the 
reports, I return to look further at some of the implications of a systems hased 
approach to patient safety. However, before I consider this, it is important to look at 
some of the key issues identified by the Shipman Report. This report is widely 
considered to have had major implications in developing a patient safety approach in 
the primary care sector and in setting out clear systems for regulating and monitoring 
the performance of general practitioners.
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The Shipman Inquiry
Harold Frederick Shipman was convicted on 31 January 2000 of murdering 15 of his 
patients and of one count of forging a will. This occurred while he was a General 
Practitioner at Market Street, Hyde, near Manchester. He was sentenced to life 
imprisonment for these murders. The Shipman Inquiry subsequently found that 
between 1975 and 1998, Shipman was also responsible for killing no fewer than 215 
patients (Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report 2005).
On the 1 February 2000, the Secretary of State for Health announced that an 
independent inquiry would he set up to examine issues concerning the protection of 
patients and what changes should subsequently take place to the system. After a legal 
challenge by many of the families affected to prevent the Inquiry being held in 
private, it was also announced that the Inquiry would be held in public. Dame Janet 
Smith DBE a High Court judge was appointed chair of The Shipman Inquiry and 
under her jurisdiction six reports were published. The First Report looked at the detail 
and time period in which Shipman killed his patients. The Second Report looked at 
the police investigations. The Third Report looked at death certification and the 
investigation of deaths by coroners. The Fourth Report looked at the regulation of 
controlled drugs in the community. The Fifth Report looked at what lessons could be 
learned from the past to safeguard patients and proposals for the future and the Final 
Report published on 27 January 2005 looked at further allegations concerning deaths 
Shipman might have been involved in, in particular whilst he was a junior doctor 
between 1970-1974 (Shipman Inquiry Website 2001).
The Shipman Inquiry’s Terms of reference were: 'After receiving the existing 
evidence and hearing such further evidence as necessary to consider the extent of 
Harold Shipman's unlawftil activities: To enquire into the actions of the statutory 
bodies, authorities, other organisations and responsible individuals concerned in the 
procedures and investigations which followed the deaths of those of Harold Shipman's 
patients who died in unlawful or suspicious circumstances. By reference to the case of 
Harold Shipman to enquire into the performance of the functions of those statutory
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bodies, authorities, other organisations and individuals with responsibility for 
monitoring primary care provision and the use of controlled drugs; and Following 
those enquiries, to recommend what steps, if any, should be taken to protect patients 
in the future, and to report its findings to the Secretary of State for the Home 
Department and to the Secretary of State for Health' (Shipman Inquiry Website 2001).
The Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report
I have concentrated upon looking at the Shipman Inquiry's Fifth Report: 'Safeguarding 
Patients: Lessons from the Past - Proposals for the Future' (2005). This report 
concentrated on exploring what lessons could be learned in terms of protecting 
patients from harm in the future. I have therefore looked at some of the main issues 
raised in the report about developing a patient safety culture and what this might mean 
in terms of patient empowerment.
Monitoring Systems
The Inquiry examined the provisions for monitoring GPs working in the NHS over a 
period of 23 years. This included looking at the powers of the Primary Care 
Organisations (PCOs) responsible for the administration of general practice since the 
NHS came into being in 1948. When Shipman entered general practice in ,1974, 
general medical services were administered by Family Practitioner Committees 
(FPC's). FPCs were in operation until 1990, when Family Health Services Authorities 
(FHSA's) replaced them. These were replaced by Health Authorities (HAs) in 1996 
and subsequently abolished in 2002, to be replaced by local bodies called Primary 
Care Trusts (PCTs). PCTs have responsibility in England for providing all primary 
care services including general medical services (Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report 2005: 
4557).
The report noted regarding the position of GPs, that there are about 34,500 GPs in 
active practice, most of them self-employed independent contractors, although some 
are directly employed by PCTs. Ineson points out that about one million people visit 
their GP every day and almost 90% of problems are dealt with in general practice 
(2004). GP services are provided under a General Medical Services (GMS) Contract 
negotiated between the government and the profession. These contracts were the first
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to usher in more modem team-based general practice, distinct from the predominantly 
single-handed practitioners that existed up until the mid-1960s. The Shipman Inquiry 
Report notes, that Traditionally, GPs have been fiercely protective of their self- 
employed status, their independence and their clinical autonomy' (Shipman Inquiry 
Fifth Report 2005: 4557).
Throughout most of the period of Shipman's practice, the Inquiry found that the 
PCO's acted primarily as providers and facilitators of GP services to local populations 
rather than exercising a monitoring and managerial role. In the 1970's and 1980's, the 
FPC's were purely administrative organisations, with no management role or 
responsibility for professional competence or quality of care. These matters were left 
completely up to the medical profession and dealt with locally through medical 
committees (LMC's), made up of GPs or nationally through the GMC. The Inquiry 
Report notes that at this time there was however 'a recognition in some quarters 
(notably the Royal College of General Practitioners) that standards of care among 
GP's were, in general, extremely variable, and, in the case of some, unacceptably low' 
(Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report 2005: 4559). Meanwhile, the FPCs lacked the 
necessary powers to undertake any systematic monitoring of clinical performance or 
of the quality of services offered by GPs (Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report 2005: 4559).
The only way that a PCO might become aware of problems with a GPs practice was if 
a complaint was made which until 1996 were directed to the PCOs. However the 
Inquiry saw this mechanism as entirely reactive, with little in the way of proactive 
monitoring of poor performance or malpractice in the 1970s or 1980s. During the 
1980s and 1990s this position was seen to shift a little bit with the FPCs given 
increased responsibilities and a managerial role. In the early 1990s the government 
also began to encourage the use of medical or clinical audit to enable doctors to 
analyse data from their clinical practice and use it to improve performance. However 
the Inquiry Report noted that despite these measures 'there were still considerable 
limitations on the ability of the PCOs to deal with those GPs who were not amenable 
to change' (Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report 2005: 4559).
The Inquiry found that this position meant that during the period in which Shipman 
was in practice the PCOs in Thameside covering the area where he worked, were
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unaware of his past convictions and referral to the GMC. The PCO arrangements for 
monitoring and supervision, however, were not seen as untypical of other PCOs 
around the country. The Report pointed out that it was extraordinary that PCOs had so 
few powers to regulate GP behaviour until less than a decade ago and put this down to 
the historical status of GPs as independent contractors. This effectively constrained 
the level of control and supervision on GPs that could be imposed by PCOs. The 
Inquiry Report noted that in 'the early part of the period during which Shipman was in 
practice, there was a strong belief, apparently shared by government, that the medical 
profession itself provided the best (indeed the only) means of imposing high standards 
of clinical care and professional conduct on doctors and of monitoring those 
standards' (Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report 2005: 4562) rigorously.
The Inquiry Report shows however that hy the 1980s, the above view was beginning 
to change on the part of government. In this respect they had begun to recognise that 
PCO's would have to be given some level of managerial responsibility over GPs if 
any consistency were to be achieved in terms of the provision of GP services, 
standards and tackling poor performance. This has led since 1998, to a considerable 
number of developments in terms of the arrangements for monitoring GPs (Shipman 
Inquiry Fifth Report 2005: 4561). The most significant change related to the Inquiry's 
remit, was the replacement of the HAs, hy the PCT's. Although smaller organisations, 
they were given a wide range of powers. The Inquiry found that these powers 
generally did allow PCT's to take better action to protect patients, however, it 
concluded 'These powers are new and the evidence suggests that, as yet, they are not 
being fully exercised in all areas' (Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report 2005: 4562).
For example, a number of steps were taken to increase the information available to 
PCT's about doctors who are on or want to join their lists. GPs are now required to 
declare information ahout any past or current criminal or disciplinary proceedings or 
involvement with any regulatory body or previous action regarding list management 
with another PCT. Since 2000, the GMC is also required to inform PCTs or a doctor's 
employer about a complaint or report being acted upon through its Fitness to Practise 
Procedures (FTP). PCT's in turn are required to make specific checks before admitting 
doctors to their lists and with the additional information available to them are in a
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much better position to not only make informed decisions, but to monitor doctors on 
their list.
Despite this situation however, the Inquiry Report found that gaps still existed in the 
information PCTs were able to access. This related to not having information about 
complaints that had not been investigated or substantiated or led to any disciplinary or 
list management action or PCTs not having information about medical negligence 
actions resulting in a finding or damages against a doctor. It was also noted that PCTs 
were dependent upon doctors not only to be truthful about the information they gave, 
but themselves needed to be able to collate a range of information which could be 
difficult and time consuming (Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report 2005: 4563).
On a national level however, the Report noted that new organisations had been set up 
with an important role in regulating and monitoring standards such as The Healthcare 
Commission (HCC) and The National Clinical Assessment Authority (NCAA). The 
latter 'set up to provide local NHS bodies with advice and support in the detection and 
assessment of substandard performance by NHS doctors and in the remediation of any 
problems detected’ (Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report 2005: 4562). Other key areas were 
also identified as important for the monitoring and supervision of GPs which are 
considered in more detail below. These areas relate to systems of clinical governance 
and complaints in primary care and the role of the GMC.
Clinical Governance:
The Inquiry Report particularly highlighted the new framework of monitoring known 
as clinical governance. This was introduced in the context of primary care with the 
intention 'that it should consist of an integrated system of different types of activity, 
all aimed at improving quality of care' (Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report 2005: 4562). 
Properly developed the Report indicated that this system had the potential to enable 
PCTs to detect poorly performing or dysfunctional GPs and to enable doctors 
performing to a satisfactory performance to do better. However, the current system of 
clinical governance was seen as deficient because of reasons such as the limited data 
available and ability to make use of it and in the difficulty attributing data to 
individual doctors. The real obstacle to implementing clinical governance however.
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was seen as 'the position of GPs as independent contractors and the consequent 
inability of PCTs to 'manage' them for clinical governance purposes' (Shipman 
Inquiry Fifth Report 2005: 4562).
This situation was seen to require greater powers for PCTs to enable them to 
discharge their clinical governance responsibilities and be accountable for upholding 
the duty of quality placed upon them. Key recommendations from the Inquiry called 
for: PCTs and bodies such as the HCC, GMC, NCAA and DOH to be able to access 
as much information about doctors on or joining PCT lists as possible; for the creation 
of a central database of information about every doctor in the UK, which would be 
available to a range of bodies to make checks, as well as to doctors themselves to 
check the accuracy of their own information; for certain types of information about a 
GP to be made available to patients to allow them to access certain types of 
information from the GMC about a doctor's disciplinary and criminal record, 
registration and revalidation status; and, that patients be given the opportunity to 
refuse to be treated by a doctor who is subject to conditions or who has resumed work 
after suspension or erasure as part of their right to an informed choice on the matter 
(Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report 2005: 4563).
Dealing with Complaints
Up until 1996, complaints made by or on behalf of a patient would go directly to the 
PCO. This system 'was linked directly with the disciplinary powers of the PCO, 
hacked by the SoS, the NHS Tribunal and, ultimately, by the GMC (Shipman Inquiry 
Fifth Report 2005: 4563). The Report notés however, that this system was far from 
perfect, because it not only did not allow for a complaint to be independently 
investigated, but also left the complainant with a very short space of time to gather the 
evidence on their own and to present their case. On the other hand, doctors 'who were 
usually represented by their medical defence organisation, often appeared to be at an 
advantage' (Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report 2005: 4563). This system though, was at 
least seen to offer a mechanism for airing and deciding upon complaints and for 
providing a standard against which that complaint could be judged. Shipman was the 
subject of three formal complaints during his practice, however the Inquiry concluded
109
that even if they had been investigated in greater detail they would not have thrown 
any light on Shipman's 'murderous' character.
After 1996, a change was made to the complaints system, which meant that 
complaints were made directly to GP practices. This was seen however as inhibiting 
many patients. It also meant that the HAs at the time might remain completely 
unaware a complaint had been registered. If a complainant was not satisfied with the 
way that their complaint was handled initially, they could then take the complaint to 
the PCO, where a non-executive member of the PCO board could be asked to convene 
an Independent Review Panel (IPR). However, the Inquiry Report notes that the IRP 
could not impose or recommend the imposition of any sanctions and even though in 
theory the PCO could subsequently do this, they rarely did so. The Report therefore 
concluded, 'the arrangements for handling complaints against GPs after 1996 became 
even less effective as a means of detecting malpractice or poor performance than the 
previous arrangements has been' (Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report 2005: 4564).
At the time of the Inquiry Report's publication the complaints procedure remained in 
transition. Whilst the first stage remained the same, the second stage had been moved 
to the Healthcare Commission. However, following the recent publication of the 
document 'Making experiences Count' (2007), (proposing new arrangements for 
handling health and social care complaints), it has been proposed, following Dame 
Janet Smith's recommendation, to give patients with complaints against a GP, a right 
to go directly to their PCT, rather than to their GP practice first. The Shipman Inquiry 
Report also recommended that what was key for the future was to develop a 
complaints system directed firstly towards ensuring patient satisfaction and patient 
safety, but one that was also fair to doctors.
The Role of the GMC
The Inquiry Report made a number of serious criticisms of the GMC which will have 
a number of implications in the future for the way that body protects patients and 
manages its regulatory role with doctors.
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Firstly, the Inquiry criticised the way the GMC dealt with Shipman's criminal 
convictions. Shipman was convicted in the 1970s of unlawful possession of and 
dishonestly obtaining a controlled drug and forgery at Halifax Magistrates Court and 
asked for 74 similar offences to be taken into consideration. He was fined and ordered 
to pay compensation. Given his convictions the police were required to report this 
situation to the GMC, in order that they could consider Shipman's suitability to 
practice. In 1976, the GMC had the power to strike off from the medical register or 
suspend or impose conditions on a doctor for gaining any criminal convictions 
(Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report 2005: 4566).
In handling this situation the GMC ultimately decided not to refer Shipman's case to 
their disciplinary committee and closed his case with a warning. The Inquiry in 
examining similar cases found that this approach was hy no means untypical and that 
the GMC's policy in these types of cases was to allow the doctor to continue to 
practice, whilst enabling them to become rehabilitated. The Inquiry concluded that in 
dealing with such cases,
'the GMC focused too much on the interests of the doctors and not sufficiently 
on the public interest and the need for patients to be protected from drug 
abusing doctors'.
(Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report 2005: 4566)
In this respect, the issue was seen as not whether to rehabilitate doctors, but how the 
GMC had failed to strike the right balance between protecting patients and regulating 
the behaviour of doctors. The Inquiry Report did concede however, that further 
investigation hy the GMC at the time into Shipman's case would have made little 
difference to the final outcome in terms of the murders he committed.
A second and related area the Inquiry looked at in relation to the GMC, was the 
operation of their Fitness to Practise Procedures (FTP). Although at the time of the 
Inquiry investigations, the old FTP procedures had recently been replaced, the Inquiry 
still wished to examine how they had operated previously in order to make 
recommendations about the future.
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Under the previous FTP procedures, in operation until November 2004, the GMC was 
able to take action on a doctors registration only if they were found guilty of serious 
professional misconduct (SPM), if their professional performance was found to be 
deficient, or if their fitness to practise was seriously impaired by a physical or mental 
condition. These areas were dealt with respectively under the GMC's conduct 
performance or health procedures. In looking at how these procedures operated in 
practice, up until new FTP procedures (combining all three of these areas) were 
unveiled in 2001, the Inquiry found a number of issues.
In relation to a complaint about serious impairment due to a physical or mental 
condition, the complaint tended to be dealt with under voluntary health procedures in 
which a doctor gave an undertaking to address the problem area. The Inquiry found 
that these arrangements seemed to work well until the late 1990s, when an 
independent review at the time showed that the voluntary procedures needed 
'tightening up'. Despite congratulating the GMC on responding to this review, the 
Inquiry raised further concerns in this area, mainly that drug-abusing doctors (abuse 
in relation to themselves, rather than patients) were more or less being automatically 
referred into the voluntary health procedures and down the rehabilitative road without 
the nature of the drug related misconduct being dealt with. This was seen as not 
always operating in the interests of patient protection (Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report 
2005: 4567).
In relation to the conduct procedures, the Inquiry noted that the level of complaints 
going to the GMC increased markedly from about 1600 in 1994 to about 4000 in 
2004. These complaints covered a range of matters firom serious to very minor 
incidents. In order to deal with what fell under their jurisdiction and how it needed to 
be dealt with, the GMC operated under the old FTP procedures a complex filtering 
mechanism. This eventually led to the referral of cases to the GMC body with the 
power to take punitive action on registration, the Professional Conduct Committee 
(PCC). However, the Inquiry found that only a very small proportion (no more than 
about 5%) of cases survived the filtering processes to reach the PCC and that in 2003, 
at least 65% of complaints were closed at this stage of the initial sift (Shipman Inquiry 
Fifth Report 2005: 4567).
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The way these processes operated was seen by the Inquiry to have an important 
impact upon the protection of patients. This was because ultimately if cases were 
being disqualified which raised legitimate issues of concern, then doctors involved 
were simply being left to practice regardless. In relation to decisions by the PCC, the 
Inquiry Report also criticised the failure of the GMC to define SPM, as an important 
area forming the basis of the GMC's jurisdiction. The report noted, this meant 'As a 
consequence, the operation of the conduct procedures was beset by inconsistent 
decisions' (Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report 2005: 4567). This situation was also seen to 
be compounded for many years by the fact that no official guidance existed on what 
sanctions could be imposed by GMC panels. The Council for Healthcare Regulatory 
Excellence (CHRE) has now acquired the right to refer to the high court, in the public 
interest if any sanction imposed by the GMC is considered to be unduly lenient. This 
right was noted by the Inquiry, as being entirely beneficial in improving decisions of 
the PCC.
The New 'Fitness to Practise' Procedures and Revalidation
In 2001, the GMC set out their vision for their new FTP procedures, the key point 
being to protect patients whilst being fair to doctors. However, in the move to 
implement these procedures the Inquiry concluded that it was difficult to still 
recognise the main underlying principles set out in the original vision. In terms of the 
key changes, the new FTP procedures moved to amalgamate the old conduct, health 
and performance procedures into one set of procedures, which would enable the GMC 
to look at a range of allegations through one type of panel hearing.
Under the amended Medical Act 1983, the GMC's remit will be to regulate a doctor's 
fitness to practise, which will cover 'misconduct, deficient professional performance, 
convictions or cautions, adverse health or a determination by another regulatory body 
that the doctor's fitness to practise is impaired' (Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report 2005: 
4568).
A major criticism raised by the Inquiry Report was that the problem of defining what 
constituted a breach would still remain a major issue, as would a continuing failure to 
formulate standards, criteria and thresholds by which impairment of fitness to practise 
could be judged. The report did note that with the large number of recommendations
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made by them in this area, the new procedures would constitute a great improvement 
on the old ones for protecting patients. But they also issued the warning, that:
'The success of the new procedures depends to a large extent upon the will and 
determination of the GMC to make them operate for the benefit o f patients 
rather than, as the old procedures often operated, for the benefit of doctors'.
(Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report 2005: 4568)
One further area that it is important to comment on concerns revalidation. In 2000, in 
the wake of the public furore concerning a number of medical scandals, the Inquiry 
Report notes, the GMC decided 'to introduce a quite revolutionary method of 
monitoring doctors' (Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report 2005: 4569). In essence, this 
meant that rather than just reacting to complaints, as a way of checking up on 
performance, doctors in addition to just being on the medical register, would be 
forced to hold a license to practise. This would then be revalidated every year by 
doctors undergoing an evaluation of their fitness to practise through assessment of a 
folder of evidence submitted to a revalidation group. Despite however, what was 
viewed by the Inquiry as originally, an innovative and proactive way to proceed, they 
pointed out this approach has now been abandoned because of the cost and 
administrative hurden and because 'the proposals were unpopular with important 
sections of the medical profession' (Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report 2005: 4569).
Instead the Inquiry found the original proposals had now been replaced by a scheme 
which required doctors only to take part in an appraisal to justify revalidation and 
would only lead to non-revalidation if performance was very poor. This was seen as 
very unsatisfactory by the Inquiry, given they argued, that the appraisal process could 
only be seen as a formative process and not what was promised by the GMC in terms 
of providing a positive evaluation of fitness to practise (Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report 
2005: 4569). A number of recommendations have been made in this area to rectify 
this situation.
In conclusion, the Shipman Inquiry makes a number of damming criticisms against 
the GMC and the way that it has operated in the past and continues to do so in the 
present. The report noted that a change of culture within the GMC and its 
commitment to its duty of protecting patients was fundamental to the future success of
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the new FTP procedures. However, it was also noted that there appeared to be in-built 
features concerning the way that the GMC operated that meant that change in this 
respect, on a fundamental level was doubtful.
The Inquiry Report noted in its conclusions on past conduct within the GMC:
'Having examined the evidence, I  have been driven to the conclusion that the 
GMC has not, in the past, succeeded in its primary purpose o f protecting 
patients. Instead it has, to a very significant degree, acted in the interests of 
doctors. Of course, I  accept that the GMC also has a duty towards doctors; it 
must be fair in all its dealings with them. But, in the past, the balance has been 
wrong and, in my view, the imbalance was due to a culture within the GMC, a 
set of attitudes and an approach that put what was seen as being 'fair to 
doctors' ahead ofprotecting patients'.
Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report 2005: 4570)
The Inquiry Report did acknowledge that in recent years some beneficial changes had 
taken place, within the GMC, such as the introduction of the new FTP procedures and 
the process of revalidation, which were seen to improve the position of complainants 
and the system to protect patients. However, the report still noted:
'I would like to believe that the GMC's culture will continue to change in the 
right direction by virtue o f its own momentum. However, I  do not feel
confident that it will do so ................ The problem seems to be that, when
specific issues arise, opposing views are taken and, as in the past, the balance 
tends to tip in favour of the interests of doctors'.
(Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report 2005: 4570)
This conclusion by the Inquiry raises considerable questions about medical 
dominance and the imbalance of power between doctors and patients. The conclusion 
seems even more worrying when viewed in the light of the inquiry's criticisms ahout 
the failure of doctors generally to report concerns about another doctor regarding the 
treatment of a patient. The Inquiry report found evidence that doctors were reluctant 
to report each other because they found it 'improper to criticise or deprecate the 
conduct of a fellow professional' (Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report 2005: 4565). This 
was found to be the case despite GMC guidance since 1993 making it clear that 
doctors had a duty to report others doctors if they had concerns related to patient 
safety. The Inquiry concluded on this however, that Professor Kennedy in 2001 had 
suggested that the old culture among doctors was still alive at that time and that
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evidence 'received by this Inquiry suggests that, in some quarters, it survives even 
today' (Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report 2005: 4565).
The Reports and Key Themes
Given the issues raised in these two reports about medical harm and patient safety, the 
remainder of this chapter will now look at some key themes from the reports in more 
detail. These themes tie into the arguments being explored in the thesis and relate 
firstly to whether the reports provide any evidence of or can be seen to represent a 
loss of public confidence in the medical profession and what this might be about. 
Whether there is any evidence in the reports that suggests that medical dominance and 
control was a contributory factor in the issues being looked at in the reports and how 
these issues might be addressed. Lastly the chapter will look at what evidence exists 
to further the debate about taking an individuaUst or systems/structuralist approach 
when looking at medical practice (as highlighted in chapter two). In exploring this 
evidence a key issue will be to look at what progress has been made in building a new 
safety culture based upon a broader systems approach in the NHS since the 
publication of the Bristol and Shipman reports.
The Medical Profession and a loss of Public Confidence
In the previous two chapters of the thesis it has been argued that the scale of medical 
harm in healthcare is considerable and that this situation has had a significant impact 
upon the victims of harm. However, given this situation, it has also been argued that 
the way that medical harm has occurred and been constructed, has been distorted by 
the power of the medical profession to articulate the issues in a way that has been in 
their own interests. Given this argument it is therefore useful to look at post-Bristol, 
whether there is any evidence to suggest a broader pattern of diminishing trust and 
reduced public confidence in the medical profession linked to issues of medical 
power, dominance and control.
One way to look at these issues, is to take a cursory glance at the news over the last 
few years which throw up a bewildering array of negative headlines about the medical 
profession. News headlines such as: "Arrogance of doctors led to organ scandal -
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Inquiry says removal of children's hearts ignored views of parents" (Sarah Boseley 
May 11 2000); " 'Grotesque' breach of Trust at Alder - Huge scale of storage of 
children's organs will appal the public" (Sarah Boseley January 29, 2001); "NHS 
inquiry to tackle loss of trust" (John Carvel May 21, 2003); "Arrogant surgeons risk 
another Bristol babies scandal" (Templeton & Feinmann September 3, 2006). These 
headlines all appear to suggest that there is an increasing loss of public confidence 
and trust in the medical profession.
On the other hand, evidence from a MORI poll conducted for the British Medical 
Association (BMA), which carried out face-to face interviews between 17-21 
February 2005 with 2,017 adults in Britain aged 15 or over, found that doctors were 
identified as the profession most trusted by individuals compared to 16 other 
professional groups. The BMA also pointed out that doctors had 'consistently topped 
the list of most trusted professions in the last 22 years of MORI's annual poll' (BMA 
2005).
However, a more systematic review of national newspaper reporting in the wake of 
the Bristol scandal carried out hy Davies & Shields, found as one of its most striking 
findings, widespread 'public mistrust in doctors and the health care system' (1999: 
340). The authors of this study point out that the review was carried out after the 
GMC hearing into events at the Bristol Royal Infirmary that resulted in verdicts of 
serious professional misconduct against three senior doctors. The review looked at 
eight national daily papers (four broadsheets and four tabloids) and six national 
Sunday papers (four broadsheets and two tabloids) in the five-week period after the 
GMC's delivery of the misconduct verdicts and subsequent sentencing. The key aim 
of the review 'was to describe the main themes emerging from the press coverage and 
to assess the implications for future debates over clinical performance and 
accountability' (Davies & Shields 1999: 340).
The authors of the review argued that their intention was not to assess the quality or 
otherwise of the reporting. Their view was that whilst they found the reports emotive 
and largely hostile, they maintained that media reporting as and of itself, was an 
important marker of public thinking and debate. In this respect they concluded that 
their findings presented 'a bleak picture of hostility and falling public regard towards
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doctors, concern about widespread (but largely hidden) failures in quality, and a 
rejection of professional self-regulation in favour of external monitoring of 
performance' (Davies & Shields 1999: 340).
This call for more accountahility from the medical profession, is also a theme that 
runs throughout the Bristol and Shipman Inquiry Reports. In this respect the reports 
consistently highlight failures to develop proper systems for monitoring standards and 
the quality of healthcare, for regulating individual medical performance and for 
dealing with and learning from complaints. These are also issues that have continued 
to arise in countless other government reports as highlighted later in the chapter. It is 
therefore my contention that addressing these issues has to he a vital part of building a 
new patient safety agenda in partnership with patients in the NHS.
What is interesting however, in looking at this dehate about public confidence and 
trust in the medical profession, is that it is not a new one and emerged with some 
vigour in the 1970s and 1980s. In this context, sociologists such as Freidson (1970, 
1983) and Illich (1977) raised a number of issues about medicine generally. They 
argued that pubhc institutions in a climate of economic crisis and uncertainty needed 
to be able to adapt to change, re-organisation and retrenchment and to he accountable 
in the way that they provided public services. Key determinants of change were seen 
in debates about the need to contain rising costs and in the way that doctors had 
engendered 'greater public scepticism and distrust', of their motives and the 'reliahility 
and value of their expertise'. Other issues related to an increased fear of medical 
experiments and a 'concern about the long-term effects or side effects of new drugs' 
and in some quarters to a greater interest in self-help and self-care (Freidson 1983: 
209).
In a cautious, hut provocative challenge to the profession, Freidson argued that whilst 
it would be an exaggeration and indeed,
'conceptually vulgar to say that these changes represent the de­
professionalization or proletarianization of medicine, .... they do represent a 
movement toward an important reorganization o f the profession as a 
corporate entity toward greater control of the activities of the practising 
physician by that corporate entity, and toward a significant redefinition of the
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profession's relation to other occupations, to its patients and to agencies of the 
state'.
(Freidson 1983: 209)
Ultimately Freidson argued that the critical question for medicine was not whether 
change would occur, but what role the profession could play in this process. In his 
view, he felt that whilst the profession had achieved a fair degree of success in 
blocking change to its advantage in the past, he felt that continued attempts along this 
path would be counterproductive. He also felt that this type of action by the medical 
profession would not succeed in preventing change, but only in ensuring the 
profession lost the power to shape the direction of that change alongside other key 
stakeholders.
The arguments above therefore clearly raise issues about a loss of confidence in the 
medical profession, but also raise important considerations about structural changes in 
the provision of healthcare and about the dominance and power of doctors and the 
medical profession. This thesis therefore argues that despite these arguments first 
being posed in the 1980's, they appear to be as relevant today, (particularly when 
thinking about medical harm and patient empowerment), as they were when they were 
first raised.
It is therefore useful to look in a bit more detail about what the Bristol and Shipman 
reports throw up in terms of the issue of medical dominance.
Medical Dominance and Control
In looking at this issue in the Bristol and Shipman Reports, a key area that is 
highlighted is the issue of an imbalance of power between doctors and patients. This 
is highlighted in a number of different ways. The Bristol report argued that a 
fundamental problem with the culture at Bristol Royal Infirmary was that there was 
no agreed means for assessing the quahty of care and no standards for evaluating 
performance. A 'club culture' was seen to exist within the hospital and an imbalance 
of power that left too much control in the hands of a few individuals (BRI Inquiry 
Final Report: 2). This situation was seen as being rooted in the historical origins of the 
NHS, with clinical standards largely left to the discretion of individual doctors.
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because the Department of Health saw quality of care as best left to health 
professionals and therefore outside of their remit. This on the one hand was seen to 
leave healthcare professionals at a local level with ultimate discretion to monitor their 
work, with few national comparators or guidance with which to judge standards.
Kennedy saw the way forward in this area as the need for the proper development of 
standards and independent monitoring of compliance with them. What he believed 
was a danger to this objective was a lack of co-ordination between different bodies in 
setting these standards and a lack of 'mechanisms for surveillance' to ensure standards 
were met (BRI Final Report 2001: 392).
Linked to creating this new culture based upon definable standards and ensuring 
accountability through monitoring, was the idea that a new safer culture should be 
open and non-punitive, to allow for learning firom errors to take place. In order to 
achieve this it was argued that litigation should be abolished, because it did not 
achieve its goal of delivering accountahility for medical negligence. It was therefore 
argued that a new no-fault compensation scheme should be put in place that would 
allow for learning and accountahility to take place through developing an open 
reporting culture.
However, I would argue that whilst Kennedy raises important issues about a lack of 
accountability in the current system, what he didn't address in recommending a new 
no-fault compensation scheme for victims of harm, was the importance of this scheme 
allowing for fair and independent investigation of the issues. It will be argued later in 
the chapter, that the failure of the current system to allow victims of harm to get open 
and honest explanations about what has happened to them, is precisely what pushes 
them into litigation in the first place. It has also been argued previously in chapter one 
that the way that the system is constructed only allows tiny numbers of people harmed 
by negligence to get justice. It is therefore argued that a ftmdamental imbalance of 
power exists between claimants and defendants when medical negligence occurs that 
has allowed the medical profession to continue to cover-up (and indeed continue to 
bury) its mistakes. This situation is seen as a major barrier to allowing the NHS to 
leam from its errors and to be part of a situation that reinforces the current culture of 
denial within the NHS (DOH 2006).
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Kennedy also stressed that a further ingredient in ensuring a better quality health 
service, was the need for patients to be involved in all aspects of planning, 
organisation and the delivery of healthcare. However to be involved he argued, the 
public had to be empowered. However, at Bristol he found quite the opposite to be the 
case and 'a sense, among many parents, of disempowerment' (BRI Final Report 2001: 
401). The Inquiry Report concluded on this issue, that it agreed with the NHS Primary 
Care Group Alliance in its paper to the Inquiry, which stated:
'Being sincere about involving patients and the public in making decisions
about their own care or about local health services involves a shift o f power.
Until individuals working in the NHS are ready for that, any user or public
involvement in decision making will be a token event'.
(The NHS Primary Care Group Alliance. Position Paper cited in BRI Final Report 
2001: 402)
The Inquiry Report strongly maintained that: 'We believe that the time is overdue for 
that 'shift in power' (BRI Final Report 2001: 402).
If we look at the Shipman Report, similar issues were raised about the imbalance of 
power between doctors and patients. Dame Janet Smith concluded her report by 
stating very powerfully that in the past the GMC had not 'succeeded in its primary 
purpose of protecting patients. Instead it had, to a very significant degree, acted in the 
interests of doctors' (Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report 2005: 4570). Even more 
worryingly, she stated in her report that, 'I would like to believe that the GMC's 
culture will continue to change in the right direction by virtue of its own momentum, 
however, I do not feel confident that it will do so' (Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report 
2005: 4570). This statement clearly makes the point that in the past the balance of 
power has been tipped generally too much in favour of doctors to the detriment of 
patients. In looking at why this was the case the Report clearly highlighted the way 
that procedures and structures within the GMC operated against complainants when 
they tried to raise issues about doctors. Just as important, the Report also showed the 
way that a culture existed in the medical profession that militated against criticising 
other doctors or reporting concerns regarding their treatment of a patient.
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In addition to this very strong criticism of the GMC, the Shipman Report highlighted 
many of the same criticisms about the imbalance of power between doctors and 
patients made in the Bristol Report, particularly the huge failure of monitoring 
systems to protect patients and to ensure proper standards of care. In looking at the 
issues in primary care, the Shipman Report highlights how Primary Care 
Organisations (PCOs) responsible since 1948 for the administration of general 
practice, had few powers to regulate the performance and behaviour of GPs until less 
than a decade ago. This was put down not only to the historical status of GPs as 
independent contractors, but also (as mentioned previously with hospital doctors) 
because of 'a strong belief, apparently shared by government, that the medical 
profession itself provided the best (indeed the only) means of imposing high standards 
of clinical care and professional conduct on doctors and of monitoring those 
standards' (Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report 2005: 4562). The report noted that this view 
had changed somewhat in the 1990's with the government recognising that in order to 
achieve any consistency in standards and to tackle poor GP performance, there had to 
be better arrangement for monitoring GPs. This meant in the 1990's replacing the 
HA's with PCTs, who were given a wide range of powers. However, they also 
concluded, 'These powers are new and the evidence suggests that, as yet, they are not 
being fully exercised in all areas' (Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report 2005: 4562).
The Shipman Report also went on to single out criticism of other arrangements for 
monitoring GPs such as the new firamework for monitoring GPs through clinical 
governance. Whilst this framework was seen as having the potential to enable PCTs to 
detect poorly performing or dysfunctional GPs and to raise quality standards, 
problems with data quality and collection were seen to impede its use. In addition the 
report concluded, the 'real obstacle to implementing clinical governance is the 
position of GPs as independent contractors and the consequent inability of PCTs to 
'manage' them for clinical govemance purposes' (Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report 2005: 
4562). The system for dealing with complaints against GPs was also seen as deficient. 
This meant that whilst up until 1996 patients could go directly to their PCO, this still 
did not allow for their complaints to be independently investigated (Shipman Inquiry 
Fifth Report 2005: 4563). Whilst after 1996, the Report notes, the complaints system 
'became even less effective as a means of detecting malpractice or poor performance 
than the previous arrangements has been' (Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report 2005: 4564).
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This situation is now being addressed with new proposals to change the complaints 
system as mentioned earlier.
Developing a Systems Approach in Patient Safety
The third area to emerge as a key theme in the reports relates to the issue of the causes 
of medical harm and the debate about individual agency versus the role of system 
failures in causing harm. The Bristol Report emphasised the need to understand the 
multiple causes of error when looking at adverse events. The Report noted that the 
issues at Bristol were as much to do with general failings within the health service as 
they were to do with individual culpability. Therefore in building a new patient safety 
culture, it was argued that one had to look at components related both to an individual 
healthcare professional's ability to maintain safe clinical care as much as to do with 
issues related to the wider system. The former relating to professional competency 
(skills, knowledge and values etc) and the latter linked to the working of the 
healthcare system such as resources, funding, the physical environment, working 
arrangements, including long hours, team work, communication, conveying complex 
information etc.
Evidence reinforcing the argument about addressing the multiple causes of error, has 
been illustrated throughout this chapter and discussed further in the section above on 
medical dominance. However in practice, it is argued that the approach to dealing 
with error has concentrated disproportionately on the case for dealing with safety 
issues to do with addressing broader systems in the healthcare environment, rather 
than also putting in place proper systems for monitoring professional performance. 
This situation is seen as problematic.
The basic contention is that the failure to address the monitoring of professional 
performance and accountability issues tie into the arguments raised by Freidson in 
chapter two of the thesis. These arguments raise issues about the power and 
dominance of the medical profession to develop and construct healthcare in their own 
interests and the implications of this for patient care. It is also argued that the state has 
traditionally tolerated and encouraged this situation, thereby failing to take the 
necessary action to protect patients. The findings of the Bristol and Shipman Reports
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in particular, are seen to make quite clear the implications of having a system of 
healthcare that allows doctors to have too much power over patients, which in turn 
fails to put in place proper systems for monitoring and regulating these professional 
powers and for ensuring accountability and redress for patients.
Given this situation, it is argued that a new holistic systems based model needs to be 
developed for addressing patient safety in the NHS that deals with addressing the 
multiple causes of medical harm as set out above. This model is seen as vital for 
protecting patients and in order for it to be effective it is argued that it should also 
incorporate an approach based upon patient empowerment.
Progress in Developing a Patient Safety Culture
In the section below, consideration is given to what progress has been made in 
developing a systems-based approach in the NHS to tackling patient safety concerns 
that also deals with a range of issues to do with reporting, monitoring and prevention, 
as well as the regulation of performance and accountability.
The report 'An organisation with a memory' (2000) represented a major turning point 
in tackling patient safety incidents and provided the first comprehensive look at the 
way that the NHS managed adverse events and learned from them. The report was 
based on the findings of a committee of experts hrom both within and outside of the 
NHS. The committee was set up in February 1999 by the Health Minister Baroness 
Hayman and was chaired by the Chief Medical Officer, Professor Liam Donaldson. 
The report based its arguments on experiences in secondary hospital care, whilst 
acknowledging that the 'truth is that we simply do not know the frequency and nature 
of such problems occurring in primary care' (DOH 2000: 7). However, in the wake of 
the Shipman convictions, the report was asked to make recommendations by Health 
ministers concerning the reporting arrangements for adverse clinical incidents in 
primary care.
Broadly speaking the report found that whilst serious failures were relatively 
uncommon compared to the high volume of care in the NHS, where they did occur 
they caused not only severe distress to patients and healthcare staff, but had huge
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financial implications generally. Perhaps the most serions finding was that where 
these failures in healthcare had occurred, the reality was that they had often taken 
place previously and often in much the same manner. The key point was that many 
adverse incidents could be avoided if only the lessons were properly learned. Hence 
the title of the report, 'An organisation with a memory' which was implying that NHS 
organisations needed to have a memory on learning firom adverse incidents and a 
culture and infirastructure to support that learning which currently did not appear to be 
there.
The report highlighted a number of key points that could assist the NHS in learning 
firom other sectors. These were the importance of developing an organisational culture 
that promoted patient safety, the development of proper incident reporting systems 
and the development of a system for sound clinical governance arrangements and risk 
management strategies in NHS organisations.
The first area related to the idea of developing an open and just reporting culture in 
the NHS based upon creating a climate in which workers felt fi*ee to report their errors 
or near-misses, which were then analysed, with feedback given to staff on action 
taken. The aim was to encourage a type of culture that would not totally exclude 
blame, but would foster an atmosphere of trust in order to encourage workers to report 
patient safety incidents. The second area concerned the failure to develop within the 
NHS a proper standardised reporting system for adverse events. Drawing upon 
research firom other sectors the main characteristics identified for effective incident 
reporting systems were the need: for the separation of the collection of data and 
analysis firom disciplinary or regulatory bodies; the collection of information on "near 
misses" as well as on actual incidents; mandatory reporting that provided rapid, 
useful, accessible and intelligible feedback; standardised reporting systems within 
organisations; a working assumption that individuals should be thanked for reporting 
incidents, rather than automatically blamed for what had gone wrong and standardised 
risk assessment that provided a common understanding of what factors are important 
in determining risk and the potential for confidential or de-identified reporting' (DOH: 
2000: 45).
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The third area identified by the report, was the importance of developing sound 
clinical governance arrangements and risk management strategies in NHS 
organisations as an important way of reducing the likelihood of service failures. The 
report saw this fi*amework as starting to be developed through initiatives such as the 
1997 government White Paper, The new NHS: modem, dependable, setting out its 
plan for modernising the health service over the next ten years. An important aspect 
of these proposals was the aim of bringing about a major improvement in the quality 
of clinical care. The Health Acts of 1999 and 2003 also set out a statutory 'duty of 
quality' for all providers of NHS services. This duty of quality is discharged at a local 
level through the implementation of clinical governance.
Clinical governance was seen as requiring the creation not only of a particular type of 
culture, but also systems and ways of working aimed at constantly improving the 
quality of service provision throughout an organisation, for example developing clear 
arrangements for reporting and accountability, with ultimate responsibility for quality 
resting with a Tmst Board. As well as developing a comprehensive programme for 
ensuring quality improvements and risk management processes, which also enabled 
poor professional performance to be dealt with.
To reinforce work at a local level, key measures at a national level were seen as those 
documented in the Government's health service modernisation strategy set out in the 
consultation document, A First Class Service: Quality in the new NHS (1998). These 
called for the development of national quality standards devised by a new National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) and National Service Frameworks (NSF's). 
The development of systems of clinical governance in NHS organisations and for 
strong monitoring systems to be developed via a new statutory Commission, the 
Health Care Commission (HCC) and for the development of an NHS Performance 
Assessment Framework and a national survey of NHS patients and user experience.
Another important national measure related to government proposals for dealing with 
poor performance amongst doctors, set out in a consultation paper called 'Supporting 
Doctors, Protecting Patients' (1999). This paper recognised that whilst adverse events 
were caused by multiple factors, some were also inevitably caused by poor 
performance by individual clinicians. The paper noted the failure to pick up on cases
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of poor clinical performance of doctors in the past and the considerable public 
concern this had caused and set out a number of proposals for addressing this 
situation.
Therefore what is evident from 'An organisation with a memory', is the commitment 
to implementing a wide ranging and comprehensive systems approach to addressing 
patient safety issues within the NHS covering both improvement, learning and 
performance issues. However, despite this report, a number of subsequent reports 
looking at different aspects of patient safety have since highlighted a number of 
concerns and gaps about the implementation of patient safety processes and systems.
Progress Post 'An organisation with a memory*
In determining the extent of this progress, the focus will be on looking at two main 
areas, which are used as indicators in establishing whether a patient safety culture 
within the NHS has become widespread and embedded. The first area relates to 
progress in NHS organisations and how they have been able to establish systems for 
ensuring quality of care to patients through clinical governance and risk management 
and other processes such as incident reporting and learning from errors. The second 
area relates to the issue of whether there exists an effective system for regulation, 
litigation and the monitoring of the medical performance of doctors and healthcare 
professionals in the NHS for protecting patients as part of the patient safety agenda.
In 2005, the National Audit Office (NAG) published their report 'A Safer Place for 
Patients: Learning to improve patient safety'. The report was commissioned by the 
NAG to examine whether the NHS had been successful both in improving its patient 
safety culture and encouraging reporting and learning from patient safety incidents. 
The key findings of this report were that at a local level the vast majority of trusts had 
developed a predominantly open and fair reporting culture, but that there were 
continuing problems. These problems related to there being no clear system for 
monitoring lessons learned at a local level, with under-reporting found to be a 
problem with some staff groups and no evidence of improvement from lessons leamt 
from local incident reporting systems being disseminated widely either within or 
between trusts. The report found that trusts were 'still predominantly reactive in their
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response to patient safety issues and parts of some organisations still operate a blame 
culture' (NAO 2005: 2).
Following on from this report, in June 2006 the Parliamentary Select Committee on 
Public Accounts published its Fifty-First Report on patient safety. Its findings 
reinforced criticisms by the NAO (2005) report about patient safety at a local level, by 
highlighting a number of criticisms on patient safety at a national level. The report 
noted that:
'Insufficient progress has been made in achieving the Department's plans in 
'Building a Safer NHS for Patients' and there is a question mark over the 
value for money being achieved by the National Patient Safety Agency, 
evidenced in the main by the delays and cost over-runs in establishing its 
National Reporting and Learning System and in the limited feedback of 
solutions to reduce serious incidents that has, so far, been provided to trusts'.
(House of Commons 2006: 2)
A number of other key findings made in the report focused on the under-reporting of 
patient safety incidents, which were seen to remain a particular problem in trusts. It 
was estimated that on average 22% of incidents went unreported and 39% of near 
misses and that medication errors and incidents leading to serious harm were the least 
likely to be reported. The lack of accurate information on deaths and serious incidents 
were found to make it particularly difficult to evaluate risks and therefore to reduce 
serious incidents. Also, whilst trusts generally were found to state that their safety 
culture had become more fair and open, less than half of trusts were able to validate 
this position through carrying out formal assessments of progress.
In relation to incident reporting, doctors were found to be the least likely to report 
patient safety incidents. In relation to other groups, the report found that whilst 
disciplinary action might be appropriate where patient safety was a concern, there was 
a perception by nurses and non-medical staff that they risked suspicion if they 
reported a serious incident. Few Trusts were also found to have formally evaluated 
their safety culture and importantly to have done enough to inform patients when 
things went wrong or to involve patients in developing solutions to incidents. Only 
24% of trusts routinely informed patients affected by a patient safety incident and 6%
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did not involve patient at all (House of Commons 2006: Conclusions and 
recommendations).
In response to this report, the Chief Medical Officer, (CMO) commissioned a patient 
safety review to 'reconsider the organisational arrangements currently in place to 
ensure that patient safety is at the heart of the healthcare agenda' (DOH 2006: 6). This 
led to the publication of 'Safety First - A report for patients, clinicians and healthcare 
managers' which was published in December 2006. The report in setting out 'a new 
national approach' to the issues made thirteen wide-ranging recommendations for 
change affecting a range of healthcare bodies and systems. These recommendations 
covered the development of systems for tackling patient safety concerns on a number 
of different levels. For example: establishing national goals and priorities to ensure 
patient safety is embedded as a core principle within the NHS; establishing a National 
Patient Safety Forum to harness the skills and expertise of a number of organisations 
making a contribution to patient safety; refocusing the role of the NPSA to ensure it 
achieved as a key objective the collection and analysis of patient safety data to inform 
rapid patient safety learning. This also meant moving its patient safety management 
function to Strategic Health Authorities (SHA's) in the form of 'Patient Safety Action 
Teams', with a remit to support the delivery of the national patient safety agenda by 
local NHS organisations.
Other key recommendations concerned the requirement for NHS boards to spell out 
how they intended to discharge their responsibility for patient safety. Looked at how 
Organisations such as the Healthcare Commission, the National Institute for Health 
and Clinical Excellence (NICE) and the NHS Institute for Innovation and 
Improvement could play more of a role in delivering a patient safety agenda. And, 
importantly the report emphasised the requirement to achieve the active involvement 
of patients and their families in developing a patient safety culture in the NHS. In 
setting out the rationale for this recommendation, the report noted that 'around the 
world, healthcare organisations that are most successful in improving patient safety 
are those that encourage close cooperation with patients and their families' (DOH 
2006: 30).
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Lastly, in 2003 and 2007, the National Audit Office published two reports looking at 
the progress achieved in implementing clinical governance arrangements in the NHS 
in both the primary care and hospital sector. These reports provide a good indication 
of whether or not the NHS has been successfiil in putting in place comprehensive 
systems for addressing patient safety. The first report entitled 'Achieving 
Improvements through Clinical Governance - A Progress Report on Implementation 
by NHS Trusts' (2003) made a number of findings: that virtually all trusts now had the 
necessary foundations for clinical governance, although this was not fully embedded 
within all clinical directorates. This situation was seen to have had a number of 
beneficial outcomes such as issues of clinical quality becoming more mainstream, 
with more open and transparent cultures emerging and more accountability of 
clinicians and managers for their performance. However the report concluded that 
progress in implementing clinical governance was still patchy and varied between 
Trusts. It noted that there was still scope for developing a coherent approach to 
quality, improving processes for managing risk and poor performance and in 
improving the way that lessons were leamt both within and between tmsts and in 
putting them into practice.
The second report is entitled 'Improving Quality and Safety - Progress in 
Implementing Clinical Governance in Primary Care: Lessons for the New Primary 
Care Tmsts' (2007). This report found that whilst the main organisational stmctures 
and processes for clinical governance had largely been put in place, progress in 
implementation varied between PCT's. On the one hand systems regarding quality and 
safety were now found to be more explicitly monitored and managed, with more 
accountability of clinicians and managers for their performance. However the report 
still argued that, 'more needs to be done to strengthen the systems which provide 
assurance about the performance of General Practitioners and which protect the safety 
of patients' (NAO 2007: 11).
These reports also provided an important indicator of patient and public involvement 
in clinical governance processes. In 1999, the document 'Clinical Governance: in the 
new NHS' set out clear expectations for NHS Tmsts in developing PPI in this area. 
However both NAO reports above noted in this area that progress was limited. This 
finding has recently been reinforced by research carried out by the Picker Institute
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research into patient-focused strategies. They found in relation to patient safety 
processes that: ‘The UK has had a major programme to improve patient safety since 
2001, but with little recognition of patients’ potential to take an active role’ (Picker 
Institute 2007).
Overall, the reports set out above provide a comprehensive look at whether the NHS 
has been able to develop a more systems based approach to addressing patient safety 
issues in a range of ways, since this was first proposed as an urgent imperative in 'An 
organisation with a memory (2000). What it would be fair to argue is that the reports 
show evidence that NHS organisations have been able to establish a number of 
structures that constitute the key foundations for tackling patient safety concerns. 
However, it is also quite clear, that all of the reports above indicate that this process 
has not gone far enough and this was strongly reinforced in Safety First, when it noted 
that:
'not enough has been made of opportunities for achieving real 'on the ground' 
improvements across the NHS. In many cases, an environment has not been 
created that motivates and inspires clinical and non-clinical staff working at 
the front line to insist that all care must be as safe as possible'.
(DOH 2006: 7)
Given this situation, it is important to look at what progress has been made in terms of 
establishing proper systems for regulation in the NHS and the monitoring of medical 
performance.
Medical Performance and the Regulatory Maze
In exploring the issues in this context, regulatory systems are divided into those 
responsible for investigating complaints and medical negligence in the NHS and those 
that look specifically at failings in individual performance. Given the sociological 
arguments set out in chapter two about the importance of regulating medical 
performance to protect patients, consideration will also be given to whether the 
regulatory systems mentioned above can be deemed to work in favour of patients. Or 
whether, in contrast, patients face a regulatory maze when trying to get redress in 
terms of their complaints and concerns.
NHS Complaints
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If one looks at the area of NHS complaints, what is clear is that the problems faced by 
patients in getting resolution of their complaints, is an area that has been well 
documented, by a number of reports and reviews over the last twenty years. What is 
also evident when one looks at these reviews, is that many of the issues that have been 
highlighted have consistently been raised time and time again and in many respects 
remain unresolved to this day.
Wider sociological research in this area, shows that doctors put up strong resistance to 
complaints which they view as a strong challenge to their professional identity 
(Allsop and Mulcahy 1998; Jain and Ogden 1999). Robinson has argued that doctors 
who struggle emotionally to cope with their own mistakes and that of their colleagues 
(Robinson 1999) create resistance to complaints. In achieving change in this area, 
Nettleton and Harding point to two factors limiting change - the existence of 
professional self-regulation which is seen to limit lay control and to act as a barrier to 
the implementation of effective complaints' procedures and 'the new managerialism 
which contributes to control by managers in spite of its rhetoric of consumerism' 
(1994: 56).
In looking at this area in more detail, Allsop and Mulcahy (1998) have written about 
their findings into how doctors respond to complaints about medical care. They note 
that a number of studies have shown that challenges to a doctor's authority remain 
relatively rare in the total sum of doctor-patient interactions. Their research focused 
on written complaints, which their wider research showed were much less prevalent 
than informal complaints.
Broadly they found that doctors treated complaints as largely unjustified and 
responded to them with a range of negative emotions. This was not based upon the 
type of complaint but the challenge to their professional identity, competence and 
expertise and based upon fears about their judgement being questioned, and about 
sanctions, loss of autonomy and control. Explanations or rationalisations for the 
complaints were seen to fall into three categories, the biomedical explanations used 
by doctors to account for the difficulty of diagnosis, or the inevitability of a disease 
pattern or death, blaming the lay person, or issues to do with the external context and
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resources. These explanations were seen by the authors of the research as attempts to 
'turn responsibility and culpability away from the doctor for the untoward events 
described in the complaint, and to neutralise the criticisms contained in the 
complaints' (Allsop and Mulcahy 1998: 811). In terms of support, doctors were found 
to rely largely on other doctors and managers were clearly identified as outsiders by a 
significant majority of doctors.
In conclusion Allsop and Mulcahy noted that complaints were rising in the NHS and 
that individuals were using them both as 'a form of protest' (Nettleton and Harding 
(1995) and to get accountability. However the reaction of doctors to complaints was 
seen to work against the current policy emphasis by the Department of Health to 
improve quality in service delivery, through the informal resolution of complaints. 
Waring (2007) also reinforces this latter point in a recent article on patient safety and 
regulation. He found when looking at attempts by management to introduce the type 
of patient safety reforms such as hospital wide incident reporting and risk 
management systems in a medium sized District General Hospital, that doctors 
resisted 'managerial prerogatives through seeking to subvert and 'capture' components 
of reform' (Waring 2007: 163). This was done to maintain their regulatory monopoly 
and resist management encroachment in areas previously seen as autonomous.
Given the problems identified by these studies about the failings of the complaints 
system, this clearly raises the need to ensure that an independent complaints systems 
exists, that is properly regulated, to enable patients to get a fair and just resolution to 
their concerns. It is therefore interesting to look at the findings of a number of policy 
reports on the workings of the complaints system over a number of years. These show 
that The NHS Complaints Procedure is currently in transition following a bewildering 
series of reviews and changes over several years to make it more responsive to 
patients concerns.
From 1999 to 2000 a DOH research study was carried out to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the complaints system. The results, published in September 2001, 
revealed a high level of dissatisfaction from complainants with the current system. 
Key findings showed that many complainants were highly dissatisfied with the way 
that the complaints procedure operated, both at the local resolution stage and at the
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independent review stage and that the most important structural failure was 'the 
perceived lack of independence in the convening decision and in the review process 
generally' (Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman 2005: 4).
The study made 27 recommendations aimed at improving the complaints system 
which were put out for consultation in Reforming the NHS Complaints Procedure: a 
listening document 2001. This document also expanded upon some of the broader 
changes linked to complaints that the government had been developing as part of a 
wider context of NHS reform. For example the idea of reforming complaints whilst at 
the same time strengthening the voice of patients and involving them more in their 
own healthcare. In 2002, as part of its response to the Bristol Inquiry, the DOH 
confirmed that they intended to put in place a new complaints procedure by December 
2002. However, it wasn't until April 2003 that the DOH set out its new vision, by 
publishing the document 'NHS Complaints Reform, Making things right' (DOH 
2003).
In November 2003, a new piece of legislation, the Health and Social Care 
(Community Health and Standards) Act 2003 also received its Royal assent. This set 
out the procedures for the new Commission for Healthcare Audit and Inspection 
(CHAI - now known as the Healthcare Commission) to be set up. This body was to 
take over the second stage of the complaints procedure and to regulate healthcare 
services. Following the publication of a number of draft regulations, on 1 September 
2006, following consideration by the DOH of the Shipman Inquiry 
Recommendations, the National Health Service (Complaints) Amendment 
Regulations 2006 came into force. This followed the White Paper commitment to 
develop a single comprehensive complaints procedure across health and social care by 
2009.
Yet, despite all of these changes to the complaints procedure, in March 2005 the 
Health Service Ombudsman in the report 'Making things better? A report on reform of 
the NHS complaints procedure in England', highlighted continuing problems with the 
complaints procedure. In calling for leadership from the DOH, Healthcare 
Commission and others to deal with the failing in the current system, she pointed out 
that the timing was now right to consider how a truly patient-focused complaints
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system could be developed. (Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman 2005: 
Foreword). These concerns from the Ombudsman were further reinforced by the 
publication in February 2007, of the results of a national audit of complaints handling 
by NHS Trusts, by the Healthcare Commission (HCC). The HCC report identified the 
ten most recurring themes in some 16,000 complaints sent to the Commission for 
independent review between July 2004 and July 2006 and noted that safety related 
concerns made up a large percentage of the complaints. The Commission's chief 
executive said of these findings, 'This is too many and suggests serious inadequacies 
in how some trusts handle complaints' (HCC Press Release February 1 2007).
Therefore given these continuing criticisms of the NHS Complaints Procedures and in 
further attempts at reform, the DOH has again recently published 'Making 
Experiences Count' (2007). This document contains a set of proposals for unifying 
and reforming the current arrangements for making complaints across health and 
social care. Its purpose, to 'propose a radical new approach to complaints handling 
which is more flexible and ensures organisational learning' (DOH 2007: preface).
Litigation and Developing an Open Reporting Culture
Given the failings with the complaints system, it is useful to consider any legal 
reforms given Professor Kennedy's arguments, about abolishing litigation in order to 
create an open and non-punitive reporting environment in which health care 
professionals felt safe enough to report adverse incidents. Perhaps the most significant 
development in this respect, was the passing of The NHS Redress Act. This came into 
force in 2006 with a view to creating a Redress Scheme that could act as an 
alternative to litigation in the courts in dealing with smaller clinical negligence claims 
up to £15,000.
However in its passage through Parliament, it faced extensive criticism from a range 
of groups for its lack of independence in proposing that the NHS investigate itself 
when complaints of negligence are made. Action against Medical Accidents (AvMA) 
in highlighting serious shortcomings in the Bill pointed out that 'It is hard to see how 
the public could have confidence in a scheme which makes the NHS investigation 
judge and jury over itself (AvMA Press Release November 2005). However, whilst 
the passage of the Redress Bill eventually allowed for some amendments to be
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introduced, giving some safeguards in terms of independence, it is argued that the 
Scheme will still be fundamentally flawed in allowing the NHS to continue to 
investigate itself when medical harm occurs.
This situation goes directly against the type of changes that Kennedy hoped to achieve 
in getting rid of litigation and therefore in encouraging a more open system for 
dealing with patient safety concerns and negligence. In this respect, considerable 
evidence has shown that if patients are not able to get open and independent 
explanations of what has happened to them when they experience medical harm, then 
they are more likely to resort to litigation as will be highlighted in my research later in 
the thesis. This point has been reinforced post-Kennedy in the Bristol Report, in a 
document published by the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) in 2005, 'Being 
Open'. This document acknowledged that: 'Many patients and/or their carers will 
often only make a litigation claim when they have not received any information or 
apology from the healthcare teams or organisations following the incident' (NPSA 
2005: 2). The document makes clear as guidance to health service providers that if a 
patient is harmed or dies as a result of a PSI, it is vital to be open and honest about 
what has occurred. It goes on to argue that: 'Promoting a culture of being open is 
therefore a prerequisite to improving patient safety and the quality of healthcare 
systems' (NPSA 2005: 2).
Despite this guidance however, there is ample evidence highlighting the enormous 
barriers put in the way of individuals getting open and honest answers when 
something goes wrong with their healthcare. The Select Committee on Public 
Accounts Report (2006) mentioned previously, found that only 24% of Trusts 
routinely informed patients involved in a reported incident and 6% did not involve 
patients at all. Therefore if the majority of Trusts still do not routinely inform patients 
when something goes wrong with their care, this totally goes against the idea of being 
open and accountable, further compounding the harm to already damaged patients. As 
reinforced by the Chief Medical Officer in 'Safety First' (2006):
'Consumers of healthcare are àt the heart o f patient safety. When things go 
wrong, they and their families suffer from the harm caused. Such harm is often 
made worse by the defensive and secretive way that many healthcare 
organisations respond in the aftermath of a serious event'
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(DOH 2006:30)
Thus, in looking at the systems outlined above, it is clear that a number of problems 
exist in their ability to properly deal with the concerns of patients when they have 
been affected by medical harm. This situation is clearly a barrier to establishing the 
type of open reporting culture that would allow everyone to learn from what has 
happened when medical harm occurs. What is also evident is that the problems that 
exist are not only about systems that do not work in favour of harmed patients 
generally. It is argued that the problem also relates to the power of health 
professionals operating within those systems, who have frequently refused to be open 
and fair in their dealings with harmed patients in order to protect their own interests. 
These two themes, about the need for a wider systems approach for dealing with both 
the range of clinical processes connected with medical harm and the issue of medical 
dominance and power, are central to the arguments put forward in this thesis.
In the next section, which looks at how individual medical performance is regulated 
by professional bodies, it is clear that these systems have consistently failed in their 
duty to protect patients.
Monitoring Medical Performance
In highlighting earlier in the chapter, key issues from both the Shipman and the 
Bristol Inquiry Reports, what was consistently reinforced was the failure to have in 
place proper systems to monitor standards of care generally and to regulate the 
performance of individual practitioners. This meant that wrongdoing and clinical 
failings were not identified and that learning to prevent errors occurring again could 
not take place. In addition the Shipman Report strongly made the point that systems 
that should have been protecting patients were in fact more focused upon protecting 
doctors and that a culture existed within medical practice that reinforced this situation. 
Given this situation, it is interesting to look at what further evidence exists about the 
systems in place for regulating medical performance and how successfully they have 
been able to manage medical performance.
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A useful starting point in looking at the issues concerned with regulating the 
performance of individual medical practitioners is to understand the definition of 
regulation used in this context and the main bodies involved in this process.
In a review of the non-medical healthcare professions, the Department of Health
defined regulation as:
'the set of systems and activities intended to ensure that healthcare 
practitioners have the necessary knowledge, skills, attitudes and behaviours to 
provide healthcare safely. The goal of professional regulation is patient 
safety'.
(DOH 2006:11)
In practice a wide range of bodies exist in this area to monitor and regulate medical 
performance. The main professional regulatory bodies and when they were formed by 
statute consist of The General Medical Council 1858; The Nursing and Midwifery 
Council 1919; The Pharmaceutical Society of Northern Ireland 1925; The Royal 
Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain 1954; The General Dental Council 1956; The 
General Optical Council 1958; The Health Professions Council (which regulates 13 
health professions) 1960; The General Osteopathic Council 1993; The General 
Chiropractic Council 1994; The National Clinical Assessment Service (covering 
performance standards with doctors & dentists) 1999 and The Council for Healthcare 
Regulatory Excellence (CHRE) 2003, responsible for promoting best practice in the 
regulation of health professionals across the UK.
These regulatory bodies were created by statute on the dates stated with the powers to 
hold a statutory professional register for one of more of the health professions in the 
UK. However despite the range of bodies that exist in this area, in the last couple of 
years a growing number of criticisms have emerged about the way that these 
organisations and NHS Trusts have failed to manage the poor performance of medical 
practitioners and therefore to protect patients. This has led to a major programme of 
reform being proposed to the United Kingdom's system for the regulation of health 
professionals. Key proposals were published in February 2007 in a White Paper 
entitled, 'Trust, Assurance and Safety - The Regulation of Health Professionals in the 
2P  ^ Century'. The White Paper was based upon consultation of two reviews of 
professional regulation published in July 2006: 'Good doctors, safer patients' by the
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Chief Medical Officer (CMO) for England and the Department of Health's 'The 
regulation of the non-medical healthcare professions'. The White paper, was also 
complimented by the Government’s response to the recommendations of the Fifth 
Report of the Shipman Inquiry and to the recommendations of the Ayling, Neale and 
Kerr/Haslam Inquiries, in a paper called 'Safeguarding Patients' (2007). This paper 
set out a range of measures to improve and enhance clinical governance in the NHS. 
Many of the reforms set out in the White Paper will require primary legislation to 
enact them or parliamentary approval for secondary legislation.
In the section below I look at some of the key themes and conclusions from these 
reports and argue that in seeking to introduce major reform in this area, the approach 
goes well beyond taking an individualistic approach to the issues concerned. In this 
respect, it is argued that the reforms are a challenge to the traditional power of the 
medical profession in being able to regulate itself and instead seek to achieve a 
comprehensive systems based approach to the issues, that has not been achieved 
previously.
This change in emphasis is very much illustrated in the tone of the two quotes below.
In responding to the Shipman Inquiry in the Government report, 'Learning from 
tragedy, keeping patients safe' published in February 2007, the report notes:
"There are still people who say that Shipman was unique; that it is futile to 
attempt to strengthen the existing safeguards, because any future individuals 
who wanted to harm patients would evade them by using different methods'.
(HM Government 2007: 5)
This quote seems to illustrate very much the individualistic approach to looking at the 
issues. This prompted the response in the report that: 'The government does not accept 
this point of view' (HM Goverment 2007: 5). In looking at the proposals for reform in 
the White Paper, what is strongly evident as a starting point to the debate, is the 
emphasis on developing systems that promote change. As stated in the Foreword of 
the Paper:
'We need a system [my emphasis] that understands the pressures and strains 
under which all professionals operate and shows understanding, compassion 
and support where these are appropriate. It also means a system [my
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emphasis] that is better able to identify people early on who are struggling - 
perhaps with personal problems of mental health or addiction - and 
supporting them, showing the same care to them that they have shown to their 
patients, so that they have a fair chance to improve and return to practice, if  
that is possible. It means a system [my emphasis] that is better able to detect 
and act against those very rare malicious individuals who risk undermining 
public and professional confidence'.
(Secretary of State for Health 2007: 2)
What is clear from this quote is the emphasis on constructing a range of systems to 
deal with medical regulation, that in turn are able to deal both with poor performance 
as well as to protect patients and support doctors generally. In looking at the issues 
raised about regulating medical performance, it is useful to note that key questions 
about the failure to act in this area were identified as a major issue almost a decade 
ago. In the consultation paper 'Supporting Doctors, Protecting Patients' (1999), a 
starting point in developing proposals to address the poor performance of doctors, was 
to note in relation to past failures that:
'the public and the wider medical profession are entitled to ask: Why wasn't 
the problem identified earlier? Why wasn't something done about it? Why 
were people unwilling to raise it with the powers that be? How could such a 
situation have been allowed to prevail?'
(DOH 1999: point 1.2)
Given the damming criticisms that were to emerge in the Shipman Inquiry, it would 
appear that the questions above in 'Supporting Doctors, Protecting Patients' were not 
properly answered and dealt with. What is clear however with the White Paper, is that 
it contains a set of proposals that represent the most extensive and wide-ranging 
changes to professional medical regulation since the Merrison Commission. This 
Commission endorsed the sort of T9^  ^ century light touch regulation’ (Davies 2002: 
4) for the medical profession in 1975, which the White Paper proposals clearly see as 
no longer appropriate in the 2Ÿ  ^Century.
The White Paper Recommendations
The main recommendations of the White Paper cover eight key areas and set out some 
defining principles as the basis for action. That statutory professional regulation must 
be about achieving for patients, safety and quality of care and post-Shipman a
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recognition that professional regulation must be 'about fairness to both sides of the 
partnership between patients and professionals' (Secretary of State for Health 2007: 
2). Professional regulation must be seen to be independent, in order to sustain the 
confidence of both the public and professionals. That regulation should be as much 
about improving and sustaining the standards of the majority, as about identifying and 
addressing poor practice and behaviour. That cost factors should not create 
unnecessary burdens or be disproportionate to the risks presence. Lastly, that systems 
should be created to serve the NHS in England whilst being sufficiently flexible to 
meet different health needs and approaches in other parts of the United Kingdom.
Regarding the recommendations, on independence, governance and accountability, 
the paper proposed measures to achieve parity of membership between lay and 
professional members on regulatory councils, to devise arrangements for councils to 
report to Parliament, for councils to operate more strategically and board like and for 
the Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence (CHRE) to take on a stronger and 
more independent role in providing expert advice on regulation. Proper fitness to 
practise measures were set out to achieve revalidation of all health professionals. 
Revalidation would include both formative and summative aspects to ensure that 
required standards were objectively met. For doctors, this would mean renewing their 
license to practice every five years based upon a summative appraisal's process that 
showed they had met objective standards. Specialist recertification would apply to all 
specialist doctors including GP's, requiring them to demonstrate that they had met the 
standards that applied to their medical speciality. For other health professionals 
revalidation arrangements would be arranged through each profession and their 
regulator.
Other proposals related to the development of arrangements at a local level for 
providing support, advice and guidance to employers in managing concerns about 
doctors and quality assuring the processes of revalidation for doctors. This would 
include "GMC Affiliates", who could take action on a doctors performance and 
introducing a new system at a local level for recording information about a doctors 
poor practice, called Recorded Concerns. At a national level, proposals suggested the 
use in adjudication of fitness to practise cases of the civil standard of proof, with its 
sliding scale, rather than the criminal standard. For there to be separation of
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investigation and prosecution from adjudication and for adjudication panels to have 
their members independently appointed by the Appointments Commission.
In the area of education, proposals suggested that regulatory bodies should continue to 
be responsible for the educational standards of their members, covering undergraduate 
and postgraduate education and continuing professional development and that the 
GMC be asked to develop clear generic standards to determine whether a doctor is or 
remains fit to practise. Selective language testing would also be introduced for 
applicants for some posts. In the area of information, proposals centred on issues such 
as asking CHRE to recommend a single standard definition of good character for all 
the regulatory bodies, developing closer co-operation and co-ordination between 
regulators and employers and developing the medical register. The latter proposal to 
ensure the register becomes the single authoritative source of information for doctors, 
which would include any disciplinary action by employers and alert notices.
In addition to the proposals above, the government also set out proposals in the 
complementary report to the White Paper, 'Safeguarding Patients' (2007). The report 
first of all looked at the four (Ayling, Neale and Kerr/Haslam) Inquiries. It then 
concluded that whilst the details varied, the underlying issue was the same in each 
case, as posed in the question below:
'how was it possible for health professionals to continue so long to abuse - in
Shipman's case, to murder - patients without anyone in authority apparently
noticing, let alone taking effective action?
(HM Government 2007:7)
In this respect the key areas that were focused on in the report, related to appointment 
and screening processes; the use of routine monitoring data to detect apparent failures 
in professional performance; the "triangulation" of information from different 
sources; the use of information from complaints and from concerns expressed by 
health professionals; the systems in place in health organisations to deal with 
performance and behavioural issues and the response of the national health 
professions regulators to concerns raised (HM Government 2007: 7). The report then 
looked in detail at a number of key themes relating to: the wider safety context in the 
NHS; recruitment and screening processes; clinical governance; complaints and
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concerns; boundary transgressions and particular issues in mental health services; 
information and taking the action forward. Action arising from both the White Paper 
and Safeguarding Patients the government has stated 'will be carried forward as a 
single, integrated work programme (HM Government 2007: 7).
Conclusion
In conclusion, this chapter has looked at a range of evidence from a large number of 
reports that have significant implications in looking at medical harm to patients and 
how this harm can be addressed in building a new safer culture of care within the 
NHS.
In looking at the evidence in the reports in this chapter, what has been noticeable is 
some of the similarities in identifying key issues that have related primarily to the lack 
of systems for ensuring quality care to patients. These systems have related to the 
requirement within NHS organisations to have proper standards of care, and effective 
systems of clinical governance and complaint, to independently monitor them to 
ensure compliance and to develop an open reporting culture through incident 
reporting, which would allow proper lessons to be leamt from adverse events. Just as 
important, has been the identification in the reports of the need to have proper systems 
for regulating professional competence and addressing issues of patient safety by 
working in partnership with patients.
However, what the evidence has illustrated in this chapter is that in the past these 
systems have not been in place, or worked effectively to protect patients and to the 
contrary, have frequently operated in the interests of doctors. Even more worryingly, 
what has also been illustrated is that despite the considerable criticisms in the Bristol 
and Shipman reports about the failure in the NHS to develop a comprehensive 
systems approach to patient safety, recent reports have shown that this is far from 
reality.
In reviewing the evidence, a number of reports have been highlighted in this chapter, 
which show that whilst some progress appears to have been made in the NHS in 
developing a systems approach in some areas of patient safety, in other areas there
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appears to have been much less progress. In this respect both primary and secondary 
care have made progress in implementing clinical governance arrangements, with the 
latter also making much more progress in developing systems for incident reporting 
and learning. However, applying a systems approach was found to be much more 
problematic when looking at mechanisms for ensuring accountability of individuals 
and Trusts and of regulating poor medical performance. In the previous chapter, it 
was argued that a failure to address these issues was related to the entrenched power, 
autonomy and control of medical professionals and health care organisations. This 
situation is also seen to be compounded by the failure of the state to challenge the 
imbalance of power between patients, particularly those affected by medical harm and 
healthcare professionals and wider organisations.
Given this situation, this thesis will argue that in building a new safer culture of care 
within the NHS in the future, a new holistic approach to tackling medical harm and 
patient safety has to be developed in partnership with patients. This needs to be based 
upon the development of systems both for preventing and learning from adverse 
events as well as for dealing with issues of accountability and professional 
competency. This more integrated approach needs to go well beyond the clinical 
markers and individual agency associated with a narrow medical model, to identify 
the range of social processes associated with medical harm that are frequently to do 
with medical dominance and control. An important part of this new approach is also 
seen to be about tackling the imbalance of power between patients and health 
professionals by ensuring that patients are both involved and empowered to be part of 
shaping this new agenda.
These issues and how they can be addressed are explored further, in subsequent 
chapters of this thesis.
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Chapter Four
The Royal Brompton Case-Study
This chapter has been included in my PhD for a number of reasons. The Royal 
Brompton and Harefield NHS Trust is a site which in many ways encapsulates my 
personal journey from 'victim' to survivor of medical harm. In my journey to get 
justice and accountability for my daughter, I have had to go through many different 
stages that have seen me transformed from simply being a 'victim' of medical harm 
into a campaigner, health advocate and action researcher. This has thrown up many 
issues about what medical harm means from a user and patient perspective. This 
journey has also come to illustrate to me what it means to be a survivor of medical 
harm and to try and create a new safety culture in the NHS that involves working in 
partnership with 'victims' of harm, patients and the public as part of an empowerment 
agenda.
In this chapter, my aim in setting out four different stages of my journey is to explore 
different aspects of medical harm from a user perspective. In doing this I aim to show 
how I have both captured and been part of constructing a process because of my role 
as both insider and outsider on the issues concerned. In illustrating the different stages 
of my journey I also identify a number of themes which began to emerge at different 
stages of the journey. These themes relate to issues of accountability, learning from 
adverse events, discrimination and the imbalance of power between doctors and 
patients. These themes in many respects are similar to the ones raised by the reports in 
the previous chapter. In analysing these themes, what I have sought to do is explore 
what they might mean for developing a new patient safety agenda. In particular to 
look at the imphcations for doing this in partnership with patients and as part of a new 
model for patient participation based upon empowerment.
Although I was not to know it at the start of my journey, these issues have come to 
form the central basis of my PhD thesis.
Set out below are the different stages of my journey.
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stage One: The Death of my Daughter
My daughter Krista Ocloo was bom in 1979 with a congenital cardiac abnormality 
that was successfiilly repaired at the Royal Brompton Hospital (RBH) shortly before 
her second birthday. Krista went on to lead a completely happy and normal life with 
her twin sister Kelly, until she started to complain of chest pain in 1995. This led to an 
admission to the Royal Brompton hospital for an exploratory catheterisation in 
January 1996. I was subsequently told that nothing had been found and that Krista 
was perfectly all right and would be sent another appointment in due course. However 
despite a reminder call in June 1996 by Krista, the Brompton did not schedule an 
appointment until a year after Krista's catheterisation in January 1997. On 5* 
December 1996 I found Krista dead at home in bed. The post-mortem revealed death 
from acute heart failure. This was to be the start of a ten-year painful journey to gain a 
tmthfiil explanation of what exactly had happened to cause Krista's death and some 
justice and accountability.
Stage Two: My Initial Experience as a ’Victim’
In my attempts to find out what had happened to my daughter, I found myself facing a 
series of obstacles which eventually proved insurmountable in allowing me to gain an 
independent investigation into my daughter's death through formal NHS procedures 
and the legal route. As I went on to become more involved in looking at issues of 
medical harm, I came to realise that the obstacles I faced were typical of those faced 
by many other victims. This realisation about the barriers that 'victims' of medical 
harm face in trying to find out what has happened and to get some accountability after 
an adverse incident has taken place, has led me to explore as part of my thesis, the 
idea that medical harm is not just about the initial adverse injury. I would argue that it 
is also about the after effects of trying to battle against a system, to get answers, 
which frequently do not work for 'victims'. Therefore medical harm for me is not just 
about biomedical issues, but is also about the social consequences of how the system 
treats 'victims' of medical harm. This I would argue can cause almost as much damage 
and injury as the original adverse incident. I shall return to this issue a number of 
times in later chapters of my thesis, but for now set out below are some of the 
obstacles I encountered in the immediate aftermath of my daughter's death and for 
many years afterwards.
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Shortly after Krista died I contacted the Royal Brompton Hospital in terrible distress 
to tell them what had happened to my daughter. At this stage I had no real 
understanding of what had happened to her. I was promised that somebody would 
contact me immediately, however after three weeks no one had returned my call. In 
the meantime, I had been given the report on Krista's catheterisation by my GP, 
(which had not been given to me by the hospital). This showed that Krista should 
have been given a follow up consultation within six months of her catheterisation, as 
she had now developed serious problems with her heart and that Krista and I should 
have been told and advised about any treatment options.
The Inquest
In Decemberl996 I therefore wrote to the Coroners Court seeking an inquest and to 
raise issues about Krista's care. The coroner's office was responsible for certifying 
Krista's death, as opposed to the Brompton.
The coroner replied to my letter refusing my request and stating that Krista had died 
of natural causes. He wrote;
'Quite frankly, what information you were given, and whether your daughter's 
death could have been prevented or postponed, is not a minefield I  am inclined 
to enter'.
Given this dismissive and insensitive response I sought advice from Inquest, a 
voluntary body that provides independent free legal advice to bereaved families about 
inquest procedures and rights in the Coroner's Court. They advised me that it was not 
unusual for coroners to respond in the way above and that it would be very difficult 
for me to challenge the refusal to hold an inquest.
The issue that came up for me in trying to gain an inquest, raises much wider 
questions about the nature of the inquest system and how it meets the needs of 
bereaved families. In relation to these issues, the organisation Inquest has argued 
consistently for many years, for reform of the current system. They have publicly 
stated that they believe 'the current system is failing and that this is heightened in 
deaths that involve questions of state or corporate accountability' (Inquest Submission
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to the Constitutional Affairs Committee Inquiry into Reform of the Coroner's System 
and Death Certification in England and Wales February 2006).
These issues have also been raised in other places. At an AvMA Conference on 
Medical negligence in 2004, it was argued that the purpose of an inquest is limited to 
investigating and answering four basic questions: who the deceased was, and how, 
when and where they came to their death. Therefore because of the limited scope of 
the inquest it is 'therefore largely defined by the interpretation of 'how' the deceased 
came to his death' (Sparks and Cragg 2004). This it was argued had led for some time 
to considerable firustration on the part of bereaved families, because of the need for 
openness and accountability, which was 'infirequently met' and that this was 
'particularly so for families who suspected that a relative had died as a result of a 
medical error' (Sparks and Cragg 2004).
In February 2006 the Department for Constitutional Affairs in their Briefing Note, 
'Coroners Service Reform', accepted the case for reform and on the 12^  ^June 2006, a 
draft Coroner's Bill was published to reform the Coroners' system in England and 
Wales. This case for reform is designed to address the weaknesses identified by the 
Fundamental Review of Death Certification and Investigation and the Shipman 
Inquiry which found the current regime to be fragmented, non-accountable, and 
sometimes ineffective.
However, in a submission from the perspective of 'suddenly bereaved people', the 
charities: Epilepsy Bereaved, Cardiac Risk in the Young (CRY), The Foundation for 
the Study of Infant Deaths (FSID), Action for Victims of Medical Accidents (AvMA) 
and Victim's Voice, stated that whilst supporting 'urgent reform of the Coroner's 
system', the current draft bill was flawed. In highlighting a number of issues, in 
relation to sudden unexplained deaths in the young (like that experienced by my 
daughter Krista) they stated: 'These deaths require specialist investigation and the 
current lack of standardisation and quality assurance in post-mortem investigation and 
certification of these deaths is a key barrier to implementation of recognised 
prevention strategies. There is also a criminal justice interest especially in respect of 
protection of children and prevention of miscarriages of justice' (Briefing on the Draft 
Coroners Reform Bill 2006).
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The Complaints Procedures
Returning to my personal story, given the refusal by the coroner to grant me an 
inquest into my daughter's death, I then felt forced to go through the NHS Complaints 
Procedure to try and find answers. More details on this procedure can be found in 
chapter three. The first stage of the procedure, called Local Resolution, provided a 
direct opportunity for the Trust to liase with me over my complaint. However after 
several months, in which the Trust maintained that they had not done anything wrong,
I then asked to be able to be referred to the second stage of the complaints procedure, 
called An Independent Panel Review (IPR). This meant setting out my continuing 
grievances in a letter to a complaints convenor, a non-executive member of the Trust, 
stating why I was still dissatisfied with the outcome of local resolution. The purpose 
of an IPR at that time was to investigate the facts of a case, taking into account the 
views of both sides and to draw conclusions and make recommendations set out in a 
written report. The review itself is conducted by a panel consisting of an independent 
lay chairman nominated by the Secretary of State for Health, but in practice is chosen 
by the Trust or regional health authority. The non-executive convenor of the Trust and 
a lay person of the purchaser or another independent person are appointed by the 
Secretary of State. If the complaint has a clinical element, then the convenor would be 
expected to call at least two independent clinical assessors with no links to the case 
(Mayberry, 2002: 652).
In May 1997 I was eventually granted an IPR and in February 1998 finally received a 
draft copy of the IPR report. This was so unsatisfactory that it led to my MP writing to 
the chief executive of the Brompton on my behalf. He stated:
T have spent a good deal of time considering the response to the questions 
raised by Ms Ocloo and myself However, my opinion is that the draft report is 
factually inaccurate. The treatment of the questions raised by Ms Ocloo is 
totally unacceptable. Given that the panel is supposed to be independent and 
to investigate the complainants concerns, the report is overtly prejudicial'.
(Ken Livingstone MP Brent East, 2 March 1998).
In June 1998 I eventually received the final IPR report. The report found no evidence 
of clinical negligence or the need for any action to be taken against the hospital or for 
any referral to the GMC. The letter quoted above from my MP to the Trust, spoke
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more than adequately for my feelings about the Report at the time, which I felt was 
biased and lacking in independence.
It is of note in relation to the use of the complaints systems generally, that in 2004, 
new Complaints Regulations came into force after a long period of review by the 
Department of Health. The key findings of the review were that many complainants 
had expressed a high level of dissatisfaction with the way that the complaints 
procedure operated, both at the local resolution stage and at the independent review 
stage. The most important structural failure was 'the perceived lack of independence 
in the convening decision and in the review process generally' (Parliamentary and 
Health Service Ombudsman 2005: 4).
The result of the review is that the second stage of the complaints procedure will now 
be taken out of NHS hands and dealt with independently by the Healthcare 
Commission, (previously known as The Commission for Healthcare Audit and 
Inspection (CHAI).
Without knowing it at the time, the year 1999 was to mark the stage where my 
journey was to move much more from the personal to the political, and where my 
situation would change to involve many others with similar stories to myself. This 
was the first time that I began to ask questions about the uniqueness of my situation 
and to ask bigger questions about how various individuals might be treated within 
healthcare when something went wrong with their treatment.
The Evans Inquiry
In 1999, having exhausted the NHS complaints procedures and considering what 
further action I might now take to get answers into my daughter's death, I happened 
by chance one Sunday afternoon, to see a number of adverse press reports on the 
Royal Brompton hospital. The publicity related to a story about an anonymous whistle 
blower working at the Brompton who had contacted the magazine Private Eye 
alleging that paediatric cardiac surgical results at the hospital were worse than 
elsewhere and particularly so in the case of children with Down's Syndrome. It was 
also claimed that the attitude of doctors towards children with Down's Syndrome was 
inappropriate. As a result of reading about the allegations and the concerns raised, I
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decided for the first time to go public with my story. The publicity on my case led to 
many other families contacting me with similar concerns about their children's care. I 
then suggested to these families that we set up a meeting in central London in August 
1999, to explore our concerns. As a result of this meeting all of the families decided to 
form a group in which I was elected chair and Mrs Polly Fleet-Pahner vice-chair. The 
group decided to call itself the Brompton and Harefield Heart Children's Action 
Group (BHHCAG) and to make as its central goal a campaign to get an independent 
inquiry to investigate the concerns raised by group members about their children's 
care.
Initially however, the Brompton refused to hold a wider NHS inquiry to look at our 
concerns, but agreed in response to the allegations raised by the anonymous 
whistleblower to review assessments for the outcomes of paediatric cardiac surgery in 
the period 1990-1999. The Hunter Review as it came to be known published its 
results in September 1999. The report concluded that no evidence had been found to 
uphold the allegations made by the anonymous whistle blower and that the cardiac 
results analysed at the Brompton, 'were similar to, and in most cases better than, the 
results taken from the UK Register run by the Society of Cardiothoracic Surgeons of 
Great Britain and Ireland' (Evans Inquiry Report 2001).
However the Hunter review was not accepted as sufficient enough to allay concerns 
by parents in the BHHCAG, or hy groups such as the Down's Syndrome Association 
and the Down's Heart Group. The latter two groups had also gone public at this time 
in raising concerns on behalf of famihes, who were members of their organisations, 
about discrimination in their children's care under the Brompton. Therefore after a 
high profile press campaign by all the groups, but led by the BHHCAG, the Royal 
Brompton eventually agreed to set up an 'Independent' Inquiry in September 1999, 
funded by the NHS to look further into concerns raised by parents. This came to be 
called The Independent Inquiries into Paediatric Cardiac Services at the Royal 
Brompton Hospital and Harefield Hospital, known in short as the Evans Inquiry after 
the chairperson. The Inquiry was originally mandated only to include Brompton 
families, but was later extended to include families from Harefield Hospital (which 
had by then merged with the Royal Brompton) after the Bristol Inquiry showed poor 
results for cardiac surgery for children over one at Harefield Hospital.
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The Inquiries were taken forward by a panel made up of Ruth Evans, former Director 
of the National Consumer Council and lay member of the GMC; Nick Archer, 
consultant in Paediatric Cardiology, John Radcliffe Hospital, Oxford; Norma Brier, 
Chief Executive of Norwood Ravenswood (an organisation for disadvantaged and 
disabled children, adults and their families); Fleur Fisher, former Head of Ethics, 
Science and Information at the BMA and Chairperson of POP AN (Prevention of 
Professional Abuse Network); Barry Keeton, consultant in Paediatric Cardiology, 
Southampton General Hospital and Sarah Leigh, solicitor specialising in medical 
negligence and secretary of the Clinical Disputes Forum. With the Harefield side of 
the inquiry the above cardiologists were replaced with John Wright, consultant 
Paediatric Cardiologist and Head of Cardiac Services at Birmingham Children's 
hospital. The panel was also able to draw upon a wide range of expert witnesses to 
assist them with obtaining evidence.
The remit of the Inquiry was to consider the complaints and concerns of parents 
whose children had received paediatric cardiac services at the RBH between 1987 and 
1999. The Inquiry panel was also asked to consider concerns submitted on behalf of 
the Down's Heart Group (DHG) and the Down's Syndrome Association (DSA) about 
alleged discrimination in the treatment and care of children with Down's Syndrome. 
The Inquiry panel addressed the concerns of 49 families of children treated for 
congenital heart disease, 42 at the RBH and 7 at Harefield hospital. Many of the 
children had died; some had suffered serious neurological injury; a few were treated 
successfully; and others had Down's Syndrome where access to appropriate 
management of their care and treatment was questioned by parents. The Inquiry had 
no remit to look at negligence, but this was only something the families found out 
about after participating in the inquiry.
Throughout the process of the Inquiry, I remained chair of the (BHHCAG). This was 
to prove a challenging and emotional experience for me. The group was initially made 
up of about 38 families, most of whom wanted the inquiry to look at their case. 
However not all of the families were accepted to go to the Inquiry, because of 
restrictions placed on the Inquiry to only look at cases between 1987 and 1999. This 
was deeply distressing for a number of families affected. Eventually about thirty 
families in the BHHCAG went to the Inquiry, with group members attempting to keep
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some of the families excluded up to date with developments. As chair of the group 
this left me with the huge task of trying to ensure that the Inquiry was set up in a way 
that best represented the needs of group members, whilst also trying to keep members 
fully informed with what was taking place. What was key to members however was 
that the Inquiry looked at their individual cases and gave them feedback on whether 
any negligence or sub-standard care was involved. Initially the Inquiry insisted that 
they would not give individual feedback to families, however when group members 
said collectively that they would not participate in the Inquiry, the Inquiry panel 
backed down. This eventually meant that families were invited to meet with the 
Inquiry panel (as mentioned above) and were then given individual feedback in 
letters. However this information on individual cases was not included in the final 
Inquiry Report.
The Inquiry reported its findings on the 2"^  April 2001 (the key findings are set out 
later in the chapter) and made 120 recommendations to the Trust to change its 
practice. Whilst the Down's Syndrome Association and the Down's Heart Group 
accepted the Inquiry's findings in the report, the parents represented by the BHHCAG 
held a peaceful demonstration and denounced the Inquiry as a 'Sham and a Cover-Up' 
that 'failed to address the individual concerns of parents or to seriously consider 
serious issues of medical negligence' (Press Release 2001: BHHCAG).
To the signature tune of 'Dads Army', in a song constructed especially for the 
occasion and waving a banner of protest outside of the building where the report was 
launched, the parents in the BHHCAG sang:
'Who do you think you are kidding Mrs Evans, if  you think we're on the run, 
we are the ones who will stop your little game, we are the ones to tell the press 
to name and shame. So...
Who do you think you are kidding Mrs Evans, this report's a total sham'.
Later on in attempting to take my case to Europe on the grounds of being prevented 
fi-om appealing through denial of legal aid, my lawyer set out the legal grounds as to 
why the Evans Inquiry could not be classed as independent in terms of human rights 
criteria. He argued that:
"The Inquiry did not provide funding for the families to be legally represented. 
It did not invite families to participate in framing the terms of reference. Nor
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did it give those families the opportunity to hear the evidence given by the 
hospital's clinical staff or to question those staff. It did not publish its 
conclusions in relation to individual cases. It did conclude, however, that 
there had been no negligence on the part of the Brompton in relation to 
Krista's care (a conclusion directly at odd with that of Leveson J  in the High 
Court).
(Chamberlain 2005 : Application to the European Court of Human Rights)
My Legal Action
Having now spent almost five years going through three Inquiries into my daughter’s 
care, all of which found no negligence and which I felt had not allowed me an 
independent investigation, I decided to bring a civil action against the Brompton for 
damages for bereavement and personal injury in 2001. As I could not afford the 
£40,000 being quoted to cover me against the other side's costs if I lost my case, I 
went into court without any insurance to protect me, effectively risking the loss of my 
home. In law I was only entitled to £7,500 damages for the death of my child, but my 
claim for £20,000 also covered personal damages for personal injury.
On December 19* 2001, Justice Leveson at the Royal Courts of Justice handed down 
his judgement. He found that: Krista should have been followed up and kept under 
active review; that Krista's consultant should have told her, her GP and I that her 
ventricular tachycardia was a cause of clinical concern at the hospital and that she 
needed to avoid severe physical exertion and to re-attend the hospital if symptoms 
persisted or other symptoms appeared. The hospital was found to be negligent in 
failing to organise suitable fiirther appointments for Krista. The judge also accepted 
that the negligence caused the loss of any opportunity to test for further deterioration 
in Krista's condition or to provide information to her and I about potentially 
developing symptoms.
However, despite this ruling, I still lost my case because I could not prove that the 
negligence was responsible for my daughter's death. In order to win a medical 
negligence case, a claimant has to prove not only negligence, but that the negligence 
is directly causative of the harm incurred. This meant that in my case, costs were 
awarded against me of £120,000, which were reduced to £10,000 only after media 
pressure. I was eventually advised that I had good grounds for appeal directly relating
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to causation, but was not able to pursue this avenue directly after the court case as the 
National Health Service Litigation Authority (NHSLA), responsible for fighting 
claims on behalf of the NHS would have bankrupted me in order to claim their costs. 
Once this situation had been sorted out however, I applied for, but was denied legal 
aid to appeal on the grounds of having too much disposable capital. I therefore could 
not afford to go to appeal by funding myself, as I could not afford to risk once again 
becoming liable for the other side's costs if I was unsuccessful again.
I therefore attempted to challenge the denial of legal aid by taking my case to the 
European Court of Human Rights, not on the merits of the case, but on the grounds 
that the UK had violated my rights by denying me public funding to bring an appeal. 
This I argued prevented me from subjecting the events surrounding Krista's death to 
an effective investigation, which includes a right of appeal. However, after waiting 
almost eight months, my application to Europe was turned down without explanation. 
I then turned to the office of the Parliamentary Ombudsman, who after several weeks 
confirmed that they could not look at the decision of the Legal Services Commission 
because I had taken my case to Europe. This final refusal brought to an end in 
November 2005, nine long years of struggling to get answers from the multiple and 
various systems responsible within the NHS for investigation when harm to patients 
occurs. This process has left me without justice for my daughter.
The Evans Inquiry: key findings
In the next part of this chapter, I go on to set out some of the key findings and 
conclusions of the Evans Inquiry and illustrate how the families who participated in 
the Inquiry received the report when it was published. I then come on to show how 
my journey as a parent campaigning for justice predominantly on behalf of my 
daughter, was to enter a new stage with the invitation from the Brompton to join a 
committee (The Parents Liaison Committee). This committee was set up in the 
hospital to implement the recommendations from the Evans Inquiry. This allowed me 
for the first time to become involved at a vdder level and to start raising issues that 
had first started to emerge as themes, from my work in the parents' action group and 
from participating in the Evan's Inquiry as a parent. These themes were to become a 
major part of my thinking, and eventually, were to form part of my thinking, in my
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PhD, about creating a new patient safety culture based upon patient empowerment in 
the NHS.
In the chairman's foreword of the Evans Inquiry Report it states:
"The RB&HT delivers world class paediatric cardiac services to children, 
with excellent outcomes. But the experience of the parents we met has been 
extremely unhappy".
(Main Inquiry Report: Xvii)
The Inquiry maintained that they were not a substitute for the courts or for the NHS 
complaints system and that they would direct parents towards these avenues where 
appropriate. The inquiry also maintained that they could not make the assumption that 
the cases they heard were the norm, but they said neither could they conclude that the 
problems which the families they met complained about, were untypical.
The Inquiry report in setting out its findings highlighted a number of distinct, yet 
overlapping themes. These were:
'the importance of effective communication and partnership between clinicians 
and parents; the management of children who had suffered severe 
neurological injury as a result of cardiac surgery; the impact of resources on 
the provision ofpaediatric cardiac services; and allegations of discrimination 
by doctors in the treatment and care o f children with congenital heart disease 
and Down's syndrome'.
(The Summary Report of the Independent Inquiries: 7-8)
A key point made in the report was that over the last decade, there had been a major 
shift in expectations on the part of parents and families for what was seen as fuller 
information and involvement in decision-making. It was therefore argued that what 
was acceptable in the 1970's was no longer acceptable now. The report basically 
found a gap between the experiences of patients and clinicians, with clinicians seen as 
sympathetic to the needs of families, but also citing pressure of workload for not 
being able to give more time. This was however seen as unacceptable by the Inquiry, 
with sufficient investment of consultant time with parents seen as vital where those 
parents were expected to absorb complex information and make life or death 
decisions for their children in an area as technically complex as heart surgery. 
Paediatric cardiac treatment at the hospital was seen in particular to have features that
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made good communication particularly important, but also more difficult for the 
reasons set out below.
This related to the impossibility of parents understanding any of the conditions 
associated with congenital heart disease without an understanding of the normal 
fimctioning of the heart. Therefore, it was argued, there was a need for every 
explanation to start with this, not least because the surgery and treatment being 
proposed was normally specialist, novel and complex.
A further issue was seen as the fact that many children were diagnosed shortly after 
birth, when parents were still adapting to the advent of a new member of the family, 
with the mother often still recovering in hospital, when she learns about the new 
baby’s condition. In addition to these problems, some parents then needed to be told 
that their child had a chromosomal abnormality - Down's Syndrome, in which they 
would then have to adjust to, before learning that their child had a heart defect (Main 
Inquiry Report: Xvii).
The report therefore concluded:
'Any service that aspires to a holistic approach to care - and paediatric 
cardiac surgery is one such service - must look upon the family’s involvement 
in their child's treatment as one of the key outcomes in measuring how 
successful it has been in achieving its aspirations. In the cases we heard, the 
Trust failed in this respect' (Main Inquiry Report: Xvi). It was argued that the 
only way to bridge this gap was through 'better communication and effective 
partnership between families and doctors'.
(Main Inquiry Report: Xvi)
In relation to partnership the report noted, that partnership was generally regarded as a 
relationship of equals, 'but in the NHS there is an unequal balance of power' (Main 
Inquiry Report: Xvii). The Health Secretary, Alan Milbum's, speech to patients' 
organisations in January 2001 was seen to sum this up. In this speech he said,
'There is a simple principle at stake here: the health of the patient belongs to 
the patient, not to the health service. I  want the balance of power in the NHS 
to shift decisively in favour of the patient, not to pitch patients against doctors 
but to put the relationship between patients and the health service on a more 
modem footing'.
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(Main Inquiry Report: Xvii)
This inequality was seen by the Inquiry panel as being heightened in the delivery of 
paediatric cardiac services, with on the one hand, parents in a state of shock and 
generally ignorant of the basic medical facts, whilst on the other hand, health 
professionals were just doing their everyday jobs. In that situation, the parents were 
seen to have a unique and essential contribution to make in the partnership with the 
clinical team. They, it was acknowledged, quickly became the experts in knowing 
their child and therefore sharing of information was not seen as something that should 
have to depend on their assertiveness or tenacity in the clinical situation (Main 
Inquiry Report: Xvii).
The report went on to highlight a number of key findings summarised below, before 
making 120 recommendations, which the Royal Brompton and Harefield Trust 
accepted and agreed to implement in full.
In the cases reviewed, the Inquiry panel found:
Many of the parents were unhappy with the amount of information that they had been 
given about the diagnosis and treatment options for their child. This contrasted with 
the feedback firom clinicians who felt that they had made every effort to explain 
diagnosis and treatment options.
Many of the parents also raised serious concerns about the consent process and 
questioned the way that their consent was sought and obtained, particularly when their 
child had died or suffered serious impairment as a result of surgery. The 
communication of the degree of risk was seen as a particular problem with parents 
stating they had not been given enough information to give informed consent. The 
panel noted that whilst it would be unrealistic for clinicians to provide information 
about every treatment option and outcome, having said this, 'clinicians at the RBH 
were not always as forthcoming as parents were entitled to expect' (Summary Report: 
15).
During hospital admission, the Inquiry panel noted that many of the concerns 
expressed by parents related to a failure to treat them as partners in their child's
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healthcare. The most significant complaints related to being inadequately informed 
about untoward events that occurred during surgery and about their child's progress 
during the post-operative period. The key to successful partnership by the Inquiry was 
seen as not treating communication as an optional 'add-on', but to lie in training staff 
in communication and listening skills. It was also seen as important to tell parents 
who was in charge of their child's treatment, involve parents in ward rounds as part of 
a partnership approach and to keep the family's GP fully informed.
A significant number of parents felt that they had not been given adequate 
information or explanation as to why their child had died. Concerns were also raised 
about parents having 'to batttle to get the truth out of doctors' and about 'staff 
insensitivity'(Summary Report: 15).
In terms of resources, clinicians felt that their workload left them with inadequate 
time for talking to parents and focussing on their needs. The report also noted 
particular concerns about the future recruitment of consultant and specialist nursing 
staff. A shortage of resources in the early period of the review, up to 1994, was 
certainly seen to impede efforts to provide a comprehensive service to families and to 
place doctors under undue pressure despite them regularly raising the matter as an 
issue.
Two particularly serious issues to be raised related to children who had suffered 
neurological injury as a result of cardiac surgery and discrimination against children 
with Down's Syndrome. In relation to the former, the panel stated that although they 
were now satisfied that clinicians warned about brain injury, they acknowledged that 
this might not have been the case in the early 1990s. Based upon evidence firom 
parents however, they concluded that arrangements for dealing with neurological 
damage, including specialist access to paediatric neurology expertise to assess 
children, were not adequate during the period under review.
In relation to the treatment of children with Down's Syndrome, the Inquiry concluded 
that well into the 1990s, the merits of medical management for Complete Atrio 
Ventricular Septal Defect (CAVSD) were still being expressed by some RBH doctors, 
at variance with most other centres. Some parents had complained that they were not
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given sufficient information on the benefits and risks of different treatments in order 
to make an informed choice, nor were they encouraged to seek a second opinion. The 
Inquiry concluded that in some cases there was a failure to provide a balanced view of 
all the options available to the families seen. This meant that such children were less 
favoured in accessing treatment by reason of their Down's Syndrome.
The Inquiry stated however that they were unable to conclude whether the impression 
of some families, that some doctors at the RBH during the period investigated were 
insensitive and displayed inappropriate attitudes towards children with Down's 
Syndrome was well founded. They could only say that from the consistency of oral 
evidence heard, that it was clear that there was a serious breakdown in trust and 
communication at the Royal Brompton between some clinicians and these families, 
which gave rise to a belief by parents that discrimination had taken place.
Key Inquiry Themes to Emerge
Therefore if we look at the report findings we see that a number of themes have arisen 
in terms of accountability, discrimination and an imbalance of power which I would 
like to explore further.
Firstly the issue of accountability is one that has been raised as a consistent theme in 
my PhD research and has important implications when it comes to thinking about 
medical harm and patient empowerment. If we look at some of the evidence about 
what individuals want when something goes wrong with their healthcare, what has 
been shown consistently is that first and foremost people want to know what 
happened and why and only tend to take further action if they cannot get this 
information from health care bodies (DOH 2003: 75; NFS A 2005: 2; Parliamentary 
and Health Service Ombudsman 2005: 49-50; Montgomery 2003). The importance 
placed on gaining an independent investigation to find out what had happened to their 
children was borne out by the response of a number of parents who went to the Evan's 
Inquiry.
This feeling about the lack of independence and credibility of the report was reflected 
in a statement read out by myself on behalf of the group, at the press conference
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launch of the report. This also made clear my own views at the time about how I felt 
about the lack of independent investigation. The statement was later reported in full, 
in an article published in the British Medical Journal entitled 'Down's children 
received "less favourable" hospital treatment' (Kmietowicz 2001) as set out below.
'Josephine Ocloo, chairwoman of the Brompton and Harefield Heart Children 
Action Group, whose daughter died while under the care of the Brompton 
Hospital in 1996 at the age of 17, called the inquiry a "sham and a cover up". 
She criticised the report for failing to demonstrate medical negligence among 
doctors despite plenty of evidence of poor clinical practice. "As parents we 
have been lied to and tricked into participating in this inquiry, which bypasses 
our concerns almost entirely. We believe the inquiry singularly failed to 
penetrate the secretive and unaccountable world of medical decision-making 
or to identify processes of concealment which are triggered in hospitals 
whenever families demand answers", said Ms Ocloo. "Once again the rights of  
patients and their families have been fundamentally ignored. After 18 months 
we still do not know why our children died or why they were brain damaged. 
We want to know who was accountable".
(Kmietowicz 2001:815)
From the statement above one can see how important it was for families participating 
in the Inquiry to have an independent investigation. This issue seems all the more 
important given that the Inquiry noted that few of the parents involved in the Inquiry 
had used the complaints procedure to resolve their concerns and those who had, had 
found it unsatisfactory. It was also noted that serious problems had been encountered 
by the Inquiry in obtaining medical records, as had parents and that the quality and 
extent of the copy documentation was problematic. Therefore a review was 
commissioned of the Trust's management of medical records. This found that in some 
cases important information - about treatment options, risk factors, key decisions or 
episodes, or about parents' concerns - had not been recorded, while in a minority of 
cases, important documents appeared to be missing or case notes badly organised. The 
implications of this particular finding, was that any parent subsequently wanting to 
take further action, would find it very difficult to do so without the full medical 
evidence in their records.
The second important theme to arise from the Inquiry relates to that of discrimination. 
Jeremy Rutter from the Down's Syndrome Association responding to the report said 
that 'parents who complained about the service had been "absolutely vindicated'". He
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said that they had "to fight hard to get the treatment for parents of the future" 
(Kmietowicz 2001: 815). What however were less obvious with the inquiry findings 
were the more subtle and hidden undertones of other types of discrimination. In a 
summary of the notes sent to me after my meeting with the inquiry panel, Ms Evans 
stated 'this case raises a catalogue of poor communication: racist, classiest and 
unacceptable' (Summary Note of RBH Independent Panel Inquiry 1 February 2000). 
The reference to issues of class and race were to come up as on-going issues as I 
became further involved with the Brompton in the Parents Liaison Group (PLG).
Certainly at that point in time I was left not only with the impression of racism as a 
factor in my case, but struck by the observation that most of the families in my action 
group were White working class families. It seemed to me that these families would 
have had little chance of taking on the system in trying to get answers as to why their 
children had received sub-standard care. Later on in the report, these issues seemed to 
link in with the observation by the panel that an imbalance of power existed between 
the parents and the doctors and a lack of partnership, however the report did not 
necessarily explore this imbalance in terms of discrimination.
The issue of how discrimination was linked to partnership and an imbalance of power 
was to become a theme that I would explore much more in my subsequent journey 
and relationship with the Royal Brompton.
Stage Three: The Parents Liaison Committee
In 2001, after the publication of the Evans Inquiry Report, The Brompton wrote to me 
asking me to sit on a committee called The Parents Liaison Group (PLG) in the 
hospital, to implement the 120 recommendations from the Inquiry Report. Despite my 
views about the Inquiry and the fact that my personal campaign to get justice for my 
daughter was still on going, I decided to swallow my fears and reservations and to 
accept the invitation. This was to be a seminal moment in my journey, taking me fi-om 
campaigning around my case and on behalf of families in the group, to looking at 
wider issues in terms of patient safety, and good standards of healthcare. I was to sit 
on this committee, which met on a quarterly basis, as a volunteer (and as the only
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parent who went to the Inquiry, for most of the time) between July 2001 and 
September 2004.
The Parents Liaison Group was comprised of a number of very senior people within 
the Trust as well as having representatives from all of the groups who went to the 
inquiry. The Trust members, all of whom were required to attend meetings, were 
made up of the Chair of the Board Lord Newton, the Chief Executive Mark Taylor 
and other members of staff such as the Director of Nursing and Quality, a consultant 
Paediatric Cardiologist and the Paediatric Services Manager. Other members of staff 
were to attend at a later stage. The patient representatives were comprised of The 
Down’s Heart Group (DHG) and The Down's Syndrome Association (DSA) who both 
submitted evidence to the Inquiry on behalf of families, as well as encouraged 
individual parents to seek a review of their case. The Children's Heart Federation 
(CHF) was also subsequently invited to join the group to provide support to the DHG 
representatives.
As the chair of the Brompton and Harefield Heart Children's Action Group 
(BHHCAG), I was initially the only member of the group to be invited to sit on the 
PLG. However, I later asked for another parent, Mrs Polly Fleet-Palmer to be 
extended an invitation to join. In attending these meetings my role was unique for a 
number of reasons. I was the only parent to attend most of the meetings because Mrs 
Fleet-Palmer could not make many of them because of her carer responsibilities. I was 
also therefore the only person who had been directly affected by medical negligence 
and gone through the Evan's Inquiry as a parent. Lastly my position was different, 
because I had decided to work with the PLG despite the fact that the Action Group I 
represented had not accepted the report and called it a 'sham'. This was in contrast to 
the other lay members of the PLG representing families with children with Down's 
Syndrome, who had accepted the report. For all of these reasons I frequently felt like 
the outsider in the PLG and felt treated like one.
In analysing my work, role and relationship with this group my intention is to 
concentrate on four key areas: communication and partnership, the imbalance of 
power between patients and healthcare professionals, discrimination and 
empowerment. These themes as mentioned in the last section of this chapter on the
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Evan's Inquiry, represented the key themes to emerge in the Inquiry and were 
reflected strongly in the Inquiry’s final report and recommendations. In looking at 
these areas, I will explore how they were played out in the context of the PLG and its 
subsequent working agenda.
The issue of communication and partnership proved to be an important theme 
throughout the three years of the group and I would argue was very much linked to 
the issue of an imbalance of power amongst group members. This was illustrated first 
and foremost by the way that the group chose to structure its work agenda. I would 
argue that this was done in a very top down manner in which the Trust tended to 
decide what the agenda would be without consultation with the rest of the group. In 
the initial meetings there was some discussion about how to deal with implementing 
the recommendations and it was agreed that as well as the Trust bringing an updated 
action plan to meetings and talking to specific areas about progress, it would also be 
more constructive to identify some key themes that could be explored more in terms 
of issues connected to the Inquiry report. The themes identified were about 
communication, partnership and power in the beginning and later discrimination 
affecting not just people with Down's Syndrome but those firom Black and other 
minority ethnic communities and other groups.
It is difficult to say whether the Trust understood these arrangements as working and 
being carried out within a spirit of partnership, but certainly from a user perspective 
there were clues early on that illustrated the imbalance of power within the group.
At the 25* July 2002 meeting, two papers were tabled for discussion. These papers 
were entitled 'Values in Social Care' and 'Power, Partnership and Empowerment' from 
'Empowering Practice in Social Care (1995) by Suzy Braye and Michael Preston- 
Shoot. The minutes of the meeting note:
'The above papers had been circulated prior to the meeting in preparation for  
this agenda item. Josephine Ocloo initiated a discussion around the 
maintenance of standards, management o f clinical errors, communication, 
and the way that personal values impact upon the way that care is delivered, 
and emphasised the importance of anti-oppressive attitudes when working 
with disadvantaged users'.
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I had suggested the PLG read these papers, as I had wanted to convey some of my 
thinking and knowledge about power in organisations and the need for working in an 
anti-oppressive way. I was also familiar with this type of thinking and approach for 
many years because of my social work background and work with local communities 
and felt that the types of themes coming up in the Evan's Report about the imbalance 
of power between users and professionals warranted further discussion.
The first paper broadly makes the point that values are important in an organisation 
and that it is important to open up a values discourse in our working environment to 
identify what values we are using. This discourse is seen as vital given the role that 
values play in shaping organisational cultures, which are never value free. Personal 
and professional values are seen to filter and shape all beliefs and action and to 
construct all of the sources of knowledge and practice that health and social care is 
based upon. Given this situation a discourse is seen as vital to identify what values are 
being used to shape practice. It is argued that it is particularly dangerous with 
professional practice to assume a consensus based upon a supposed common-sense 
viewpoint on what is valued (Biehal and Sainsbury 1991 in Braye and Preston-Shoot; 
35). This can mask the fact that practitioners may think their decisions are based upon 
professional objectivity, 'when in reality they are making assessments and decisions 
based on their cultural values' (Harris 1991 in Braye and Preston-Shoot: 35). The 
failure to question ones value base and analyse assumptions is therefore seen to cover 
up the 'profound social and personal subjectivity involved in the assessment of other 
people's lives (Stevenson 1989 in Braye and Preston-Shoot: 35).
In exploring values, Braye and Preston-Shoot (1995) argue that there are broadly two 
categories of values: traditional values that 'urge practitioners to 'treat people better' in 
the context of allotted roles and place in the social structure' and 'values calling for 
radical change to, and renegotiation of, existing roles and social structures, to create a 
fairer society' (Braye and Preston-Shoot 1995: 35). The former seeks to bring about 
an adjustment of users to the status quo and existing conditions in society, with a 
focus on personal problems, whilst, a radical agenda seeks to change the status quo by 
highlighting the structural context in which problems and power relations are 
'produced and reproduced' (Rojek et al 1988 in Braye and Preston-Shoot 1995: 35).
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The second paper looked at how professionals use their power and how this is linked 
to wider power relationships in society and the impact this has on the lives of service 
users. Key arguments in the paper pointed to the growth in awareness in recent years 
about the way 'services are provided in ways which at best are inappropriate to 
people's needs, and at worst collude with and perpetuate inequalities' (Braye and 
Preston-Shoot 1995: 98). This was seen to have led to demands by service users to be 
treated equally and with respect and to have control and to be able to participate in 
how services are structured and provided.
The authors of the paper therefore argued that for real change to take place a number 
of things had to happen. Firstly, that a reappraisal had to take place of the traditional 
power balance between users and professionals which takes into account what users 
say they want, rather than having oppressive and non-negotiated solutions imposed 
upon them. Secondly, that a mandate from users is seen to impose a dual 
responsibility on professionals to provide services that are 'non-oppressive' and which 
'neither negatively stereo-type vulnerability through age, disability or mental health, 
nor oppress people through their race, sex, sexuality or class status - and that 
practitioners must be anti-oppressive in how they engage with users and their 
networks in challenging oppressive practice and experienced oppression' (Braye and 
Preston-Shoot 1995: 100). This agenda in turn is seen to require professionals to take 
into account the way that holding stereotypical images about people can affect 
assumptions about their competence and therefore their rights and autonomy. This 
will therefore require a professional response that is based not only upon tackling 
individually focused goals, but also social structures as well. (Braye and Preston- 
Shoot 1995: 100).
The minutes of the PLG meeting of July 25* 2002 in relation to the above papers 
noted,
'This raised issues and a lengthy discussion including:
Informed consent
How doctors communicate with patients 
What training clinical staff receive about this
How to empower patients and also get patients to take personal responsibility 
Ethnic and other minority monitoring 
Racism
Meeting individual's needs and the knowledge required to do so'.
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As a result of the discussion that took place around this agenda item, the Trust 
decided to commission a comprehensive review of research to evaluate methods of 
conveying information to patients and parents. The review was commissioned from 
Royal Holloway College and involved a steering group of academics as well as the 
appointment of a researcher for six months. The literature review covered 'a history of 
doctor/patient communication, lay perceptions of risks, styles and patterns of 
communication and the development of working partnerships' (Notes of the Board 
Sub-Committee to advise on actions arising from the Independent Paediatric Inquiry - 
December 2003).
I had suggested looking at this topic further to explore in more detail how patients and 
users could be excluded in the healthcare process and ways of working more with 
them in partnership. This clearly was an issue that affected the families in going to the 
Evans Inquiry and me on a personal level. However what I came to see as an irony 
with this review was the way that it totally excluded me from the process of carrying 
out the review, as a parent representative and indeed the only academic amongst the 
lay representatives on the PLG. The review committee met for the life of the PLG 
without my knowledge and without my requests for information about how the review 
was progressing, producing any further clarification. The minutes of the meeting of 
21®^ September 2004 note in relation to my request for information about the review 
that:
'JO asked about the commissioning of research to evaluate different methods 
of conveying complex information (recommendation no. 51) She reminded the 
group that this project was set up as a result of the issues she raised in her 
presentation to the group and expressed the view that therefore she thought it 
unfortunate that she had not been involved or included in the project in any 
way, as she would have liked. CS replied that this had been undertaken by 
Royal Holloway College and that she would send a copy o f their research to 
JO'.
In looking at this report later on, I noted that it basically constituted a literature search 
of articles in this area and that had I been involved I would have wanted the research 
to be conducted differently and to have focused on different things.
Throughout the life of the PLG, this example of top down communication and an 
approach which did not seem inclusive or to be. about working in real partnership
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(both highhghted in the Evans Report) with lay members seemed to be typical of the 
process on many occasions. This situation is illustrated by two further examples set 
out below. In the first example the CHF representative on the PLG wrote to the 
Brompton on the 16* July 2002. She wrote:
'On behalf of CHF I  wanted to express our concern regarding the policy 
documents as distributed to the Parent Liaison Group. Although these 
documents demonstrate a valuable initial contribution to any discourse on the 
issues they address, they also suggest a lack of commitment in essence to the 
principle of partnership'.
She continues;
'Although many Health Care Professionals endorse the principle of  
partnership they continue to use language which undermines this claim. As 
highlighted in the article supplied by Josephine Ocloo - 'Power, Partnership 
and Empowerment' (p. 117):
Language itself is not a neutral medium: it carries received ideas, values, and 
standards, and is itself a form ofpower (Rojek et al. 1988). The language used 
as currency in channels of communication will either facilitate or stifle 
effective interchange of ideas and opinions.
As such the language used in policy documents can have an immense effect on 
both the spirit in which these policies are implemented by staff and the manner 
in which parents engage with them.
That groups such as DHG, BHHCAG and DSA are involved in assessing these 
documents demonstrates that management at The Brompton are attempting to 
pursue the principle o f partnership. Unfortunately language used in policy 
documents we have been asked to comment on does not support this'.
In December 2002, this issue of a lack of proper partnership was stated even more 
strongly to the Commission for Health Improvement (CHI), now the Health Care 
Commission (HCC). As part of their assessment of services at the Royal Brompton 
and Harefield NHS Trust, CHI carried out a number of meetings to establish the 
views of local people. As part of this review the Children's Heart Federation and the 
Down's Heart Group made a joint submission to CHI. In relation to the Evan's Inquiry 
and the establishment of the Parent's Liaison Group, the submission stated:
'In our view, the Trust have seen the implementation of the Evan's 
recommendations as another, albeit important, management and bureaucratic 
exercise to be competed and got out of the way as soon as possible. They were 
stung by the Evan's criticisms and wished to be seen to be ejficient in putting 
there services right.
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They are to be commended for their commitment to this, but we feel in taking 
this line they have taken insufficient account o f the message underlying the 
Evans, and other reports, o f the need for a change in the culture of the service.
There is an 'inside-out' approach, where a 'patient-centred service' is seen as 
bolting on to the current systems and culture the process of consultation with 
patients. Reports, standards, and policies continue to be developed, 
articulated and negotiated within the organisation and its culture, and 
produced in the language of that culture. It is only when the policy-makers, 
managers and professionals have reached their accommodations that 
representatives of parents are brought into consultation. This is keeping the 
patient as "tail end Charlie rather than being involved in the actual 
development of proposals'.
(Joint submission by the Children's Heart Federation and the Down's Heart Group for 
the Inspection by the Commission for Health Improvement on the Royal Brompton 
and Harefield NHS Trust).
This theme of a lack of real partnership, with the implicit criticism that the balance of 
power lay with the Trust, continued to raise its head in different ways throughout the 
life of the PLG. An issue that was particularly close to my heart was that of expenses 
and reimbursement for time, for volunteers. I felt that this was particularly important 
for Mrs Fleet-Palmer and myself because we were the only two parents attending 
PLG meetings in our own time as volunteers. All other members of the Group 
including the other patient representatives were attending as part of their paid work. I 
felt that this issue went to the heart of addressing the issue of creating real 
partnerships. On the 27* January 2003 I wrote to Lord Newton, chair of the Trust and 
PLG about this matter. In outlining my concerns I stated:
'I am the only person at the meetings who undertakes the work in my own time. 
I  believe this puts me at considerable disadvantage in terms o f participation 
compared to other members of the Liaison Committee and certainly raises 
issues for me in terms o f user empowerment and working in partnership. The 
Brompton and Harefield Action Group is not a funded body and therefore 
attempting to communicate the issues being set out in the numerous policies 
being developed, is costing me in particular, a considerable amount of money 
in terms o f postage, telephone and meeting expenses'.
This matter was discussed at the meeting of the PLG on the 29* April 2003. The 
minutes note Lord Newton's response to the issues raised in my letter:
'that financial re-imbursement to the group would have to be nominal 
otherwise the group could not be considered to be voluntary or independent.
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He continued by also stating that funding should come from outside of the 
Trust’.
Lord Newton did however concede that the Trust were required to have a policy on 
patient/parent involvement by 2004 and that he felt that 'the principles of this matter 
do have to be considered as other groups are involved within the Trust'.
I was not particularly happy with this response and continued to pursue the matter at 
various meetings, in the hope that a policy could be developed which would be 
supportive of volunteer involvement in the Trust. The meeting of the 10* July 2003 
noted
'JO asked for progress on financial reimbursement' and in my diary notes of the 13* 
February 2004, which turned out to be the penultimate meeting of the Group, (the last 
meeting being September 21®* 2004), I wrote in relation to the issue of volunteer 
expenses:
'Newton had said at (sic) last meeting he would push this up the agenda, but 
needed to have a wider policy and not just make an exception for one group. 
The minutes had said that the issue would be raised at the Trust PPI open day 
but this did not happen. Basically I  felt I  was fobbed off by the response that 
we are now waiting to see what a number o f other NHS Trusts do about this 
issue (no surprises here) '.
The sequel to this particular issue, is that more than two years later on 27 October 
2006, as part of my role as chair of the Trust's Patients Forum, I was still pursuing this 
matter. In a letter to the Trust lead on PPI and copied to Lord Newton as set out 
below, I state why the lack of a proper policy on reimbursing expenses and payment 
of volunteer time is seen not just as a barrier to good PPI, but is also now seen as good 
practice as defined by the Department of Health.
'Re: Forum feedback on the expense policy
At the Trust PPI Core Group (April 18^  ^ 2006) PPI Forum members pointed 
out that the existing policy was inadequate for the purposes of patient and 
public involvement and that greater clarity was required. The group felt 
strongly that the matter of volunteer payment should be addressed as it is a 
significant incentive for involvement.
The forum would therefore like to register their surprise that the issue of  
volunteer payment has been separated and taken out o f the policy going
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against best practice as advised by the DOH (Reward and Recognition, DOH 
2006:16).
It is best practice that service users involved with service providers in 
activities that involve deciding together, acting together and encouraging 
independent initiatives are offered payment. The service user can decline this 
offer if they wish and be involved on a voluntary unpaid basis.
The forum would again like to propose that the Trust addresses the issue of  
volunteer payment in their expense policy. I  would like to point out that I  have 
in fact been raising this matter as an issue with the Trust seen 2002 as part of 
my participation in the Parents Liaison Group. I  would also question why PPI 
Core members were invited to come and give their time to participate in a 
meeting around this issue only to have the matter entirely ignored when it 
came to reviewing the policy.
The Forum would appreciate an early response to how this matter will now be 
dealt with'.
The above mentioned examples illustrate a number of issues related to 
communication, partnership and ultimately an imbalance of power between the health 
professionals and senior members of the Trust in the PLG and the patient 
representatives. This illustrated to me that the themes in the Evans Report were 
ongoing and part of the cultural expression of the Trust in the way that it operated 
through its different functions. However, the themes just highlighted, were not the 
only ones to reflect the issues raised in the Evans Report. Perhaps the area that was 
most difficult for me to deal with on both a personal and professional level was the 
issue of discrimination.
As illustrated earlier, the Evans Report was highly critical of the way that families 
with children with Down’s Syndrome had been treated. However, in terms of progress 
made in this area, what was evident in the PLG, was that the Trust were prepared to 
work with members in the group representing organisations dealing with issues that 
affected families with Down's Syndrome, to address any outstanding concerns in this 
area. A particular concern related to the care of children with Down's Syndrome, who 
had been treated at the Trust in the years leading up to and including the Evans 
Inquiry. To address this concern the Trust carried out a review of 161 patients and 
following scrutiny of their medical records and information from other hospitals, 
invited 22 children and young adults to a specially convened clinic where they had
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medical and psychosocial assessments and their plan of care reviewed. This led to a 
model of care for the friture.
In respect of this work, it is clear that the Trust worked in partnership with the groups 
representing these families and that the Down's Group representatives were pleased 
with the work done. This positive endorsement of the Trust's work was also reflected 
in the Trust's implementation of Recommendation 119 about implementing model 
guidance on the avoidance of discrimination in the care and treatment of children with 
Down's Syndrome and congenital heart disease. At the Parents Liaison Group meeting 
of 29* April 2003, the minutes note:
'The Down's Heart Group commended the Trust on the progress with this 
recommendation and continued by stating they would be happy to say so publicly'.
However it must be said that when looking at other areas of discrimination, the 
experiences in the Group were no-where near as positive. On the subject of 
discrimination, the Evans Inquiry Report concentrated on issues affecting children 
with Down's Syndrome. This was clearly because they looked at a number of cases 
brought to their attention by two groups specialising in this area.
However, this focus did not mean that other areas of discrimination were not hidden 
beneath the surface of events. After my personal interview with the Inquiry panel 
about my case, I received a summary note firom them about what they saw as the main 
issues. In the note, Ruth Evans made the point:
'This case raises a catalogue of poor communication: racist, classiest (sic) 
and unacceptable'.
(Summary Note of RBH Independent Panel Inquiry, February 1 2000)
She raised the points about race and class because I had talked about my suspicion 
that there was racism involved in the care of my daughter. I also raised questions 
about a certain distance and superiority that I had noticed, but never questioned in my 
relationship with Krista's consultant over the years. The relationship was friendly but 
paternalistic with him firmly in charge. I also mentioned how most of the families in 
our action group who were white and working class, were mainly complaining about 
the same consultant as the one who had treated Krista. All this raised questions about
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the information they had been given and their view that certain important elements 
had been withheld from them about their children's care and treatment. Some families 
also expressed to me that they felt talked down to by their consultant and patronised. 
Given these issues, once I became involved in the PLG, I decided to broaden the 
discussion of discrimination to both race and class. In an early meeting of the Group, 
the minutes of the 25* July 2002 note in a discussion of Recommendation 110 and 
119 on discrimination:
'Josephine Ocloo asked what information the Trust keeps on race, gender and 
disability on both staff and patients, and what use is made of this information. 
Lord Newton agreed that this information would be provided for discussion at the 
next meeting'.
In reading through the minutes of later meetings, what is noticeable is my continuing 
request for various bits of information in this area. This is perhaps encapsulated best, 
some two years later from the original request for information noted in the above 
quote in the minutes of September 21^ 2004. This was the last meeting of the PLG 
and the minutes reflect my frustration and disappointment at failing to make progress 
in the area of addressing and promoting race equality in the Trust. The minutes note in 
relation to an item headed - Trust wide ethnic mix and gender - staff and patients:
'JO was disappointed that she had not received the information that she had 
■ requested at the last meeting concerning minority ethnic representation of 
staff and patients and in particular information relating to targets and 
progress made against them. IB apologised that this had not been forthcoming 
and explained some of the difficulties associated with capturing this 
information. JO did not accept the argument that difficulties in obtaining 
information prevented targets being set and progress monitored.
JO also referred to the core principles of the NHS as set out in the NHS Plan 
which states: "The NHS of the century must be responsive to the needs of
different groups and individuals within society, and challenge discrimination 
on the grounds of age, gender, ethnicity, religion, disability and sexuality". JO 
questioned whether the hospital had appropriate information on the needs of 
diverse patient groups and therefore whether they were able to respond to 
their needs. She stated that she continued to find that she was the only person 
from a BME background on the various committees that she sat on in the 
hospital and tended to be the person that got left to raise issues o f race and 
other areas of equality and diversity'.
The reason why I had not received the information I had requested and on action 
taken against targets in this area was to become much clearer several years later. This
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related to when I again attempted to make progress in relation to the Trust promoting 
race equality, as part of my role as chair of the Trust’s Patients Forum. This I shall 
come onto in the next section of this chapter.
The issue of class was in many respects even harder than race to raise in the PLG, not 
least because of the subtleties in the way that it manifested itself and the lack of any 
real investigation or interest in looking at whether this was an issue. Perhaps the best 
example of where this was raised was in relation to the planning of a seminar for 
parents by the Trust Paediatric Department on patient and public involvement, which 
took place on the 13 November 2003.
This event was suggested for a number of reasons by the PLG. Firstly, because 
following the implementation of the recommendations the PLG meetings were 
coming to an end. Secondly because the Health and Social Care Act 2001 now 
required PPI in all aspects of NHS Trust work and therefore the Trust thought it 
would be useful to see how this could be pursued after the PLG came to an end and 
thirdly, because PLG members like myself thought that a seminar of this type was 
important in terms of addressing issues of discrimination and promoting equality and 
diversity within the Trust. The minutes of 10* July 2003 on this issue note when 
quoting me that, 'She believes that there needs to be a seminar/training day in which 
issues can be teased out - oppressive behaviour, policy and diversity. She is aware that 
legislation will soon be released into the public domain, which will lead on this'.
However, the feedback on the event from the Trust and individually from myself and 
Polly-Fleet-Palmer as the two parent representatives from the PLG to attend the 
seminar, are interesting to note in the very different perspectives they raised.
The Trust minutes of 12 February note, 'RC reported on a successful day in which 
many parents had expressed interest in setting up a parent's charity'. However at the 
next meeting (September 2004) and the last one to be held for the PLG, the minutes 
state:
'Both JO and PFP stated that the attendance on the day had not been as 
diverse and representative as it could have been, with mainly White middle- 
class families appearing to be present, rather than families from working class
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or Black and minority ethnic backgrounds. It was felt that this representation 
and the setting for the event meant that not all people had felt comfortable 
with the day and this therefore suggested that the needs o f different types of 
patients had not been met’.
What is also interesting about these minutes, is that in the meeting itself, I had 
initially expressed these views and was being challenged on their validity and then 
Polly arrived later, with Rose her daughter in a wheelchair. Polly then decided to 
declare her own views on the event, independent of me and stated about the event 
location, 'I felt uncomfortable about where it was held in that posh hotel', she also 
stated about the representation of the participants at the event that 'there were few 
people of my class'. Suffice to say the PLG agreed to accept my amendments to the 
minutes on this issue.
Finally in looking at this section of my journey as health advocate in the liaison 
Group, there are two incidents I want to end with. These two examples are illustrative 
to me both of issues concerning partnership and the imbalance of power existing in 
the Group between lay members and the health service representatives. These 
examples also illustrate some of the issues that both Mrs Fleet-Palmer and I faced as 
the only parent representatives in the Parents Liaison Group.
The following example is one that is particularly moving and poignant for me to 
illustrate and concerns Polly Fleet-Palmer. Polly came to be a parent in the Liaison 
Group because of her involvement with the Evan's Inquiry and her personal 
experience with Harefield Hospital whom she believed to be responsible for the 
serious and catastrophic brain damage that her daughter Rose sustained after a heart 
operation when she was eight years old at Harefield Hospital. Polly, like me, had 
fought unsuccessfully to get any justice and eventually Polly became a member of the 
Action Group that I formed and of which became vice-chair. She decided to join the 
PLG with extreme reservations like myself and found the meetings particularly 
difficult and intimidating because she did not have a professional background or 
committee experience and was a full-time carer for her daughter Rose.
Polly was not able to attend many of the PLG meetings over the three years because 
of her caring responsibilities and the pressure this put her under. However her
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attendance at one meeting (13 September 2004), was to be an unforgettable one and to 
illustrate to me more than any other, the imbalance of power between a parent in 
Polly's situation (an ordinary working class person with no committee experience 
trying to make herself heard against the system) and the position of the rest of the 
Group, particularly Trust members. What I witnessed in this meeting made me think, 
perhaps more than at other times, how important it was to think about patient 
empowerment.
Set out below is an extract from my personal diary on the meeting, in which Polly 
turns up unexpectedly halfrvay through:
'At this point PFP made a remarkable entrance with her daughter Rose in a 
wheelchair. PFP had told me only a few days prior that she was bringing her. 
The shock in the room was palpable as Rose's presence in a wheelchair spoke 
for itself PFP had frequently felt very nervous and intimidated and depressed 
about her ability to speak out at these high powered meetings.
She made me feel very moved and humble as in her own way, ignoring the 
niceties of the agenda, proceeded to outline her desperation and frustration at 
caring for Rose and why the RBH had failed to do anything about the DOH 
recommendations concerned with the setting up o f an emergency fund [for 
people in Polly's situation]'.
My notes in referring to lord Newton state:
'He was flustered and silenced as PFP outlined her issues, this time 
demanding her issues were minuted. She even movingly read out a personal 
letter from another family whose child had been brain injured and left without 
compensation, where the child had now died. No one spoke a word in the 
room, there was just stunned silence as Polly spoke and Rose gesticulated, 
cried out and picked her nose.
Newton finally pleaded with, begged PFP to meet him after the meeting for a 
chat. PFP had even gone to the trouble of handing around in a glass plastic 
wallet a document of several pages outlining her grievances with Rose's care'.
I wrote finally in my diary:
'I remain incredibly touched and impressed by Polly's strength and courage, 
speaking out in her own way, not necessarily according to the usual 
conventions of meetings, but getting her points across'.
Looking back in hindsight at the meeting, I realise what an extraordinary intervention 
Polly made. First of all it was obvious how incredibly uncomfortable others in the
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meeting felt at Polly bringing along her disabled daughter. For Trust members it 
seems to me that Polly’s daughter would have been the visible symbol of the medical 
harm that Polly and Rose had experienced. This clearly made the Trust 
representatives very uncomfortable and this showed visibly in their facial expressions 
and eventually in the way that the chair pleaded with Polly to talk to him outside of 
the meeting. It was also interesting for me to note that the other patient representatives 
did not seem comfortable with the emotional nature of the intervention. They of 
course had not gone to the Inquiry personally and so were participating in the meeting 
on behalf of those personally affected by medical harm.
In some ways, what Polly was able to do with her intervention I feel was to break 
through the imposed formal convention of the meeting, which in many respects had 
acted to silence both Polly and I in raising anything of a direct personal and emotional 
nature. I think this situation was empowering for Polly on one level, because it 
allowed her to place in the room the very issue, about Rose's condition, that had made 
Polly go through the inquiry in the first place. Yet she had still been left silenced and 
the issues she faced as a carer still un-addressed. Her intervention was a way of 
saying I will not be totally silenced even if I have to break the formal conventions of 
your meeting and this is a way that I can best communicate my issues.
However, on another level, despite Polly's brave attempt to make her views known, it 
was also obvious to me and I think everybody at that meeting, that despite the 
emotional impact of the protest, nothing would (perhaps now could) be done to 
address Polly's concerns.
This incident to me illustrates the more personal impact of institutional power on an 
individual's life. It also raises issues about the nature of patient and public 
involvement and how individuals can genuinely be empowered to speak when they 
are numerically in the minority and have had no committee experience. They may, 
because of their lay involvement, lack the expertise in the subject area and may also 
be disadvantaged because of their race, class, gender background etc.
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Finally, what for me illustrated a more structural example of the imbalance of power 
within the Liaison Group, was in the production of the Final Report on implementing 
the Evans Inquiry recommendations.
This report was clearly important as it was to set out the achievements of the Group in 
implementing the recommendations and was to be used to sign off the process and to 
be sent to the Inquiry chair, Ruth Evans. Given the importance of this report, it would 
have been impossible for me to predict not being a part of the production of it, but this 
is precisely what happened.
At the Parents Liaison meeting in September 2004, I asked 'what the audit 
arrangements were going to be for the final report'. The response was that 
'independent auditors from Thames Audit, and the Trust's Clinical audit Team had 
been involved in checking compliance with the recommendations and had reported 
their findings to the Trust Board Sub-committee'. The minutes then note the surprised 
response from me in being excluding from this process.
'Jo expressed surprise that auditing arrangements had taken place without any 
inclusion o f the Parents Group in the process. She stated that she had always 
expected to be involved'.
The minutes of this meeting then went on to reflect my comments on the Final Report 
and my feelings about myself and the other patient representatives having been 
excluded from the process of producing it.
'JO said she felt none the wiser for having read the report, because it lacked 
evidence and tended to make statements about progress that she felt unable to 
verify not having been part o f the auditing process. Other members o f the 
group expressed similar views. JO also felt that there was an imbalance of 
power between those writing the report and the Parents Liaison Group, and 
that it was unfortunate that there was no discussion about audit and 
evaluation prior to the report being written, or involvement o f the members of 
the group in the writing of the report. Given the concerns raised about the 
lack of evidence in the report, it was agreed that it should be amended to 
reflect some of the issues raised'.
The final report that went to the Trust Board was therefore forced to insert a 
compromise caveat, which stated that, the report:
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'has been discussed with members of the Parents Liaison Group. Members felt 
that it was difficult to comment on the substance o f the report because they 
had not been involved in the auditing process and therefore were not 
conversant with the evidence base cited'.
(Final Report of the Paediatric Inquiries, Board minutes 23 November 2004)
In many respects the production of the final report echoed for me the processes that 
had been evident right the way throughout sitting on the PLG and reflected the 
comments in the Evan’s Inquiry report about medical dominance and control. The 
report stated that partnership was generally regarded as a relationship of equals, hut 
in the NHS there is an unequal balance of power' (Inquiry Report: Xvii). This was 
certainly my experience in the PLG and meant that by the last meeting I was 
desperately glad that the experience had come to an end. As my personal diary noted 
at the time, as I left the meeting for the last time:
'I left them all chatting and socialising, as always for the three years, on the 
outside and divorced from the social side of the process. Always only making a 
professional contribution and leaving, refusing to be drawn into the social, 
humour, banter and I  felt the loneliness and I  also felt the relief that those 
meetings had come to an end'.
(Diary Note, September 21 2004)
The chair of the Trust subsequently wrote to me on 7* October 2004 stating:
'I wanted to thank you for your contribution, critical revie^v and help over the 
last few years. You know as well as I  that the recommendations covered a 
wide range o f issues in the Paediatric Services and that many of these have 
had implications for other parts of the Trust and for paediatric cardiac care 
nationally. For many, this has been both a personal and painful issue and 
therefore I  am even more grateful for the work you have done and the time you 
have committed to helping us'.
Stage Four: Chair of the Trust Patients Forum
The end of my work with the PLG was not however to mark the end of my journey 
working with the Royal Brompton and Harefield NHS Trust. Despite feeling that my 
work with the PLG had not been empowering and questioning what I had achieved, I 
decided to stay working with the Trust for a number of reasons. Firstly because my 
campaign for justice was still on going at this stage and this continued to leave me 
without a sense of closure on the issues associated with my daughter's death.
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Secondly, as time had gone by I had increasingly began to think not only about justice 
and accountability for my daughter, but also about wider issues and'the need to look 
at developing a new patient safety agenda and culture in partnership with patients. 
Thirdly, as a result of my involvement with the Evans Inquiry and PLG, I was left 
with many questions about issues of discrimination and power and how an oppressive 
and discriminatory culture could impact upon and harm the most vulnerable groups of 
patients. In other words I was left with a hypothesis about medical harm and patient 
empowerment. This thinking coincided with the opportunity to apply for a CASE 
studentship to undertake a PhD, in partnership with Accident against Medical 
Accidents (AvMA) at Surrey University. In successfully being awarded this 
studentship and taking up work with AvMA, my thinking about my field research and 
developing a participatory action research approach, began to influence me in 
thinking that I might draw upon some of my work at the Brompton to use in my PhD.
I therefore decided to apply to join the Patients Forum for the Brompton, as I felt that 
this would continue to be a good way to allow me to look at some of the issues I was 
working with at the Brompton academically. I had also begun to wonder if my Forum 
work might provide me with an opportunity to generate data both as a Forum 
representative and as an action researcher. This also seemed like a good way for me to 
take forward some of the wider issues emerging in my own mind about patient safety 
and patient empowerment, as a result of my campaign for justice.
The legislative context to the emergence of Patient Forums comes out of the Health 
and Social Care Act 2001. This set out guidance on the need to develop a more 
patient-centred, responsive and accountable National Health Service. Section 11 of 
the Act, places a duty on Strategic Health Authorities, Primary Care Trusts and NHS 
Trusts to involve and consult patients and the public on: the planning and provision of 
services, the development and consideration of proposals for changes in the way those 
services are provided, and, on decisions to be made by that body affecting the 
operation of those services. The aim being to lead to better 'patient-centred care and 
improvements in the patients' experience (DOH 2003).
In order to facilitate these aims a number of new mechanisms and bodies were set up 
by the government. These included setting up The Commission for Patient and Public
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Involvement in Health (CPPIH), an independent body set up to ensure that the voice 
of both the wider public and patients are heard on health matters, primarily through 
the setting up of Patient and Public Involvement Forums (PPIFs) attached to all NHS 
Trusts.
However, despite the rather lofty goals set out above, CPPIH and the Patient Forums 
will be abolished in June 2007. Other new bodies to be set up at the same time as the 
Forums were the Patient Advice and Liaison Services (PALS) set up within hospital 
Trusts to handle and resolve patient concerns and provide advice and information. 
The Independent Complaints and Advocacy Service (ICAS) set up to provide support 
to patients in England who have formal complaints against the NHS and the Overview 
and Scrutiny Committees (OSCs), made up of locally elected councillors with the 
power to scrutinise and improve health services and reduce health inequalities in local 
communities.
Given the strategic goals of the Forums, I therefore applied to CPPIH in 2003 to 
become a member of the Patients Forum for the Royal Brompton and Harefield NHS 
Trust. I did not know whether my background with the Brompton would act as a bar 
to my gaining membership of the Forum, but I did not hide any of the details. I was 
required to fill out in an application stating why I wanted to join the Forum and what 
skills and knowledge I could bring. This eventually led to my being interviewed by 
CPPIH and eventually gaining membership of the Forum in December 2003.
The PPI Forums were seen at the time as having a particularly important role to play 
in developing the patient and pubhc involvement in health (PPIH) agenda. Also a key 
role in providing a mechanism for patients and the public to have a voice and an 
active role in shaping service provision at a local level throughout NHS Trusts. The 
conduct of Forums was determined by statute (The Patients Forums (Functions) 
Regulations 2003) and Forums were also given potentially important powers as set 
out below.
The primary roles of the Patient and Public Involvement Forums (PPIFs) were to:
• Monitor and review the range and operation of services provided by the NHS 
Trust
• Provide advice, reports and recommendations based upon these reviews
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e Obtain the views of patients and their carers about the range and operation of 
services and report these views to the Trust
• Refer matters of concern to the relevant OSC'S and / or CPPIH
• Make advice and information about services available to patients and their carers
PPI Forums set up for PCTs had additional responsibilities to:
• Promote, encourage and support public involvement in consultation exercises and 
processes relating to local health policy development
• Provide advice to NHS and other bodies about how to encourage public 
involvement
• Provide information and advice about complaints processes
• Represent the public's views on matters that affect their health
(Information Pack, Voluntary Action Westminster January 2004)
However despite these aspirational goals it was soon to become obvious to me that 
whilst in theory the PPIH model sounded empowering, in practice they suffered from 
a number of structural limitations. This meant that in practice Forums were greatly 
limited in representing patients and introducing accountability from a patient’s 
perspective into health services. Key problems related to the Forums having no 
budgets or paid staff and only very limited administrative support and insufficient 
members with diverse enough backgrounds, with the requisite skills, knowledge and 
expertise to take the work forward.
In exploring my role as part of the Patients Forum, there are many different areas that 
I could highlight and concentrate on. However, in order to best illustrate the process, I 
have concentrated on looking at how I was able to continue as a Forum member, 
taking forward and developing, the continuing themes that had emerged from 
previous parts of my journey at the Brompton, which also raised major issues for me 
about empowerment. In reflecting upon my early days as a Forum member, it is 
interesting to note how I came to become chair of the Forum and Forum lead work 
relating to clinical governance and race equality and diversity. Both of these interests 
as mentioned previously, I had championed in the Parents Liaison Committee, as a 
result of my experiences with the Evans Inquiry. It is interesting here to note some of 
this process and in looking back at my diary, I am reminded of how important it has 
been, in taking these issues forward, to have done so both from an insider (personal) 
perspective and playing an outsider (more detached, health advocate) role.
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It is clear from an insider perspective, that I had a unique insight into the issues 
because of my personal experiences and yet, it was now vital for me to be able to 
stand back and look at these issues in a detached way and on a wider level. Managing 
this dual role whilst fraught with difficulties, has been possible and was recently 
reflected back to me when I spoke at a conference on healthcare regulation and 
introduced myself both as chair of a patients forum and as someone who had 
personally been affected by medical negligence. Afterwards the convenor of the 
conference wrote back to me:
' Well you weren’t the only user. But you were perhaps the most thoughtful and 
convincing o f the users. It is hard for most people to move on from their own 
experience, especially if that was traumatic, to see how their experience fits in 
a wider context. Several other people have said how much they valued what 
you had to say'.
(Martin Rathfelder, Regulating Health Care Professionals and the Regulation of the 
Non-Medical Healthcare Professions Conference 11/10/2006)
However in positioning myself to take up issues in my Forum, championed previously 
in the Brompton's PLG, I initially had to overcome a number of hurdles. Firstly I 
found myself being challenged within the Forum about a possible role conflict and 
conflict of interest. This arose because I had made it clear that I wanted to continue to 
take up the themes that had arisen as part of my work with the PLG and which had of 
course initially arisen out of my personal experiences. What some Forum members 
seemed to struggle with was why they were able to use their 'positive' experiences to 
insist that we worked with the Brompton in a particular way and in relation to certain 
themes, whilst it was seen as problematic for someone to want to address issues 
arising out of a 'negative' personal experience. I felt it to be an early victory for me to 
be able to establish that it was legitimate for Forum members to have had both good 
and bad experiences with a Trust and that it was not just the latter that raised issues of 
subjectivity.
Later on at the height of my legal case to Europe, I took advice from the Commission 
for Patient and Public Involvement in Health (CPPIH) about any role conflict with my 
work at the Brompton. CPPIH were responsible for appointing members and ensuring 
members conformed to a wide range of guidelines, including any matters associated
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with a conflict of interest. I therefore felt vindicated when they responded to my 
request for guidance, as below:
'I have discussed the matter you raised me with me, with Harbinda Hanspal, London 
CPPIH PPI and Governance Lead. Harbinda confirmed my view that there is no 
problem with you continuing as both a member, forum representative on the risk 
strategy committee and chair of the forum during your legal case which you are 
taking to the European Courts. We do not see an underlying conflict o f interest.
I  am happy for you to circulate this to whoever you feel it is necessary'.
(Rosie Newbigging, Regional Manager, 17/5/2005, CPPIH)
A second and equally difficult hurdle to deal with that relates to the first issue was 
that of involvement in committees at the Brompton. This issue was to remain in some 
way throughout the whole of my time as chair of the Forum and related to issues of 
power and partnership in taking work forward with the Brompton. Initially this issue 
arose in relation to the chair of our Forum having observer status on the Trust Board. 
NHS Trust Boards are made up of an independent chair appointed by the NHS 
Appointments Commission, executive members, who are senior members of staff, 
heading up or managing particular areas and a number of non-executive directors, 
usually two, again appointed by the Appointments Commission. There would not 
usually be any patient representatives on the Board.
The initial response to a request for observer status by the Brompton's Chief 
Executive was to state that 'it wasn't actually necessary for us to sit on the Board to 
participate' (Diary entry 26 May 2004). However, once this was challenged the Forum 
was offered Board status as observers with speaking but non-voting rights. However, 
because by chance the current Forum chair had fallen quite seriously ill, I was asked 
by forum members to take up the position of chair on the Trust Board at the next 
Board meeting. This position on the Board was to mark the first of many battles that I 
had, to be able to sit on various Trust committees and to be allowed to participate 
equally with other Trust committee members. Most of these battles were only 
partially won.
Therefore in setting out below how I attempted to take forward the issues on clinical 
governance and equality and diversity within the Trust, I illustrate how this was as
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much about a battle to be able to participate on an equal basis as partners with the 
Trust and patient empowerment, as it was to get the Trust to take action in specific 
areas.
The Forum’s Agenda for Change
The Forum's Action Plan for taking forward specific areas of work was developed 
after an open day for members. This was arranged so that members had an 
opportunity to discuss areas of work that they were interested in and where broader 
themes could be identified that would be relevant to concentrate on given the Trust's 
status as a specialist heart and lung hospital. Most Forum members chose to 
concentrate on areas of work that were connected to previous experiences they had 
had as a patient under the Trust. It was agreed that given my previous experience of 
certain areas that I would concentrate on looking at issues of diverse PPI in Trust 
work, patient safety and clinical governance and equality and diversity issues. 
Therefore in order to take my work forward, I contacted the Trust's main PPI Group, 
the Modernisation Group, to see how I could become further involved with their 
work. After a long discussion with the Trust person leading on PPI it transpired that 
the Trust was looking at these issues in lots of different committees and that the PPI 
strategy did not deal with how these all fed into each other. It was therefore agreed 
that the best way for me to pursue them was to join the Modernisation Committee.
However, having agreed this, it subsequently became difficult for me to get the 
approval to join the Committee, because the Trust would only allow one Forum 
member on it and they already had someone on the Committee who had joined before 
she became a member of our Forum. Despite this obstacle I eventually managed to 
negotiate my way onto the Committee, by swapping with the current forum member. 
However it then transpired when I attended the meetings that the Committee did not 
look at clinical governance which was one of the main reasons that I had joined it in 
the first place and which I had been told was the main committee for covering this 
area. Clinical governance, I was finding out, was the main framework for dealing with 
wider quality issues within the Trust including patient safety concerns. It also quickly 
became clear that, apart from myself, the committee had no members from Black and
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minority ethnic (BME) communities, and that no issues of equality and diversity were 
raised, apart from when I raised them.
It was as a result of my experience of sitting on this Committee and getting no-where 
in terms of developing the Forum's strategy in relation to clinical governance and 
equality and diversity issues that led me to take a different approach to taking these 
areas forward. In this respect on behalf of the Forum, I applied to the CPPIH, to 
commission somebody to look at how the Trust was addressing issues of race and 
equalities in its work. My bid to CPPIH was successful and eventually led to the 
production of a report independently produced by Trinity consultancy entitled 'Race 
Equality and Diversity: Royal Brompton and Harefield Patient and Public 
Involvement Project' which was published in April 2005. At the same time I was also 
able to secure funding to investigate the lack of lay involvement in any of the Trust's 
clinical governance committees. A report was also independently commissioned and 
published in March 2005 entitled 'Patient and Public Involvement and Clinical 
Governance -  Working in Partnership', to assist the Forum in becoming more 
involved in this area of work.
Promoting Race Equality and Diversity:
In relation to the Trinity report on promoting Race Equality and Diversity, a number 
of quite serious criticisms were made about the way that the Trust were found to be 
operating in this area. However, despite these findings, the Trust were not prepared to 
take the requisite action suggested by the report and endorsed by the Forum, until the 
Forum published their views in a conunentary on Trust compliance with the Health 
Care Commission's core standards as part of the Annual Health Check. The Annual 
Health Check is a new system which came into effect on 1st April 2005, based upon 
measuring Trust performance within a framework of national standards and targets set 
by Government and replacing the previous system based upon star ratings. The 
Forum's commentary has to be published unaltered by a Trust, along with their own 
assessment of how they are meeting the core standards. As a result of the publication 
of the Forum commentary, the Trust was forced to review the situation regarding the 
promoting of race equality and diversity within the Trust. To this effect and at the 
Board meeting of 25 January 2006, they produced the statement set out below, setting
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out how they would now address the deficiencies in their approach to addressing race 
and equalities within the Trust.
‘Mr Xpresented the Position Statement which set out progress since the Board 
meeting on 22 June 2005 over the past nine months on managing equality and 
diversity within the Trust. Mr X  drew attention to the statutory obligation of 
the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 and referred to concerns that were 
raised by Ms Josephine Ocloo, Chair of Royal Brompton & Harefield PPI 
Forum, following a report the PPIF had commissioned from Trinity which 
identified shortcomings in the way the Trust was promoting race. The Trust 
had re-formed the Equality and Diversity Steering Group and Mr X  asked the 
Board to note the membership.
Reviews by external organisations had expressed concerns about the 
robustness o f the Race Equality Scheme, shortcomings in addressing diverse 
patient needs and lack of clarity in the role o f the Trust Board. These 
indicated it would be difficult to demonstrate compliance across standards 
covered by the RR (A)A \
‘Ms Josephine Ocloo said that she was very pleased to see the Position 
Statement and wanted to express her appreciation o f the work done in 
producing it. Ms Ocloo pointed out that there was a long history to moving the 
work forward in this area. This went back to her involvement in the Evans 
Inquiry as a mother who had lost her child whilst under the care of the Trust. 
She had then chosen to join the Parents Liaison Group set up to implement the 
120 recommendations from the Inquiry and in this respect had frequently 
raised issues about the way that the Trust was promoting race equality and 
diversity ’.
The minutes on this section conclude:
‘The Trust Board accepted the position Statement and at the invitation of the 
Chairman the Board recorded its gratitude to Ms Ocloo for her contribution 
to promoting equality and diversity throughout the Trust’.
This statement marked a seminal moment in my work with the Trust around equality 
and diversity issues and brought me almost full circle firom my experiences in the 
PLG when I had been left hopelessly raising these issues, whilst being almost 
completely ignored. The above statement firom the Trust also marked a turning point 
in my journey from victim to action researcher. This related to my being able to place 
on the table and action, issues arising out of my personal experience that I had then 
subsequently been able to generate research on whilst taking action at the same time 
to address the problem.
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The work in this area carried out at the Brompton has also fed into the processes at the 
Health Care Commission for picking up issues related to promoting race equality. In 
this respect they carried out an audit in March 2006, to see how many NHS Trusts 
were complying with the requirement by the Race Relations (Amendment) Act to 
publish three pieces of information regarding race equality. The results showed that 
less than 1% of Trusts were complying with this requirement (Healthcare 
Commission Newsletter, September 2006). The HealthCare Commission has now 
announced that they will be carrying out in 2007 a numbers of reviews in partnership 
with the Commission for Racial Equality on how NHS Trusts are promoting race 
equality and complying with the Race Relations (Amendment) Act.
Developing Lay Involvement in Clinical Governance:
In relation to the report on clinical governance this initially produced a much more 
positive result than the report commissioned by the Forum on promoting race 
equahty. The clinical governance report concentrated more on setting the context for 
carrying out this work in the Trust and how lay members could get involved, rather 
than identifying any issues in terms of addressing patient safety concerns. This clearly 
created much less contention within the Trust about the work. It also must be said that 
the Trust appeared to be much more advanced in this area in tackling the issues, as 
opposed to promoting race equality and diversity, which seemed as a work stream aud 
a strategic Trust priority to have been almost completely ignored.
The report on clinical governance within the Trust made some key recommendations 
in terms of addressing patient and public involvement in this work, as set out below:
• Agreeing a protocol for j oint working in this area
• Undertaking a joint review of the trust PPI strategy to strengthen its user 
involvement.
• Review together Trust committees to see how the forum can contribute
• Agreeing role specifications for committees on which the forum is 
represented.
(Patient and Public Involvement and Clinical Governance -  Working in Partnership 
2005: 25)
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These recommendations initially received quite a positive response from the Trust by 
virtue of the way that the lead person at the Trust in this area chose to deal with the 
report and to liase with me over the issues. However once this person, moved from 
this position to lead on the application by the Trust for Foundation Hospital status, the 
momentum for change in this area seemed to me to go in a rather different direction.
In the section below I set out some examples of the way that the Forum's attempt to 
become further involved in clinical governance and patient safety work has gone. In 
doing so, I also illustrate the issues that continued to be present in relation to the 
imbalance of power between the Trust and lay members and the lack of partnership. 
The themes that have been present throughout my journey with the Trust, from victim 
to survivor of medical harm and as someone embarking on that tentative journey of 
patient and public involvement in health care.
In my diary notes of the 18-5-05, I recorded a discussion with the Trust lead on 
clinical governance and the recommendations from the report commissioned by the 
Forum. What is interesting about this conversation is the way that the real issue about 
patient involvement eventually surfaced in the conversation. This issue was 
essentially about my perceived subjectivity on the issue, as someone directly affected 
by medical harm whilst receiving health care under the Trust.
'After talking generally with X  who reassured me that generally there was no 
opposition to the recommendations in the report, it was more about how to 
implement them, I  moved the conversation to the unspoken, eg my involvement 
as chair and lead on clinical governance in the Risk Committee'. (The Risk 
Committee is the main committee in the Trust responsible for dealing with 
patient safety and monitoring patient safety incidents).
He then opened up and was very frank with me. He said there was concern 
about my involvement and my possible objectivity. He said he had no personal 
opposition to my involvement and noted he felt my participation on the Board 
was very measured. But said not everyone felt the same.........
I  said I  thought it was about recognising a general principle that users of all 
backgrounds should be able to be involved, not just those with positive 
experiences and I  challenged the issue he was raising about objectivity, saying 
we needed to recognise, no-one came to the table as neutral, we all brought 
baggage'.
At the end of the conversation in inviting me to now formally write to him stating that 
I would like to be on the committee and agreeing to talk to the chair of the committee 
and to send me some dates, he admitted:
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’that in effect the fears were being generated by me personally, but that 
perhaps they needed to try to stop legislating for me as an "exceptional 
person"
What is interesting about this conversation was that the focus was only on my 
subjectivity, even though it was acknowledged that some of the Trust individuals 
taking part in this debate were connected with the Evan's Inquiry personally. The 
assumption was that they were coming to the debate on an objective basis because 
they were medical practitioners. I sensed when I pointed this out that the issue of 
doctor bias or subjectivity was not one that he had really thought about before and 
that he was assuming that professional expertise bestowed an element of neutrality 
that did not apply to patients and the public with their subjective experiences. I 
believe that the issue of subjectivity also only seemed to be seen as an issue if the 
'user' perspective was attempting to raise issues based upon a negative rather than a 
positive experience of the hospital concerned.
My next diary entry reflecting upon this situation notes:
'What is coming up as a major issue is that a bar to involvement and 
empowerment of people affected by medical harm is that they are prevented 
from participating and having a voice on the basis of the view by dominant 
groups that their subjective experiences make their participation a problem. 
E.g. involvement on Forums, Risk Committees, invitations to conferences, 
invitations to be involved and invited to be involved in any capacity'.
(Personal Diary notes 9-6-05)
As a result of this conversation with the Trust lead on clinical governance, the Forum 
was eventually invited to sit on both the Risk Strategy Committee (RSC) the 
Complaints Committee (CC) and eventually the Infection Control Committee (ICC). 
However, I would argue that in terms of overall success of the strategy in becoming 
more involved in clinical govemance and patient safety issues, this has definitely 
produced variable results and I would question what has actually been achieved.
For example in terms of participation on the various committees there has often been 
major problems in trying to get issues addressed as the only PPI person or one of two 
on a committee. This is illustrated to some extent by the observations of an outside 
observer to my first meeting of the Risk Strategy Committee (RSC). The clinical 
govemance Tmst lead invited along this person, to make any useful observations 
about the process of developing PPI in this area. This woman was a non-executive
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director on another Trust and a university lecturer on a course teaching about patient 
and public involvement.
I noted in my diary about this meeting that she commented to me afterwards that:
'she thought I  was brilliant in asking questions but thought the atmosphere 
was such that no other lay person would have felt able to speak. She felt that 
there were no introductions of the group for me, the chair was very 
intimidating and was amazed I  had just been asked along with no induction'.
This atmosphere did not really improve in future RSC meetings and after many 
meetings in which I tried to raise issues about the way that the Trust were monitoring 
and dealing with certain matters and the way in which the committee functioned, I 
was informed that the committee was going to be abolished. The explanation given 
for this was the need to move towards more integrated govemance in the Trust. This 
was apparently required with new government guidance issued in 2005 on the need 
for Audit committees to have a wider responsibility to scmtinise risks and controls 
which affect Tmst business and to consider the relative responsibilities of clinical 
govemance or risk committees within the Tmst (RBH Board minutes April 2006).
To this effect it was proposed to establish new terms of reference for the existing 
audit committee and to establish it as an Audit and Risk Committee (ARC). The old 
RSC committee was to be abolished and to be replaced with a new Govemance and 
Quality (GQC) Committee. In the basic consultation that the Brompton had with me 
as the chair of the Forum about the remit of these committees, I pointed out that both 
of the new committees appeared to have responsibility for looking at patient safety, 
however the ARC seemed to have more of a financial brief. I therefore suggested that 
I be allowed as chair of the Forum to remain on the GQC. This request was refused 
and the Forum were told that they could only have an observation role on the ARC 
and that the new GQC would now become a totally closed management committee 
with no PPI on it.
In a letter to Sir Michael Partridge and Mark Taylor who had been commissioned by 
the Tmst to carry out a review of Harefield hospital services in the light of 
considerable patient safety concems raised about the hospital by an independent
191
Strategic Health Authority Review, the Forum raised the following concems about 
our exclusion from the new GCQ committee.
'The findings from The Royal Brompton and Harefield Independent Paediatric 
Inquiries 1999-2001 (set up by the Trust to determine how shortcomings 
identified by parents of children who had died whilst under the care of the 
hospital, might best be addressed) has also influenced and fed  into the 
Forum's work on addressing patient safety and clinical governance issues.
The forum therefore views with much concern, the information that the chair 
of the forum and another nominated PPI representative, will no longer be 
invited to sit on the Trust's re-structured Risk Strategy Committee. This 
committee is to be renamed the Governance and Quality committee (GQC) 
and will lead on managing clinical risk. The forum is informed that proposals 
will go to the Board about these changes, which include making the 
Governance and Quality Committee an entirely management committee with 
no PPI involvement.
We understand that instead the forum will be invited to have attendance status 
on the new Audit and Risk Committee. This committee will look primarily at 
financial risk as well as to take an overview on clinical risk. However given 
the current issues being addressed within the Trust regarding patient safety, 
we do not believe this situation is acceptable and think it is particularly 
important that the forum is not excluded from the committees and processes 
set up to deal directly with clinical risk and patient safety concerns. We 
believe that this is the only way to retain public confidence in the Trust's 
handling of these issues.
This matter has been raised in our commentary on trust compliance for the 
Annual Health Check and hope given the emphasis in your review on working 
in partnership with a range ofpatient and public bodies, that you will take this 
matter seriously in your report to the Trust Board'.
Yet, despite the strongly worded request for representation on the GCQ, the Tmst 
declined this request, although they did allow me to sit on the ARC. After some 
pressure by me at the Board meeting, they did concede that the new govemance 
stmcture should be reviewed after its first year of operation and it 'could then 
reconsider PPI from the PPIF's perspective if the fbmm had concems' (Board minutes 
April 2006). At this time, the expectation was that the Forums would no longer be in 
existence after 2007, but this was subsequently deferred until March 2008.
If I now reflect about what I have achieved as part of my role as chair of the Patients 
Fomm in trying to deliver a model of patient and public involvement as 
empowerment as advocated by Professor Kennedy in the Bristol Report, I have lots of
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questions. Certainly there have been many experiences of dis-empowerment in the 
way that PPI has been carried out with the Trust. This has meant participating on 
committees where there has only ever been token representation of lay people and 
where individuals have been expected to attend meetings without any induction, 
training or payment for their time, and with papers sent out to them frequently only a 
couple of days before meetings. In my experience, the meetings I have attended have 
been overwhelmingly white and certainly I have yet to come across another person 
from a BME background as a lay/patient participant.
On the other hand, despite these experiences, I was able to air some of these issues 
about patient and public involvement at a senior level within the trust and to open up 
the debate about more inclusive involvement. I would also argue that key 
achievements were to have been able to input into the strategic arrangements at the 
trust for dealing with patient safety. And, to have been able to open up a considerable 
debate about the importance of promoting race equality and dealing with other areas 
of discrimination in trust service planning and delivery.
Overall, in looking more broadly at my achievements as a layperson who has become 
involved in patient safety work as a Victim' and survivor of medical harm, I can see 
that my journey to develop a new patient safety culture in partnership with patients 
continues. On the April 2006, I was appointed joint project manager on a project 
called the Patients' for Patient Safety (PIPS) Project. This work is frmded by the 
National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) (the lead government agency in this area) and 
is being carried out in partnership with Accidents against Medical Accidents (AvMA). 
The project has as its key objective developing patient and public involvement in 
patient safety work. This project will entail working with a network of lay individuals, 
many affected by medical harm (who have mainly been brought together as a result of 
my work at AvMA), to empower them to become involved in patient safety work. We 
will also be working with two hospital Trusts, who have responded to the project 
enthusiastically and to me sympathetically (because of my personal experience) and 
with great encouragement to take the project idea forward.
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In Conclusion
What I have tried to do in this chapter is to set out a journey I have undertaken and a 
process that I have been part of as a result of suffering a personal experience of 
medical harm as a result of the loss of my daughter. As a result of this experience I 
have travelled though a process from 'victim' to survivor of medical harm to become 
both a health campaigner, advocate and action researcher. This journey whilst starting 
out simply based upon my personal experience, has now broadened to include a thesis 
about the way that victims are treated more generally as a result of their experiences 
of medical harm. It is therefore useful to summarise in the light of this journey, what 
some of the key messages are from this chapter.
In concluding chapter three, it was argued that the evidence from key policy and 
inquiry reports illustrated that in the past systems had not been put in place that 
worked effectively to protect patients. This was seen to be the case both in having 
systems for preventing and learning from adverse events, regulating the performance 
of doctors and in ensuring accountability for patients. In addition it was argued that in 
order to create a new safer culture of care this had to be done in partnership with 
patients. In creating this situation, it was noted that the evidence showed that there 
was an imbalance of power between health professionals and patients which wider 
systems of state regulation had systematically failed to address.
In looking at how these conclusions might apply to this chapter, a number of issues 
are highlighted.
Firstly, in charting my journey to find out what happened to my daughter, I have 
attempted to show that the conclusions of the coroner in certifying Krista's death as a 
natural one were problematic. In setting out my campaign for justice, I attempted to 
show how a range of factors were connected to my daughter's death that were linked 
to sub-standard care and negligence. This situation was seen to be compounded by the 
power of the medical profession and wider systems of regulation to cover up their 
errors. In setting out my own experience, I then came on to look at the experiences of 
a number of other families affected by medical harm. In doing this, I also attempted to 
illustrate how these families had had to fight to get an open acknowledgement that
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their children's care had been substandard. Therefore in looking at the personal stories 
of medical harm in this chapter, these experiences were seen to raise important 
questions about the power of the medical profession to determine the issues in their 
own interests when errors and wrongdoing have occurred. But in addition, also to 
show how the state has reinforced this situation by failing to put in place proper 
systems that independently investigate medical harm, regulate medical performance 
and ensure proper and public accountability when medical wrongdoing causes harm 
to patients in the NHS.
Secondly, building upon these issues, this chapter also attempted to illustrate the way 
in which the imbalance of power between health care professionals and patients 
directly impacted upon patient care as highlighted in the Evans Report, through a lack 
of partnership in working with patients. In addition to this it was also illustrated how 
this situation was compounded in the way that users such as myself and Polly Fleet- 
Palmer and the patient representatives in the Parents Liaison Group were dis- 
empowered in trying to work in partnership with the Trust and in subsequent attempts 
to become involved in developing a new patient safety culture.
Therefore in drawing upon the Royal Brompton case study in my PhD, it is argued 
that the issues raised, continue to demonstrate the need for a new holistic systems 
based approach for addressing patient safety in the NHS that also deals with 
addressing the multiple causes of medical harm. This model is seen as vital for 
protecting patients and in order for it to be effective it is argued that it should also 
incorporate an approach based upon patient empowerment. The issues associated with 
empowering patients are looked at in more detail in chapters nine and ten of the 
thesis. However, the next three chapters also deal with important issues of patient 
empowerment, both regarding my field work methodology and through the data 
generated firom my participatory action research with groups and individuals affected 
by medical harm.
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Chapter Five
Research Methodology: A Participatory Action Research (PAR) 
Agenda
Introduction
This chapter of the PhD looks at the methodology used for carrying out my field 
research and ties into two subsequent chapters that look at my research findings. In 
exploring the theory and methods underlying my research, the chapter starts off by 
looking at the historical context to action research and a number of different action 
research approaches. The chapter then comes on to look at participatory action 
research (PAR) which is identified as the methodology guiding my field research. 
This section outlines what PAR is, the historical context to the approach and key 
components and methods of PAR methodology. The last section of the chapter then 
comes on to look at my field research, starting with the key aims and objectives of the 
research and the academic context, the research design and ethical considerations and 
finally getting ethical approval for the research.
An Action Research Typology
Action research has a distinct history going back at least half a century and 
incorporates a range of different approaches and practices. These are grounded in a 
number of research and intellectual traditions covering social psychology, the natural 
sciences, organisational science and social planning and reflecting various 
philosophical and psychological assumptions as well as political aspirations. In his 
comprehensive review of the action research literature covering the period from about 
mid-2004 to mid-2006, Dick (2006) points to the way in which the literature in this 
subject area has continued to expand. He points out, 'I found keeping abreast of just 
the past two years a considerable task' (Dick 2006: 440). His review, illustrates the 
diversity of action research both in its methodology and the application of action 
research to a range of areas such as education, the community, participatory 
development, human services, healthcare and organisational applications and to 
professional and practice development (Dick 2006). This range and breadth of action
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research approaches is also highlighted once again, by the recent publication of the 
new second edition 'Sage Handbook of Action Research' (2007).
Despite the diversity of action research approaches, all are seen to have in common on 
some level, a commitment to the development of theory, to be participatory, 
collaborative, experiential, change and action oriented and problem focused 
methodologies (Hart and Bond 1998; Reason and Bradbury 2001, 2007; Holter & 
Schwartz-Barcott 1993). An additional feature of action research is seen by Susman & 
Evered to be characterised by its use of different and multi-method techniques for 
data collection and its cyclical nature, incorporating five phases (diagnosing, action 
planning, action taking, evaluating, and specifying learning), although not all action 
research models incorporate all five phases (1978: 588-589).
It is much more accepted these days that research has an important role to play in the 
workplace in informing the work of staff and professional practice. Bridging the role 
of theory and practice presents a number of problems, for which there is not 
necessarily any definitive solution (Tierney and Taylor 1991: 506 cited by Hart and 
Bond 1998: 4). However, action research is seen as particularly useful 'for bridging 
the gap between theory, research and practice' (Holter and Schwartz-Barcott 1993: 
299). With its dual aspects of action and research, it is seen as particularly appropriate 
for organisations, where problem solving, change and improvement are on the agenda 
(Hart and Bond (1998: 3). In particular where there is an intention to take forward 
issues through mutual exploration between a range of stakeholders, (users and 
practitioners) towards shared and emerging goals. 'Moreover, the combination of 
enquiry, intervention and evaluation which powers the action research cycle [is seen 
to mirror] the iterative processes employed by professional staff in assessing the needs 
of vulnerable people, responding to them and reviewing progress’ (Hart and Bond 
1998: 3).
Hart and Bond have developed an action research typology, which builds upon four 
traditions that give rise to different orientations in the action research process. The 
experimental approach associated with Lewin and his followers, the organisational 
approach associated with places like the Tavistock institute, the empowering approach 
associated with community development and the professionalising approach
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identifiable with nursing and education. They also identify seven specific criteria, set 
out below (distinguishing action research firom other methodologies), that vary 
according to the particular research approach it is located in within the typology.
Educative
Deals with individuals as members of social groups 
Is problem-focused, context-specific and future-orientated 
Involves a change intervention 
Aims at improvement and involvement
Involves a cyclic process in which research, action and evaluation are interlinked 
Is founded on a research relationship in which those involved are participants in 
the change process
(Hart and Bond 1998: 37-38.
Hart and Bond argue that the typology has been developed to illustrate that action 
research can and does retain a distinct identity, despite spanning a whole range of 
research approaches fi*om experimental to social constructionist. It also shows how 
this type of research model has shifted over time, firom a more positivist, scientific 
approach to social change to a more qualitative social constructionist methodology. 
Given the range and diversity of approaches within this fi*amework. Hart and Bond 
have described the spectrum of approaches as based upon a binary opposition between 
rational social management, assuming a consensus view of society on the left of the 
typology and a structural change and conflict model of society on the right (1998: 44). 
The level of collaboration and participation is seen to vary depending upon which 
research model is used. In constructing the typology. Hart and Bond have also drawn 
upon Weber’s (1946, 1947) concept of ideal types as a methodological device, in 
order to enable a picture to be developed of a particular form of action research, 
within a particular context. In this respect, the models within the typology are 
intended as abstractions with which to compare empirical realities, rather than to 
describe particular situations and it is therefore intended they serve as a helpfiil guide 
to practice (1998: 44).
Below I have set out the four traditions developed within the typology to illustrate the 
broad spectrum of action research approaches.
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The Experimental Approach
Elden and Chisholm argue that although its exact origins are open to dispute, action 
research as a distinct form of social inquiry has been evident since the 1940s. Kurt 
Lewin's (1946) work in America, broadly associated with the experimental approach 
is credited with introducing the term 'as a way of generating knowledge about a social 
system while, at the same time, attempting to change it' (1993: 121). John Collier as 
Commissioner of Indian affairs in the US between 1933 and 1945 is also credited with 
being one of the original proponents of action research (Susman & Evered 1978; 
Meyer 1993).
Lewin a social psychologist was interested in using the knowledge of the social 
sciences to address social problems (poverty, inter-group conflict, fascism, minority 
issues etc), in ways that a traditional positivist approach was seen as failing to 
address. For him the laboratory was the change experiment taking place within a 
social system in which practitioners and social scientists collaborated together to find 
ways to bring about needed changes (Susman and Evered 1978: 587).
Lewin basically saw a problem solving approach as important in guiding the needs of 
organisations, and the main features of action research as needing to be focused on 
problems that should, in a cyclical sense, lead to some kind of action and research on 
the effects of that action, thus eventually leading to an understanding of the dynamic 
nature of change by studying it under controlled conditions as it took place (Gill and 
Johnson 1991: 58-59). This series of cyclical steps, was known as 'rational social 
management', which married the experimental approach of social science with social 
action in response to the major social problems of the day (Kemmis et al 1982: 13 
cited in Hart and Bond 1998: 15). Evaluation, through 'fact-finding about the result of 
the action', thus providing the means to establish any change in the original situation, 
was also seen as crucial to this process (Hart and Bond 1998: 15).
Hart and Bond argue that it was in the early 1940s drawing upon a context in which 
social psychology was increasingly being applied to social problems, that Lewin 
refined his thinking on action research as a method of 'planned social change', in 
which the social sciences could be used in a practical way to bring about democratic 
change in society (1998: 17). Meyer (1993: 1066) a nurse researcher has argued that
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the four step process of planning, acting, observing and reflecting, that Lewin's 
developed, basically remains the foundation for much of the contemporary action 
research taking place today.
Hart and Bond argue however, that despite Lewin's pioneering work, many modem 
day action researchers would take exception to a number of aspects of his approach. 
For example, the emphasis on looking for universal and measurable laws of human 
behaviour, in which action research is then used as a tool for manipulation, re­
education and social change. They maintain that action research in a modem context 
is much more about consciousness raising and empowerment, in which researchers 
and practitioners seek to avoid imposing their own agenda, aim to work 
collaboratively as co-researchers with practitioners and frequently adopt the model of 
'insider' researcher in the research process (1998: 21).
Action research models post-Lewin have also tended to move away from more 
positivistic influences in the research process because of criticisms from writers such 
as Susman and Evered. These writers point to the inappropriateness of positivist 
science (referring to a range of approaches, committed to an empirical base and to a 
science that treats knowledge as obtainable from sense data directly experienced and 
verified between independent observers), for generating knowledge that can be used 
for solving problems that individuals face in an organisational context (1978: 583). 
Action research is seen as a more legitimate method of inquiry, for correcting the 
perceived deficiencies of a positivist science approach. These relate to the way the 
cyclical action research process is seen to facilitate 'future oriented' goals through 
dealing with the practical concems of clients in collaboration with them and through 
problem-solving procedures. In this reflexive process the researcher in directly 
engaging with the system, and making explicit their own values, is seen to enable 
problems to be looked at differently, thus generating new knowledge and theory in 
action to drive the change process.
Organisational Change
At around the same time in the UK, another strand of action research was developing 
independently, which was similar to developments in the US and had its roots in the
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Second World War. This saw a number of multi-disciplinary professionals 
(psychologists, psychiatrists, anthropologists) coming together to tackle a range of 
problems. This work eventually led to the setting up of the Tavistock Institute of 
Human Relations in 1947, made up of people from various social science 
backgrounds committed to using the social sciences to tackle important social 
problems in the post-war period (Gill & Johnson 1991: 59). The focus of the work 
however was embedded more in psychoanalysis and social psychology, than in 
Lewin's social and experimental psychology (Holter & Schwartz-Barcott 1993: 299).
Hart and Bond argue that 'the consultancy style of the Tavistock Institute was 
designed to enable an organisation to work through conflict by using a therapeutic 
approach underpinned by action research' (1998: 24), although this term was not used 
specifically until the 1960s. The majority of the Institute's work placed the emphasis 
on problem-centred, long-term work with clients, assessing their needs and helping 
them to implement and monitor changes. It also focused on studying the research 
process and the relationships that developed between researcher and client and how 
this impacted upon the research findings (Gill & Johnson 1991: 59).
In developing a fusion of styles combining psychoanalytic theory, with Lewin's field 
theory in organisational action research, the Tavistock Institute were able to become 
with Lewin the two major forces behind the development of action research in the 
world (Hart and Bond 1998: 24).
Town (1978) however in reviewing organisational action research approaches looks at 
how the London School of Economics (L.S.E.) Industrial Relations and Work 
Behaviour Unit went on to develop a rather different approach to the Tavistock 
Institute that went beyond its 'social consultancy' role. A role he argued that in 
developing more general theoretical knowledge about the working of the organisation 
or to derive more general hypotheses about the relationships between work and the 
social system, had tended to be subsumed by the main objective of meeting the needs 
of clients. Whilst this approach was seen as important for a single organisation, it was 
argued that it had more limited relevance in terms of a wider context.
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Town argued that the approach adopted by researchers in the L.S.E. Industrial 
Relations and Work Behaviour Unit in looking at public housing maintenance 
organisations was on making the research findings more relevant, by feeding back the 
findings for action with a view to further action studying the change process. This 
enabled the researcher not only to test out their hypotheses about the workings of 
organisations and management systems, but also allowed for generalised knowledge 
generated by research to emerge. Thus the researcher did not implement changes like 
a consultant, but instead served as an advocate for change. It is suggested that this 
role, compared with the Tavistock, may have been made more possible because of the 
independent nature of the L.S.E.'s funding base and the discretion of the researchers 
to choose their level of involvement (1978; 165-166).
Hart and Bond argue that a more radical form of organisational research, which drew 
upon some of the later work at the Tavistock, has been termed participatory action 
research. Whyte (1991) has argued that in contrast to traditional research, respondents 
are not treated as passive recipients, who are confined to just giving their consent to 
the project, acting as research subjects and receiving the results. PAR as a type of 
applied research, is seen to go beyond the conventional applied research model, in 
which researchers act as professional experts and recommend action to their clients. 
This is seen as an elitist model. PAR is instead seen to include active participation and 
collaboration between the researcher and some of the people in an organisation or 
community under study, throughout the research process from the initial design, to the 
presentation of findings and consideration of the research results and implications for 
action (1991: 20).
The strengths of this approach are seen as considerable, with its potential not only in 
developing practice and dealing with concrete problems in organisations, but also in 
its contribution to theory building. Whyte also maintains that contrary to popuW 
opinion, 'The scientific standards that must be met to conduct a successful PAR 
project are daunting' (Whyte 1991: 20-21).
Hart and Bond argue that in terms of the collaboration involved with participants, this 
model actually has more in common with Lewin's early action research than in the 
later models that have developed 'in practitioner action research', where researcher
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and practitioner frequently merge, which it is argued tends to individuahse the process 
of change (1998: 26).
Community Development
Hart and Bond argue that the third type of action research approach had its roots in the 
community development projects (GDPs) set up by the Home Office in 1969, in the 
context of the 're-discovery of poverty' in the 1960s. These projects were also 
influenced by a similar development, the Anti-Poverty Programme in the United 
States, as well as the Educational Priority Groups (EPA's), set up to tackle the 
problems of educational under-achievement in depressed industrial areas in Britain 
(1998: 26-27; Town 1978: 162).
Green and Chapman (1991:56) point out that the GDPs, had community work built in 
from the start (cited in Hart and Bond 1998: 28). Through the setting up of project 
teams in twelve areas across the country, the aim was to use experimental ways to 
investigate the causes of social problems and therefore to find new ways of tackling 
them and monitoring the results. As with the EPAs, the idea appeared to be to use 
these programmes to generate new approaches which might eventually lead to the 
formulation and acceptance of fresh and improved social policy and practice (Hart & 
Bond 1998: 27; Town 1978: 161-2).
Hart and Bond argue that by using an action research framework, the GDPs, drew 
upon research in the form of social surveys generated by teams of researchers, to base 
their action strategies on. However by 1972, for a number of reasons, the GDPs were 
left much more to their own devices without central support, thus leading them to take 
on the characteristics of local pressure groups, and develop a much more critical 
stance about previous poverty approaches and initiatives. These approaches were seen 
as victim blaming and located in individual pathology, rather than structural 
explanations, which viewed inequalities as about class and power. The GDPs were 
also later seen to influence work in health, with a community development values 
approach to working at a grassroots level. This led to much criticism of the medical 
model and the tendency to pathologise ill health as something to do with the 
individual, rather than society (1998: 27-28).
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Action research of this type is seen to raise a number of related issues. Hart and Bond 
question to what extent local initiatives such as the CDPs, can address the sort of 
bigger societal questions linked to socio-economic issues such as poverty and social 
deprivation. These types of questions are also seen as relevant to those conducting 
organisational action research, where marginalised groups may require fundamental 
changes to the structure and nature of the organisational status quo, which may in turn 
be blocked by the institution when these issues are exposed (1998: 29). Town 
suggests that what is most important with localised action research projects is for 
them to be able to present evidence of wider generalisability. It is argued that this is 
then not only able to become the major product of the action research, but can also 
enable the research findings to become a means of advocacy for new measures as part 
of national policy 1978: 163-164).
Nursing and Education Approaches
The fourth approach within the typology has come to be linked with action research in 
professional areas such as education and nursing. Kemmis et al (1982: 17) argue that 
Lewin's ideas on action research were absorbed into education programmes in the US 
very early on, fimctioning alongside teachers in action research programmes. 
However despite a backlash in terms of criticism of the rigour of its methodology in 
the 1950's, leading to a decline in its popularity, Kemmis et al point out that action 
research in education has now re-emerged in terms of popularity, in the context of 
curriculum research and development in such countries as the US, Britain and 
Australia (cited in Hart and Bond 1998: 29).
Hart and Bond cite a number of influential papers such as 'The Practical: a language 
for curriculum' by Schwab in the US in 1969 and Stenhouse's 'Introduction to 
Curriculum Research and Development, and Elliot's article 'What is action research in 
school?' as marking a general turning point in challenging the traditional research 
approach and ushering in the idea of teacher as researcher movement. This they saw 
as paving the way for more qualitative and collaborative approaches to research 
between academic researchers and practitioners. These approaches are seen to have 
placed more emphasis on a more active role for teachers in the curriculum, through
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more critical reflection and a problem-focused approach based upon their practice 
(Hart and Bond 1998: 30).
Meyer points out that 'the development of action research in education is of particular 
interest to nurses owing to the parallels that can be drawn firom nursing research' 
(1993: 1066). Education as with nursing is seen to have turned to action research as a 
result of realising the limitations of positivist ideas and quantitative approaches in 
providing strategies for dealing with people in organisations, as well as part of a 
developing Jfrustration, seen to emerge firom the 1960s in both sectors, with qualitative 
approaches more generally (1993: 1067).
Although action research in nursing is seen to have progressed more slowly than in 
education, there has been much more convergence in this area between the two 
professions, in the last decade (Hart and Bond 1998: 32). Meyer argues however that 
the action research models used in a modem context have moved on considerably 
fi*om Lewin's ideas. This is seen to place them not only within what has been termed 
'the new paradigm tradition of collaborative research', but also to emphasise action 
research more as a practice of reflective self-inquiry, leading to a more systematic 
way of developing professional knowledge to be shared with practitioners (1993: 
1067).
Reason in highlighting the increasing popularity of what he refers to as co-operative/ 
experiential inquiry methodologies or the paradigm of co-operative inquiry, 'with and 
for people rather than on people', defines this at its simplest as:
'a way o f doing research in which all those involved contribute both to the 
creative thinking that goes into the enterprise - deciding on what is to be 
looked at, the methods of inquiry, and making sense o f what is found out - and 
also contribute to the action which is the subject o f the research'.
(Reason 1988: 1)
Action research in this sense is seen as a paradigmatic shift representing a 
discontinuity with a previous world-view. But connected to a new world-view 
emerging along with many other ideas such as 'systems thinking, ecological concems 
and awareness, feminism, education, as well as in the philosophy of human inquiry' 
(Reason 1988: 3).
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Some examples of action research in nursing over the last twenty-five years are:
Towell and Harries's (1979) five year experiment designed to improve psychiatric 
care, particularly focusing on the way that participants of health care define their own 
situations as well as how staff contributions can be more effectively utilised to meet 
the communities they serve. This study places a strong emphasis on the work of the 
Tavistock institute to applied social research.
Webb (1989) also summarises a range of ways that action research has been used in 
nursing. For example she cites the way Lathlean and Famish (1984 cited in Webb 
1989: 404) used action research as an evaluation tool for a ward sister development 
project to build upon and refine existing work within the project. She also points to 
the way that Hunt (1987 cited in Webb 1989: 404) in drawing upon Lewin's ideas, 
used action research to promote change and innovation in nursing practice, although 
she notes this met with limited success because of resistance to change fi*om ward 
staff.
The Institute of Nursing has also undertaken a four-year action research study, 
looking at the development of patient centered nursing and the complex processes 
required in making the shift firom more traditional nursing practice. In this context 
new models of collaborative partnerships are suggested which it is argued address 
some of the weaknesses in previous studies (Titchen and Binnie 1993: 858).
A major attraction of this approach in health care seems to be that it offers the 
possibility of change, and closing the theory-practice gap, whilst working and 
conducting research with people in non-exploitative and non-hierarchical ways (Webb 
1990 cited in Hart and Bond 1998: 33). However a note of caution should be sounded 
about falling into the trap of automatically treating new paradigm research as 
tantamount to more equal relationships. Meyer (1993: 1070) highlights the dangers of 
inequalities of power hiding under the mask of collaborative fidendship, which could 
place research subjects at even greater risk than more positivist research fi*ameworks. 
Writers like Sparrow and Robinson, also note the possible limitations of action 
research for wider change in health care, in that they argue, it might be more suitable 
for small-scale projects rather than with larger populations. This is because in a
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rapidly changing environment, the NHS may prove to be too fluid and unstable to 
allow a project to be completed, particularly over any length of time (1994 cited in 
Hart and Bond 1998: 33).
An Empowerment Model
The level of collaboration and participation across the different action research 
models identified above will vary depending upon which model is used. I have 
identified the empowerment model as the most appropriate for working with Victims 
of medical harm' as an empowerment approach actively seeks to shift the balance of 
power towards oppressed groups (Braye & Preston Shoot 1995; Dalrymple & Burke 
1995; Thompson 2001). The research design also draws upon an empowerment 
strategy for ethical reasons in order to try and ensure that nothing further is done to 
harm individuals and groups who already feel abused and harmed by dominant and 
oppressive systems. In exploring the development of an action research funding 
proposal for research with women who had been sexually abused. Hart and Bond 
illustrate the importance of an empowering approach when conducting research with 
traumatised or vulnerable groups.
They noted that:
'Such women, whose needs are the focus of this study, are therefore potentially 
vulnerable to further abuse by any research practices which objectify or 
devalue them and/or which further disempower them by falsely raising their 
hopes about speedy personal and structural changes. It is therefore 
considered essential that those engaged in the research processes of this study 
conduct their affairs in such a way as to empower women.
Such a commitment to empowerment demands policies and practices which 
actively seek to shift the balance of power towards those who are oppressed 
by, for example, sharing information encouraging partnership in decision 
maidng, and enabling active participation (Frost and Stein 1989: 142) from 
those contributing to the research'.
(Cited in Hart and Bond 1998: 67).
This rationale would seem to apply in a similar way to working with those affected by 
medical harm. It is therefore argued that a research design, in which respondents 
become more active participants in the research process, is more inclusive and 
empowering for the groups and individuals involved.
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This approach also gives prominence to issues of gender, race, class and culture as 
these are seen to affect every aspect of the research process (Bell 2001; Maguire 1987 
cited in Minkler et al 2002). Within the context of my field research, I will be looking 
at these issues within a wider theoretical firamework of anti-oppressive practice 
(Dalrymple and Burke 1995; Dominelli 1997, 2002) that provides a radical approach 
to social change. This approach to social care seeks to fimdamentally challenge power 
structures, which oppress a range of social groups, and to challenge exploitative 
relationships, which maintain inequality and oppression, thus taking workers beyond 
the boundaries of the status quo into political and social action (Preston-Shoot 1995).
Participatory Action Research (PAR)
What is known as participatory action research (PAR) is one model that would fit 
under the empowerment strand of action research. Although given the criticisms cited 
below, about its origins in the developing world, it is interesting to note that only PAR 
origins in Western organisations are cited in the Hart and Bond typology of 
approaches set out earlier. One explanation for this omission has been put forward by 
Town (1978: 160). He suggests that because action research is firequently conducted 
outside of the academic world, earlier attempts to use such an approach, than what are 
cited in the academic literature, may have been missed through lack of it being 
reported.
Hall (2001: 174) however argues that participatory research is not something that was 
invented by researchers, educators or even community activists. PAR as a practice has 
always been in existence, wherever different oppressed and marginalised groups have 
struggled collectively to understand and to take action, often to tackle inequalities of 
power, in their social worlds. In this respect, PAR is seen as a common way for 
individuals in community-based or social movement contexts to work together.
Reason has identified three approaches to research as participation: co-operative 
inquiry, participatory action research and action inquiry. Participatory action research 
is seen as the most widely practised participatory approach comprising of a number of
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different research communities (1994: 2). However, although PAR can be seen as 
made up of a number of different strands, it can be defined loosely as:
'systematic inquiry, with the collaboration of those affected by the issue, for 
the purposes of education or affecting social change'.
(George et al 1998-1999 cited in Minkler et al 2002: 14)
In thinking about how to develop my field research set out in the next section of the 
chapter, this definition fitted very well with the idea of carrying out research with 
individuals affected by medical harm or self-help groups whose members had had 
these experiences.
A Historical Context
In looking in more detail at PAR as a research approach, it is important to look in a bit 
more detail about why its origins are in contention. Reason points out that PAR was 
originally used to describe a form of 'liberationist inquiry in underprivileged parts of 
both the "Third" world and the developed west' (Gaventa 1991 cited in Reason 1994: 
6). Other practitioners have also used this term to apply to their work in Western 
organisations as mentioned earlier in the chapter (Whyte 1991). Reason, (1994: 6-7) 
however, makes a serious point in this debate by suggesting that in Western 
practitioners borrowing the terminology of the "original" version, many PAR 
practitioners have objected to this for a number of reasons. Firstly he argues it is 
offensive because it is 'a way that the rich establishment is once again co-opting and 
colonizing the world of the underprivileged' (Reason 1994: 7). Secondly, because it 
embraces a more liberal ideology to its original more radical counterpart, that holds 
quite different ideas about the relationship between popular and "scientific 
knowledge". Thirdly because it is seen to unnecessarily confiise the debate between 
different types of collaborative inquiry approaches (Brown, 1993; but see also Whyte, 
1992 cited in Reason 1994: 7).
Fais Borda (2001) contributes to this debate by looking at some of the ways that have 
led to the international convergence of a participatory action methodology over the 
last three decades. He points to a range of research and action projects that were set 
up in different parts of the developing world in the seventies, that had a considerable
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effect on subsequent work, interchangeably referred to as Participatory (Action) 
Research (P(A)R, or Participatory research (PR). He argues that the roots of PAR and 
the search for an 'alternative paradigm, appear to confirm previous work in the South 
of the world' (Fais Borda 2001: 32). These developments are also seen as being 
accompanied by supporting academic and political written materials in many Western 
countries and places such as Mexico.
Fais Borda points to The 1977 first World Symposium of Action research, convened 
at Cartagena, Columbia, as an important juncture in bringing together a range of 
thinking in the field of participatory action research, propelling the movement to take 
on international dimensions. In the search for an alternative paradigm for a new 
'scientific plus activist/emancipatory work' (2001: 31), he points to an emerging 
definition of PR. This was characterised 'as vivencia meaning life experience' 
(according to Husserl's Erfahrung cited in Fais Borda 2001: 31), 'which was necessary 
for the achievement of progress and democracy, a complex of attitudes and values that 
would give meaning to praxis in the field' (Fais Borda 2001: 31. Fais Borda argues 
this set the context for PR to be seen not only as a research methodology and a 
philosophy of life, but also converted its practitioners into 'thinking-feeling persons'.' 
(2001:31).
The 1977 first World Symposium of Action research was pinpointed as aheady 
incorporating two trends of PAR research, the activist Latin American contingent and 
the participatory elements firom Canadian educators. However by the time of the 1997 
World Congress the number of schools or trends of PR type work were seen to have 
grown to about 32, reflecting a range of localities and conditions. An attempt to 
introduce some consensus on convergence eventually came up with 11 streams or 
schools, which were upheld, despite being inconclusive (Fais Borda 2001: 32).
In terms of the development of a convergence among these approaches however. Fais 
Borda makes the important point that whilst at the 1977 Symposium there were 
doubts about the possibility of an alternative paradigm, twenty years later at the 1997 
World Congress the feeling was different. This he argued was expressed in an 
acknowledgement that:
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'the values usually accompanying the dominant paradigm (consistency, 
simplicity, scope, certitude, productivity) could be enriched with participatory 
ones like altruism, sincerity of intent, trust, autonomy and social 
responsibility'.
(Fais Borda 2001: 32)
Fais Borda concluded therefore that the development of this altemative paradigm:
'appears to confirm previous PR work, especially in the South o f the world, by 
combining praxis and ethics, academic knowledge and popular wisdom, the 
rational and the existential, the regular and the fractal. It breaks down the 
subject/object dichotomy. It is inspired in the democratic pluralist concepts of 
alterity and service, favouring to live with differences, and introducing 
perspectives of gender, popular classes and pluri-ethnicity into the projects'.
(Fais Borda 2001: 32)
However, in a note of caution about the development of an altemative paradigm, Fais 
Borda pointed out that this jiaradigm could not be viewed as a final product and that 
the challenge of an evolving open project continued. He argued that participants at the 
1997 World Congress felt that an open paradigm presented an opportunity for 
multidisciplinary work. Fais Borda also seems to suggest through the quote below, 
that this approach represented a challenge to universities to connect more with the 
world that they were attempting to study and to measure:
'This idea of mixing visions and methodologies with their several readings applies to 
universities to recover their critical mission to shake up the tardy, tedious and 
departmentalized disciplinary world, and to put students and professors more in 
touch with real-life problems'.
(Fais Borda 2001: 32)
Key Components of PAR
Given this context, it is useful to identify some of the central components of PAR. In 
this respect. Reason (1994: 6-8) points to a number of key characteristics. He argues 
that the location of PAR can be placed firmly within the tradition of liberationist 
movements (Fals-Borda and Rahman 1991 cited in Reason 1994: 5) with a primary 
objective of raising the awareness and consciousness levels of ordinary people (Fals- 
Borda and Rahman, pvi cited in Reason 1994: 5). A central cornerstone of PAR 
philosophy is seen to relate to concepts of power and powerlessness and the
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importance of challenging established and dominant forces within society and their 
privileged monopolisation of knowledge and the way it is used. In this context, 
epistemological and methodological issues are seen as much more secondary 
considerations (Reason 1994: 5).
Hall makes the point about power very forcefully, by arguing that PAR is not a 
neutral process for consulting with a range of stakeholders, like other methodologies, 
but is instead a 'process that is biased in favour of the least powerful'. The challenge 
he argues is to bring a range of groups together in a way that gives those with 
historically less economic, social and political power, more of a voice (2001: 175).
A second aspect of PAR is the importance placed on the lived experience of people, 
and the notion that through actual experiences, one can experience reality and 
"intuitively apprehend its essence" (Fals-Borda and Rahman, p. 4 cited in Reason 
1994: 6). Key aims are seen as the need to produce knowledge that is useful to 
ordinary people and to empower them through the construction and use of their own 
knowledge - what people like Paulo Freire (1972) have referred to as consciousness 
raising. A process actively aimed at validating the lived experiences of oppressed 
groups and communities. Hall supports this notion by stressing that 'PR was very 
largely theorized and disseminated from a social movement or civil society base' 
(2001:176) in the developing world. Therefore in breaking the 'monopoly over 
knowledge production by universities' (2001: 176), he argues that this is not a form of 
anti-intellectualism. Instead, it is, 'a recognition that the academic mode of 
production was, and remains, in some fundamental ways linked to different sets of 
interests and power relations from those of women and men in various social 
movement settings or located in more autonomous community-based, non­
governmental structures' (2001: 176).
Torbert has argued however that many action research communities have traditionally 
been averse to looking at power, with a tendency to assume that the way it is 
exercised is inherently unilateral, with little scope for more equal partnerships. He 
argues therefore that even where action research has addressed this issue, inspired by 
work such as Freire's, 'Pedagogy of the Oppressed', this tradition still seems to offer:
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'a rather blunt, bivariate theory of oppressive, top down, unilateral, 
institutional power versus emancipating, bottom-up, mutual, people power 
offering little insight into how to transform power itself.
(Torbert 2001: 256)
Thirdly, a PAR approach is seen to place real value on processes of more genuine and 
democratic collaboration, which respect and treat as equal the wisdom and expertise 
of ordinary people. The use of dialogue is seen as important in moving away from the 
subject/object relationship of traditional science, to creating a subject/subject 
relationship. 'One in which the academic knowledge of formally educated people 
works in a dialectical tension with the popular knowledge of the people to produce a 
more profound understanding of the situation' (Reason 1994: 6). Reason argues that 
PAR practitioners work mainly in and with particular types of communities, who find 
themselves open and vulnerable to colonialist oppression by a dominant culture. Thus 
the main critique of non-participatory research is seen as the exploitative way it 
continues to reinforce a dominant culture that monopolises the creation and use of 
knowledge to the detriment of communities in which the research takes place (1994:
7).
In this respect, Reason (1994: 7) quotes Tandon (1982) in his four-point critique of 
what he calls 'monopolistic' research:
The Absolutist critique challenges the idea that there can be any one or pure truth in 
social research and therefore to pursue this aim is seen as illusory. The Purist critique 
follows on by challenging the attempts of social science to obtain objectivity and 
rigour in the research process, through strict separation of researcher and research 
subject, that ultimately leaves all control in the hands of the researcher. The 
Rationalist critique raises the way that in the interests of maintaining objectivity, the 
traditional research paradigm has over-emphasised and therefore privileged the 
thinking process to the detriment of cognition in the wider sense of feeling and acting. 
Lastly the Elitist Critique points out that given the way that the traditional research 
paradigm is accessible to a professional elite, this in turn gives rise to research which 
is most likely to advance the ideological and economic advantages of their class.
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Reason argues therefore that Tandon developed this critique in order to illustrate that 
PAR provides a very different approach to the traditional research paradigm. This 
approach:
'values the people's knowledge; sharpens their capacity to conduct their own 
research in their own interests; helps them appropriate knowledge produced 
by the dominant knowledge industry for their own interests and purposes; 
allows problems to be explored from their perspective and maybe most 
important liberates their minds for critical reflection, questioning and the 
continuous pursuit of inquiry, thus contributing to the liberation of their minds 
to the development of freedom and democracy'.
(Tandon 1989 cited in Reason 1994: 7)
In many respects this summary of PAR, provides a perfect backdrop to my own 
attempts to design my field research with individuals and groups affected by medical 
harm. As will become clearer in the next two chapters, these individuals and groups 
very much saw themselves as disenfiranchised in not having a voice on issues directly 
impacting upon their lives. Instead they saw these issues as very much driven by 
dominant medical perspectives supported and reinforced by the power of wider 
economic and political imperatives. Given my knowledge of some of these processes, 
I was keen to develop my research design in a way that empowered the research 
participants as much as possible in the research process, in order that they might set 
their own agendas. I return to look at my research design in more detail, in the last 
section of this chapter.
PAR Methods
Lastly before I come on to look at my research design, the section below looks at 
some arguments about PAR research methods.
In exploring PAR methodology, there appears to be more emphasis on the ideological 
and philosophical basis of the approach rather than the methods required to carry it 
out. Hall points to the way that knowledge outside of academia is created in a 'myriad 
of socially constructed and creative ways' (2001: 174). Thus he argues, because PR is 
about, a collectively and socially constructed knowledge, research methods should 
emerge and take inspiration firom the creative and collectively constructed practices 
within communities and movements, rather than as set out in a handbook on action
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research. This is seen as more supportive of and helping to continue to facilitate or 
create 'new processes for collective knowledge generation, learning and action (Hall 
2001: 175).
This process is illustrated in many ways by the development of the two different 
strands of my field research, which I come onto shortly and explore in more detail in 
the following two chapters. This shows how in capturing data firom those affected by 
harm, I had to be creative in my research methods. In this respect working with 
processes that these groups and individuals thought were useful for them in telling 
their stories and in putting across their issues, rather than concentrating on methods 
designed to advance my own PhD research.
Reason argues that PAR methodology can be diverse using both quantitative and 
qualitative methods. It also often draws upon oral traditions of communication and 
dissemination of knowledge, with a preference for communicating the practice of 
PAR through the description of cases. However, he points out, that this approach has 
also attracted criticism for not providing enough detail for learning about the process 
of the research being undertaken. It is also noted however, that PAR may use more 
traditional methods for gathering information through the use of survey techniques, 
but then allowing the community to make sense of the data from their perspective. 
This is seen as an 'important source of peoples' knowledge and empowerment' (de 
Roux, 1991; Rahman, 1991; Gaventa and Horton, 1981; Tandon & Brown, 1981 cited 
in Reason 1994: 8).
Reason points out that what is called the research design (data gathering, analysis etc) 
in more traditional research, tends to be replaced in PAR research with more 
emerging forms and 'processes of collaboration and dialogue which empower, 
motivate, increase self-esteem, and develop community solidarity' (Reason 1994: 7). 
Thus community meetings and events are seen as an important medium in this sort of 
process. On the one hand empowering individuals by allowing them to identify issues, 
reclaim a sense of community and explore the potential for liberation strategies. As 
well as providing the space for facilitating the research process, collecting 
information, reflecting upon progress and helping to develop the ability of the 
participants to continue with the PAR process.
215
Reason also makes a similar point to the one made earlier by Hall (2001), about 
research methods being inspired by the communities they are seeking to engage with. 
In this respect he argues that meetings, by drawing upon and engaging in a range of 
activities (storytelling, song, drama, painting etc), that would frequently be seen as out 
of keeping with a more traditional research project, do encourage a form of 'social 
validation of "objective" data which cannot be obtained through the orthodox 
processes of survey and fieldwork' (Reason 1994: 8). He therefore points to the 
importance of exploring stories and storytelling as part of an emerging paradigm of 
participatory inquiry. He identifies two basic modes (explanation and expression) for 
reflecting upon and processing experience. The former he associates with orthodox 
inquiry approaches and the way that it seeks to answer the what and the why questions 
in research. The latter is seen as a mode that allows the meaning of experience to be 
expressed and to emerge through the process of participation rather than through 
detached analysis. Thus a 'methodology of meaning-making' is seen as a fundamental 
part of human inquiry, and developing stories and storytelling, the most universal of 
all expressive media. Although neither explanation or expression are ultimately seen 
as competing or mutually exclusive strands, but important parts of a dialectic that 
should complement each other in a holistic model of inquiry (1988: 79-81).
The starting point therefore in moving forward with this approach is to ask questions 
such as: 'How do we use stories as inquiry? How do we draw forth meaning through 
storytelling? And what are the stages in the process of meaning creation in and 
through stories?' (Reason 1988: 83). These methods are seen as crucial in allowing 
people and communities who may have been subjected to a 'culture of silence' based 
upon oppression for many years to tell their stories in their own way and therefore to 
reclaim them (Salazar, 1991 cited in Reason 1994: 8).
Overall it is clear that a PAR approach seeks not only to empower research subjects 
through a more inclusive methodology, but one that also seeks to create more equal 
partnerships through the development of jointly agreed and action oriented outcomes. 
However despite this ideal. Fais Borda (2001: 33-34) points to some key challenges 
for this approach for the future.
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These relate to the need to continue to develop more multidisciplinary and holistic 
approaches in building a more coherent AR, PR or P(A)R for the grassroots and 
academia. The need to ensure that rigour and validity criteria are developed to 
critically evaluate fieldwork processes to address persistent criticisms of amateurism. 
To be able to identify significant case studies whose theoretical-practical 
interpretations can be generalized. To continue to work towards producing PAR 
approaches that enables its advocates to deconstruct the global trends 'adverse to 
people's interests' (Pals Borda 2001: 33). This is seen to require a methodology of 
scientific research, education and political action that 'continue to find ways to 
privilege the production of responsible knowledge so that the common peoples who 
have been victims of capitalist exploitation and abuse become the main recipients and 
beneficiaries of research and schooling?' (Fais Borda 2001: 33). Therefore building 
bottom up participatory democracy with supporting social, political and cultural 
movements is seen to be a natural consequence of PAR work.
Lastly, the greatest challenge for PAR is seen as the construction of an 'ethnogenetic 
emancipatory ethos'. In this respect, PAR is viewed as carrying a liberating political 
mantle in which a critical community of intellectuals could construct open pluralist 
societies in which oppressive abuses of power are proscribed. This effort is seen to be 
based upon 'a humanist utilization of science, knowledge and techniques' (Fais Borda 
2001: 34), in which PAR inevitably plays a key part.
This analysis of PAR methodology therefore brings me on to look at how this 
connects to my own field work research design. In the section below, I have set out 
the main aims and objectives of my field research. I then note the academic context to 
the research, the main research design and some ethical considerations and then touch 
upon some issues associated with getting ethical approval for my research.
Field Research: Aims and Objectives
My field research can be described as consisting of a sociological investigation into 
the experiences of a range of self-help groups and individuals that have been affected 
by (or the group set up as a result of) medical harm. A participatory action research 
(PAR) design was chosen to enable the groups and individuals to be actively involved 
in gathering the research data, with a view to looking at different aspects of medical
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harm from a patient's perspective. A PAR approach was seen as important in 
empowering the participants in the research process to have a voice and to be co­
actors and learners in the research process. This approach was also identified to 
enable a deeper understanding to be gained about what survivors of medical harm saw 
as the key issues and how these issues have affected their lives. By adopting an action 
oriented focus, the aim was to generate data from patient perspectives that would 
enable policymakers and NHS employees to look at a range of systems and policy 
regarding patient safety, regulation and accountability and to adopt, change and 
improve practice. A key aim was also to draw upon ideas from data generated about 
how better to achieve patient and public involvement and empowerment in this area.
The Academic Context
This research is broadly located within the sociology of health and illness and draws 
upon an extensive literature relating to the effects of social processes on health. Very 
little research exists however relating to users who have been affected by medical 
harm. Therefore the project not only seeks to explore health user perspectives in this 
area, but also to explore how these views can contribute towards the NHS developing 
its new patient safety agenda.
Theoretically, the field research has taken as its starting pomt a critical sociological 
standpoint, that challenges a biomedical view that routinely associates health and 
illness with the body, rather than locating its origins in social processes (Nettleton 
1995). Therefore in conducting research in this area, concepts will be explored that 
suggest that medical harm as a phenomenon is difficult to pin down and as a process 
is not value free, but is socially constructed and mainly determined by the medical 
profession (Sharpe and Faden 2001). The field research also seeks to explore whether 
a new paradigm of knowledge is needed that incorporates altemative views to the 
medical model, about the causes of iatrogenic illness. In looking at this issue and 
drawing upon perspectives of social constructionism and political economy, the 
research will explore what is required in building a new patient safety culture within 
the NHS and whether a more critical theoretical framework is needed for achieving 
this based upon patient empowerment.
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The research will also draw upon the current policy context within the NHS, which 
seeks to modernise and change and to create an empowering culture of service 
provision with patients at its centre. An important aspect of this policy agenda is to 
bring about an improvement in the quality of clinical care (DOH 1997) through key 
reforms regarding patient safety and learning from failure within the NHS (DOH 
2000; DOH 2003).
The Research Design and Ethical Considerations
At the outset in thinking about my research methodology, I was particularly keen to 
use a research approach that enabled me to generate research data by working in 
partnership in some way with my research respondents. As a result of my own 
experiences and of working with families in the action group I chaired, I was very 
keen to ensure that my research did not further disempower individuals. This meant it 
was important for me to try and find a way to conduct research with these individuals 
rather than upon them and to try to ensure that they gained something from the 
process.
Therefore finding the right methodological framework for my research was of crucial 
importance to me. Given this situation, I decided at an early stage that I did not want 
to use a quantitative approach, based upon numbers and statistics, with the researcher 
in a more traditional position as detached observer and research respondents as 
passive subjects. I also ruled out adopting a straightforward qualitative approach, 
although an emphasis on discovering a deeper meaning of the issues through the 
identification of a small number of cases certainly seemed to fit more with my field 
research subject. Eventually I felt that what I needed to do was to be able to identify a 
research model that allowed data to be gathered more collaboratively, but also in 
partnership with a range of stakeholders. This research design also needed to enable 
the research participants to have some ownership in the process as actors and co­
researchers.
Developing a PAR approach was therefore considered for ethical reasons, given the 
background of the potential research subjects and their experiences of harm. I felt that 
by developing a research approach based upon PAR, that this would minimise the risk
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of incurring further harm to the research participants through the exploitation of their 
situation for academic purposes. In order to gain as wide a perspective as possible 
from users affected by different aspects of medical harm, I decided eventually that I 
would aim to generate data from both groups representing individuals affected by 
harm and individual not in groups via two different but complimentary strands.
The first strand drew specifically upon the experiences of a number of self-help 
groups affected by medical harm. As part of my work at AvMA, it was agreed that I 
should lead on trying to set up a network for self-help groups whose members had 
been affected in various ways by medical harm. These groups were campaigning for 
justice and medical accountability in different ways and for changes to the system to 
develop a safer culture of healthcare that also worked in partnership with patients. I 
had an interest in networking with self-help groups because of my own experience of 
medical harm. I had also recently become a member of a NHS Patients Forum, 
making me part of a wider network of Forum members trying to achieve changes in 
healthcare. In addition to these personal interests, I had had a longstanding 
professional interest in the area of user involvement based upon previous experience 
working at a community level with different communities. In my previous work as a 
social work lecturer I also had strong teaching interests in social work anti-oppressive 
and anti-discriminatory methodologies (Thompson 2001; Dalrymple and Burke 1995; 
Dominelli 1997, 2002; Preston-Shoot 1995; Braye & Preston-Shoot 1995) for 
empowering users as part of a process of empowerment and change.
AvMA were also keen to support the goal of building a national network of self-help 
and support groups in order to make it possible for individual patient and patients 
organisations to play a more central role in clinical governance and patient safety 
work at both the local and national level. This was seen as an important way of 
enabling experiences to be shared between groups and opportunities to be developed 
for a more co-ordinated national voice on patient safety issues.
In conducting a thesis looking at medical harm from a patient's perspective, carrying 
out field research with the self-help groups was seen by me to provide a unique 
opportunity to capture data in this subject area. This was because the groups that came 
to be involved in the network had become politically involved because of their
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personal experiences of medical harm. These groups therefore offered a unique 
perspective on changing the system from a patient's perspective, this seemed even 
more important given the current exclusion of patients and the public in developing a 
new patient safety agenda within the NHS (which is explored further in chapter nine). 
As what came to be known as the Medical Harm Self-Help Network (MHSHN) began 
to develop core objectives of collectively working towards change, based upon the 
personal experiences of the individuals involved, it became vital for me to develop a 
methodological approach that could engage with and capture this process. The 
research that I ultimately carried out with the groups in the MHSHN is discussed in 
detail in the next chapter.
The second strand of my research concentrated on generating data from individuals 
(rather than groups), directly affected by medical harm. I was keen to talk to 
individuals because most people affected by medical harm do not become part of 
groups. The MHSHN in this respect only allowed people in groups to attend 
meetings. I therefore thought it was important to get a sense of what the issues were 
with individuals on their own, to see if they were raising concems that were 
substantively different from those people who had become more politicised and 
interested in the wider issues through joining a group. AvMA were also keen to 
support this work as part of the development of their support services to individuals 
affected by medical harm.
The first opportunity to consider how I could do some research in this area came from 
the organisation of a one-day event called from 'Pain to Gain' which took place in 
May 2004. The event was organised by another AvMA worker and myself and was 
carried out in partnership, with AvMA and the Brahma Kumaris, an organisation that 
promotes empowerment through personal self-development. The aim of the one day 
event was to enable individuals affected by medical harm to come together to explore 
ways of dealing with the emotional and psychological damage caused to them by the 
medical harm they had suffered. The event was free of charge and attended by 42 
individuals who overwhelmingly asked for a more in-depth, on-going, programme of 
support to be developed for the future.
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The 'Pain to Gain' event, eventually led to the development of a programme called 
The 'Break Through Programme' in 2005, which was set up to empower individuals 
affected by medical harm to work together in a supportive group context. The concept 
of the programme was individually inspired by me as a result of the death of my 
daughter, but subsequently came to be supported by AvMA as part of its support 
services to victims of medical harm. This two-day residential support programme for 
victims of medical harm provided the context for me to carry out some action research 
which is discussed in more detail in chapter seven.
In developing a research framework to work with the groups and individuals the key 
aim was to be creative and to ensure that I was developing structures for them to 
participate in which were not just designed for me to carry out my research. The 
MHSHN, was therefore appropriate because the groups later made it clear that they 
did not have a forum where they could come together to discuss their issues about 
medical harm and patient safety. I was able to work with them over three years, 
organising the meetings, taking minutes and identifying key issues to present at a 
conference that I led in organising, in order to empower the groups to have their say 
to policy makers about change in this area. In relation to the setting up of The Break 
Through Programme this was an important vehicle for me both to generate research 
data, as well as to meet the needs of individuals affected by harm. In organising the 
'Pain to Gain Event', in many respects this had acted as a pilot in enabling me to 
determine whether individuals would be interested in getting involved with a support 
initiative and therefore whether it would allow me to carry out my research at the 
same time.
In the next two chapters I discuss in detail my work with the MHSHN and the key 
issues to emerge from this process and my findings from the data generated from The 
Break Through Programme.
Lastly, in the section below, I say something about the main issues associated with 
getting ethical approval to carry out my research and some of the difficulties that 
emerged for me in this process.
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Getting Ethical Approval
Despite giving the ethical considerations of the research project quite a lot of thought, 
getting formal ethical approval proved quite daunting. First and foremost I had to 
establish whether formal NHS ethical approval was required for the research project, 
as opposed to just getting approval from Surrey University's Research Ethics 
Committee. This was unclear to me given my intention that all research participants 
would be recruited from voluntary/community organisations and that there was no 
intention to obtain any personal information on individuals either from personal 
health records or from NHS sites. In seeking to clarify this situation, I looked at the 
University's Ethics Committee weh-site. This appeared to suggest that health related 
research should always he referred first to the appropriate NHS REC and then 
suggested reference be made to various documents in considering submission for 
ethical approval.
In particular the site quoted the Research Governance Framework for Health and 
Social Care entitled 'Governance Arrangements for NHS Research Ethics' (2001). 
This stated in section 3.1 that:
'Ethical advice from the appropriate NHS REC is required for any research 
proposal involving (a) patients and users of the NHS. This includes all 
potential research participants recruited by virtue of the patient or user's past 
or present treatment by, or use of the NHS. It includes NHS patients treated 
under contracts with private sector institutions, (b) individuals identified as 
potential research participants because of their status as relatives or carers of 
patients and users of the NHS, as defined above'.
This advice created considerable confusion with both my supervisor and I in trying to 
work out what was meant by the phrase 'recruited by virtue of. This led my 
supervisor to seek clarification from Professor Terry Stacey, Director of COREC, and 
the Central Office for Research Ethics Committees of the Department of Health. 
Professor Stacey responded by stating that:
'recruitment via voluntary organisations - even for health related research - 
does not require review by NHS RECs, as long as there is no intention to 
obtain information from NHS records, etc. It is certainly good practice that 
research on human subjects should have independent ethical review, and your 
University committee will be perfectly competent to do this'.
(Email dated 22.12.04)
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Despite however getting this advice from Professor Stacey, a long and detailed 
correspondence was eventually to occur between my supervisor, the University Ethics 
Conunittee and myself. This correspondence led to my making several revisions to 
the research being proposed and resubmitting it to the University. The correspondence 
however, continued to stall on the view of the committee that because the research 
involved participants who had at some point been treated for a certain condition by 
the NHS, then formal NHS ethical approval was required. This view by the committee 
was substantiated by their taking advice from Sandra Holley, the COREC advisor for 
Surrey and Sussex. This opinion however created even more questions, as it implied 
by virtue of the fact that most of the population will have been patients of the NHS at 
some time, that to conduct research with them would always require formal NHS 
ethical approval.
This matter was only eventually resolved when advice was received from the chair of 
the NHS South East Multi-Centre Research Ethics Committee (MREC) who 
confirmed that:
'These documents have been considered by the Chairman who has advised 
that the project is not one that is required to be ethically reviewed under the 
terms of the Governance Arrangements for Research Ethics Committees in the 
UK'.
(Letter from the South East MREC, 3^  ^November 2005)
This opinion eventually led the University Ethics Committee to grant ethical approval 
for my research in November 2005. My supervisor in subsequent correspondence to 
the University Ethics Committee concluded about the whole matter, (see 
correspondence cited and application to the Ethics Committee in Appendix):
'It is our contention that the opinion originally obtained from Professor Terry 
Stacey, the Director of COREC, was correct about the matter, and much time 
has been wasted in looking for an NHS Review o f the proposal that was not 
required'.
(Buhner November 7^  ^2005:)
Overall, this situation led to quite a difficult start to getting the research project off the 
ground and raised a number of issues in my mind about the scope of NHS research
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ethics committees to approve wholesale, social science health related research. This 
also made me think about the dangers of the independence of this type of research 
being compromised and what appeared to be the medical dominance of the research 
approval process.
Conclusion
In conclusion this chapter has looked at a range of material in relation to the 
methodology of action research and more specifically participatory action research. In 
doing this detailed consideration has heen given to the key principles of PAR and why 
I decided this methodology was appropriate for me to use in conducting my research 
with those affected by medical harm. In exploring key principles of PAR, what 
emerged was that this methodology provided me with a framework for working with 
individuals who had been oppressed or harmed by the system. It also provided a 
vehicle for enabling me to encourage and empower these individuals to generate their 
own knowledge and to look at the issues from their own perspectives, in this respect 
providing an alternative knowledge base to the dominant critiques in this area. Given 
the issues already explored in previous chapters ahout medical dominance, working 
with those affected hy medical harm through a PAR approach seemed to be a good 
way to generate alternatives views to these dominant perspectives. This methodology 
was also viewed as enabling me to empower those affected by medical harm in 
generating research and to think about issues of patient empowerment in building a 
new patient safety agenda for the future.
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Chapter Six
The Medical Harm Self-Help Network 
Background Context
This chapter sets out the research results from the first strand of my field research in 
working with the Medical Harm Self-Help Network (MHSHN). In illustrating these 
findings I have divided the chapter up into a number of sections to make it easier to 
follow the process of the research. Firstly in order to set the context, I have started 
with a narrative account of the work that the network undertook and how it agreed to 
proceed over the life of its existence. In chapter eight I reflect in more detail on some 
of the processes involved in building the network and how my thinking was 
influenced hy PAR principles and wider action research criteria. The next section of 
the chapter then looks at the profiles of the groups in the network and analyses what 
are identified as some of their key characteristics. Lastly, the chapter then comes on to 
identify some key themes from the research data. Consideration is given to what these 
themes suggest in terms of medical dominance and the need for a hroader model for 
looking at medical harm that identifies hoth clinical and social processes, and which is 
hased upon a model of patient empowerment.
The Formation of the Medical Harm Self-Help Network (MHSHN)
On 2"  ^December 2003 as part of my work as a CASE student at AvMA, I convened a 
meeting with a small group of individuals to explore the possibility of forming a 
wider network of self-help groups whose members had heen affected by medical harm 
in different ways. I was particularly keen to develop contacts with self-help groups as 
part of my research and as a way of exploring issues of medical harm and patient 
empowerment from the perspectives of individuals directly affected by the issues. In 
addition, in developing my understanding of the policy context in terms of medical 
harm, it seemed to me that these self-help campaigning groups appeared to be 
excluded or very much on the periphery of many of the current policy debates and 
changes taking place in this area.
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Aside from AvMA members, three self-help groups were invited to attend this first 
meeting. I was already familiar with all three of these groups and had met up or 
spoken with them on the phone about the idea of the meeting. However on the day, 
the meeting was attended by AvMA's Chief Executive, Peter Walsh, the research and 
policy officer Liz Thomas, Richard Ennals and myself from Action for the Proper 
Regulation of Private Hospitals (APROP). The remaining two groups (the National 
Committee on Organ Retention (NACOR) and The Richard Neale Action and Support 
Group) sent their apologies and were unahle to make the meeting. Although those 
present at the meeting were disappointed that the two absent groups were unable to 
attend, everyone felt that it would still be useful to go ahead with the meeting and to 
discuss the idea of setting up the network. Some conclusions from the meeting in 
terms of forming a wider network were that, 'it was very timely given the current 
context and various changes taking place around patient safety and clinical reform' 
(Meeting with Self-Help Groups, December 2"^  ^ 2003). There was also some 
discussion about the use of the term self-help as noted in the quote below and it was 
felt that this should cover:
'groups made up of victims/survivors who have experienced a medical 
accident. (A medical accident is defined by AvMA as an injury caused as a 
result of medical treatment or failure to diagnose. This includes cases of 
clinical negligence). This could include groups looking solely at these issues 
or as part of a wider agenda'.
(Meeting with Self-Help Groups, December 2003)
Lastly, the meeting felt that it was important to convene another meeting again as 
soon as possible and to invite more groups. This meeting was subsequently convened 
in February 2004 and was attended by three AvMA members including the chief 
executive and myself and three self-help groups, APROP, The Richard Neale Action 
Group and NACOR. Two further groups sent their apologies the Kerr/Haslam Support 
Group and The Leicester Epilepsy Concern Parents and Carers Group.
The minutes of this meeting note that:
'A lively discussion took place about a range of issues related to medical 
accidents covering topics such as the role of the GMC and how the legal 
system works, training for doctors and the importance of the patients expertise 
and perspective in service provision and developing better systems for 
accountability in the future.
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Everyone attending the meeting was keen to see this dialogue develop further 
by holding future meetings to discuss key issues. It was also decided that a 
Network for self-help groups could be set up and supported by AvMA, 
dependant upon resource constraints. It was also agreed to hold a conference 
in the Autumn o f2004 which would allow self-help groups and individuals to 
take a lead in defining what some of the key areas for change should be and 
how this could be achieved’.
(Meeting with Self-Help Groups, February 12^  ^2004)
The self-help groups at these initial meetings were therefore keen to come together as 
a way of taking forward their strategic political and policy goals whilst gaining more 
collective support from other groups.
Network Meetings
Over a period of about two and half years I worked with a range of groups from the 
original meeting in December 2003 until the network in partnership with AvMA held 
a major conference on May 9^  ^ 2006 entitled The Patients' Agenda for Safety & 
Justice'.
In terms of identifying groups to join the network, many of these groups were 
identified because of their importance in having instigated and gone through major 
inquiries set up by the NHS to investigate their concerns about medical harm. In the 
early stages of establishing the network all of the groups could be described as self- 
help organisations, however, as the network developed, other groups with a hroader 
remit hut with an interest in issues of medical harm were invited and attended 
meetings.
In terms of the numbers of meetings held after February 2004, the groups met in May, 
July and November 2004 and in May, June and October 2005. In 2006, I mainly 
corresponded with individuals and groups in order to organise the conference for May 
2006. Therefore in total seven network meetings were held with groups and I was able 
to gather further information on the groups and their perspectives by meeting up with 
twelve representatives from the groups on a one to one basis. However because I was 
responsible for developing the network, this meant that in practice I was in contact
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with all of the groups personally over the two and a half years, either in meetings, on 
a one to one basis or by telephone and email.
Because the network was unfunded there were a number of problems in funding 
people to attend meetings. Although a number of individuals were based outside of 
London, the meetings took place in Portcullis House in Westminster which is the 
main office building of the House of Commons, housing most parliamentary MP's and 
where a number of Parliamentary Select Committees take place. The network 
members agreed that this was the best place to meet because of its central location and 
because AvMA was able to secure a room for firee through the support of an MP 
sitting on its trustee board. The location also allowed some of the more politically 
organised members of the network to combine some of their own political activities in 
meeting up with MP's, whilst attending network meetings. However, because many 
groups were not able to attend network meetings consistently because of problems 
with time and resources, the groups below formed the main participants in feeding 
into or attending network meetings over a two and a half-year period. The first set of 
groups below attended meetings twice or more over two years:
MRSA Support; The Erb's Palsy Group; Action for the Proper Regulation of Private 
Hospitals (APROP); Leicester Epilepsy Concern - Parents and Carers Group; 
Sufferers Against Iatrogenic Neglect; SOS - NHS Patients in Danger; ALERT; AIMS 
(The Association for the Improvement of Maternity Services), and NACOR whose 
member then switched to representing The National Bereavement Partnership.
And the latter groups attended one meeting:
The Richard Neale Action Group; JABS; APRIL (Adverse Psychiatric Reactions 
Information Link); WITNESS (formerly POP AN) and MIND.
All of these groups however expressed support for the network and sent apologies 
when they could not attend meetings.
Gaining Access to the Groups
Making contact with the groups and securing their interest in building a network 
proved to be one of the most challenging aspects of this work. Issues arose for a
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number of reasons. In the first instance I found myself encountering widespread 
distrust and indeed some hostility firom the groups about the system and any attempts 
hy a national organisation like AvMA to organise them. In addition to issues of trust, 
a key issue was how to build a network that would have demonstrable benefits for the 
groups and make it worth their while getting involved, given their own campaigning 
work and limited time and resources.
Although these issues were to remain a problem to some extent, I found that what was 
invaluable in building trust and opening up a dialogue, was the ability to use my own 
personal experiences in relation to medical harm and campaigning for justice. These 
were personal issues that all of the groups were familiar with in one way or another. 
This meant that rather than refusing to work with me from the outset, it meant that 
with all of the groups, because of my personal loss, they sympathised with me and 
therefore were prepared to talk with me. In these circumstances we were able to 
discuss the pros and cons of whether getting involved in the network would be of any 
benefit to them. Given my experiences of the difficulties of trying to gain access to 
these groups and to win their trust, I would argue that this may well explain why so 
little has been written about those affected by medical harm in the sociological 
literature.
Criteria for Network Membership
Given the problem of a lack of resources, making it difficult to fund regular meetings 
of the network, a number of suggestions were made for maintaining the momentum of 
the network, which would not necessitate the groups having to meet on a regular 
basis. It was firstly agreed that AvMA should seek funding for network meetings, but 
in the interim, that a mission statement should be developed which would allow 
groups to work together loosely but collectively on some key issues whilst 
maintaining their own identity.
The objectives below were eventually agreed as part of a general mission statement 
for the network;
Mission statement for the network
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The Medical Harm Self-Help Network is a forum for independent voluntary 
groups to share information and experience.
Members share a common interest in support and/or justice for people harmed by 
medical treatment or health professionals and improving patient safety.
Where appropriate members will work together on issues of common concern, hut 
each group remains autonomous and independent.
Action against Medical Accidents (AvMA) provides a secretariat for and 
facilitates the work of the network.
Key Goals of the Network
As the network was not able to meet on a regular basis, it was agreed that a good way 
forward in maintaining the momentum for the network was for AvMA to organise 
some key events in 2005 that the groups could benefit from. Some initial ideas for 
these events were to invite a speaker from the Healthcare Commission in March/April 
2005 to come and talk about their work relating to patient safety, whilst also using the 
event to encourage a wider number of groups to attend network meetings. In addition, 
to this it was suggested that a workshop on clinical governance could be held later on 
in the year. This would look at how clinical governance operated within the health 
service and how patient/user perspectives in this area might be developed in 
conjunction with the work of the Patient's Forums.
It was also agreed that the network would support my research through an action 
research project that could be developed with whichever groups wanted to participate. 
The groups certainly thought the idea of looking at medical harm from a patient's 
perspective was important and liked the idea of being able to participate in a research 
project that allowed them to collaborate in the work on a more equal basis.
Initially I agreed to draw up a protocol to guide the research that would give people 
more information about participatory action research. I also set out some proposals for 
how some research could be gathered collectively through the network. Firstly 
through the generation of data through network meetings and secondly I proposed 
talking to individual network members about producing case studies on their
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organisations and the work they were involved in, which I could then collate into a 
book.
However, it eventually became clear that producing case studies and a book was to 
ambitious and unrealistic for all concerned, not least given the time-scale for 
completion of my PhD. The time-scale for carrying out my research was restricted 
even more because of the confusion and delay in getting research approval from the 
University Ethics Committee. This was not granted until November 2005. It was 
therefore agreed that it was more realistic to generate research data by my drawing 
upon the discussions taking place at network meetings. I therefore agreed to produce 
minutes of meetings and to write up some of the key themes emerging from 
discussions. I was also able to interview individual members about their experiences 
and look at information they provided on their groups and their activities from their 
web-sites.
Perhaps the most important goal to arise from the network, was to organise a 
conference in partnership with AvMA that would allow those directly affected hy 
medical harm, patients generally and patient organisations to set the agenda on 
developing a new patient safety culture within healthcare. Network members were 
adamant that although key statutory agencies in the patient safety field should be 
invited, they should not be speakers but be asked to listen and take back the issues to 
their organisations. The conference marked the end of a process of network meetings 
and was organised to enable the groups to tell key policy makers what their agenda 
for change was.
It was also agreed that the material that I went on to collate as research data whilst 
working with the network, should be written up and presented at the conference as 
part of an agenda for change from survivors of medical harm. This data it was decided 
should identify key issues and points that the groups had made over the years that 
they felt were important in creating a new patient safety agenda. In writing up this 
material I agreed to publish it in a special conference edition newsletter that was 
eventually called 'Patients Perspectives on Change'. The key points from this 
newsletter are summarised later in the chapter and the newsletter is included in the 
appendix of the PhD. To coincide with the conference, I also agreed to research some
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background information on the groups in the network and to write up some case 
profiles, which it was agreed could then he placed on AvMA's weh-site as a way of 
puhlicising the strategic goals of the groups. These profiles have been included in the 
next section of the chapter when looking in more detail at the characteristics of the 
groups in the network. Taking a lead in the organisation of the conference and 
presenting the issues from the groups in the network, was to mark the culmination of 
my input into the network as part of my Case studentship, although not my 
subsequent involvement with groups in the MHSHN.
The conference that took place on May 9* was widely seen by all those individuals 
who had been involved with the network as a resounding success. In a post­
conference newsletter produced entitled User Perspectives on Change' (see appendix) 
on the event, it was noted that:
'The event was a great success and attended by more than a hundred people 
and very much represented an important step in patients and those affected by 
medical harm setting out what their perspectives are on developing a new 
patient safety culture'.
(AvMA newsletter May 9^  ^2006)
A number of network members both spoke at the conference as well as attended. The 
speakers included the chair of Witness, the chair of MRSA Support, a nominated 
speaker from ALERT, the chair of APRIL and myself. In the post conference 
newsletter, I was able to include a new good practice model for patient empowerment 
based upon a range of data generated from both the network and The Break Through 
Programme.
The conference also launched a new project called the 'Patients for Patient Safety' 
(Pfr*S) project, managed hy AvMA in partnership with the National Patient Safety 
Agency (NPSA). The project ran from April 2006 to April 2008 and I was successful 
in being appointed to co-manage the work alongside another person from AvMA. The 
project aimed to develop patient and public involvement in patient safety work in the 
NHS by working with two NHS hospital trusts and facilitating a national network for 
patients and patients’ organisations with an interest in patient safety. The project also 
built upon the work and formed the inter-country element of the international
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‘Patients for Patient Safety’ initiative of the World Alliance on Patient Safety - a 
World Health Organisation (WHO) initiative. This project was inspired by ideas 
emerging from the MHSHN and my work at the Royal Brompton and Harefield NHS 
Trust in developing lay involvement in patient safety work.
The Medical Harm Self-Help Network: Group Profiles
In the next section of this chapter I have documented the profiles of the groups in the 
network. This information was compiled from a combination of information given to 
me by group members as well as taken from their websites. I then come on to analyse 
some of the key characteristics of these groups.
Self-Help Groups:
Action for the Proper Regulation of Private Hospitals (APROP) was set up in
1998 by a group of families whose relatives had sustained severe injury or death as a 
result of their care in the private acute hospital sector. Prior to the formation of the 
group, individual members had campaigned unsuccessfully for many years for a 
change and improvement in clinical standards. APROP believe that an important 
opportunity was lost to address a number of their key concerns ahout safety with the 
passing of the Care Standards Act 2000, which they believed was probably heavily 
influenced hy private healthcare industry lobbying. They continue to campaign for 
proper accountability and the monitoring and regulation of standards in private 
hospital care comparable to best practice in the NHS.
Justice Awareness and Basic Support (JABS) is a self-help support group for 
vaccine damaged children. The group neither recommends nor advises against 
vaccinations, hut aims to promote awareness and understanding about immunisations 
and offers basic support to any parent whose child has a health problem after 
vaccination. JABS want comprehensive information to be given to all parents to make 
an informed decision on the benefits and risks of vaccination. They also want the 
current method of reporting adverse reactions to be radically changed to ensure all 
reactions are reported and continue to campaign for legal aid to be reinstated and a 
legal right for compensation for all vaccine damaged children.
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The Leicester Epilepsy Concern Parents and Carers Group was formed in 2001 as 
a result of the suspension and investigation of paediatric neurologist, Dr Andrew 
Holton. In May 2001 Dr Holton was suspended from duty and in November 2001 a 
survey of 214 of Dr Holton's epilepsy cases by the Royal College of Paediatrics and 
Child Health found 40 per cent had a wrong diagnosis. Parents subsequently launched 
legal action. In October 2003 a Department of Health report found that Dr Holton's 
treatment of patients should have been investigated sooner and that a total of 688 
children had been misdiagnosed. In June 2005 a High Court Judge approved a £10 
million-compensation scheme for parents and children. The GMC however allowed 
Dr Holton to continue to practice in medicine subject to conditions and retraining. The 
Parents Group believe the GMC's decision is a complete travesty of justice. They 
continue to campaign to expose what they see as the complete failure of the system to 
tell them the truth, to take the action needed to prevent a repeat of the situation and to 
learn the lessons for the future.
IVIRSA Support is a support group for sufferers of MRSA (Methicillin Resistant 
Staphyllococcus Aureus) and their dependants. It was established in March 2002, by 
Tony Field, a previous sufferer of MRSA and now has over six hundred members. 
The group point out that MRSA is a bacterium which is relatively harmless under 
normal conditions. However problems occur when it gets into the bloodstream 
through a cut or broken skin, particularly if the immune system is weakened. MRSA 
can in certain instances he fatal. Due to the overuse of antibiotics over many years this 
bacteria has evolved to be resistant and there are now only two antibiotics which will 
deal effectively with this hug, which both need to be administered intravenously. 
MRSA Support aim to provide practical and moral support to all affected by MRSA 
and also campaign for a cleaner approach to hospital hygiene. As part of their 
campaign they have puhhshed a booklet compiled by their chairman Tony Field 
entitled "MRSA - A PATIENT'S DEFENCE!" This outlines practical steps, which 
can be taken to help prevent hospital patients and visitors from picking up the MRSA 
bug.
The Royal Brompton and Harefield Heart Children’s Action Group
(RBHHCAG) was set up to campaign for an independent inquiry by the parents of
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children who had died or suffered brain injury whilst under the care of the Royal 
Brompton and Harefield NHS Trust. The group emerged out of publicity surrounding 
an anonymous whistle blower working at the Brompton, who contacted the magazine 
Private Eye alleging that paediatric cardiac surgical results at the Royal Brompton 
were worse than elsewhere and particularly so in the case of children with Down's 
Syndrome. It was also claimed that the attitude of doctors towards children with 
Down's Syndrome was inappropriate. These allegations prompted the Hunter Review 
published in September 1999, which claimed to have found no evidence to uphold the 
allegations.
However due to a high profile press campaign, hy myself on behalf of a number of 
families and groups representing children with Down's Syndrome, the Trust agreed to 
set up an Independent Inquiry in 1999, to allay concerns. This was originally to 
include only Brompton families hut was extended to include Harefield families after 
the Bristol Inquiry showed poor results for cardiac surgery for children over one at 
Harefield Hospital. The Inquiry reported its findings on the 2"^  April 2001, making 
120 recommendations to the Trust to change its practice. At the same time the parents 
represented by the RBHHCAG held a peacefiil demonstration and denounced the 
Inquiry as a 'Sham and a Cover-Up' that 'failed to address the individual concems of 
parents or to seriously consider serious issues of medical negligence'. (I represented 
this group in the very early stages of building the network whilst the action group was 
still in existence).
SOS-NHS Patients in Danger was formed in 1999 hy bereaved relatives of non- 
terminally ill primarily elderly or vulnerable adult patients who had been victims of 
dehydration, starvation or misuse of diamorphine. The group campaigns to stop this 
abuse by health care professionals and against elderly patients or patients with 
disabilities being killed by involuntary euthanasia. Non-voluntary euthanasia is seen 
to occur when tight funding and high demand for beds lead doctors and hospitals to 
ration treatment inappropriately to patients whose "quality of life" is deemed too low. 
This can mean fatal doses of painkillers are given to patients or 'do not resuscitate' 
(DNR's) orders prescribed without agreement. SOS-NHS Patients in Danger monitor 
and try to stop these abuses and are planning to sue the government for failing to 
protect vulnerable citizens.
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ALERT is a group that campaigns against legalised euthanasia and in defence of 
vulnérable people's right to live. They believe that older people and the disabled 
should not be discriminated against when it comes to treatment and should be treated 
with respect and not like second-class citizens. Families who are trying to prevent the 
planned death of a relative in hospital, or to get justice when they have failed to do 
this contact ALERT. The group try's to support families in this situation or to refer 
them to other organisations. ALERT was founded by Dr Peggy Norris in 1991 
because she felt that an organisation was needed for lay people to be able to protest 
against what was seen as growing international pressure for legalised euthanasia. Her 
interest in this area developed after being affected as a newly qualified doctor just 
after the end of the war, looking after survivors from the concentration camps and 
being shocked by the Nazi doctors' abandonment of the Hippocratic tradition and 
willingness to commit medical harm. At present GMC guidelines on withholding and 
withdrawing "life-prolonging treatment", (i.e. food and water given through a tube), 
allow it to be withdrawn from patients who are not dying, hut may not make a good 
recovery, even if they have requested in advance to be given treatment.
Sufferers of Iatrogenic Neglect (SIN) was set up in November 1998 as a pressure 
and support group for victims of poor medical care and their relatives who wish to 
improve standards in the NHS. The two founding directors were both affected by 
medical harm. The group is concerned with iatrogenic suffering which relates to 
disorders, symptoms etc caused inappropriately hy any clinician through his/her 
diagnosis, manner or treatment. The group aim to improve standards and access to 
medical care in the NHS, reduce medical errors and help their members obtain the 
truth if something goes wrong with their care. They also believe that it is imperative 
that the basic human right to adequate health care is upheld (Article 25 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights) and that iatrogenic patients form a united front to 
ensure that the voice of the mistreated patient is heard and to work towards 
developing a change in culture in the NHS of mutual benefit to both doctor and 
patient.
The Richard Neale Action and Support Group was founded in September 1998 
and comprised of some 250 women treated under Richard Neale, a former consultant
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gynaecologist and obstetrician. Most of the women had suffered substantial 
permanent physical and/or psychological injury at the hands of this doctor. The group 
was also comprised of the relatives of deceased patients, a number of whom, it was 
believed died unnecessarily at the hands of Richard Neale. Richard Neale had been 
struck off the medical register in Canada for gross clinical incompetence and 
dishonesty, after patients died under his care. Despite the GMC being warned about 
this situation hy the Canadians and the danger of allowing Neale to continue to 
practice, no action was taken against him for fifteen years, before a campaign by his 
damaged victims, forced the GMC to act and to strike him off the medical register in 
July 2000.
APRIL (Adverse Psychiatric Reactions Information Link) campaigns to promote the 
preservation of mental health by relieving and protecting persons who may be at risk 
from adverse psychiatric reactions to prescribed drugs. APRIL was founded by Millie 
Kieve in 1998, who began researching adverse drug reactions (ADR's) after the death 
of her daughter Karen in 1995. Millie found that there was an urgent need for the 
medical profession, as well as the public, to be made aware of the possibility that 
perceived mental and physical illness, including dementia, may in fact be adverse 
effects of medicines or anaesthetics (iatrogenic disease). APRIL aims to raise 
awareness of psychiatric ADR's; to establish a database on ADR's with information 
from users, medical professionals and from research papers and medical literature; to 
raise funds to sponsor research into why some people are vulnerable to ADR's; to 
obtain expert guidance and publish information on the best way to help people who do 
suffer from psychiatric ADR's and to compile a dictionary of drugs with a known risk 
to mental health either for people with a previous history or no history at all of mental 
health problems.
The Erb’s Palsy Group is a registered charity that aims to increase awareness and 
understanding of Erb's Palsy, to offer mutual support to famihes with affected 
children, and to act as a network to provide information. Erb's Palsy now more 
commonly referred to as Obstetrical Brachial Plexus Paralysis (GBPP), is a largely 
preventable birth trauma, which affects the nerves that supply movement and feeling 
to a baby's arm. Some babies recover on their own and others need specialist 
treatment. The group has its origins in the birth of a baby in 1991 with Erh's Palsy
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whose mother Debhie Clark found herself with little information or support about the 
condition. She eventually made informal contact with other families and found this 
situation to he common and so the decision was taken to set up a support group with 
charitable status. The group now has over 1080 families as members. The initial 
objective of the group was to get accurate information to parents about appropriate 
treatments for their babies. Since 1995 the group strongly drawing upon user 
involvement has also campaigned to try and bring about change and to try and lower 
the incidence rate of OBPP. This has been done by working in partnership with 
agencies to educate them ahout the condition and developing training courses so 
midwives can develop the skills they need to avoid the injury in the first place.
Health Consumer Groups:
AIMS (The Association for the Improvement of Maternity Services) is a pressure 
group funded by a lottery grant that campaigns to improve maternity care. In 1960 
Sally Wilmington, the founder and President, wrote to a national newspaper about her 
distressing antenatal and hirth experience. As a result of her letter a deluge of 
complaints from other women followed, which led to the formation of AIMS. The 
group’s membership consists of parents, midwives, doctors and other health 
professionals drawn from Britain, Ireland and abroad. The group provide emotional 
support and advice to individual women and couples and campaigns on both a 
national and local level. They publish a well respected and widely read journal which 
focuses on current issues in maternity care and strongly believe that changes for 
women in childbirth come about as a result of supporting midwives as practitioners in 
their own right, who in most cases, should undertake the care of mothers and babies 
throughout pregnancy, birth and afterwards.
Mind is the leading mental health charity in England and Wales. Its mission is to 
work to create a better life for everyone with experience of mental distress by: 
advancing the views, needs and ambitions of people with mental health problems; 
challenging discrimination and promoting inclusion; influencing policy through 
campaigning and education; inspiring the development of quality services which 
reflect expressed need and diversity and achieving equal rights through campaigning
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and education. Established in 1946, Mind now has a network of over 200 local Mind 
associations throughout England and Wales. Local Mind Associations offer supported 
housing, crisis helplines, drop-in centres, counselling, befriending, advocacy, 
employment and training schemes, and other services. Mind is currently focusing on 
the Government's review of the Mental Health Act and working with other mental 
health organisations to ensure that the new Act gives people sufficient rights and 
protection. In terms of patient safety. Mind is also concerned about the recent report 
by the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) into sexual assaults on service users 
on mental health wards.
The National Bereavement Partnership is a small charitable organisation with a 
small network of staff and volunteers. It is the only charity in the UK that provides a 
national helpline offering specialist advice to bereaved people, particularly in the 
context of post-mortem examinations. The organisation was founded by Michaela 
Willis MBE and Helen Rickard in March 2003 and became a registered charity in 
September 2004. Both Michaela and Helen were parents who were involved in the 
Bristol Inquiry as a result of babies they lost under the care of Bristol Royal Infirmary 
and were part of the Bristol Heart Children's Action Group. Both have many years' 
experience of supporting bereaved families, fiiends, and relatives and have received 
counselling training and are actively involved in staffing the helpline and providing 
training to health professionals, coroners and their officers and voluntary and other 
organisations. Key objectives of the charity are to prevent and/or relieve the mental 
and physical sickness and distress of persons suffering from bereavement or loss, by 
the provision of advice, assistance and support for such persons. To advance the 
education of the public in issues surrounding bereavement, particularly, hut not 
exclusively, hy the provision of training for persons who wish to work with and 
support the bereaved. To provide a specialist free, confidential and independent 
service to bereaved people and professionals working with bereaved people. To 
empower those who are often unable to progress their own concems by providing 
information, advice, and support.
Michaela originally attended network meetings representing a group called the 
National Committee for Organ Retention (NACOR), which was set up to represent 
parents who found out that their children's organs had heen taken without their
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consent after their children died. Michaela subsequently changed to representing The 
National Bereavement Partnership at network meetings and as a result of her work 
with the MHSHN, was eventually invited hy AvMA to become one of its trustees.
WITNESS (formerly POP AN) is against abuse by health & care workers and is the 
only charity in the UK working exclusively to help people who have heen abused and 
working to prevent that abuse. The organisation does this by providing a helpline and 
professional support and advocacy services for the victims and survivors of abuse and 
by campaigning for improvements in policy law and practice, conducting research and 
providing education and training. WITNESS aims to support survivors to seek 
justice, assist survivors to overcome their experience of abuse, reduce the incidence of 
ahuse, decrease the isolation of survivors and increase survivors' confidence. The 
organisation wants to see the provision of comprehensive advocacy services across 
the U.K; Mandatory reporting and recording of incidents of abuse by professionals; 
Meaningful user and survivor participation; For health and social care services to 
acknowledge serious errors and to make a clear commitment to proper redress for 
victims; Statutory regulation of counselling and psychotherapy; Teaching on 
professional ahuse and its prevention to be a mandatory part of formal health and 
social care training; Effective, transparent and accountable complaints systems across 
all health and social care professions; Substantial research into ahuse by professionals 
and independent inquiries into serial and institutional abuse.
Key Characteristics of Self-Help Groups
In setting out the profiles of the groups above, there are a number of characteristics, 
which are useful to highlight, in particular the distinctions made between self-help 
groups and professionally funded, formally structured voluntary organisations with 
paid workers. As mentioned in chapter five, the rationale for wanting to work with 
self-help groups was because I wanted to gain a sense of the issues directly fi*om a 
user perspective. In this respect all of the self-help groups and their members are 
comprised of individuals directly affected by the issues the group are campaigning on. 
This situation can be seen as different fi*om the composition of other types of 
voluntary organisations in which the leadership of the organisation is often comprised 
of people interested in the issues, but not directly affected by them and working on
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behalf of client groups. This type of voluntary action I would describe as 
philanthropic, doing on behalf of, rather than self-help.
The intention with my field research has heen to pursue the development of a critique 
that illustrates the way that social processes feed into the construction of medical 
harm by looking at diverse patient experiences. The critique aims to show how these 
social processes are currently obscured by the way that a dominant medical model is 
applied to explain the concept of medical harm. This is seen not only to cover-up 
some of the complex processes that take place in this area, but to be detrimental to 
developing a new safer system of healthcare that places patients at its centre through 
patient involvement and empowerment.
A starting point therefore in analysing my work with and data about the groups, is to 
look at the concept of self-help and what this means in practice. Therefore in setting 
out the profiles of the groups that came to be part of the MHSHN, I have started off 
by dividing the groups into two broad categories which I have called self-help groups 
and Health Consumer Groups. It is clear that both these types of groups can be found 
as part of a wider voluntary sector that is hugely variable in terms of the diversity of 
its provision, organisational structures, activities and user groups. This has made 
measuring this activity extremely difficult (Royal Statistical Society 2000). To 
compound this problem, even less has been done to systematically document and 
define certain types of voluntary action such as that contained within the self-help 
tradition. Katz and Bender (1976) provide one of the most widely cited definitions set 
out below, which I found useful in categorising the groups in the network.
'Self-help groups are voluntary, small group structures for mutual aid and the 
accomplishment of a special purpose. They are usually formed by peers who 
have come together for mutual assistance in satisfying a common need, 
overcoming a common handicap or life-disrupting problem, and bringing 
about desired social and/or personal change. The initiators and members o f  
such groups perceive that their needs are not, or cannot be, met by or through 
existing social institutions. Self-help groups emphasize face to face social 
interactions and the assumption of personal responsibility by members. They 
often provide material assistance, as well as emotional support; they are 
frequently "cause"-oriented, and promulgate an ideology or values through 
which members may attain an enhanced sense ofpersonal identity'.
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To this definition or 'model description' can he added a further list of defining 
features, such as: '1) self-help groups always involve face to face interactions. 2) The 
origin of self-help groups is spontaneous (they are not usually set up hy an outside 
group). 3) Personal participation is an extremely important ingredient; 
bureaucratization is antithetical to the self-help organization. 4) The members agree 
on and engage in some actions. 5) Typically, the groups start fi-om a position of 
powerlessness. 6) The groups fill needs for a reference group, a point of connection 
and identification with others, a base for activity and a source of ego-reinforcement' 
(Katz 1981: 136).
If we look at the long tradition of self-help activity in Britain, we get more of a sense 
of the significance of this type of voluntary action. What we see is the way that these 
organisations have long acted as a vehicle for people directly affected hy various 
social issues to have a voice and to take action independently themselves to change 
their social conditions. These groups differ from other organisations in the voluntary 
sector, often characterised hy a philanthropic approach and professionally constituted 
and run by paid workers. Allsop et al (2004) has referred to these types of groups in 
health as health consumer groups. This is defined as, 'a voluntary sector organisation 
that seeks to promote and/or represent the interests of users and/or carers at national 
level, to capture experiences across a range of conditions, namely: arthritis, cancer, 
heart and circulatory disease, maternity and childbirth and mental health' (2004: 739).
These groups are seen to have:
'a situated knowledge which draws on personal experience, but incorporates 
other forms of expertise. The people who represent groups may themselves 
speak from personal experiences but they also legitimate their position 
through drawing on the experience o f their members and this is achieved by 
operating consultative and participatory practices '.
(Allsop et al 2004: 752-753).
This term has been used to apply to groups in the network that were more 
professionally structured than the self-help groups and consisted of individuals who 
were both personally affected hy the issues as well as those advocating on behalf of 
them.
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In looking at the profiles of the self-help groups in the MHSHN, what became 
increasingly apparent was that they had a number of features in common. First of all, 
they were all organisations whose members and/or their families had heen directly 
affected by medical harm. So they were patient led user groups. Secondly the groups 
had heen set up to provide mutual support both on an emotional level and through 
their giving members information and advice which had not been available to them 
through the mainstream. Thirdly, all the groups had a campaigning agenda both in 
relation to enabling their members to get justice and accountability in terms of their 
own cases, but also in seeking to make wider socio-political changes at a systems 
level in terms of patient safety and medical regulation. In this respect, many of the 
groups had been successful in acting as a catalyst for change at a wider level, by 
gaining broader inquiries into specific issues. What was evident ahout these groups is 
that they operated as a voice for those directly affected hy medical harm in an 
environment dominated by medical perspectives. Through self-determination and 
self-mobilisation they were able to empower their members by enabling them to 
challenge dominant medical ideologies and to put on the agenda, issues that had 
previously only been looked at from a medical perspective.
In analysing the research data fi*om network meetings over two and a half years, the 
features of the groups set out above were illustrated in a number of different ways as 
set out below:
Firstly 10 out of the 11 groups mentioned were set up directly as a result of individual 
experiences of medical harm. This led to a group being formed a) either arising out of 
one persons experience who then founded the group with others in a similar situation 
or h) the group being formed around the experiences of a group of individuals who 
had been affected either by a particular doctor or doctors under a particular hospital or 
by a similar issue impacting upon a range of individuals in different environments, 
which then led to the formation of a group. In the first situation for example, the 
founder of the Erhs Palsy Group was a mother whose child was affected by the birth 
trauma. She then set up the group when she came across others whose children had 
been similarly affected. This situation was similar to the way that I founded The 
Royal Brompton and Harefield Heart Children's Action Group or the way that Tony 
Field founded MRSA or Sheila Wright-Hogeland, The Richard Neale Action and
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Support Group. Whereas in the latter situation, groups such as JABS, The Leicester 
Epilepsy Concern Parents and Carers Group and Action for the Proper Regulation of 
Private Hospitals (APROP) either came together because a number of families had 
been affected by a single issue such as MRSA or MMR for example (Jabs later 
extended its support to families with children damaged by other vaccines), or because 
a cluster of families had been affected by a particular doctor, under a particular 
hospital and then chose to form a group together.
Secondly, following on from how the group was founded, it is clear that the 
campaigning objectives of all of the groups came to he developed directly out of the 
experiences of harm of the group's members. For example, if the group's members 
were all affected by a particular type of injury or harm such as the MMR jab or other 
vaccines or MRSA or an adverse psychiatric reaction, then the group focused on this 
issue. On the other hand, some group objectives had developed because group 
members were affected by a particular condition, such as a heart problem or epilepsy 
or had been having gynaecological treatment, but had sustained their harm through 
the actions of a particular doctor or doctors and under a particular hospital. In this 
respect, all of the groups had different and distinct campaigning agendas, but seemed 
to have in common a desire to challenge the medical perspective and medical 
dominance on a number of issues and to put forward their own unique perspectives on 
change. This more collective agenda is illustrated later hy looking at key themes to 
emerge from network meetings about a number of issues.
In these situations, groups such as The Leicester Epilepsy Concern Parents and Carers 
Group, The Richard Neale Action and Support Group and The Royal Brompton and 
Harefield Heart Children's Action Group, were campaigning for justice for individuals 
and for action to he taken against the doctor or doctors concerned as well as the 
individual hospital Trust involved. In some situations because all group members had 
been affected by harm in the private sector then campaigning objectives focused both 
on helping individuals to achieve personal goals as well as campaigning for broader 
changes in the private and independent sector. Campaigning objectives therefore for 
most of the groups, tended to include a focus both on finding out why individuals had 
been harmed and calling for accountability and justice, as well as focusing on 
achieving wider changes to the system in a particular area.
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Thirdly, in terms of the structure of the groups, this seemed to be variable, in terms of 
how often the groups met, whether there was a formal management committee and 
elected officers and how the groups worked with their membership. The Erhs Palsy 
Group for example was formally constituted with a management committee that met 
regularly, whilst the group APROP did not have a larger management committee, but 
had identified officers, who were clearly elected to lead the group. This was also the 
case with the Leicester Epilepsy Concern Parents and Carers Group, whilst the 
Richard Neale Action and Support Group was led informally by its founder Sheila 
Wright-Hogeland.
Overall a common thread amongst these groups in terms of structure was the more 
informal nature of the organisation in terms of the way it was run. This meant that in 
contrast to the health consumer groups, who all had paid workers, most of the self- 
help groups were not formally constituted as organisations with charitable status or a 
written constitution and did not employ paid staff, but were run by their members. 
Apart from ALERT, the membership seemed to be made up almost entirely of 
individuals directly affected by medical harm. Apart from the groups that had gone 
down the charitable route such as APRIL and The Erb's Palsy Group, most of the 
groups had fairly basic written information on their objectives, although most groups 
had set up their own web-sites. Most of the groups also clearly had a strong 
campaigning function, which may well have been one reason why they had not 
constituted themselves as charities, as this would have restricted that function. Most 
of the groups also appeared to have no external funding apart from monies they raised 
themselves, with the exception of The Erb's Palsy Group, which operated more 
formally with some paid workers.
Fourthly, a unique feature of these groups was the mutual advice and support 
provided to members. This was clearly extremely important given that many group 
members had joined the group because they were fighting to get answers and redress 
in relation to harm they had suffered, which they had not been able to resolve on their 
own. In this respect, the key focus of groups such as The Leicester Epilepsy Concern 
Parents and Carers Group, The Richard Neale Action and Support Group and The 
Royal Brompton and Harefield Heart Children's Action Group was in actively
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campaigning for individual justice and redress for their members and for action to be 
taken against the doctors or Trusts involved. Secondary to these goals was achieving 
wider system change. With these groups, members had clearly come together as part 
of a collective experience of harm under a particular doctor or hospital trust. Whereas 
with groups such as APROP, JABS, MRSA Support, ALERT, SIN, APRIL, SOS- 
NHS Patients in Danger and the Erhs Palsy group, the focus of the groups was in 
more generally assisting individuals as they approached the group for advice and 
support, while campaigning more generally for specific changes to the system based 
upon a range of member experiences.
Fifthly, a distinctive feature of these groups was the way that they were able to bring 
specific user/ patient perspectives to the issues that they were campaigning on that 
were different to the dominant medical perspectives in that area. This meant that 
JABS for example made clear that they thought that MMR could he dangerous and 
has significant side effects and had harmed a number of its members. This went 
against the dominant government and medical position on the safety of the MMR 
vaccine. Other self-groups also had distinct perspectives on change. For example SIN 
believed that it was imperative to uphold people's human right to adequate health care 
(according to Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) and for those 
affected by iatrogenic illness to form a united front to change the culture in the NHS 
for both doctors and patients. The Erb’s Palsy Group had been successful in bringing 
a user perspective to the issues they were looking at by showing the medical 
profession how to lower the incidence rate of OBPP. This had been done by working 
in partnership with the medical profession to educate them about the condition and to 
train midwives so that they could develop the skills they needed to avoid the injury in 
the first place. Groups such as APROP also highlighted the failures of the private 
sector and the way in which it was not subject to the same standards of accountability 
as the NHS. In this respect they were calling for comparable complaints systems as 
the NHS and similar levels of monitoring and inspection.
In the next section, I come on to look at how the network developed over the two and 
half years of its inception and to analyse this development drawing upon Hart and 
Bond's seven criteria for distinguishing action research from other methodologies. 
However, before I do this, I want to look briefly at the four groups listed in the
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network, which could not be described as self-help groups, because they were 
professionally constituted and fimded. It is useful when looking at the development of 
the network to look at how these groups came to be included.
Perhaps the first thing to note is that despite my attempts to build a network that was 
'theoretically pure' in terms of comprising just self-help groups, this turned out not to 
be possible or practical. Although the network was an attempt to try and tap into and 
empower those individuals directly affected by medical harm, what became obvious 
at some point was that some groups were doing very good work, working with users 
affected by medical harm, who were not self-help groups. It therefore seemed 
pointless to exclude them from meetings if they could contribute to the issues from a 
user perspective.
fri inviting groups to meetings, it also became clear that it was not always easy to 
separate out those that were purely self-help, from those that were more 
professionally constituted and did not just involve those people directly affected by 
medical harm. Also given the fluid nature of the attendance at meetings, it seemed 
that network members themselves were broadly happy for any group to attend so long 
as they appeared to support a patient/user agenda and those directly affected by 
medical harm, fri this respect, this seemed a more practical way of allowing 
involvement and attendance at meetings, rather than whether the groups met a more 
theoretical and stricter interpretation of what constituted self-help.
This more fluid way of building the network also worked because the network did not 
decide to formally constitute itself, but just to produce a mission statement on its aims 
and objectives. The mission statement when defining membership of the network 
agreed to keep the definition general and fairly loosely defined in order not to exclude 
groups from network meetings. Therefore using the wording the MHSHN, 'is a forum 
for independent voluntary groups to share information and experience'. This meant 
that in practice whilst the majority of network members were made up of individuals 
directly affected by medical harm, who were part of what could be termed self-help 
organisations, this was not exclusively the situation. What was also interesting about 
the four groups that were professionally funded and constituted was that at least two
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of them had their origins in self-help, via their founding member being affected by 
medical harm.
For example with AIMS, the founder and president of the group had experienced a 
traumatic antenatal and birth experience and with The National Bereavement 
Partnership, the founding members had both lost children under the care of the Bristol 
Royal Infirmary. They were also founder members of the Bristol Heart Children's 
Action Group that successfully campaigned for the Bristol Inquiry. All of these 
groups worked closely with those affected by medical harm. With MIND and 
WITNESS, it was also clear that both of these groups not only worked with those 
affected by medical harm, but also strongly saw themselves as organisations 
representing patients and acting as patient advocates.
Having said this, what became very obvious from my work with the groups and 
individuals in the network, was that those directly affected by harm and particularly 
where they were still part of campaigning self-help groups, seemed to have very 
distinct perspectives about medical harm and patient safety. These perspectives were 
very much based upon an oppositional perspective, in contrast to dominant 
mainstream viewpoints about the system. In meetings, at times, these views came 
across as much more radical and critical than perspectives coming from members of 
more formally constituted groups.
Key Research Themes
In the final section of this chapter, I come on to look at some of the key issues and 
themes identified by the groups in the self-help network over the period I worked 
closely with them. These themes were also strongly reflected in the presentation I 
gave on the key issues coming out of the MHSHN at the conference held by AvMA 
on May 9 2006. These themes have been broadly divided into four areas: a lack of 
openness and accountability; punishing and pathologising victims of medical harm; 
issues of discrimination and a failure to leam from medical errors. In analysing these 
issues below, I have picked out the points that I believe were the most important to 
the groups and which represented the themes that came up most consistently in the 
meetings (see also newsletter presented at the AvMA conference in the Appendix). In
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looking at these issues, what is noticeable is the way that they echo many of the same 
themes identified in earlier chapters of the PhD. These themes concern the social 
processes involved in constructing and defining medical harm and have been 
illustrated throughout the PhD in order to challenge a dominant biomedical viewpoint 
of these issues.
A Lack of Openness and Accountability and Punishing/Pathologising 'Victims’ of 
Medical Harm
The theme that the medical profession failed to be open and honest when medical 
harm took place and that regulatory bodies covered up on their behalf, was the most 
consistent theme that came up with all of the groups. This situation it was argued had 
left individuals in a situation where not only did they have to deal with the original 
medical injury, but then also had to contend with investigative systems which covered 
up on a number of levels what had happened to them. These levels frequently started 
with the hospital concerned, but then invariably spread to other agencies with a wider 
investigative remit, for example NHS or Complaints Procedures covering the private 
sector, the General Medical Council (GMC), the Nursing and Midwifery Council 
(NMC) and bodies such as the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory 
Agency (MHRA). All of these agencies were consistently criticised by network 
members for failing to deliver justice and accountability. In setting out some of these 
issues about a lack of openness and accountability, reference is also made to how 
network members felt that they eventually became characterised as the problem 
because they were not able to prove that they had been affected by medical harm and 
negligence.
Overall network members talked generally at meetings about the way that their 
members had been forced into -taking legal action as the only way to get some 
accountability and redress for what had happened to them. They also wanted to try 
and get action taken to ensure that there would not be a repetition of the harm that had 
taken place. However, for many, taking this action had come at a considerable price 
with individuals facing huge barriers in terms of getting hold of their medical records, 
which they sometimes had to pay for, then for some, finding their records had been 
tampered with or crucial items of information removed.
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Other barriers to justice were seen as the problems in getting legal aid, getting access 
to independent medical experts and the problem of medical experts being used who 
themselves might have been involved in causing medical harm to patients. Individuals 
also spoke about the problem of some lawyers not acting professionally and 
mishandling cases of medical negligence and the problems of overcoming the difficult 
legal threshold (the Bolam Test) for medical negligence.
Some members of the network provided very strong accounts of these types of issues 
impacting upon their members. For example, APROP talked about the vast majority 
of their members not being told about 'the quite comprehensive guidelines for 
investigating complaints' produced by the private sector's former trade body, the 
Independent Healthcare Association (the IHA) and the NHS Confederation. Instead 
APROP maintained:
'complaints were invariably answered by the hospital manger in an evasive, 
obfuscatory and cavalier manner, rarely admitting to or apologising for 
error, even in cases of severe injury or death. This despite advice published 
by both the IHA and doctors' defence organisations that acknowledgement of 
mistakes and apologies should be made, where appropriate. In the very worst 
instances relatives who complained and whose complaints were subsequently 
upheld - were threatened with legal proceedings for defamation.
APROP members' experience would indicate that complaints, especially 
where serious, are treated primarily as a commercial threat, with any 
acknowledgement of error seen as endangering future custom. The hospital 
may also be contractually bound by its insurers, on pain of raised premiums 
or the invalidation of cover, always to deny liability, irrespective of what may 
have happened to the patient'.
(From Case Summary written on APROP - June 2005)
Other groups in the network also echoed these types of sentiments. For example the 
The Leicester Epilepsy Concern Parents and Carers Group, spoke about the way their 
members had faced enormous barriers in trying to find out what had happened to their 
children and why they had suffered hann in the diagnosis and treatment of their 
epilepsy. The chair of the group at one network meeting spoke about 'feeling the 
medical fi-atemity had closed ranks', when parents tried to raise their concerns. He 
said that:
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'parents in the group had started off not wanting to litigate, but because they 
couldn't get answers, felt forced to take legal action'. There were now some 
700 litigation cases ongoing'.
(Chair, The Leicester Epilepsy Concern Parents and Carers Group, MHSHN meeting 
13-5-05)
He also felt that he had been targeted personally, because of his struggle to try and get 
answers, leaving him 'ostracised professionally as a solicitor'.
At the same meeting a member of MRS A Support spoke about how after contracting 
MRSA in hospital after a road accident, he had fought his way through numerous 
investigative procedures to get answers and that it had taken him 'four and half years 
alone to ,get his medical records'. Yet he said, despite his personal struggle to get 
answers he said that it was him who was blamed as the problem, in which the 
'Ombudsman labelled me as neurotic' and that he had been 'denied treatment by his 
GP as a result of having had an MRSA infection'.
This issue was cited as common, in which network members could find themselves 
'labelled', 'blamed', 'ostracised', and maligned as 'trouble-makers', or portrayed as 
'htigious', 'neurotic' or as having 'psychological problems', when they had suffered 
medical harm and were then forced into fighting to get open and honest answers about 
how that harm had occurred.
Network members argued that there was a need to recognise the pain, isolation and 
psychological trauma of medical harm which affected people not only because of the 
original injury, but was compounded by the way that victims had to fight for justice 
and redress. A further point was also made that individuals could be further 'punished' 
by the medical profession when they complained, by being denied and excluded firom 
treatment. This point was noted by the Committee of Inquiry set up into the conduct 
of Richard Neale. The report noted 'clearly some patients with justifiable complaints 
did not complain for fear of affecting future treatment'. Network members also 
mentioned that some individuals after an experience of medical harm felt unable to 
have treatment or use health care services they desperately needed, because their faith 
and trust in the system had been broken.
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A number of the groups in the network also provided strong examples of the way that 
some of the above mentioned issues were played out in terms of their groups as they 
struggled to find out what had happened to them after incidents of medical harm.
The Richard Neale Action and Support Group for example, provided a very poignant 
example of the experiences of hundreds of women who had suffered severe and 
permanent damage by the consultant gynaecologist, Richard Neale. However, the 
chair and founder of the group Sheila Wright-Hogeland made it absolutely clear that 
the way that the system had covered up this harm had deeply compounded the agonies 
of the women in her group. In talking to me about her campaign for a public inquiry, 
Sheila made clear that she felt that the 'Richard Neale scandal' constituted a cover-up 
of the highest order, and had:
'helped to contribute to a very great extent to the national loss of confidence in 
the medical profession in general and the NHS in particular. And none o f it
need have happened Because the authorities charged with protecting
the public and the patients in the UK - the GMC and the Department o f Health 
- not only failed to protect the public, they knowingly put the public at risk'.
(Witness statement fi-om Sheila Wright Hogeland 26/9/01 for a judicial review into 
the decision of the Secretary of State for Health not to set up a public inquiry into the 
activities of Richard Neale)
Despite failing in her attempts to get a public inquiry, the evidence of a cover-up was 
eventually home out by the statements of a number of other bodies and individuals, as 
set out below.
For example on the day that Richard Neale was eventually struck off, the president of 
the GMC, Sir Donald Irving said:
'The case, like others recently, raises a number of important, wider issues for  
the whole system of medical regulation. I  cannot defend the GMC procedures 
that 15 years ago failed by allowing Neale to practise in this country despite 
his record in Canada. Furthermore, his case highlights serious deficiencies in 
NHS procedures. The first complaint from NHS management to the GMC was 
not made until February 1998. It is difficult to understand why local action on 
his poor practice was not taken much earlier'.
(GMC Press Release 25 July 2000)
The Committee of Inquiry that was eventually set up by the Secretary of Health 'To 
Investigate how the NHS Handled Allegations about The Performance and Conduct 
of Richard Neale', also concluded:
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'I believed that the most perplexing aspect was how Richard Neale could be 
struck off in Canada, but able to retain his license to practise medicine in the 
United Kingdom. Explanations given to the Inquiry in the summer of 2003 
though honestly given, lacked conviction. Between January and the end of 
March 2004 significant evidence was finally obtained that confirmed not only 
had the General Medical Council been fully aware of his history in Canada, 
but had chosen deliberately not to act on this in 1986 and subsequently. The 
GMC Disciplinary Committee finally sat in judgement on him in 2000. How 
such a situation can ever be acceptable or fair must now be considered with 
urgency, but is not within my terms o f  reference’ [my emphasis in bold].
(DOH 2004)
The chair of the group JABS also provided a more personal insight into the 
controversy surrounding the safety of the MMR vaccine by talking about some of the 
experiences of members of her group. She told me that JABS was set up to provide 
support for parents in their fight for justice for some one thousand British children 
whose lives they claim were ruined by the MMR vaccine. The families have 
maintained for a number of years that their children were injured by the triple jab, 
which they claim is linked in some way to the brain damage and autism suffered by 
their children. The fight of these families for answers and accountability provides a 
compelling insight into the complex web of connections between drug companies, 
health care, consumers and the state system and also highlights the enormous barriers 
that families can face when trying to get answers about medical harm.
The Queen’s Counsel acting for the families when legal aid was withdrawn in their 
battle against the drug companies alluded to these enormous barriers. Jeremy Stuart- 
Smith, QC told the high court in challenging the denial of legal aid: 'that the legal aid 
decision was flawed and likely to be judicially reviewed'. In describing the legal 
arguments to Mr Justice Keith who was due to hear the case, the QC, in setting out the 
legal arguments, described how the families had taken the case forward "against all 
the odds".
'He accused the defendant drug companies, with their "huge" resources, of  
laying down obstacles and "a trail of litigation treacle" through which 
families were forced to wade'.
(JABS Website 15-3-04)
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The chair of JABS also shared the way in which many of the children in the group 
were suffering from side effects which were well known to the manufacturers of 
MMR, despite a denial by them of any liability. JABS also argued that the defendant 
drug companies had used their enormous power to place all sorts of barriers in the 
way of families. For example, in the aftermath of the withdrawal of legal aid, JABS 
pointed to the way that members of their group were being intimidated by letters 
being sent directly to them (rather than to their solicitors) from the defendants 
solicitors. These letters warned them of their liability for costs should they proceed 
with further action after legal aid was withdrawn.
JABS pointed out that families in these situations often had an almost impossible 
battle on their hands to prove medical harm, yet as was the case with all of the 
families in the group they had a damaged child on their hands. Fighting back in this 
situation and against powerful companies was almost impossible for families and 
certainly not possible without legal aid. Yet many of the families desperately needed 
compensation to help with looking after severely damaged children. Yet as JABS 
pointed out, the only alternative to legal action was for families to try and establish 
any eligibility for payments under the DOH's Vaccines Payments Scheme, which it 
was argued could take many years.
What is clear when looking at the experiences of these groups is that the initial 
experience of medical harm was only the first in a long line of problems and traumas 
that the families and individuals were forced to face. What also appeared to be the 
case was that the full might of the system was being used to prevent individuals from 
finding out exactly what had happened and from establishing any liability. Therefore 
in the absence of establishing liability, not only could individuals not prove that they 
were the victims of medical harm, but conversely were likely to face the full wrath of 
the system for attempting to establish any wrongdoing.
Issues of Discrimination
In relation to the area of discrimination, the members of three groups raised the issue 
in various different ways. This issue was also one that I spoke about given my own
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experiences with the families in the Brompton and Harefield Heart Children's Action 
Group (as covered in chapter four). The issues raised in this area, related to different 
groups of individuals and the way that they were treated in healthcare. These groups 
were older people, people with disabilities and those from Black and minority ethnic 
communities. In talking about the issues, there was a tendency to talk more about 
what had happened to specific groups of people rather than network participants, 
making the links between different groups and their experiences of a wider pattern of 
discrimination in healthcare. It is also of note in this area that the Richard Neale group 
was made up of woman who had been seriously harmed by a male gynaecologist. In 
this respect, there might well have been underlying undertones of a pattern of 
discriminatory behaviour on the grounds of gender; however this was not raised 
explicitly by members of this group.
fri relation to these issues of discrimination, the first point made by members of two 
groups (ALERT and SOS-NHS Patients in Danger) was about the way that older 
people could be negatively treated in the NHS. This, the groups argued, was because 
their lives could be viewed as of 'less value' because they were very sick and 
vulnerable. Examples given of this type of treatment were of vulnerable patients who 
had experienced the withdrawal of food and hydration without proper consent. A key 
campaigning objective for these groups therefore, was that all patients should be 
treated with dignity and respect and in a non-discriminatory way regardless of their 
background.
The group ALERT also spoke specifically about the case of Leslie Burke who they 
were supporting, and who suffered from a rare and progressive neurological 
condition. They spoke about him taking his case to the European Court of Human 
Rights to establish his right to receive artificial nutrition and hydration if he became 
unable to voice his wishes. Leslie had previously challenged the General Medical 
Council's (GMC) guidelines on when life-sustaining treatment should be withdrawn 
in the High Court and in the Court of Appeal. This case was seen as an important test 
case by ALERT, for vulnerable people in ensuring that they were not denied treatment 
because of the condition they were in. However, unfortunately, Lesley Burke 
eventually lost his case in the European Courts. SOS-NHS Patients in Danger, also 
raised the issue of the way that abuse towards older people could be covered up
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because of the way that the Inquest system and other systems of investigation 
operated, which might not be geared up to look at this discrimination.
In addition to the issue of discrimination against older people, the other area that was 
raised related to the treatment of Black and minority ethnic women in maternity care 
services. This issue was raised by a network member from the organisation AIMS and 
she then sent me information that she had written in her organisations in-house 
Journal ahout the problems that some of their clients, particularly Black and minority 
ethnic women were experiencing with health visitors and social services. The Journal 
article entitled 'Watch Out - Here Comes the Health visitor', pointed to the increasing 
number of complaints about health visitors from the organisations clients, who 
because they had refused an offer of a visit, had been reported to social services as a 
potential risk to their children. The article argued in response to this situation that:
'health visiting is increasingly being dominated by surveillance, not support, 
with all mothers being assessed for risk of child abuse at the first meeting'.
(Robinson 2004: 1)
This situation it was further argued was occurring despite health visitors having no 
right of access to an individuals home unless invited in. The article pointed to a 
government campaign about stopping aggression towards NHS staff that was 
encouraging "health staff (and social workers) to label clients as aggressive when it 
suited them, or to say they "felt threatened" - and such a label is seen as adding to the 
risk for friture child abuse" (Robinson 2004: 2). Robinson argued, that 'we know, also, 
that black people are more likely to be perceived as aggressive than white by police 
and health services' (Robinson 2004: 2). Robinson then points out in the article:
'Two black clients we have come to know well, whose homes we have visited, 
have been so labelled. (We noticed an apparent escalation of unwarranted 
child protection actions against black families after the Climbie report). So 
was a Romany mother - who happens to have a white collar job and lives in a 
settled home, whom we found quiet, gentle and sensitive'.
(Robinson 2004: 3)
The issue of race continued to be something that preoccupied this network member 
and in an email exchange after one network meeting, she commented:
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'On the race issue I  am in despair. The trouble is that so much is surface- 
smooth OK and people want to believe that's the real situation (typically 
British). Even those o f us who think we have at least partly educated eyes to 
see are missing major problems. One of the problems we see is a dearth of 
cultural psychiatry and psychology and - worse - the assumption from 
professionals untrained in this area that they know it all. We are very worried 
about child protection and its dominance in health care. Social workers go 
into families they don't understand in emotional hob-nailed boots and leave an 
aftermath o f damage to extended family relationships. Oh well, enough 
moaning. Please go on doing a terrific job! Jean'.
(Email 21 April 2005 13:16)
A Failure to Learn from Medical Errors
Lastly, the failure of health care organisations to leam from their mistakes, which 
were subsequently repeated time and time again to the detriment of victims, was also 
a common theme arising from network meetings. This point was made particularly 
with reference to regulatory bodies such as the GMC. fri relation to this organisation 
several groups (such as The Leicester Epilepsy Concern Parents and Carers Group, 
The Richard Neale Action and Support Group, SIN, MRSA Support, AIMS, APROP, 
etc), recounted the way in which this organisation had failed to properly hold doctors 
to account and in this respect to enable the system to leam from its mistakes. A 
number of criticisms to this effect were made at one network meeting held 
specifically to discuss the changes being proposed by the GMC to its 'Fitness to 
Practise' Procedures in the wake of the forthcoming Shipman Inquiry Report.
Some key points noted in the minutes of this meeting were:
'The GMC should be a system of last resort and that GMC complacency had 
virtually condoned unprofessional behaviour at a lower level. It was felt that 
the GMC should take a much stronger lead, and be much quicker in 
challenging bad practice.
Richard [from APROP] raised the point about the continuing failure of the 
GMC (and the NMC) to acknowledge or address the problem o f doctors (and 
nurses) falsifying their notes in the wake of an untoward incident. This is seen 
to take many forms including: key records going missing; errors being 
tippexed over and amended and a photocopy of the new altered version being 
sent to the family's solicitors; notes being deliberately badly photocopied so as 
to be almost indecipherable; notes being sent in messy unpaginated bundles 
and most commonly, notes not being contemporaneous, having been written 
up after the event to conceal or play down any failures, and to include both 
doctors and nurses/ODA's. This issue was also seen as being covered up or
258
ignored by the DOH and other regulators, with only the defence organisations 
warning their doctor subscribers against falsification (although not out of 
ethical concerns), but out o f a fear that if  this emerged in court it could 
undermine their defence’.
(MHSHN minutes 21'  ^July 2004)
Whilst the issue of regulation and accountability was identified as a major problem in 
terms of the medical profession learning firom their mistakes, other areas for change 
were also identified by the MHSHN. In order to address these issues a numbers of 
recommendations were made by the network which I wrote up for the conference 
newsletter 'Patients Perspectives on Change', that was presented at the AvMA 
conference on May 9 2006.
These recommendations included:
The need for proper independent regulation of healthcare services and for patients and 
the public to be properly involved and empowered as part of the Annual Health 
Check; The need for the Private Sector to be subject to the same standards of 
accountability and regulation as the National Health Service; The need for a proper 
and independent NHS Redress Scheme; The need for a Duty of Candour to be placed 
on all health care professionals; The importance of remembering the need to work 
positively and in partnership with the medical profession, with patients and self-help 
groups having much to teach health care professionals; The need to address the issue 
of the exclusion of people directly affected by medical harm and wider patient and 
public involvement from the current changes taking place in the patient safety field. 
This was seen to prevent health care professionals from learning from the experiences 
and expertise of victims.
Based upon the data from the network meetings, some key themes also eventually 
began to emerge which I was also able to write up in the newsletter mentioned above 
for the conference. These themes have formed the basis for the model set out below in 
terms of good and bad practice in terms of developing a safer culture of healthcare.
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A Medical Model based upon Bad Practice:
■ Professional Dominance
■ Imbalance of Power between health care professionals and patients
■ A closed & Paternalistic Culture
■ Lack of Patient Involvement and Empowerment
A Good Practice Model Based upon Patient Empowerment:
■ Based upon developing a new patient safety culture with:
■ An Open Reporting System for PSPs which also gives patients who are 
harmed Open and Honest Explanations
■ Independent and Accountable Systems of Investigation
■ Proper Access to systems of Justice and Redress based upon fairness and 
Human Rights
■ Patient and Public Involvement and Empowerment
These points are aimed at providing an outline framework for working towards a new 
patient safety agenda, which is based upon patient empowerment and participation. 
These are issues that I shall return to explore in more detail in discussing my research 
findings in chapter nine.
In Conclusion
This chapter has looked at a range of material generated from a patient/user 
perspective about the experiences of a range of groups set up as a result of medical 
harm and campaigning on these issues for their members, fri setting out this material, 
this chapter has attempted to illustrate how individuals and groups excluded from 
mainstream debates about medical harm were supported to come together in a 
network, to collectively explore the issues about medical harm from their 
perspectives. In order to enable that debate to take place, a PAR methodology was 
utilised as a central part of my generating research data for my PhD. This approach 
was aimed at empowering the groups to speak out in a supportive group environment 
and to collectively raise levels of consciousness about a range of issues. As well as to
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enable the groups to generate their own knowledge based upon their lived experiences 
and to find ways to speak, act and be change agents.
Through this process, a number of key themes were identified from network meetings 
that showed that the groups had a range of critiques about the medical profession and 
medical dominance and the way that this had led to the issues on medical harm being 
presented from a medical perspective. In this context, the groups had also argued that 
these perspectives were reinforced or acted in tandem with wider political and 
economic influences. This related to how the state regulated the medical profession, 
the way that bodies such as the pharmaceutical industry could cause harm, whilst 
protecting its own position and how all of this had led to a failure to protect patients. 
Therefore it is argued that the current context for addressing medical harm is 
inadequate because it relies too strongly on a medical model that a dominant medical 
profession has been allowed to promote against the interests of patients. Given this 
situation, the contention is that a hroader model is needed for addressing the complex 
clinical and social processes associated with medical harm. Because these social 
processes also include issues of power, control and a lack of accountability, action has 
to be taken to address the imbalance of power between health professionals and 
patients. Lastly, an important part of this new framework is seen as the need to 
include strategies for ensuring that patients and the public are both involved in 
healthcare and empowered.
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Chapter Seven
The Break Through Programme
As set out in chapter five on my methodology, my field research consisted of two 
different but related components. Both of these components focused on looking at 
medical harm firom a user perspective. The first strand concentrated on documenting 
the experiences of a number of self-help groups set up as a result of different 
experiences of medical harm, as set out in the previous chapter. The second strand 
draws upon data emerging firom a support initiative for individuals directly affected 
by medical harm called the Break Through Programme. This chapter sets out the 
research findings from working with a number of individuals who attended the Break 
Through Programme and highlights the key themes in relation to medical harm that 
emerged from their personal stories.
The Break Through Programme consisted of a two-day residential programme that 
was held at Chamey Manor Conference Centre situated in a beautiful setting near 
Wantage, Oxford, from Monday 24^  ^ October to the afternoon of Wednesday 26^  ^
October 2005. Twenty-one individuals including two couples attended this event. The 
programme was held in the week to keep costs down and participants were asked to 
pay £85 per person to cover full board and lodging. A small team of individuals, who 
were responsible for planning the event, delivered the programme. This team 
consisted of Louise Price senior case manager at AvMA, John McConnell an 
experienced stress management trainer and myself.
Key aims of the programme were to enable individuals to:
• Develop ways of managing the negative emotional and psychological effects of 
medical harm;
• Identify ways to move forward with their lives regardless of any action they 
might be taking, or thinking of taking, against a healthcare provider;
• Meet other people in similar circumstances to gain support and develop strategies 
for self-empowerment.
The programme covered a number of different sessions over two and a half days. 
These drew upon a range of methods such as stress, anger management and positive
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thinking strategies, meditation, relaxation exercises, opportunities to share in pairs 
and small groups, to participate in a panel discussion drawing upon people's own 
experiences of harm and to develop personal action plans for self-development. In 
both large and small groups sessions, participants were given opportunities both to tell 
their stories and to listen to other people's experiences and to explore ways of 
personally moving forward with their lives as well as discussing collective actions and 
strategies for change to the wider system.
Methodology
The data that emerged from the programme was gained by writing to the participants 
prior to their arrival and asking them to participate in my PhD research on medical 
harm and patient empowerment and asking them to fill in a questionnaire and consent 
form. Participants were informed that the aim of the research was not only to gain 
information for my PhD, but also to gain information that could help make the case 
for developing a fiilly fimded national support programme. A further aim was to try 
and improve patient safety by enabling the NHS to better understand medical harm by 
looking at the issues from a patient's perspective. Participants were informed that they 
were under no obhgation to provide information and could still attend the programme, 
if they chose not to participate in the research. Research data was also generated from 
the range of sessions held throughout the programme and it was agreed by 
participants that this information could be used to feed into a conference on Patient 
Safety and Justice being organised by AvMA, in partnership with the Medical Harm 
Self-Help Network. This conference was about enabling those affected by medical 
harm to set the agenda as speakers, whilst inviting stakeholders from key bodies in the 
patient safety field to come and listen.
In order to enable Break Through Programme participants to have a voice in this 
process, I agreed to produce (funding the printing through my research grant), a Break 
Through Programme newsletter. The aim of the newsletter was to enable programme 
participants to have a voice and to tell their stories from their own perspectives. I also 
included the data from programme sessions the about changes participants wanted to 
see to the current system. I entitled these suggestions, 'An Agenda for Change' in line 
with similar suggestions outlined in the newsletter produced hy me on behalf of the
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Medical Harm Self-help Network for the conference mentioned above. What was key 
from my own perspective as a researcher was to ensure that research data generated 
was produced as part of an action research agenda, which was aimed at producing not 
only research, but action and wider change for research participants.
The Research Findings
All of the participants who attended the programme returned their questionnaire 
except for one individual who later produced a narrative account of her story instead 
for the Break Through programme newsletter. One questionnaire was also received 
per couple. In terms of research data this left me with 18 questioimaires and 1 written 
narrative account. In terms of the background of the participants, 16 were women, 5 
were men and 1 person came from a Black and minority ethnic background (see copy 
of the questionnaire in the appendix).
The majority of individuals (14) came via AvMA, with 3 individuals being referred 
directly from their sohcitors and 1 from an unknown source. Application forms were 
also sent to the London branch of the Citizens Advice Bureau who were then 
responsible for managing some of the contracts for the Independent Complaints 
Advisory Service (ICAS). However, no applications were received from this source. 
This may well have been because applications were sent to them at very short notice 
leaving them with very little time to distribute them. Therefore in terms of the sample 
of people attending the programme and filling in the questionnaire, these individuals 
were self-selecting in nature and perhaps more likely to have had a grievance or sense 
of injustice, in terms of being on AvMA’s data-base in the first place.
In order to clarify for research participants what was meant hy medical harm in the 
questionnaire, the NPSA term for medical harm was used. In this respect in their 
policy documents, they refer to the term patient safety incident, defined as:
'any unintended or unexpected incident which could have or did lead to harm 
for one or more patients receiving NHS funded healthcare. This is also 
referred to as an adverse event/incident or clinical error and includes near
misses'.
(NPSA 2003).
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In total, programme participants were asked to answer 11 questions as part of the 
questionnaire they were sent. The questions were designed to elicit some numerical 
data, but mainly to elicit more in-depth, but semi-structured data on the personal 
stories of the participants attending the programme. The data from the questionnaires 
was collated and analysed, alongside information emerging from the programme over 
the two and half days. Some individuals also chose to have their personal stories 
written up in the newsletter that I produced on the programme, fri this respect I used 
the data from the questionnaires alongside information gained over the telephone 
from participants to write up the personal stories for the newsletter.
Below I have set out some of the numerical findings from the questionnaire and then 
later under the heading 'Major Themes in the Data') have analysed the rest of the 
questionnaire data by looking at key themes to emerge.
Firstly, respondents were asked whether they believed that they had suffered harm as 
a result of their medical treatment or lack of it. Eighteen out of 19 respondents 
answered yes to the question that they believed that they had suffered from harm as a 
result of their treatment and one person said one of her parents had been affected. 
When asked to give more details, 16 of the respondents said that they had been 
directly affected by the harm. This included three respondents who said that their 
child had also been harmed (twp of the children had died and one had been left with 
severe brain damage). With the remaining three respondents, two said their partners 
had been directly affected and another, her parent.
Secondly, respondents were then asked to indicate from a range of categories (set out 
below) what were the main causes of the medical harm affecting them or their family.
Failed or delayed referral
Failed diagnosis/misdiagnosis
Lack of access to treatment or effective monitoring
Failed surgical or technical procedures
Medication errors
Hospital infections
Communication errors
An injury during surgery
Problems during childbirth
Other
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Four individuals identified 1 category each affecting them. These related to problems 
during childbirth; an injury occurring during surgery; failed diagnosis/misdiagnosis; 
and a lack of access to treatment or effective monitoring. The remaining 15 
individuals all ticked a combination of the other categories. This suggests that in some 
cases medical harm may be viewed by families as having multiple causes and ties in 
with the literature in the area identifying multiple systemic errors as typical in the 
nature of medical harm.
In relation to when the harm took place, 9 respondents were affected between 2000 
and 2005, 6 were affected between 1991 and 1998, 3 were affected between 1984 and 
1989 and 1 respondent did not answer this question.
Thirdly, respondents were then asked to summarise the harm that had taken place and 
to describe its impact (physically, emotionally, financially and on personal 
relationships). In order to illustrate the accounts given, I have set out below, four 
personal stories which were written up for the Break Through Newsletter. The 
newsletter is included in the appendix of the PhD and illustrates other stories fi*om the 
participants on the programme and key issues to emerge overall firom the programme. 
In the newsletter, the participants also asked for the quote below to headline the 
heginning of the stories.
We want our stones to be told with all the emotion and injustice' - Break Through 
participant.
Participant Stories 
CS
The medical harm relates to CS's mother who died in hospital. CS believes that her 
mother's drug administration in hospital and general medical care was mismanaged. 
The key concerns relate to the way that internal bleeding by Mrs X was dealt with as a 
result of the administration of strong pain-killers and how this was addressed once it 
was brought to the attention of ward staff by CS's family. Other concerns about Mrs 
X's treatment related to a lack of general basic care. Mrs X had raised concerns about 
how she was being treated before her death and a failure to change her dressings. Mrs 
X's family were also upset that no post-mortem was carried out despite a request for
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one by the family and that eventually a death certificate was issued with the wrong 
cause of death stated on it. CS feels terrible pain because her family 'entrusted our 
most treasured possession' to the Trust, who were then 'highly negligent causing 
suffering and terror to my mother'.
CS also feels guilty that she didn't try to intervene more with the hospital staff to try 
and get something done, but she didn't want to make a fuss as she thought the staff 
knew what they were doing. At one point she felt that she didn't want to live, so was 
urgently referred for counselling by her GP. The family has instructed a solicitor to 
represent their interests at an inquest and have written a letter of complaint to the 
hospital's chief executive and clinical governance team. After the inquest they are 
thinking of making a claim under the Human Rights Act - regarding Right to Life.
SW
SW had a cataract operation on her right eye and the harm took place in the 3-month 
post-operative period. She was given eye-drops to use but because of inadequate 
advice about aftercare and no monitoring, she lost the sight in her right eye. SW is 
now registered blind cannot go anywhere on her own and relies on others to help her. 
She lives on her own and has no family support. Losing her sight meant that she was 
unable to continue working as a machinist. She had her own business. She did attempt 
to sue for compensation, but felt that because she did not receive proper support firom 
her solicitors, the case was dropped, but not before she had spent almost every penny 
that she had. Her lack of income has also affected her relationships with family and 
firiends. Her telephone was cut off because she could not afford it and because she is 
unable to write or read letters, she has become isolated.
SW says 'I have been blinded as a result of the treatment I received. I will never come 
to terms with it and I feel bitter that no one has listened to my side of the story. My 
eyesight has gone for ever, there is no treatment, cure or operation. I used to cry all 
the time, everyday I get depressed and worry how I am going to cope. I struggle with 
everyday life and with the knowledge that my sight will never return'.
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M SA
Mrs F was treated by a private osteopath with his own practice, who was also a 
registered doctor with the General Medical Council. She used private healthcare 
insurance whilst at work to pay for treatment. However, the osteopath gave her 
unnecessary treatment without providing any information or getting consent. He 
incorrectly administered an epidural into her lower back, with no monitoring 
equipment or qualified staff available. No monitoring was provided after the severe 
psychological reaction due to the physiological reaction of the epidural being injected 
inadvertently and incorrectly. As a result of this situation Ms A has been diagnosed 
with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and has continued to suffer with on-going severe 
mental health and physical problems. Her whole quality of life has also been affected, 
she lost her job because she could not cope with what had happened, it also affected 
her relationships with friends and caused difficulties with intimate relations. Ms A 
successfully sued for negligence, which took six years.
JW
fri 1970 JW became a blood donor aged 18, the youngest age you are allowed to give 
blood and continued donating for 25 years until he was 43 years old. In Feh 1991 JW 
was told about a new way to donate blood so he changed to this new method. This 
meant that he could donate more frequently, without becoming anaemic and he could 
increase the benefits to sick patients by donating both blood plasma and platelets in 
one sitting. In 1994, JW became the first person in Birmingham to pioneer another 
blood donation method, by agreeing to give blood in a more concentrated form. This 
method allowed twice as much blood to be taken than previously, to gain more 
platelets than plasma whilst using less donors. This way of donating was particularly 
beneficial for sick patients because it allowing them to receive more blood from one 
donor, thereby reducing the chances of cross-infection. However within six months of 
using this method, JW's health changed dramatically and over a period of years he 
went from someone who as a life-long non-smoker and drinker who had been 
completely healthy, to developing a number of adverse symptoms. These included 
developing tinnitus in 1995, diabetes in 2001, receiving medication for hypertension 
and raised cholesterol in 2002, being diagnosed with prostate enlargement and a 
raised PSA in 2004, Dry Eye Syndrome in 2005 and developing a degenerative spine
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condition. In response to these developments, JW found his own doctors to be 'passive 
and unresponsive'. In 1997 he went to a homeopathic centre who found a number of 
serious problems with his health which then prompted him to consult a solicitor for 
medical negligence. Yet despite being granted legal aid, two unsupportive expert 
witness reports led to the closure of his case in 1999.
In response to his situation, JW says 'I have learned to live with these conditions for 
more than ten years. You leam a lot about coping strategies especially on your own'. 
He has had no recourse to public support, sick pay or social security, but as he runs 
his own business he feels his physical conditions will soon force him to look for 
alternative work. Ultimately JW says 'If I had my life all over again, I would still be a 
blood donor to help benefit others'.
With question four, respondents were asked whether they were currently taking (or 
had in the past) taken any action (e.g. professional advice, making a complaint or 
taken legal action), as a result of the harm they had suffered. Question five followed 
this question up by asking whether there were any particular reasons why the 
respondent chose not to take any action or to take professional advice. The responses 
to question four showed that: 6 individuals had succeeded in taking legal action; 2 
were intending to pursue legal action after an inquest; 1 was currently pursuing legal 
action; 1 was told she had a legal case but had been too ill to pursue it; 2 had taken 
legal advice but had not taken things any further and 7 were unsuccessful in their 
legal actions. These responses showed that all respondents had attempted to take some 
sort of action after the harm they had suffered.
Question six asked respondents whether they had received the type of support they 
would have liked as a result of the medical harm suffered and if yes to provide any 
examples. Fifteen respondents answered no to the question and 4 provided examples 
of support they had received. The responses given related to legal support and from a 
counsellor; support received from a Community Health Council; support from a 
psychiatrist who had good knowledge of the complaint procedures and from fiiends 
and colleagues and support at least initially, from hospital visitors, (see section 'Major 
Themes in the Data', under the heading 'The lack of help and support for 'victims'
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when harmed by the system', for more details on the answers in this area from 
respondents).
Question seven asked respondents, if answering no to question six, what type of 
support they would have liked to have received. Options given to respond to were: a) 
advice and support on action you could take b) professional, emotional/psychological 
support c) informal support networks d) support from people in similar situations and 
e) other. Fourteen respondents ticked option a), 11 ticked option d), and 5 respondents 
cited other suggestions for support. These related to wanting more collective family 
support, more support specifically for those affected by adverse drug treatment and to 
identify individuals who have not had a yellow card report made out on their adverse 
reaction; writing a book to support others in a similar situation and more support from 
doctors' surgeries. (See section 'Major Themes in the Data' under the heading 'The 
lack of help and support for 'victims' when harmed by the system' for more details on 
the answers in this area from respondents).
Question 8 asked respondents whether they had been able to recover and/or move on 
after their experience of medical harm. Ten people answered no to this question and 1 
person yes. Other responses consisted of a mixed answer to the question illustrating 
on the one hand that the effects of the harm continued, but on the other hand showing 
a range of coping strategies being used by respondents to move forward with their 
lives, as illustrated by the quotes below.
FW said - 'It's very hard and I  have to accept that I  will never be able to forget or be 
the same person again'. 'I have to deal with the mental and physical consequences [o f  
the harm] on a daily basis'. But, 'I choose to get my life back together and help others 
too'.
JG said - Getting pregnant with twins and winning a medical negligence case helped 
her to come to terms with what happened to some extent. However, she said, 'I have a 
lifelong physical condition as a result of the negligence. The scarring is a continuous 
reminder of my experience. I  am very wary of the medical profession and would be 
very anxious about any future surgery'.
Question 9 asked respondents why they had chosen to participate in the Break 
Through Programme. This question produced a range of responses, which fell broadly 
into three categories: To enable programme participants to meet others in a similar 
situation and for self-empowerment, to find ways of coping, healing and moving on
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from their experiences of medical harm and to change the system for the better for 
others.
The quotes below illustrate some of these responses:
'Because I  need to meet people who are in a worse state than I  am to see how 
they coped. To get strategies for relaxing when I  feel tense and agitated. To 
feel part o f a group so that I  can converse and not feel isolated and rejected'.
'Losing someone as a result of clinical negligence is a very isolating 
experience. May people, friends, family seem unable to realise how dijficult it 
is to put it all behind you. I  look forward to the opportunity of meeting other 
people who have had similar experiences and being able to share and learn'.
'Its very important for me to heal from the trauma and move forward. It also 
fits in with my desire to empower and help others'.
'To stop the medical profession deliberately, knowingly causing harm to 
patients, (which she felt was compounded by the behaviour of medical 
negligence solicitors) who take clients money, conduct fraud and cause untold 
distress to the patient'.
Finally, respondents were asked whether they would like to see an initiative like the 
Break Through programme developed nationally and fimded hy the NHS. Fifteen 
respondents answered yes to the question, 3 said no and 1 was not sure. A comment 
from an individual that answered no was also strongly supported by those who wanted 
to see a more permanent programme. She had said no:
'because of the danger of a lack of independence if  the programme was funded by the 
NHS, which could then be influenced by both the government and NHS leading to 
bias'. She also stated: 'Not all good things in life are free'.
Programme Evaluation
At the end of the programme participants were also asked to fill in an evaluation form 
and 18 forms were completed. These contained a range of written comments, fri 
relation to the question 'What have you enjoyed most about the programme?' 
Everyone answered this positively with the most common theme expressed as the 
opportunity to meet others in a similar situation.
As reflected in the comments below:
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'The kind & supportive approach of all participants, who I  feel I  have known 
for years, as a result of that’.
'For the first time being able to share my story and listening to others with 
equally horrendous stories'.
Participants were also asked, 'Have you learned anything useful from the sessions?' 
Again most people responded positively raising a range of issues to do with being 
able to relax, to think about strategies for moving forward and recognising that they 
were not alone in being in the situation they were in.
Key comments were:
'yes, I  have learned that by sharing these experiences that most people can 
find something beneficial by talking about the harm they have suffered'.
'Yes. I  need to work on my emotions more, to help myself, my husband + son.
I  feel now that enough is enough - the NHS will not take any more o f my life + 
happiness. Not that of my husband + son. We need to build our togetherness 
again'.
The programme participants were also asked 'Is there anything about the programme 
that could have been better'. This produced a range of comments such as some of the 
sessions being too long, the need for light entertainment, more icebreakers, longer for 
sharing stories, more practical solutions etc.
Some comments were:
'Programme was too crammed into time allowed'.
'Invite say two or three members o f Parliament whereby complaints can be 
taken straight back to government level'.
Major Themes in the Data
The research findings generally highlighted a number of key themes that I have 
explored in more detail in the section below. These themes are based not only on the 
findings from the questionnaires, but from the key issues to emerge throughout the 
programme and 'Agenda for Change' put forward by participants for inclusion in the 
Break Through newsletter to be presented to the AvMA conference. The key themes 
as headlined below are: The wider impact of medical harm; Transparency and 
accountability when things go wrong; Pathologising, blaming and punishing the
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victims; The lack of help and support for Victims' when harmed by the system; The 
desire by 'victims' to tell their stories from their own perspectives; Healing the 
personal pain; Changing the system.
The wider impact of medical harm
Being affected on many levels by the harm caused physically, mentally, financially 
and in their wider relationships.
Two important themes to emerge from the data in the questionnaires but also from the 
narratives emerging on the Break Through Programme, was the way in which medical 
harm not only impacted upon those directly affected by an injury, but the way that a 
much wider circle of individuals were affected as well. The impact of this harm could 
be physical, emotional/psychological, financial etc and could impact upon all areas of 
a victim's life as illustrated by the stories below.
A number of individuals on the programme had lost children through medical harm or 
experienced the death of a close relative, or parent; others had been affected by 
serious injuries. These situations had clearly left them traumatised, but their stories 
show how much wider aspects of their life were affected as well.
Ms B talked about the devastating effects on her own life and her relationships, as a 
result of the death of her baby after the way that his birth was mishandled. She 
described how she now felt 'continually angry at anyone at any time and out of  
context'. She said, 7 trust no-one especially people of "professional" status i.e. 
doctors, nurses, lawyers, police etc'. She pointed out that she had 'not been able to 
work as I  cry, am difficult and difficult to get to know'. She also said that she did 'not 
have much self-confidence/worth' and said I have 'lost my value in the market place'. 
She had also found it difficult to hold down a relationship because she said, 7 cling on 
and become very dependent as I  am afraid that anyone I  love will be taken from me'. 
It is clear from this account that the trauma of her daughter's death had clearly 
affected all aspects of her life.
Ms S spoke about her feelings of anguish after her mother died in hospital, which had 
affected all aspects of her life and driven her to feeling suicidal. She said she felt 'the
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most painful upset I  can imagine because we entrusted our most treasured possession' 
to the care of the hospital, who were then 'highly negligent causing suffering and 
terror to my mother'. She felt guilty that she had not tried to intervene more with the 
hospital staff to try and get something done. At one point she stated she had felt so 
bad that she didn't want to live and was urgently referred for counselling by her GP. 
She also spoke about wanting other members of her family to come onto the Break 
Through Programme as a way of recovering from the trauma of their mother's death, 
but said they had refused. She felt that they had attempted to cope with their mother's 
death by keeping terribly busy, which she felt had had the opposite effect of keeping 
them apart from each other, when they could have benefited from being together.
In very different circumstances Mrs P and Mrs C also talked about the devastating 
effects of medical harm on themselves and their families. Mrs P spoke about the way 
that her daughter had sustained catastrophic brain damage during heart surgery. She 
described the emotional costs as devastating for herself and her family. She said that 
she had suffered from depression, guilt and the pain of never knowing exactly what 
had happened to her daughter and why. She felt that there has been a cover-up and a 
lack of justice and that her family was faced with a lifetime of responsibility for 
caring for their daughter without the much-needed compensation they felt that she 
needed and deserved. In writing to the hospital in an attempt to get them to address 
her grievance about her daughter's care, Mrs P poignantly and graphically sets out her 
concerns, as set out below.
'To whom it may concern. We hereby submit notification of our desire that our 
daughter's notes and care are THOROUGHLY examined as part of the 
enquiry into the above NHS Trust. Rose sustained severe neurological injury 
during or post op. In I.T.U. at Harefield. The cause has never been identified 
and we are left with: GUILT of ignorance of the real possibility of brain 
damage, o f which we were NEVER warned. CONSTANT BEREA VEMENT of  
the child we lost in 92, who 'lives' but is no longer our Rose. SADNESS & 
FRUSTRATION & ANGER towards medics we trusted. ONGOING 
FINANCIAL BURDEN due to no compensation to date. LEA's are on tight 
budgets, so too are SOCIAL SERVICES and the HEALTH SERVICE'
..............................................   'Our family is
now 'disabled' due to what has and hasn't happened at Harefield'.
Mrs C also described her terrible injuries after surgery that went wrong. This had led 
to a number of other knock-on serious effects, emergency surgery, and several further 
operations, which often made the problems worse. She developed peritonitis and other
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infections, developed a DVT, had to have her bladder rebuilt, her hernia repaired and 
her left kidney and gallbladder removed. This situation she said had affected her 
family in many different ways, physically, financially and in terms of her relationship 
with her husband. She says it meant that:
'physically, the first few years were very difficult as I  was very weak, we 
bought a wheelchair so that I  could go out. I  spent years in and out of bed 
with constant urine infections. I  am still limited walking and have to 
catheterise 4 times a day'. Financially she said 'it was hard as I  had been 
working part time and have never been fit enough to work again'.
Other financial problems were caused because they 'had to pay for a lot o f help' and 
Mrs C said because 'I did not slot into any category for prescriptions, these all had to 
be paid for and o f course the many many hospital visits to London. Emotionally Mrs 
C said, the situation she had found herself in had 'been devastating for our 
relationship', with her husband experiencing a nervous breakdown. However after 
they received counselling Mrs C stated, 'we came through it together'.
Transparency and accountability when things go wrong
'The importance of the medical profession and systems for redress being more 
transparent, open and accountable in order to facilitate an individual's 'recovery' 
following an experience of medical harm'.
In addition to the very real consequences of the impact of medical harm on 
individuals lives, many of the respondents spoke of the terrible pain and trauma they 
had experienced, at having to fight to find out why they had been harmed and if 
anyone was responsible or culpable. The majority had faced major hurdles in trying to 
get open and honest explanations about what had happened to them. Also, although 
all of the nineteen respondents indicated that they felt that there had been some 
negligence in causing the harm to them, the majority had been unsuccessful in 
achieving a proper explanation of events and any redress. In telling their stories what 
came across from the respondents was the way that they were faced with the power, 
dominance and control of a medical profession who sought to cover-up their mistakes. 
This situation had then forced respondents into battling for answers from other bodies 
who should have been assisting them, but from the respondents stories also came to 
be part of the problem.
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In the earlier stories mentioned of Mrs B, Ms S and Mrs P, the harm they suffered all 
occurred in different ways. In all of these cases however, a consistency of experience 
came through, in the way that all of them spoke of the further way they were harmed 
in trying to get answers to what had happened to them or members of their family. 
Mrs B said she would not describe herself as having moved on, as she said, 'my life 
can never be the same'. She believed however, she had learned to live with the 
situation in some way only since her court settlement, which had taken almost five 
years. Yet it was clear that her grief continued to be compounded by being unable to 
get any statement of regret from the hospital. Ms B pointed out, 'Despite being 
promised, I  am still waiting for my letter of apology from the hospital despite them 
having admitted liability 2 years ago '.
Ms S also set out how she found herself having to challenge the hospital's version of 
events almost as soon as her mother died. In a letter of complaint she asked the 
hospital to 'investigate our concerns with regard to the breach o f human rights which 
we believe has occurred. That Mrs X  has been denied her right to life by the NHS'. 
Ms S set out her concerns in a letter to the hospital, in which she complained that no 
post-mortem had been carried out despite a request for one by the family and that a 
false death certificate had been issued relating to the cause of death. The family had 
been forced to instruct a solicitor to represent their interests at an inquest and after the 
inquest they were thinking of making a claim under the Human Rights Act regarding 
the Right to Life Article. Clearly though Ms C found the whole situation daunting in 
trying to get answers and to understand what had happened with her mother's care and 
to have to negotiate investigative systems that she and her family, did not really 
understand. As stated by Ms S, 7 would like some support prior to the coroners 
hearing from people who have been through it, to really understand the process and 
not to have false expectations about what it will achieve'.
With Mrs P, issues concerning trying to find out what had happened to her daughter 
formed a central part of her story and continuing pain. She maintained that her family 
had never been warned about the risk of brain damage with the operation and had 
never received an acceptable explanation about what had happened. They were unable 
to sustain legal action because their legal aid certificate was withdrawn because they 
were told the failure of a similar case meant that they were unlikely to win their case.
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Missing medical records also meant that it was always going to be almost impossible 
to prove liability. Mrs P indicated that her suffering had been compounded by the lies 
and cover-up that she felt had taken place regarding what had happened to her 
daughter, which was something she had to live with as well as to provide a lifetime of 
care without much needed financial assistance. She states in her grievance letter to the 
Trust about being accountable:
'If any of us as car drivers are involved in an incident, there follows an 
investigation and insurance is involved. I f  any of us do something wrong in 
life, we are not allowed to choose our own judge. Although that's probably 
different for Freemasons'. ................................................................................
'It is morally wrong and we believe a corrupt scandal, for any organisation to 
hide facts under a carpe. And casually leave rose guinea pig families to pick 
up the distressing pieces'....................................................................................
'The Trust MUST look at their practises and attitudes so that they realise the 
lives entrusted to their skills are innocent, individual, loved children. Not lab 
rats'.
Several other cases illustrated the difficulties individuals faced in finding out what 
had happened to them. In all of these cases what is evident is the way that this further 
exacerbated the person’s grief and suffering. Mrs J 's case illustrated this very 
strongly. Mrs J believed that she was wrongly prescribed HRT with Thyroxin for 
many years, which caused her terrible adverse problems with her health. She 
described how she warned doctors repeatedly of adverse effects, but no action was 
taken until it was too late. It was only once she produced evidence from a private 
consultation that she was informed that she had grounds for complaint. However, 
despite taking her complaint through the complaints system, taking legal action, going 
to the GMC and the Ombudsman’s office, Mrs J was unable to get any redress. She 
states 'my health and life has been permanently changed for ever'. She believed that 
the system did not work in the interests of patients who have been harmed and that 
there was no proper regulation of the medical profession. She also felt that the GMC 
were well aware of malpractice among doctors and that the medical profession were 
not accountable for their failures. Ms J felt ultimately that not only was it extremely 
difficult to get accountability, but that if one tried, this could result in further 
sanctions to punish the injured patient as illustrated below:
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'Too many NHS patients trust the medical profession (and lawyers) until 
something goes wrong and they are harmed'. Then she said, 'the damaged 
patient will find a closed shop and a 'gagging order' and no support - only 
untruths. No one will support a damaged patient i.e. CHC, Health Authority, 
GMC, Health Ombudsman, PALS, PCT. Malpractice is upheld. Further 
threats to seriously damage the patient is given. Confirmation that medication 
will be withheld (should the patient become ill again) '.
Mrs G's case also graphically illustrated the way that the medical profession and 
systems responsible for regulating it, often let down the very people they are supposed 
to be protecting. Mrs G initially consulted her GP about a facial rash. The rash and 
other allergic and bowel symptoms including bleeding, were subsequently mistreated, 
misdiagnosed, missed, not represented in referral letters or were misrepresented in 
records. Mrs G thought that she might have a mercury allergy after linking the onset 
of the rash to an amalgam filling, as well as a malabsorption problem, but this was 
discounted by her GP. Her observations were later proved correct by private tests and 
blood tests carried out at the London Homeopathic Hospital.
However because she was not diagnosed, her condition deteriorated to the point 
where she was forced to give up work. The stress and misery of her situation caused 
her to start thinking about her abusive childhood and she was referred to a clinical 
psychologist for ‘therapy’ under an NHS Trust. The psychologist, without consent, 
then applied hypnosis via a controversial induction, which eventually led to Mrs G 
developing post traumatic stress disorder. Eventually Mrs G's husband made a 
complaint on her behalf. This was denied by the psychologist, whom the family 
maintains, then falsified her records to cover-up, the fact that she had used hypnosis.
The complaint was then referred to the Health Service Ombudsman (HSO), whose 
office refused to investigate until the family threatened them with legal action. This 
situation prompted the Ombudsman's office to investigate and they found that the 
family's complaint to the Trust had been mishandled, although they still failed to 
investigate the substance of the complaint. The HSO also refiised to reimburse the 
family for the £7,000 in legal costs they were forced to incur. As a result of her 
experiences Mrs G said I have been left with the feeling that 'there is bias, dishonesty, 
complacency, secrecy and vindictiveness surrounding medical harm'.
This she says.
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'disgusts my sense of morality and fair play. The strain ofpursuing the truth, 
of injustice, o f character assassination without a right of reply, of callousness 
in the face o f the trauma caused, has damaged our lives and it hurts and is 
impossible to forget. I  think it will always hurt and will never be forgotten. 
We do not consult UK doctors now. We consult complementary practitioners, 
who frankly have done a fantastic job in cleaning up the mess made of me by 
the medical profession'.
All of the stories above show how a lack of openness on the part of the medical 
profession when something goes wrong with an individual's care can greatly 
exacerbate the harm and pain caused to those individuals. The stories also show how 
'victims' do not just have to battle with the medical profession, but also with other 
aspects of the system (such as complaints, the Ombudsman's office, the GMC, the 
Legal Services Commission) that they expected to be there to assist them with 
challenging any failures in their care. It was clear from the stories however, that an 
important part of coming to terms with what had happened was to be able to get 
proper explanations, redress and reassurance that the incident would not happen 
again. This process seemed collectively to offer some sense of justice and consolation 
to victims, however only a small number of people indicated that they had been 
successful in achieving these goals.
Pathologising, blaming and punishing the victims
'Being labelled 'neurotic' and not believed when questioning or challenging the doctor 
about the treatment they have received which has ajfected future access to 
appropriate healthcare'.
The pain o f being labelled and not listened to; 'They don Y listen, don’t want to listen'.
There is little doubt about the considerable suffering that victims incur when they are 
harmed as illustrated above. However, this then appears to be compounded by victims 
having to struggle against all sorts of barriers to get answers and the harm 
acknowledged and recognised as well as fighting for some sort of justice and 
accountability, fri this context the respondent's stories showed that there was a real 
danger that the 'victims' of harm could become pathologised as being the problem, 
rather than the system being at fault. This could then lead to individuals being further 
victimised, punished and blamed or denied treatment for complaining or challenging 
their treatment, diagnosis or care. Criticism without the patient being able to prove
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that something had gone wrong, could be perceived by the medical profession as 
being unjustly critical or attacking the profession without evidence, good reason or 
justification, which could then leave the patient at risk of being barred firom treatment.
This situation is illustrated by the following stories.
Above I set out the case of Mrs J and her long battle through many different systems 
to get redress. Mrs J talked about how she was dismissed with no one prepared to 
properly listen to her or to take her case seriously. This she said had led to her being 
treated as if she was the problem both by her GP and other bodies with an 
investigative remit. In describing her efforts to get her GP to listen to her about the 
side effects she was experiencing from her medication, she states:
7 visited GPs once again fatigue was extreme. I  was bald and trembling 
uncontrollably, eyesight was badly affected, as I  tried to explain my symptoms 
the GP got up and showed me the door, I  left in despair. I  then tried the 
telephone route only to be told to drink milk and water and rehydrate myself.
Mrs J described how she felt that she was in effect 'used as a guinea pig' for the drugs 
she was given, but only she said 'after a long fight the grossly abnormal TFT's were 
found in my medical records, I  was informed I  had a complaint'. She felt deeply let 
down she said because 'No one in the medical profession are accountable for their 
actions or failures'. She stated, 7 warned doctors repeatedly of adverse events, no 
action was taken' and she said despite taking her complaints to numerous 
investigatory bodies, they would not help her and one PCT she said, 'even threatened 
to sue me'.
Mr R said he was initially misdiagnosed with TB, which was then replaced with a 
diagnosis of Hodgkin's Lymphoma. He believed that TB was not ruled out 'because of  
my origin' he said, as someone of Bangladeshi ethnic origin. Because of the TB 
diagnosis he said he had had an arduous open lung biopsy measuring 20cm. This 
resulted in his chemotherapy having to be stopped, because the lung biopsy split open, 
which then led to his lymphoma not responding anymore. Mr R, as stated below, 
believed that due to the mismanagement of his care, his chemotherapy had not gone 
into remission and because he challenged this situation, it had led to a breakdown in 
communication with the doctors, who then continued to deny him the treatment he 
needed.
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7 did not get into remission because lack o f proper management of  
chemotherapy. I  spoke out and it led to breakdown in communication. Then 
they completely denied I  have lymphoma. Since then I  have been deteriorating 
and no doctor would diagnose'.
This situation was clearly causing Mr R great distress as he stated, 'know I  am in a 
vicious circle, I  wake up in the morning and its there, will they or wont they treat me, 
what if  I  wake up one day and its too late'. In addition to being denied the proper 
treatment, Mr R also felt that because he had 'openly talked about my fear', the 
situation he was in had been 'made into a psychological problem ', in which he was the 
issue.
Mrs G wrote that she 'was given HRT in the form of implants for ten years, 
unmonitored' that had led to a number of serious physical side effects. She said,
'My jaw  is now 1 1/2 inches bigger than it was 15 years ago. I  am always ill. I  
now have an under active thyroid. I  feel tired most of the time. Also under 
constant stress. As all steroid overdoses effect your adrenls, doctors fail to 
give you a metyrapone test. It has cost me at least £25,000 chasing a claim 
long-term. Relationships are a no go as I  can be ok one day and ill the next'.
She continued to suffer she said, because she felt that her doctor was covering up the 
side-effects of the drugs she was given and therefore would not acknowledge the 
medical problems that she continued to suffer from. She also could not prove her case 
she said because the medical reports she commissioned didn't actually say her doctor 
was negligent. This meant that she couldn't then get legal aid to further pursue her 
claim. As she put it,
7 am still suffering 24hrs a day from hormone loss which could be rectified by 
a simple prescription for cortisol and then thyroine and a doctor who I  have 
known all my life said 1 don’t have a problem - Thyroid UK say I  have - 
Private Jabs say I  have. Only source would be to go private which I  am not 
prepared to do'.
Mrs G had therefore found herself in a position where she believed she had suffered 
serious side-effects from drugs given to her, but was then being punished further 
because she could not get any acknowledgement of the problem or the treatment she 
needed. She basically saw this situation as an attempt by the medical profession to 
cover up its mistakes, which she saw as corrupt. As she put it, 'Unless you have been
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at the other end of corruption in the medical profession, you do not realise it's 
actually the NHS that is the corrupt one'.
Overall these stories illustrate that many of the respondents were treated after their 
harm took place, in such a way as to exacerbate the emotional distress they were 
already in. After the harm occurred, they spoke about finding themselves in a 
situation where they were forced to fight to get an open explanation of the 
circumstances surrounding the harm that affected them. The majority of respondents 
found that the truth was only admitted when the hospitals or GP's concerned were 
forced to concede, often through legal action being initiated. However this situation 
ended up creating an adversarial stand off between the parties in which the more 
powerful medical profession were either explicitly or implicitly able to suggest that 
the issues being raised were spurious and without merit. This culminated in the 
victims being treated as if they were malicious and blaming doctors. This situation 
had also then led to a number of respondents not receiving the treatment they still 
required, not least because of their injuries, or continuing to receive the wrong 
treatment.
The lack of help and support for Victims’ when harmed by the system
'The abuse of trust that can make you no longer want to use the health service'
What was very obvious ftrom all of the respondents stories was the devastating effects 
of medical harm on their lives. This was compounded for many individuals by having 
to fight for justice. However even though it appeared that getting some form of justice 
and redress allowed some form of closure to take place, many of the respondents still 
seemed to struggle to put their experiences behind them and to move on with their 
lives. As illustrated by the comments below, these individuals had been able to move 
on with their lives on some levels, but they were still clearly struggling with the after­
effects of the traumas they had experienced.
Ms W said:
'It's very hard and I  have to accept that I  will never be able to forget or be the 
same person again'. 7 have to deal with the mental and physical consequences 
[o f the harm] on a daily basis'. But, 7 choose to get my life back together and 
help others too'.
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Mrs JG said that getting pregnant with twins and winning her medical negligence case 
had helped her to come to terms with what had happened to a certain extent.
However, she said:
7 have a lifelong physical condition as a result of the negligence. The 
scarring is a continuous reminder of my experience. I  am very wary o f the 
medical profession and would be very anxious about any future surgery’.
Mrs B said, 7 would not use the term move on, more put a full stop in place and learn 
to live with it'. She said that she had only been able to start to do this since gaining an 
out of court settlement on her legal claim. She stated:
'My only living child has been taken from me as the result o f the many 
incompetencies the hospital did. This you do not move on from you learn to
live with it. My life can certainly never be the same'.  'Despite being
promised I  am still waiting for my letter of apology from the hospital, despite 
them having admitted liability two years ago'.
Overall when respondents were asked whether they had received enough support 
when affected by medical harm, most people (15 out of 19) said no. The stories below 
of Mrs W and Mrs M particularly illustrate the lack of support that individuals faced 
after they were harmed and the pain and the isolation that went with those situations.
Mrs W was referred to earlier, as part of the four case summaries stories. She 
described graphically how isolated she had become and the lack of support she faced 
on a daily basis. As stated:
7 live on my own and have no familial support. Losing my sight meant that I  
was unable to continue working as a machinist. I  had my own business and 
could no longer continue. I  also made an attempt to sue for compensation, but 
received no support from my solicitors and the case was dropped, but not 
before I  had spent almost every penny that I  had. With the lack of income, this 
has had an effect on me emotionally, financially and indeed affected my 
relationships with family and friends as I  had to have my telephone cut off 
because I  couldn't afford it and Tm unable to write or read letters and as a 
result have become isolated'.
Mrs M was given an overdose of radiotherapy after ovarian cancer, which burnt her 
intestines leaving her with permanent and prolonged diarrhoea attacks. She said.
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7 am afraid to go out for fear of an attack and the embarrassment if  caught 
out on someone else's property especially if there is not a public toilet and one 
has to ask to use the staff toilet'.
She pointed to the major problem of finding a toilet in a strange place and the time it 
took to clean up in someone else's place. She said she suffered from depression and 
intense pain at times. She also faced 'horrendous amounts o f washing' and pointed to 
the 'difficulties of making friends or having relations to stay or taking holidays alone'. 
She also had to read all the ingredients on food packages, so shopping takes a long 
time, has to wear incontinent pads all the time and said I 'cant discuss the matter with 
anyone as they don Y want to know'.
fri terms of the type of support respondents wanted to see, what seemed particularly 
important from comments made on the programme, was how individuals could get 
information and support from an independent body that would enable them to deal 
with their various concerns and to negotiate systems such as the Coroners Court, NHS 
complaints procedures, regulatory bodies and the legal system. Individual comments 
made in the questionnaires, in relation to this area stated the need for:
'support prior to a coroners hearing from people who had gone through it, so can 
understand the process, aim of the hearing and not to have false expectations about 
what it would achieve'.
'An independent body not linked to the NHS to provide support'.
'Independent doctors to assess claims of harm without bias and to give remedial 
treatment as necessary'.
7 want to know what compensation lam  entitled to as a result o f the negligence 
suffered'.
Other kinds of support that people wanted to see more of was 
emotional/psychological support. Two particular comments stood out here. Firstly, the 
view that appropriate professional support had not been available after the harm took 
place. This issue was reflected in comments such as: 7 did not receive any 
professional support after I  was injured, until my husband had a breakdown'. Another 
said that she had 'expected the health authority to provide support, not prescriptions'. 
Another respondent pointed to the way that she was ignored by her doctor's surgery 
after her partner died through negligence. She then felt that she 'had no-one to turn to
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for support and advice and about her feelings of loss and how her partner might have 
suffered’. Another comment graphically illustrated the respondent's isolation when she 
stated I 'got no support from the hospital’ and she thought that 'they hoped her 
daughter would die so that they could bury their mistakes'. This lack of support was 
compounded by her GP who told her that her daughter's care 'was costing him a lot of 
money'. This led her to change to a new GP practice, which she said had been much 
more supportive.
Secondly however, many respondents expressed issues of mistrust of the medical 
profession since being harmed. This led them to stress the need for independent 
support. In this respect, respondents on the programme said that whilst they would 
like to see the Break Through programme properly developed and funded, they all 
agreed that it was crucial that the programme operated independently from the NHS.
Overall it was clear from respondents stories that their experiences had led the 
majority of them to become very isolated and cut off from family and friends. They 
talked about people not understanding the situation they were in, or wanting them to 
move on from the trauma, which they felt was difficult to do. Those who seemed to 
cope best, were the ones who had been able to get appropriate professional advice and 
support and to have support from a network of families and friends. The majority of 
respondents had not been able to benefit from this situation.
The desire by ’victims' to tell their stories from their own perspectives
'We want our stories to be told with all the emotion and injustice as well'.
A clear and consistent theme from all of the programme participants was the view that 
they had not been listened to properly about their stories and had not had a chance to 
tell things from their own perspective. In the open group sessions on the programme, 
this sense of not being heard and misrepresented was reflected through comments 
such as:
'They don’t listen don’t want to listen', being 'Labelled as mad and neurotic 
for speaking out about abuse', and 'Nobody said sorry and if  the truth had 
been told, I  would not have sued'.
285
In many respects the Break Through Programme was constructed as an opportunity 
for people in similar situations to come together and to tell their stories, but in order to 
really empower individuals, I agreed to write up some of the stories and to publish 
them in a newsletter. I agreed that I would then circulate this newsletter to a range of 
health professionals in the patient safety field as well as to distribute it at a conference 
being organised by AvMA on Patient Safety and Justice on May 9th 2006 in London. 
The conference aimed to provide an opportunity for those affected by medical harm, 
patients and patients' organisations to set the agenda through delivering presentations 
on key patient safety issues. Representatives of the key statutory agencies in the 
patient safety field were also invited to be in the audience to listen and to provide 
feedback to their organisations.
The Break Through Programme newsletter consisted of twelve stories from 
participants on the programme. Four of these stories are reproduced in full in this 
chapter as cited earlier. The newsletter and stories were written up by me to allow the 
individuals to tell their stories in their own way. I also included a series of key points 
made by the participants generally on the programme about what they felt constituted 
a new agenda for change in tackling medical harm and its impact on those affected by 
it.
These points emerged over the three days of the programme in which participants 
were invited in a number of different ways to explore issues related to the harm that 
they had faced and how they could move forward with their lives. These sessions 
involved key individuals (including myself), speaking to the group about their 
experience and what strategies they had deployed to deal with their situation. Other 
sessions involved participants working in small groups sharing about their stories and 
supporting each other in thinking about tackling any issues they still faced. Lastly the 
participants spent some time in bigger group sessions talking about an agenda for 
change which not only involved changes to the system but also to themselves.
The key aspects of the agenda for change that emerged focused on wider issues such 
as the need for more openness, transparency and accountability from the system when 
individuals are affected by medical harm and for the victims to be treated with 
compassion and respect. The need for recognition of the emotional and psychological
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trauma of medical harm on its victims and for proper support. The need for health 
care providers to look at the way they are treating patients on a number of levels in 
order to learn new lessons to avoid medical harm and strategies for self­
empowerment, enabling victims to make some progress in moving forward in their 
lives.
The strategies for empowerment reflected in the respondents' stories more generally 
fell into two areas, which I have called 'strategies for healing the personal pain' and 
'strategies for changing the system'. These are illustrated below.
Healing the personal pain
'The enormous anger at struggling to find the truth'.
What is striking when one reads the individual respondents’ stories is the level of pain 
and anguish that individuals have and were clearly still experiencing. This trauma is 
reflected in different ways and seen physically, mentally, financially and in 
individuals’ wider relationships and reflected in comments such as:
'The whole family become 'victims' not only the person who has suffered 
medical harm'.
Although the individual stories illustrated that everyone had a different aspect to their 
trauma and were coping with a different set of issues, recurring themes related to not 
being listened to, coping with the guilt if harm had affected a close relative, the 
enormous struggle to get at the truth, the pain of feeling that their trust had been 
abused and the lack of proper support for 'victims'.
However in response to this situation and given a chance to reflect together on their 
situation and with help firom the facilitators, individuals were able to identify their 
own strategies for self-healing and moving forward. This was reflected in the key 
points below, which emerged firom various group work sessions over the course of the 
programme. There was clearly recognition by many that there was a need to deal with 
the emotional fallout fi*om experiencing medical harm and for many, having to fight 
for justice and accountability. In particular many participants accepted that there was
287
a need to deal with the strong negative emotions impacting not only upon their own 
lives, but those closest to them. This recognition was expressed in comments such as:
'Facing your emotions and being able to bring things out in the open in order 
to deal with what has happened'; The need to deal with the anger in order to 
move forward'; 'Realising the impact of the harm upon personal 
relationships'; 'The need to stop trying to run away from what has happened 
and to take ownership or accept what has taken place'; 'Recognising when 
you need help'.
Participants also discussed ways of personally empowering themselves to move on 
and to move forward in the absence of external support available to them. They talked 
about the need for:
'Courage, becoming stronger and affirming that you have 'come through it' '; 
‘Having the choice about ‘indulging’ in negative thinking'; 'Stopping the self 
blame -  making the decision not to go down or continue along the negative 
path -  giving yourself permission'; 'Forgiveness, acceptance and letting go'; 
'Having self-belief and refusing to be labelled'; 'How perceiving things 
positively and not allowing yourself to be a victim, this can enable you to 
move forward'; 'Not giving up - using personal resources to find what you 
need'; 'Self-empowerment and taking back control'; 'Allowing one-self to be 
happy again and keeping hope alive'; 'Makingpositive changes to the system, 
by moving through the negative experiences; to becoming a 'survivor' o f the 
harm'.
All of these comments show that participants had begun to recognise on the 
programme that although they felt angry about the systems and individuals that had 
hurt and harmed their lives, that there were also things that they could do to take some 
control in moving things forward. Participants on the programme felt that they could 
empower themselves by making changes in themselves which would not only enable 
them to challenge the system better and failings in their healthcare, but in this way to 
have the effect in the friture of protecting themselves against more adverse care. This 
showed a recognition that empowerment was not just about external changes made to 
the system to make it safer and more accountable, but also about changes to the way 
that individuals operate themselves in terms of their own healthcare. In this respect, 
individuals were able to get a sense of their own resilience and to look at some of the 
problems of taking a passive role as a patient and therefore the need to be more 
assertive in trying to protect and take care of themselves.
In talking about the role of the passive patient, one participant stated:
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'Because medical professionals are qualified, this means therefore that 
patients are in awe of them and trust them'.
However, the comments below illustrate the range of ways that participants thought 
they could be more assertive and the importance of using key skills, knowledge and 
information. For example the need to:
'Challenge inappropriate care and questioning things more as a recipient of 
healthcare'; 'Drawing on previous professional skills'; 'Being well prepared'; 
'Developing knowledge in order to feel confident about questioning'; 'Become 
more informed'; 'Being more challenging'.
It was also recognised however that these things could be difficult to do solely on 
ones own and that there was therefore a need to 'Draw on professional support from 
family and friends and those who understand'.
Changing the system
'A need to change systems and the culture of the medical profession so that people 
can move on'.
In terms of empowerment the majority of respondents however, placed a strong 
emphasis on what they felt were political and policy changes that needed to be made 
to the wider system, which they felt was important in enabling them to come to terms 
with what had happened to them. In this respect participants wanted to see changes, 
because they felt that what the system was doing was wrong and also in order to 
protect others from the sort of experiences they had had in the future.
The examples of system changes individuals wanted to see fell into four main 
categories relating to: a doctor’s individual practice, developing an open and 
transparent culture in healthcare, managing treatment and discrimination in 
healthcare.
Individual medical practice
The first theme relating to doctors individual practice and comments about change, 
related to issues to do with the structure of practice such as 'The need for more time to 
be given to the patient', or to do with training, such as:
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'The need for medical students to have a longer period being super numery in 
order that that they have more time observing the practice o f more 
experienced medics before being thrown in the deep end and learning on the 
job'.
Other comments focused on a doctor's behaviour and attitude to patients and the need 
to keep patients properly informed. For example the need to address 'The problem of 
the arrogance of doctors' or the dangers of medical practitioners being closed and 
unable to think flexibly about issues, as illustrated by the comment:
'The medical profession appear to have a set of rules which they must carry 
out to the letter regardless. They do not take any notice of patients if  they do 
not fit the rule book'.
Programme participants also stressed that there was a need for key information to be 
given such as 'proper warnings about risks'. Participants on the Break Through 
programme also thought it was important for medical professionals not to collude 
with bad practice on the part of their colleagues and therefore to 'be more questioning 
of colleagues practice'.
Developing an open and transparent cnltnre
The second area related to the need for openness on the part of health professionals 
when something went wrong with healthcare. This was reflected in comments such as 
'The importance of telling the truth and apologising if harm occurs'. Some 
participants did acknowledge that some change had occurred in this area, reflected in 
the comment that it is 'Important to recognise that some change is happening e.g. 
medical students are now being ‘taught’ to apologise when things go wrong'. 
Participants overwhelmingly agreed however about the presence of a cover-up culture 
in the NHS reflected in comments such as:
'The importance of the Medical Profession admitting that they do not always 
get it right rather than covering up when errors, harm occurs'.
Some participants also wanted to make it clear that it wasn't just the NHS that was 
causing medical harm and failing to learn from adverse incidents, but that the private 
sector could be equally as problematic. These participants agreed that there was a:
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'need for patient safety incidents to be properly documented in the private 
health sector so that lessons can be learned and further incidents prevented'.
Issues related to treatment
In relation to treatment, participants were not only worried about how a doctor's 
practice might compromise treatment as suggested in the comment below.
'Medical professionals need to ask patients more questions in order to obtain 
an accurate and detailed picture o f their condition/situation in order that they 
receive appropriate and adequate treatment'.
But more worryingly also felt that treatment could be withheld as a sanction against 
those affected by harm as illustrated below:
'Treatment should not be withheld when further corrective treatment is needed 
following medical harm '.
"The danger of labelling patients negatively or withdrawing treatment if they 
challenge a doctor about their treatment'.
Inequality and discrimination in healthcare
The programme was only attended by one person from a Black and minority ethnic 
(BME) background. However he clearly felt that issues of race discrimination had 
been present in some way and had affected his treatment. He mentioned this feeling in 
the small group he was in on the programme and to other participants and also 
referred to this in his questionnaire. He also talked to me on a one-to-one basis about 
this issue and may well have been more open with me because I am also from a BME 
background. He basically thought that racism had affected his care and that 'black 
people can be treated differently to white people'.
Conclusion
In conclusion this chapter has highlighted a number of themes and issues arising from 
looking at the experiences of a range of individuals directly affected by medical harm. 
In setting out some of the personal stories from these individuals and highlighting key 
themes, this chapter has shown how wide-ranging and devastating the impact of 
medical harm is, both on those directly affected, but also on their families and wider
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relationships. The effects of this harm also clearly impact upon individuals 
emotionally, psychologically and financially. In exploring the multiple effects of 
medical harm, this chapter has sought to illustrate that victims of harm are not only 
affected by the original injury, but in addition, harmed many times over by having to 
battle to find out exactly what happened. This battle to get what the victims of harm 
frequently refer to as justice and accountability is seem to compound the original 
effects of medical harm many times over.
fri highlighting the themes from the research with these individuals, what is evident is 
that similar themes arise that have been identified previously in the thesis. These 
relate to the failure of systems to provide victims of medical harm with accountability 
and redress, the perception that these systems work in favour of protecting and 
defending the medical profession, the pathologising and blaming of victims and the 
lack of support available when people experience medical harm. These themes 
continue to reinforce a picture of an imbalance of power between health professionals, 
and wider systems meant to protect victims and patients using healthcare. This 
situation ties in with evidence highlighted in chapters one and two about the 
difficulties of victims of harm overcoming legal tests such as 'Bolam' which allow the 
medical profession to set the clinical standards about what constitutes harm. This 
position is seen to be reinforced by the way that regulatory systems have worked in 
the interests of the medical profession.
It is therefore argued that in this context the medical profession have been able to 
narrowly set the boundaries on what constitutes medical harm, that focuses 
disproportionately on looking at the issues through the lens or prism of a medical 
model. This model is seen to frequently ignore wider issues of harm to do with 
professional or institutional wrongdoing and then to pathologise victims of harm who 
attempt to challenge the medical version of the harm they have experienced.
Given this situation it is argued that the imbalance of power between medical 
professionals, wider regulatory bodies, patients and the public has to be addressed. To 
achieve this situation it is argued that a broader conceptual framework is needed for 
looking at medical harm. What is seen as crucial to this framework is the need to 
incorporate both the medical and social processes associated with medical harm and a
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framework for addressing wider issues of patient and public involvement in their own 
care hased upon a model of patient empowerment.
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Chapter Eight
Medical Harm and Reflections upon a Participatory Action 
Research Journey
This chapter reflects upon the challenges of undertaking participatory action research 
in the thesis. This is done by looking at the processes concerned with gathering the 
empirical evidence from a diverse range of sources and then looking at some key 
themes that arose in the research process. These themes relate to the difficulties of 
managing the different strands of the field research and the challenges that arose in 
the different areas and in meeting the requirements of the PhD and the needs of the 
research participants. The chapter also looks at the nature of empowerment as 
practised in the thesis and gives some account of the relationship between knowledge 
and power. An important issue explored at the outset, is the nature of my own 
transition from 'victim' to action researcher and what this meant in terms of 
developing the qualities of self-reflection needed for this role as an action researcher 
in the field. Related to this the chapter looks at some of the challenges arising from 
my heing both insider and outsider in the research and how these tensions were 
managed. In looking at this issue at the Brompton, the chapter then looks in more 
detail at the challenges involved in building the Medical Harm Self-Help Network and 
developing a dialogue incorporating different perspectives. Then reflects upon the 
learning processes involved in the Break Through Programme and how this was 
facilitated.
As discussed earlier the empirical evidence in the thesis is derived from three sources. 
This starts with the evidence presented in chapter four on The Royal Brompton Case- 
Study which charts my own personal journey of medical harm from 'victim' to 
'survivor' and through subsequent stages of transformation into health campaigner, 
advocate and action researcher. Further evidence is presented in chapter six that sets 
out the data generated in setting up and working with the Medical Harm Self-Help 
Network over a period of two and a half years. Chapter seven also sets out the 
evidence from questionnaires and personal accounts collated by me and supplied by 
participants who attended a weekend residential programme. The Break Through 
Programme, organised by Action against Medical Accidents (AvMA). The variety of
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activities covered in the thesis have been my attempt, in some way, to create a prism 
of light, reflecting a wider spectrum and rainbow of experiences, about the nature of 
medical harm and its construction from the perspectives of those directly affected by 
the issues. Seeking inquiry in a participative sense has therefore been a deliberate 
process. The intention to try and generate knowledge and data within action based 
structures that could somehow act as a refractor in allowing individuals to think, 
speak, understand, create, shape, change and transform things from their own 
perspectives, into living evolving processes, rooted in their own experiences of 
medical harm.
I chose to adopt a PAR methodology or 'orientation to inquiry' (Reason and Bradbury 
2008: 1) in my PhD, because of its liberatory and emancipatory focus and as a way of 
bringing to the 'table' voices and experiences usually ignored and silenced by the 
wider medical and health community. However, it is only in hindsight and on 
reflecting upon my own personal journey into action research that I understand that 
this orientation to inquiry also chose me. It was the medium in which I tried to make 
sense of things and the way in which I struggled to understand what had happened to 
my daughter. It was also my way out of anger, bitterness and despair and my 
possibility to try and change things for other users of healthcare, for the better, so that 
what happened to Krista could not happen again. Therefore in identifying what 
motivated me on my journey into action research, a chord is struck with particular 
writers on this subject. That is, with those who argue in essence, that the primary 
purpose of action research is not to produce academic theories and knowledge but 'to 
liberate the human body, mind and spirit in the search for a better, freer world' 
(Reason and Bradbury 2008: 5).
From ’Victim’ of Harm to Action Researcher
In chapter four of the thesis on the Brompton case study, I talked about my journey 
from victim of medical harm to survivor, health activist and action researcher and set 
out how this journey manifested itself in four main stages. Stage one related to the 
initial events surrounding the death of my daughter. Stage two related to my personal 
campaign to find out what had happened to my daughter. Stage three connected to my 
experiences as a member of the Parents Liaison Committee at the Brompton and stage
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four was to do with my experiences as a member and chair of the Royal Brompton 
and Harefield NHS Trust Patients Forum.
In setting out this journey, I illustrated how broadly in the first two stages I was 
coping with the death of my daughter and then the consequences of what it meant to 
be a victim of medical harm in terms of fighting for answers and for justice. In stage 
three, I illustrated how I came to be involved in the Parents Liaison Group (PLG) at 
the Brompton and how this marked the early stages of my beginning to think about 
issues of medical harm on a broader policy level. However, it was only really at the 
point where I became chair of the Patients Forum, marking the start of what I refer to 
as stage four and starting my PhD that I began to think more formally about 
conducting research in the area of medical harm.
This meant having to reflect upon my own personal journey, changing roles and 
experiences and what this would mean in a research process in striking a balance 
between subjective involvement and detachment. Looking back on that journey now, I 
can see that the glue between the processes of involvement and detachment was the 
ability to operate in a critically reflective manner. This I can see was important in 
order to be able to understand and separate out how my own privately held thoughts, 
assumptions and feelings were impacting upon and influencing a particular situation 
and any action taken.
In hindsight, it has become clear that the ability to operate in this critically reflective 
manner, was becoming more and more a requirement as I evolved into and began to 
play out different roles in my journey from Victim' of medical harm to a health 
campaigner. It was only when I embarked on my PhD, that I began to think more 
consciously about what it meant to become a participatory action researcher in the 
field of medical harm and what qualities of self-reflection were required to undertake 
this particular role, fri this process of analysis perhaps the most important and 
surprising realisation, was the understanding that it was actually my own personal 
journey from Victim' to survivor of medical harm, that provided the basic training 
ground for becoming a PAR researcher. These experiences were then developed and 
fine-tuned over time by carrying out research for a PhD.
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Given this realisation, the section below looks at my early journey into participatory 
action research in more detail and how this acted as a catalyst for undertaking PhD 
research on medical harm using PAR as an orientation or methodology for inquiry.
The Personal Journey to a Critical Consciousness
In the first instance, on my own journey towards a more critical reflection about 
medical harm, I had to move quickly from a state of extreme grief after my daughter's 
death, to a more controlled emotional state, in order to be able to ask critical questions 
about what had happened. I quickly realised that I was not going to be able to gather 
the information that I needed and to get people to listen to me about my concerns if I 
wasn't able to function in a particular manner. This meant that as my campaign 
developed, I had to be able to gather information, process, reflect and make balanced 
decisions about what was taking place. I also needed to be able to speak to a range of 
people and convey information in a clear calm manner without being perceived as 
angry, vindictive, unbalanced or disproportionate in any way. It was obvious to me at 
an early stage that I was not participating on a level playing field in trying to 
challenge the medical profession and healthcare systems. As a 'victim' of medical 
harm, I could see that I was going to have to deal with a range of negative stereotypes, 
fuelled by medical perspectives that unfairly pathologised individuals like me as the 
problem.
This situation meant therefore that despite the negative and oppressive treatment 
meted out to me, by both the Brompton and the wider system, I had to be able to 
operate in a manner that required a high level of emotional and indeed spiritual 
development and detachment. The personal journey to achieve this consciousness and 
way of being, ultimately resulted in my developing the critical skills to stand back 
from the personal issues associated with my own case to understand broader concerns 
connected to medical harm and to develop a wider patient safety agenda in the NHS. 
In many respects I came to observe in myself a personal transformation which 
involved a range of different emotions. This meant in going through different stages 
of my campaign and the pain associated with the constant struggle to be heard, I had 
to learn to feel the pain and then stay with the situation. In this painful space I learned
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to stand back and reflect on my feelings and then explore my assumptions about what 
was happening to me, before I made any decisions about what action to take.
This ability to think, act and reflect eventually allowed me to comprehend how the 
events connected to my daughter's death were being played out in my life. I realised 
that I could have more control over what was happening if I could manage my own 
emotions better in relation to these events. Developing the self-control to choose how 
I responded in any given situation, despite the oppressive nature of the events 
occurring, eventually gave me the strength and critical ability to work with other 
families affected by medical harm. This capacity to manage my own situation well 
was reflected back at me when I first came into contact with other families with 
complaints about the Royal Brompton and Harefield Hospitals. After telling my 
personal story at a public meeting with them for the first time, I was overwhelmingly 
identified as the best person to lead the newly formed Brompton and Harefield Heart 
Children's Action Group (BHHCAG). This was with the aim of trying to enable 
everyone concerned to gain answers about their children's care.
So developing a critical consciousness was therefore about a journey in which 'I 
learned in action' (Coghlan and Brannick 2001) to challenge the oppressive conditions 
I was facing through my campaign for justice and in fighting on behalf of other 
families. On reflection, Paulo Freire below graphically describes a process that I 
believe I had to follow in order to be heard. Freire in this sense argues, for the 
oppressed:
'whose task it is to struggle for their liberation together with those who show 
true solidarity, must acquire a critical awareness of oppression through the 
praxis o f this struggle'.
(Freire 1972: 27)
Freire also argues about the process of liberation that:
'Functionally, oppression is domesticating. To no longer be prey to its force, 
one must emerge from it and turn upon it. This can be done only by means o f  
the praxis: reflection and action upon the world in order to transform it'.
(Freire 1972: 28)
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It was only later as I began to read about a PAR approach whilst undertaking my PhD 
that I came to realise that I had already been subjected to a crash course on PAR 
methodology through my campaign experiences. In this exploratory context however, 
the 'learning in action' process described by Coghlan and Brannick, also provided a 
useful tool for consolidating my understanding about the activities associated with 
learning in PAR. These four activities are described as: experiencing, reflecting, 
inteipreting and taking action. The first linked to experiencing events in action both 
on a physical, cognitive and emotional level; The second about learning to stand back 
from these experiences and to reflect and inquire into them and to explore what they 
mean; The third activity about interpretation and looking for answers in the reflective 
process drawing upon theory to make sense of experiences; and lastly, how action is 
determined by what happens in the reflective/interpretation process (2001: 28).
These elements have provided a useful checklist for me in thinking about the action 
research process and my subjective involvement in it throughout subsequent stages of 
my PhD. Writers such as Reason have also reinforced the importance of working 
with this subjective involvement through a process seen to involve a constant 'cycling 
and recycling through phases of action and reflection' (Reason 1994:13). The validity 
of this approach he argues is illustrated through the discipline of 'co-inquirers' 
constantly looking at their subjectivity critically and recognising the bias that can 
occur from things such as their class, personal perspective etc. Thus the process is 
always about a journey of personal development, as 'co-inquirers move from being 
relatively unreflexively subjective towards a position of critical subjectivity' (Reason 
and Rowan 1981, Chapter 10; Reason and Marshall, 1987 cited in Reason 1994: 13).
Involvement at the Royal Brompton and Harefield NHS Trust
In the second instance, building upon my personal journey into PAR, what also came 
to be a good induction into PAR research for my PhD, was my involvement in 
committees at the Royal Brompton. This process marked a key stepping stone in my 
needing to work with my personal feelings on the issue of medical harm and not 
allowing those feelings to prevent me from seeing broader and connected issues. This 
meant gradually being able to step back from the processes I was in whilst actually 
being immersed in them. This was a particular challenge for me given my own strong
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feelings about the lack of justice regarding my daughter's death. It meant that on a 
number of issues directly related to concerns that emerged around my daughter's care,
I had to suppress my personal feelings of hurt and pain in order to make a wider point 
affecting other patients. This was a skill that took some working on and which had to 
be adapted and refined according to the role that I was playing at the Brompton, first 
as a parent representative in the PLG and then as Forum chair.
In practice as time went on and I became more involved at the Brompton, I found that 
I was able to make the leap in gaining a balance between my personal concerns and 
the links to broader issues. This was illustrated in a number of different ways with the 
examples given in chapter four. In the PLG for instance, I was able to highlight wider 
concerns first raised in the Evans Inquiry. These were about communication and 
working in partnership with patients and how this could have implications for patient 
safety, as well as raising issues of catering to diverse patient needs and issues of 
discrimination and inequality. However, my personal feelings about the issues in my 
own case never left me and were always there beneath the surface acting as a driver in 
trying to look at broader patient safety concerns.
Whilst sitting on the PLG, my diary entry below of the last meeting of the group (21®^ 
September 2004) notes a more uncharacteristic personal response to the issues raised.
The diary entry notes:
T was also more uncharacteristically emotional and personal about the issues 
at the meeting. Maybe because it was the last one and because X  raised the 
issue of a forthcoming complaint about the way that things raised in the Evans 
Report from parents were still happening. She was referring to the death of a 
little girl with Down's Syndrome who had died with nobody bothering to get in 
touch from the hospital and the perception often in these types of cases that 
adverse treatment might have had an element o f discrimination in it.
I  chose to then mention what had happened to me in no one getting back to me 
after Krista died and my perception of racism in Krista's care. I  reiterated that 
these types of issues had to be looked out'.
(PhD diary September 21^ 2004)
This example reinforces the point that whilst the process of looking at the issues in the 
group was about achieving wider change, for those like me personally affected by 
medical harm, there was always a link between the 'personal and the political'.
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However, it is also important to note that the personal example raised by me at this 
meeting was not done just as a way of ventilating the issues in my case. It was raised 
to actively make the link between my perception of racism being involved in my case 
and the perception of discrimination being highlighted in the case mentioned. The 
motivation therefore for drawing upon my personal experience was intentional and 
subjective, but also designed to provoke change in the system for others in relation to 
looking at wider issues of discrimination. On the issue of subjectivity in a process of 
change Paulo Freire has argued that:
'To deny the importance of subjectivity in the process of transforming the 
world and history is naïve and simplistic. It is to admit the impossible: a world 
without men. This objectivistic position is as ingenuous as that of subjectivism, 
which postulates men without a world. World and men do not exist apart from 
each other, they exist in constant interaction '.
(Freire 1972: 27)
However, in relation to my involvement in a process of change at the Brompton, my 
subjective involvement was constantly evolving. This meant that whilst I had sat on 
the PLG as chair of the BHHCAG, representing a number of families affected by 
medical harm, by the time that I became the chair of the Patients Forum, I was being 
required to operate in a very different capacity. This meant moving further away from 
being an individual person affected by harm and formally a participant in an action 
group, to becoming more of a participant observer in committees at the Brompton as a 
patient representative and then finally a researcher in action. These roles were much 
more about representing a wider group of patients on healthcare issues generally, 
whilst also trying to generate data, in a participatory context to change systems.
Thus, in the process of this journey, I started off by fighting to highlight my own 
concerns and then progressed to advocating on behalf of others. In this context I had 
to become increasingly adept at managing my personal experiences, whilst also 
engaging with a broader analysis of the issues and policy debates if I was to be 
successful in the roles being undertaken. My ability to do this is illustrated by an 
example below of advocating on behalf of the Patients Forum at a Brompton Board 
meeting, which was actually deeply personal to me.
My diary entry of this Board meeting notes:
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'regarding the Clinical Governance Quarterly Report I  am angry and very 
disappointed to see issues and concerns arising that were raised as part of the 
Evans Inquiry Report'.
(PhD diary 6* April 2005)
The issues being raised here were about the Trust failing to ensure that all the patients 
under their care were being properly communicated with and appropriately given 
information about their treatment. These issues were very much factors in my 
daughter Krista’s care. However despite the emotions this raised for me, I was able to 
respond to this matter by raising the broader implications for other patients.
The Board minutes of the 6^ April 2005 note:
'The Chairman commented on concerns relating to waiting times and 
communications which linked to one of the main issues examined by the 
Independent Paediatric Inquiry from 1999 to 2001. Ms Josephine Ocloo said 
they were also her concerns. Information and communication issues were 
raised throughout the Evans Inquiry with many parents and families ajfected. 
The issues continued to feature in complaints and needed to be examined in 
more detail. Ms Ocloo felt these issues ought to be looked at more closely to 
see whether some families from particular backgrounds were more likely to be 
affected. This issue emerged as a concern with some families involved in the 
Evans Inquiry'.
In response to these comments, it was noted that the Trust would further 'examine 
standards of written information and how information was communicated'. The 
discussion was then brought to a conclusion, with the comments, 'The Chairman 
suggested that Ms Ocloo's approach had been very constructive and suggested Dr. 
Shuldham discuss matters further with her' (Board minutes of the 6* April 2005).
This exchange in the Board minutes shows that despite the personal nature of the 
issues being discussed, I was able to manage my emotions and remain critically 
detached enough to raise wider questions. The ability to operate in this manner 
became easier as I became more and more involved as a patients representative and 
was reflected back at me most strongly, in attending a conference on healthcare 
regulation (see chapter four, page 176). This involved speaking out about wider issues 
on patient safety, whilst stating that I had come to the issues as someone personally 
affected by medical harm. Afterwards my involvement in the conference prompted 
the conference convenor to write to me saying:
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' Well you weren't the only user. But you were perhaps the most thoughtful and 
convincing of the users. It is hard for most people to move on from their own 
experience, especially if  that was traumatic, to see how their experience fits in 
a wider context. Several other people have said how much they valued what 
you had to say'.
(Martin Rathfelder, Regulating Health Care Professionals and the Regulation of the 
Non-Medical Healthcare Professions Conference 11/10/2006)
However, the change in role from parent representative to Forum representative was 
not without considerable challenges in terms of trying to act as a broader patient 
advocate, whilst trying to generate data as an action researcher in order to change the 
system. This meant I had to develop the personal qualities of involvement and 
detachment, but it was also necessary to be able to develop robust advocacy skills and 
an ability to challenge and present my case from a patient's perspective.
In chapter four I set out a number of examples of how I attempted to change systems 
at the Brompton. In my role as parent's representative on the PLG, I explained how I 
attempted to highlight some of the key themes from the Evans Inquiry Report 
concerning communication and partnership and the imbalance of power between 
healthcare professionals and patients. To reinforce some of my thinking about these 
issues, I was able to draw upon academic papers about how power and discrimination 
can operate in organisations, manifesting itself in structures, personal and professional 
values and interpersonal relationships. I then set out various examples of how I 
attempted to create more equal partnerships by raising issues about reimbursing 
volunteers for their expenses and addressing issues to do with discrimination and 
meeting the needs of diverse patient groups.
I explained that with my change in role, as a Forum chair, I was keen to continue to 
build upon themes raised previously in the PLG. This meant looking at broader 
strategic issues within the Trust in relation to issues of clinical governance, risk 
management and patient safety and the wider equality and diversity agenda. As a 
Forum chair and action researcher, I would argue that I was able to have some success 
in pursuing these issues. I did this by adopting a rigorous approach to obtaining 
evidence of good practice in these areas and by commissioning independent reports 
on the issues. This approach in presenting robust research and empirical evidence, 
whilst arguing for change at the Trust Board produced some progress in enabling the
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Forum to gain greater access to Trust strategic committees and a Trust commitment to 
tackling the issues in these areas, as set out in chapter four. Despite this, the 
reflections in my diary on my involvement in these committee processes and my 
feelings about making changes, demonstrated a very different reality, in which I felt 
just as disempowered as when I sat as a parent's representative on the PLG.
The examples below set out some of my personal observations in attending some 
Trust committee meetings for the first time as a Forum chair.
In attending the Trust Risk Strategy Meeting I noted:
'Attended Risk Strategy Committee. Very nervous as they didn't offer me any 
induction training. I  attended and an experienced PPI lecturer was invited as 
well to observe and make any recommendations.
It was as usual a very powerful and intimidating meeting. In the Boardroom at 
least 20 all white, senior, middle class professionals, with X  a very 
intimidating chair. The meeting was conducted in such a way that the 
emphasis was on time and getting through the agenda. The atmosphere was 
not conducive to asking questions and Ifelt as if  when I  asked things everyone 
was looking at me and as usual like at the Board, I  felt I  had to say something 
in a rush.........
Given the atmosphere created of needing to move quickly through the agenda, 
I  didn't feel I  was going to be able to ask small things to get clarity for myself 
like jargon used etc. which I  thought would make me look inexperienced. 
When I  asked about how the Quality Framework was monitored for issues of 
equality and diversity, I  felt I  was getting fobbed off.
(PhD diary 4* M y 2005)
With The Trust Complaints Committee, I noted that:
'Overall felt I  learnt an awful lot about how complaints work - felt an open 
group, largely willing to learn, but so professionally dominated. Easy to see 
how things and justify things from own perspective.
Need PPI input into investigations and need another person with me on 
committee. Even though meeting more informal, I  think it would be hard for a 
less confident and informed person to dare to speak'.
(PhD diary 9^  ^August 2005)
My observations about involvement in these committees show that I did not feel 
empowered or able to operate as an equal partner. My feelings about this situation 
were also echoed by my experience in attending an event at the Health Care
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Commission designed to enable Forums to input into the process of the Annual Health 
Check (AHC). The AHC is the system responsible for measuring Trust performance 
within a framework of national standards and targets set by Government. Patient 
Forums were able to input into this system by writing a commentary on Trust 
compliance with core standards which then had to be published unaltered by a Trust 
with their own self-assessment of compliance.
My reflections on the usefulness of this Health Care Commission event in enabling 
Forums to act as equal partners in the AHC process are set out below. In response to a 
question that I raised about the difficulties of being able to input into the process as 
Forums, the facilitator hosting the event:
'agreed all o f this was a problem for the Forum in participating as equal 
partners when we were volunteers and had no budget or staff or even 
training'.
(PhD diary IS*" July 2005)
Despite the assurances of this facilitator that further events would be held to support 
the Forums, I still noted:
'I basically felt though that it was a very uneven partnership with not enough 
strategic guidance from the HCC, who could for eg have arranged for Forums 
to have more discussion with the bodies who are also supposed to be 
independently monitoring and scrutinising this process such as the SHA's, 
OSC's etc. I  don’t really feel the facilitator knew what to suggest but 
acknowledged the imbalance in the partnership was an issue'.
(PhD diary 15''July 2005)
These reflections raise a number of questions about involvement and empowerment in 
a process of change and whether I was indeed able to make any real changes at all as a 
patient representative and researcher in action. This is a question that I will return to 
at the end of the chapter when looking at the nature of empowerment.
In the sections below I continue to reflect further upon some of the challenges 
associated with using participatory action research in my PhD. fri doing this I look at 
both my attempts to build a network with self-help groups working in the area of 
medical harm and my work with individuals affected by medical harm on the Break 
Through Programme. Lastly, the chapter comes on to look at the nature of
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empowerment in the PhD and what this meant in the various research processes 
developed.
Developing the Medical Harm Self-Help Network (MHSHN)
In the next section of this chapter, I analyse some of the processes involved in 
building the MHSHN and show how my thinking was influenced by some key 
principles of action research. For example those identified by Israel et al 1998, (cited 
in Minkler et al 2002) who argue that PAR is about participation; is co-operative 
[engaging community members and researchers in a joint process in which both 
contribute equally]; is a co-leaming process; involves systems development and [local 
capacity building]; is an empowering process through which participants can increase 
control over their lives and achieves a balance between research and action. I also 
draw broadly upon Hart and Bond's (1998) seven criteria for distinguishing action 
research from other methodologies as discussed in chapter five.
Education as consciousness raising
Within the context of building the network, education was conceptualised more as 
about awareness or consciousness raising, rather than about a more formal educational 
exchange. This process is seen to have occurred through groups and individuals being 
empowered through praxis (acting upon the conditions one faces in order to change 
them). Writers such as Freire (1972) describe this process as containing the seeds to 
raise the consciousness levels of individuals and through the development of a 
bottom-up critical theory, the conditions for change and improvement. Harvey (1990) 
also argues, for the critical social researcher, generating praxis (a form of 'practical 
reflective activity') is vital because it enables critical knowledge to be generated in 
order to change the world. This is seen as a reflexive process in which knowledge not 
only changes as a result of praxis, but in turn, 'an analysis of oppressive social 
structures is in itself a political act' (Harvey 1990: 23) in which knowledge generates 
change.
In the network, this meant enabling the groups to generate their own knowledge by 
drawing upon their own lived experiences of medical harm to provide a critique that 
challenged perceived dominant medical perspectives. I came to see this type of
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process as an important way of empowering excluded groups and as a way of them 
taking their own agenda forward. After the first few meetings with the group, it 
quickly became obvious that they did not have a collective platform from which to 
raise and discuss their concerns, which they thought was important. Individual groups 
also did not have the time and resources to support this type of networking activity. 
Therefore the groups welcomed the idea of forming a loose network in which they 
could meet to exchange ideas and develop a more collective agenda. What was clear 
however from the earliest stages of building the network, (as illustrated in the quote 
below on the second meeting of the network) in terms of this agenda, was that the 
focus was on political action and the groups being able to put the issues from their 
own perspectives on medical harm.
My diary notes about this meeting that:
'A major focus of the discussion everyone agreed was the need to concentrate 
on lobbying for change. People recognised that a network could have a 
support element but it was clear that people wanted to be much more pro­
active and I  guess (political) in trying to change the system.
It was agreed that the groups needed to continue meeting in order to be able 
to identify key issues and to be specific about what changes were needed from 
a patient's perspective'.
(PhD diary 12^  ^February 2004)
My diary further stated about this meeting, that whilst there was no consensus yet on 
patient perspectives: 'There was a healthy debate where it was clear that some groups 
differed in perspective' (PhD diary 12*^  February 2004). On the one hand, groups such 
as the The Richard Neale Action Group stressed in this meeting, 'the dangers of 
becoming co-opted into the system if one was not organised'. They felt it was 
important to learn from the past and felt that many of the issues now were still the 
same as in the past for them when Neale was struck off.
On the other hand groups such as NACOR (National Committee for Organ Retention) 
'argued that there was no point in just beating doctors up'. I noted in my diary about 
this point however, that 'in many respects she seemed to be advocating some of the 
medical professions arguments around a no blame culture'.
307
Given this varied, but healthy debate, I was keen to support the process of dialogue in 
the future through taking a number of measures to support meetings such as; 
organising events, distributing information and papers, facilitating discussion and 
taking the minutes.
Individuals as group members and participants of change
Hart and Bond (1998) point to a number of issues when looking at a group process 
when it comes to action research. In particular they point out that whereas in 
traditional research, the researcher is more likely to determine the criteria for the 
study, in action research there is likely to be a combination of means used, where 
boundaries, membership and accessibility are defined.
Within the context of building the self-help network, a number of challenges in this 
area emerged. These related to opening up the space for the network to come together 
and for dialogue to begin. Juggling with the roles of various participants as co­
researchers in the action research process and moderating and facilitating the different 
perspectives involved and drawing these different views into a dialogue.
Opening up the network space
In terms of opening up the space, the shape of the network, criteria and boundaries for 
membership, were very much determined as part of a collective process. This meant 
that I was led by the groups attending meetings, rather than trying to lead them. The 
network also developed in an informal manner because it lacked proper funding for its 
work. This meant taking a flexible approach to calling meetings which were reliant on 
the resources I brought as action researcher and as a student volunteer working at 
AvMA one day a week. In terms of membership of the network, this was left flexible 
and eventually covered by the loosely worded mission statement mentioned earlier. 
What emerged in the first meeting to discuss the formation of the network, was that 
the term self-help seemed to be a useful way of targeting certain types of groups. It 
was therefore agreed in the meeting that the term:
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'should cover groups made up o f victims/survivors who have experienced a
medical accident'  This could include groups looking solely at these
issues or as part of a wider agenda'.
(Minutes of the meeting of December 2"  ^2003)
This definition broadly dictated the basis for membership for some time, although 
eventually individuals were invited to attend network meetings from professionally 
funded organisations, whose members would not necessarily have been directly 
affected by medical harm. In terms of the focus and boundaries of the network, as 
mentioned earlier, group members decided to concentrate on building a 
predominantly campaigning network rather than one based predominantly on 
providing a support function and chose to restrict membership to groups, rather than 
to lone individuals. The aspiration to develop a network with a collective agenda 
however, also meant that the various roles of the participants concerned had to be 
managed in a particular way. This meant that very early on, in the formation of the 
network, I had to tbink about the nature of participation and my own role within this.
Managing different roles in the network
Drawing on Lewin (1946), Holter and Schwartz-Barcott (1993: 300) have argued that 
in action research the principle focus of collaboration involves interaction between a 
practitioner or a group of practitioners and a researcher or a research team. However it 
is clear that as action research has progressed, different models of collaboration have 
developed in different ways, leading to different variations on the 'outsider/insider’, 
'researcher/practitioner' theme. In building the network, I worked broadly with the 
idea that the insider and outsider models could be brought together in a 
complementary 'double-act' model (Titchen and Binnie 1993), allowing the broad 
group of people involved to act more collaboratively as co-researchers. Titchen and 
Binnie argue that combining these roles helps to overcome a number of problems that 
exist with these roles operating independently, and allows for a more unified and 
integrated approach.
In practice in my field research, taking this approach meant working with a number of 
factors and recognising the roles of different people in the research process. This 
meant recognising and treating the self-help groups as mainly insiders and actors who
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were both survivors of medical harm, but change agents as well and these were their 
primary roles in the network. However in coming together and working with me to 
collate information on medical harm from a user perspective, they were also acting 
with me as co-researchers in the process. In working with these groups I saw myself 
as both an insider (actor working within AvMA and survivor of medical harm and 
change agent), but also clearly an outsider in the form of having an explicit role as a 
researcher in the network project. In relation to AvMA, I saw their role as different to 
the self-help groups and in this respect treated them as operating in an insider 
practitioner role, facilitating and supporting change (change agent) through the 
network, but also providing support and information (researcher) for the data and 
research gathering process.
The different roles held by network members impacted upon the project in different 
ways, because of the different agenda's held by participants. Hart and Bond (1998: 50) 
point to some dilemmas in managing this type of dynamic group process. For example 
the danger of the researcher finding themselves dependant upon the patronage of the 
most powerful group, which may undermine the collaborative relationship and restrict 
the researchers ability to protect group boundaries, which results in the agenda 
shifting uncomfortably away from an empowering approach. I found myself having to 
guard against this situation in different ways.
In dealing with the groups, it was important for me to be able to maintain a balanced 
position in facilitating the network to collectively move forward, rather than being 
influenced by any particularly dominant groups or perspectives. My diary entry of one 
meeting notes on this point:
'In terms of the meeting it is a slight struggle for me in that I  have to some 
extent to play a dual role of AvMA person, someone affected by medical harm 
and researcher. All the roles have different implications.
Because I  am part of AvMA I  am more careful about what I  say at the meeting 
to be supportive of AvMA. However, behind the scenes, the groups also 
confide in me about how they feel about AvMA and some have shared issues 
about the support they feel they have received. Also because I  have ended up 
taking the minutes of meetings it does make it a bit harder'.
(PhD diary 13* May 2004)
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One way that I tried to achieve a balance between competing interests, was to 
carefully manage my AvMA role in terms of the network, its administrative functions 
and chairing meetings to ensure that the different groups had appropriate space to 
articulate the issues from their perspectives. This meant managing the agenda, 
facilitating meetings or recording minutes to ensure that no particular group 
dominated and that different perspectives were reflected to make sure that groups 
were not excluded on the basis of how they were choosing to make changes to the 
system. For example on more than one occasion, there were sharply divergent views 
on how to work with the medical profession. On the one hand the minutes of 21®^ July 
2004 record: 'The need for balance in working with the medical profession if change 
is to occur', whilst also noting the use of a 'stick' rather than a 'carrot', in forcing 
change. As stated, 'The importance of litigation in forcing the medical profession to 
change'.
In practice, this also meant juggling the balance between AvMA's interests which I 
was representing as a CASE PhD student in the network and the group’s agendas. My 
diary entry below shows how I reflected on dealing with this balancing act in some 
network meetings:
'At the last 2 meetings I  have also been conscious of pushing X  [AvMA] to 
chair in such a way that the groups get an opportunity to say something about 
themselves and their issues. This is difficult and I  know to some extent X  finds 
it difficult because it can allow the groups to go off on a tangent and to launch 
into long personal stories.
On the other hand, I  have felt that I  needed to push to allow the groups space, 
because I  believe they find it empowering and it gives them a way of getting to 
know each other and their issues. For me it is important to ensure, given that 
they are travelling a long way, most of them come from outside of London, 
that they should get space to participate. Not least because they are often not 
given a voice in so many other ways’.
(PhD diary 13* May 2004)
Overall, in playing a major part in negotiating this balance, I felt it was invaluable to 
be able to communicate with all of the groups and AvMA. I felt this was helped by 
my ability to utilise my unique position as both insider (survivor of medical harm and 
activist) on the issues and outsider researcher and health campaigner involved with a 
number of wider health policy issues as chair of an NHS Patients Forum. This
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position enabled me to understand and work with a range of positions and was crucial 
to enabling me to build all round trust.
Building trust as an insider/outsider researcher
In terms of my role in the project, the blurring of the boundaries between researcher 
and respondent was particularly useful, because I was both researcher and someone 
affected by medical harm that had been involved with an action group. I believe these 
combined roles as both 'insider' and 'outsider', were key in building trust with the 
groups. This situation meant that I could act as a bridge between different 
stakeholders in the network and as a catalyst in encouraging the groups to work 
together more closely. For example, a considerable hurdle for me to overcome at the 
outset in building the network, was the distrust expressed by some groups about 
AvMA's involvement and their motives in wanting to help build a network and 
whether they were independent enough from the medical profession to warrant 
collaborating with.
What was key in overcoming this distrust, was firstly that as a 'victim' of medical 
harm, I was able to advocate a collaborative approach to looking at the issues from a 
user perspective and able to cite the advantages of collectively putting forward group 
concerns. Although I would also argue that this as and of itself was not enough to 
overcome the distrust by some individuals. The fact that I had also been involved in a 
campaign of my own for justice and had chaired an action group, ultimately gave me 
the credibility that convinced certain sceptical groups to work with me. I believe that 
this 'credibility factor' also worked for me conversely, in allowing me to convince 
some potential members of the network that network meetings should not just be a 
forum from which to attack the medical profession. I therefore had to convince these 
individuals that network meetings would be an important and strategic way of putting 
across the issues from a user perspective, but that this needed to be done in a 
constructive manner.
On this basis I would argue that there are considerable advantages in being both an 
insider/outsider researcher and being able to negotiate the issues from a user, 
practitioner, policy maker and researcher perspective. However, in building the 
MHSHN, I was acutely aware of the difficulties and responsibilities of negotiating
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these boundaries in ways that ensured I did not breach the trust or misinterpret the 
perspectives or positions of the different stakeholders involved. In addition, I had to 
contend with the personal challenges of my multi-purpose role which was probably 
the hardest and yet most rewarding issue to contend with. This meant that whilst I 
could identify very much with the personal stories of the groups, which helped with 
building trust, empathy and understanding, there was always the danger of 
subjectivity which could potentially influence the data.
Certainly in terms of building the self-help network, there was no doubt that I was a 
full member of the group and I participated to this effect. In this respect, my views on 
the issues would clearly have been affected by my experiences of medical harm. That 
said, it was also clear to group members that I was playing a facilitative role in 
developing the network and in this respect I had to work with and gain the trust of all 
members involved. To do this, I built in methods to ensure I was both understanding 
and representing the views of network members accurately. This entailed me taking 
and circulating minutes and agenda's for approval, which could be amended both 
before and at the meetings. I was also able to document and then circulate for 
accuracy and approval the profiles of groups and eventually the manifesto for change 
material. Creating a critical and reflexive approach to the data and information came 
about through constant discussions at meetings, in which a range of groups discussed 
and challenged each other about the issues. In this context, all participants were 
forced to become more critically reflective. This has led writers such as Reason to see 
community meetings as important vehicles for developing a critical and reflexive 
approach. In my experience, it was precisely through the networking process in the 
MHSHN meetings that dialogue and clarity about the issues began to emerge.
The network and its emerging agenda
A distinguishing feature of action research is the emphasis placed upon solving 
problems in an immediate and particular situation. This does not necessarily mean 
that something is wrong, but that 'a problem is a definition of a need for change and 
describes how certain issues can be addressed' (Hart and bond 1998: 53). The extent 
of negotiation about the nature of the problem will vary according to the action 
research model. An empowerment model suggests the problem will emerge out of the
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everyday experiences and realities of members of the group, whilst experimental 
models assert the 'problem' is defined in relation to social science or management 
interests (Hart and bond 1998: 53).
In developing the network, the emphasis in meetings, was for the different groups to 
share their own unique experience of medical harm and how this had affected their 
members. In this respect, a range of issues emerged regarding how people had been 
affected in specific ways. This process also threw up a number of shared and common 
themes, which then began to form the basis for an agenda for change. For example 
members of the network had clearly had different experiences in the way that they had 
sustained the medical harm affecting them or members of their groups. This related to 
experiences of harm such as catching a hospital acquired infection such as MRS A, 
being damaged through a vaccine injection such as MMR, experiencing a birth trauma 
such as Erb's Palsy, or being misdiagnosed with epilepsy or injured by surgical 
treatment. However a common denominator for many of the groups was their 
experience in trying to get these issues addressed once the harm had occurred and 
these were the very things that the groups wanted to concentrate on in developing a 
collective agenda for change. I was able to work with the network to develop this 
agenda, both in helping to define and write up the issues fi*om their perspectives and 
what they saw as key actions for change. Importantly, I was also able to make taking 
these objectives forward more concrete, by supporting a process of how these 
perspectives could be articulated to policymakers in a wider forum such as a 
conference.
In this respect, I agreed to lead on organising a conference from AvMA, which the 
groups clearly saw as an important opportunity for them to have their say and to speak 
out. As the minutes of 13* October 2005 set out:
’It was agreed that the conference would be an opportunity for those directly 
affected by medical harm to ’Speak Out’. The self-help groups would constitute 
the main speakers on a range of different topics covering themes such as: 
patient empowerment, justice, investigation, accountability, redress and 
impact upon particular groups. Those invited to listen would be the press, 
politicians, policy-makers, those from regulatory bodies etc’.
Supporting the groups to speak out at a conference seemed to fit in with the central 
cornerstone of PAR philosophy identified by Reason (1994:5) in chapter five. This
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relates to the notion of challenging established and dominant forces within society and 
their privileged monopolisation of knowledge and the way it is used.
As highlighted earlier, the groups placed a strong emphasis on the network being 
about changing the current system of health care, to make it safer and more 
empowering for patients. Having a conference was clearly seen as a vehicle for taking 
this change forward. As the minutes further noted: 'It was also agreed to hold a 
conference in the Autumn of 2004 which would allow self-help groups and 
individuals to take a lead in defining what some of the key areas for change should be 
and how this could be achieved'.
Part of the rationale for holding a conference was to be able to tell healthcare 
professionals and policy makers about anomalies and injustices in the system as it 
operated in dealing with medical harm. However not everyone in the network saw the 
issues in the same way and clearly for funded organisations like AvMA, their position 
on the issues was dictated by a number of considerations such as their wider 
organisational priorities and membership base. In order to allow the network to 
develop without compromising the individual positions of organisations, the Mission 
Statement for the network had built in a clause that spelled out that 'Where 
appropriate members will work together on issues of common concern, but each 
group remains autonomous and independent'.
This situation meant that when it came to organising the conference, the aim was for it 
to be a collaborative venture hosted by AvMA in partnership with the network, whilst 
also providing network members with an opportunity for them to put across the issues 
on medical harm from their perspective. However behind the scenes and in trying to 
organise the conference, my diary reflects some of my frustration in trying to juggle 
the different interests with the comment: 'I have always found myself trying to retain 
the balance between the groups agenda's and AvMA's' (PhD diary 25* November 
2005). I further noted on this issue:
'X fed back AvMA trustees a bit worried about whether the initiative could 
bring the organisation into disrepute and whether AvMA, who it was argued 
was funding and doing all the work should be pursuing this type of 
partnership. X  said they agreed to move forward, but also agreed for AvMA to 
be cautious'.
(PhD diary 25* November 2005)
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In order to try and move things forward in this area. I was able to organise the 
conference so that individual network members were given the space on the 
conference platform to present their own views. Alongside this I was also able to 
present a more collective agenda from network members that everyone was happy 
with. This was aimed at a compromise in which individuals had some space to speak 
out independently in the way that they wanted, whilst not being able to detract from or 
compromise a more collective stance developed through dialogue in the network over 
a number of years. AvMA were then happy to publish these views in a special 
conference edition newsletter (as mentioned earlier called the 'Patients Perspective on 
Change' - see appendix).
The newsletter and the themes to emerge from network meetings, documented by me 
as part of the PAR process, eventually began to form an alternative knowledge 
critique about the process of medical harm. This critique was based upon alternative 
lay viewpoints on the issues, based upon real and lived experiences of medical harm 
and campaigns for justice and accountability, rather than upon dominant and 
professional medical expertise.
Later on in this chapter I come back to reflect upon this alternative critique and what 
this might meant in terms of empowerment.
The Learning Process and The Break Through Programme
As set out in the previous chapter the Break Through Programme was developed as a 
support initiative for individuals directly affected by medical harm and was run as a 
residential programme over two days in October 2005. The key aim of the programme 
was to try and enable individuals affected by harm to find strategies for self­
empowerment by working collectively together with others in a supportive 
environment. The four main methods used on the programme were small group and 
larger sessions for individuals to tell their personal stories and to share their feelings 
about the ways medical harm had affected them and how they had developed personal 
strategies for overcoming these issues. Facilitated and small groups exercises also 
enabled individuals to explore strategies for change based upon a method called 
appreciative inquiry which focuses upon the positive, rather than the negative in
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trying to find ways to move forward. The development of personal action plans as 
tools to work with after leaving the programme and the use of techniques for dealing 
with stress and trauma such as stress management and relaxation methods and 
meditation.
How the Learning Process was Facilitated
My role in the programme was as both an insider and outsider in looking at the issues. 
I had agreed with the planning group from the outset that I would operate both as a 
facilitator but also as someone affected by medical harm and I agreed to be open and 
share my experiences within the group in this respect. The aim in being open about 
my own personal experience of medical harm was to encourage participants to work 
with the programme objectives and to try and build trust. The issue of gaining trust 
first arose in trying to encourage individuals to attend the programme. This required a 
big commitment from the participants as they were being asked to commit to 
programme objectives that were focused predominantly on personal change rather 
than on trying to change the system. The planning group were aware that this might 
be an issue, from a previous event called from 'Pain to Gain' (described in Chapter 
Five), run in May 2004 for those affected by medical harm, which also focused on 
dealing with the personal trauma caused by harm. With this event the participants had 
tended to want to concentrate on looking at wider political changes to the system 
rather than on looking at how they could find tools for personal self-empowerment. 
The programme participants also needed to be prepared to take a number of days out 
mid-week and to pay £85 to cover programme costs, board and lodging.
Given this context, I was keen to illustrate the importance of the programme goals by 
talking about my own journey in trying to recover from the pain of losing my 
daughter and finding the strength to do something positive in her memory. Therefore 
on the first evening of the programme after dinner and after the welcome and 
introductions, the main session for the evening consisted of a talk called 'Breaking 
Out - Breaking Through' in which I shared my personal story of medical harm and my 
journey from 'victim' to survivor.
The aim of the talk was to try and be motivational in talking about the trauma of my 
daughter's death and the strategies I had found for rebuilding my life again. I also
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wanted to share with the group why I had decided to become involved in developing 
an initiative like the Break Through Programme. This meant explaining to participants 
about the difficulties I had faced in overcoming the emotional problems linked to the 
loss of my daughter dying suddenly and how this trauma had been greatly 
compounded by having to fight for justice. In addition I was keen to highlight my 
view that their was a lack of support for victims of medical harm and therefore the 
need for funding to be given for a more permanent support initiative like the Break 
Through Programme in the future.
After my talk, participants were given the opportunity to ask me questions and to 
share any personal reflections from their own situation about moving forward after 
their own experiences of harm. A personal exercise then took place that was aimed at 
enabling individuals to start developing their Personal Action Plans based upon 
identifying personal goals for change. In this respect they were asked to Think about 
and write down what a Break Through might mean for you in terms of managing your 
current situation and what changes you would like to make to try and achieve this. 
Please give some examples' (Facilitators notes on the programme). These exercises 
were built into different sessions throughout the programme, so that participants could 
try and build up a personal plan of their learning and strategies for change. Each 
participant was also given a present of a personal diary on the first night to use in 
whichever way they chose to record any learning or personal thoughts or feelings.
In terms of setting the agenda for looking at personal change, I believed that it was 
important to tell my story and to be open about sharing my feelings, because as one of 
the facilitators I was trying to encourage participants to do so themselves. This 
sharing on my part was meant to show that I understood and was sympathetic to the 
types of issues that participants were raising in the questionnaires they had filled in 
before coming on the programme. In this respect, it was clear from the stories that 
many people felt that they had not been listened to or understood in the past and felt 
alienated and silenced when they had tried to raise their concerns. My personal diary 
noted after this session:
'Feel relieved and happy the session is over, but went well and feel 
overwhelmed and touched at the support from the wider group. It was good to 
be able to engage in such an open debate about how we as victims o f medical 
harm can seize our own power and move forward. But clear not everyone
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wants to focus on the personal elements and the desire for political action and 
for system change is already coming across loud and clear'.
(PhD Diary 24* October 2005)
This building of trust, based on drawing upon my own background of harm, continued 
on the programme. This meant not creating an atmosphere of 'expert' facilitator and 
'victim' participants, but instead creating an atmosphere with all of us working 
together collectively to try and find strategies for moving forward. Working 
collectively in this way, in which I was both facilitator but was also part of the group, 
as someone affected by medical harm, seemed to help to make it easier for others to 
share their personal stories.
Learning Through Story Telling
In evaluating the feedback on the programme firom the evaluation sheets the strategy 
of getting participants to share their stories certainly seemed to be a popular one as 
evidenced by several comments quoted below in response to questions about what 
they had liked best and what they had learned from the programme.
'For the first time been able to share my story and listening to others with 
equally horrendous stories'
'Meeting other people who have been affected by medical harm. The "telling 
our story " sessions '
'I have learned that by sharing these experiences that most people can find 
something beneficial by talking about the harm they have suffered'.
However, despite the popularity of participants being able to share their personal 
stories, a number of individuals clearly wanted to see more of a focus on political or 
practical strategies for change. This was evident when looking at the evaluation sheets 
after the programme. In response to questions such as: 'Is there anything about the 
programme that could have been better?' One respondent stated: 'Projects discussed! 
Invite say two or three members of Parliament whereby complaints can be taken 
straight back to government level'. Other responses to the question, 'Can you suggest 
any topics, which could be included in future events?', suggested, some participants 
clearly wanted to see a more practical side to the programme, related to how
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individuals could take legal action linked to their personal cases. As illustrated by the 
comments:
'How to find a pool of solicitors and lawyers who are interested and willing to 
pursue such cases'.
'Perhaps a session looking at practicalities eg bringing legal action possibly 
have a talk by a solicitor or legal eagle about the pitfalls etc'.
'Perhaps a talk on litigation and the way the system works'.
'More discussion about how we change the NHS'.
Clearly an issue with regards to the learning process for some participants on the 
programme very early on was that they felt the programmes goals, focusing on 
personal change as a strand of empowerment, was to narrow. In order to 
accommodate these feelings, already coming across on the first evening of the 
programme after my talk, I decided on the second day of the programme to tell the 
participants about the conference being held by AvMA entitled 'The Patient's Agenda 
for Safety and Justice'. I explained that I was going to present key issues to the 
conference about changing the system fi*om a patient's perspective from the MHSHN. 
I then asked whether participants on the Break Through Programme would like me to 
write up their experiences to be published in a newsletter which could be given out at 
the conference. This suggestion was very well received and all of the participants 
agreed that key themes about changes to the system should be included in a 
newsletter, including any personal stories that anyone wanted to share. I was 
eventually able to write up a newsletter on the programme (included in the appendix) 
which was circulated both at the AvMA conference and later to AvMA's diverse 
membership base.
After the programme had finished and I had returned home, my ambiguous feelings 
about doing PAR research without properly accommodating the objectives of the 
participants were reflected in my notes on the event. As stated:
'Only really able to get research data as part o f collecting it as part of a 
process of changing the system eg agreeing to do Manifesto of Change. 
Otherwise would have felt exploitative'.
(Notes on Break Through Programme 26-10-2005)
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A key area of learning for me in respect of this situation was about the need to be 
flexible as organisers and facilitators when running a programme of this type. This 
meant being able to constantly reflect on whose agenda was being promoted and 
recognising the need for continual space to be built in for negotiation in relation to 
programme objectives.
Despite this issue however, a range of feedback from the programme coming out of 
both the small group sessions and reflected in the feedback forms showed that many 
of the programme participants did also want to embark upon a journey of self- 
discovery in terms of changing and healing themselves.
Developing Tools for Self-Empowerment
On the second day of the programme most of the day was spent in small groups, with 
opportunities for everyone in the morning to share with others in their group their 
personal experience of medical harm. In the afternoon, participants were then given 
the opportunity to discuss collectively, strategies individuals had found for moving 
forward through their experiences and the trauma many had faced. This also included 
participants thinking about how they could develop personal action plans for changing 
their situation when they returned home from the programme. In the evening a session 
took place on meditation in which participants were given an opportunity to explore 
some spiritual methods for achieving personal heahng.
My notes on these discussions in the small group I was facilitating highlight the point 
that there was a:
'Long discussion about the way in which people had been traumatised in 
different ways by the medical harm and did not realise how badly they had 
been adversely affected. Everyone had a different aspect to their trauma and 
were coping with a different set o f issues and its effects'.
(Notes on Break Through Programme 25-10-2005)
Yet despite the clear anger from programme participants about their treatment and the 
need for the system and medical profession to change, many participants also 
recognised the importance of personal change and looking at what steps they could 
take in empowering themselves to move forward.
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This view was reflected in a number of the comments from the feedback forms, as set 
out below:
7 have found the course has helped me to put some things into perspective that 
all suffering is relative, but sharing the load has helped. I  am glad that I  
decided to come, which for me has been the first step'.
'I need to work on my emotions more to help myself, my husband and son. I  
feel now that enough is enough - the NHS will not take any more of my life and 
happiness. Not that o f my husband and son. We need to build our togetherness 
again'.
(Break Through Programme Feedback Forms)
Some participants also clearly enjoyed the sessions on spirituality as a tool for 
personal healing. In response to the question on the feedback form, 'Have you learnt 
anything useful from the sessions?' some responses were:
"How to unwind and maybe to meditate on my inner self (soul)'.
'Yes, how to look positively at myself via meditation'  If this venue can
be used again it would be great to offer a topic of Godly prayer for those that 
are seeking that peace or already have it and want more'.
Some participants however had some reservations about the use of spiritual tools such 
as meditation and relaxation exercises on the programme and wanted to see a broader 
approach with use of these methods. As reflected in the comments:
'Stronger leadership - less happy clappy "presenters" ............... less o f the
music - a broader approach to people's spiritual/religious beliefs'.
'A bit less looking at the inner self and more time for people to share 
experiences that NHS and system doesn't want to hear'.
Another participant suggested in this respect for future events, the use of 'Alternative 
therapies and complimentary treatments for our medical problems'.
These comments illustrate that despite the need for flexibility in how the programme 
was managed, programme participants were prepared to engage with the programme 
goals. I believe that by creating an informal environment where individuals could 
meet each other and share their stories in a peaceful and tranquil setting, was
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conducive to enabling those affected by harm to explore personal and collective 
strategies for change.
My Role as an Insider Researcher
I also believe that my role as an 'insider' researcher was an important aspect in 
encouraging individuals to share their story. This was because I was able to illustrate 
both that I understood many of the issues associated with being affected by medical 
harm such as fighting the system. But also the personal challenges involved in 
recovering fi-om the trauma of being harmed by health systems and professionals 
meant to be caring for you.
Whilst many of the feedback forms illustrated how much the participants had enjoyed 
the programme, were glad they had attended and appreciated the facilitators, the 
comment below was very special in acknowledging my contribution to the 
programme.
'Have really appreciated the obvious research, admin, selfless time that has 
been put into this course. Thank you so much Josephine for setting this up so 
courageously and selflessly. Your insight is great.
However, whilst I would maintain that there were considerable benefits in being an 
'insider' researcher into the issues, there were also some challenges that I had to face. 
These related to my need to be able to maintain enough detachment to run the 
programme and to facilitate in relation to issues being raised that were intensely 
personal and at times distressing, both for me and the programme participants. Also in 
wider discussions and in the small group sessions, it was important for me as a 
facilitator to be able to challenge where some individuals were coming across as 
overwhelmingly negative about doctors, the whole system and personal change. This 
meant them refusing to look at where they could do anything to change their situation 
by looking at themselves as opposed to just looking at others and the wider system. 
The difficulty in managing this situation was noted in my reflective notes on the 
programme after the event. I felt that it was:
'Difficult to manage the anger and get people to think about themselves and 
moving forward, although people did seem to want to do this (see evaluation 
sheets').
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(Notes on Break Through Programme 26-10-2005)
As it was clear that many individuals had come onto the programme with a genuine 
desire to try and find personal ways of moving forward, there was a strong 
responsibility on the facilitators to be able to provide the right atmosphere to do this. 
This meant for me moving beyond being just one of the group, with the cosiness and 
acceptance that could bring, but instead being detached enough to try and empower all 
the participants and prevent group sessions being dominated by any individual or 
perspective. This allowed participants not to get stuck on looking at the medical harm 
caused to them, but also to be able to focus on finding strategies for change and their 
role in this process.
The Nature of Empowerment
Carr and Kemmis (1986) describe the process of action research as like a 'series of 
cycles', emphasising the fact that the process is not linear or does not follow any 
clear-cut stages. To a large extent this was true with my research, although much 
more so in the early stages before I started my PhD, when as the different stages of 
my campaign unravelled there was no plan on how to move forward.
In relation to developing the MHSHN and the Break Through Programme, much 
more thought went into developing the research in these areas. This meant thinking 
through a research plan and developing a research protocol, setting out the aims and 
objectives of my research, the methodology and some research questions. It is clear to 
me now that because of the flexibihty required to undertake PAR as a collaborative 
exercise, in which research participants are treated as co-researchers, this would 
always mean that the research agenda could not be set in stone. Instead, the research 
process would need to be able to constantly change and adapt, to accommodate the 
shifting agenda's and priorities of the different participants involved. This brings me 
on to the issue of empowerment and the struggle to ensure that the research being 
carried out did not reflect primarily my own agenda, with its central driver and 
outcome the award of a PhD.
This meant in reality that the concept of empowerment was an important issue for me 
right from the outset in undertaking participatory research and was seen as both
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morally and practically necessary to complete the research. This thinking is explored 
in more detail below.
The Road to Self-Empowerment
In order to talk about how I came to my thinking about empowerment in the PhD, it is 
necessary to refer back to my own journey from Victim' of medical harm to survivor. 
There is no doubt that losing my daughter and then having to fight the system for 
answers, in the beginning left me broken and disempowered. The journey back to 
regaining my own power was in fighting my campaign for justice and accountability. 
During this process there was no plan, only the stark choice of whether to lay down 
and give up, or to die, face a living death, or fight back. Neither situation appealed to 
me as it felt on the one hand, to face one's own mortality without ever having been 
diagnosed with a terminal illness. Which seemed to be my fate if I could not establish 
what had happened to my daughter and why? Whilst on the other hand, fighting back 
seemed an impossible task reinforced by the continuous and ever lurking feeling that 
my status and identity as a Black woman and single mother would not assist me in my 
fight for answers.
In this context and faced with these choices, my own survival meant that I decided to 
fight for answers, which meant that I had to climb what I often described in the early 
days of my campaign as a glass mountain. This seemed the only viable way out of my 
situation. And, eventually, as I started to move through the various stages of my 
campaign, in assisting others in the action group and then through my work in the 
Patients Forum trying to create a safer culture of care for all patients, the route to self- 
empowerment gradually emerged.
Empowerment and the PhD
By the time that I came to undertake the PhD, based upon my own experiences of 
being disempowered as someone affected by medical harm, it was vital for me to try 
and find alternative ways to carry out my research based upon a model of 
empowerment. Some of the main ways that I tried to achieve this and the issues I 
encountered are set out below.
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A key starting point of my research was to construct a research design that would 
allow the groups and individuals involved to have some say in how they wanted to 
engage in the research process. I wanted to enable the participants to have a voice and 
to tell their story or articulate the issues from their own perspectives. Empowering the 
groups and the individuals in my research in this way was important because their 
perspectives provided alternative views to powerful dominant perspectives within the 
medical profession. This was also seen as important in a context where those affected 
by medical harm have frequently been labelled, denied a voice and excluded by 
oppressive systems as discussed earlier in the thesis and explored in more detail in 
chapter nine when reflecting on my research findings. Therefore, finding a research 
methodology that could act as a catalyst for generating data and also provide 
alternative views on medical harm from the medical profession was a basis for 
enabling the research participants to achieve their own goals in terms of the process of 
social change. This also provided a way of trying to improve and develop more 
inclusive bottom up systems in the future for harmed patients and patients generally.
In attempting to achieve the above goals, PAR seemed to be an appropriate method. 
Tandon (1989) has argued that,
'PAR is a methodology for an alternate system of knowledge production based 
on the people's role in setting the agendas, participating in the data gathering 
and analysis, and controlling the use of outcomes'.
(cited in Reason 1994: 7)
Developing a Patient’s Agenda on Medical Harm
Given the rationale by Tandon for conducting PAR, an early question for me in 
generating data for my research was to deal with the question of ‘whose agenda’ was 
being addressed when dealing with medical harm and in developing a new patient 
safety culture within the NHS. This question was always going to be an important 
issue for me given my personal campaign, work with other families affected by harm 
in the BHHCAG and my experiences at the Brompton. In Chapter Four (pages 177- 
185), I highlighted the difficulties and barriers I faced in trying to become involved in 
the Trust's clinical governance and patient safety processes and to be part of looking 
at the issues on patient safety from an alternative patients perspective
326
My frustration at this situation is summarised on pages 177-178 of Chapter Four when 
I note that:
'Therefore in setting out below how I  attempted to take forward the issues on 
clinical governance and equality and diversity within the Trust, I  illustrate 
how this was as much about a battle to be able to participate on an equal 
basis as partners with the Trust and patient empowerment, as it was to get the 
Trust to take action in specific areas'.
My feelings of disempowerment in these committees are also illustrated by the quotes 
from my PhD diary made earlier in this chapter about my initial participation on the 
Risk and Complaints Committees at the Brompton. These feelings, ultimately 
culminated in my views about the whole process of participating in the Health Care 
Commission's Annual Health Check and the sense of being in an uneven and 
unbalanced partnership. However, perhaps the biggest act of disempowerment with 
the Brompton was their decision to eject me from all of their committees when the 
Forums were abolished in March 2008. This was despite having the option to allow 
me to continue to be involved as a non-forum member in committees as part of 
compliance with their duty to involve patients and the public under the Health and 
Social Care Act (DOH 2001). My unhappiness about this decision on behalf of the 
Forum, was reflected in a letter to the chair of the Brompton Board, Lord Newton, 
which noted:
'Given the contributions made by Forum members over the last few years, the 
Forum is very disappointed that this opportunity for involvement is now being 
withdrawn. This will leave the Trust without proper PPI at strategic level arid 
in particular exclude the few individuals from BME communities that the 
Forum has demonstrably engaged in Trust activities'.
(Letter to Lord Newton, 25^  ^March 2008)
Given these experiences, I set out in Chapters Six and Seven and in my earher 
.reflections in this chapter on the MHSHN and Break Through Programme, how I 
attempted to create a more level playing field between medical and 'victim' views, by 
generating data from those directly affected by medical harm. My interest in doing 
this was further reinforced by evidence explored in Chapters One, Two and Three of 
the thesis. This has illustrated that whilst medical harm is a contested concept, the
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debate about its nature is currently dominated by the perspectives of the medical 
profession frequently to the exclusion of patient perspectives.
Generating Data from the ’Victims' of Harm
Therefore in terms of an empowerment agenda my starting point was to create the 
conditions for a dialogue to take place from a Victim' perspective, by organising the 
space so that individuals could meet, debate the issues, form alliances, gain mutual 
support and begin to develop collective strategies for change. In order to support this 
process, the research design had to incorporate mechanisms for supporting the 
network and the Break Through Programme, but also to go beyond simply producing 
data for my PhD. This meant providing the conditions for the groups and individuals 
to be empowered in some way, to think, act and to speak out for themselves. In 
working with traumatised and vulnerable groups, in a research process. Hart and Bond 
(1995) however, caution against falsely raising hopes about speedy personal and 
structural changes. A commitment to empowerment is therefore seen to be about:
'policies and practices which actively seek to shift the balance o f power 
towards those who are oppressed by, for example, sharing information 
encouraging partnership in decision making, and enabling active 
participation'.
(Frost and Stein 1989: 142 in Hart and Bond 1995: 67)
I was able to do this as illustrated in Chapters Six and Seven, by organising, 
facilitating and running meetings and eventually taking the lead in organising the 
conference on behalf of AvMA and the network entitled 'The Patients' Agenda for 
Safety and Justice'. This conference was seen as groundbreaking by AvMA and 
network members and was attended by up to a hundred individuals, representing key 
policy making bodies such as the NPSA as well as those affected by medical harm.
For this conference I was able to produce the materials, a special edition newsletter 
entitled 'The Patients Perspectives on Change' setting out the agenda for change from 
the self-help groups in the MHSHN. I was also able to produce a post-conference 
newsletter for the participants at the conference, entitled 'User Perspectives on 
Change'. With regards to the Break Through Programme, I described earlier how I 
was able to adapt the agenda of the Programme to incorporate the more political
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views and feelings of participants about system change. This led to me setting out the 
personal stories of individuals affected by harm in a Break Through newsletter paid 
for out of my research grant. This felt like a more collaborative way to proceed with 
the data generated from the programme. I was then able to distribute this newsletter at 
the conference, giving Programme participants a way of feeding their views into the 
agenda. I was able to arrange for a number of the members of the MHSHN to speak at 
the conference itself, as well as to reserve some places for individuals from the Break 
Through Programme. After the conference, all of these newsletters were circulated 
through AvMA's membership base made up of a wide variety of groups and 
individuals interested both in the area of medical harm or affected by it.
Placing ’Victim' Stories in the Public Domain
Consequently the research generated through the MHSHN and the Break Through 
Programme carried out in partnership with those affected by harm was able to serve a 
dual purpose. It allowed individuals and groups to have a dialogue between 
themselves, both to tell their stories from their own perspectives as well as to be part 
of developing a more collective agenda for change from the Victims' perspective on 
medical harm. It also allowed knowledge to be placed in the public domain as part of 
a wider debate on tackling medical harm.
Gaventa and Cornwall in examining the relationships between knowledge and power, 
have argued that:
'Undeniably one of the most important contributions o f participatory action 
research to empowerment and social change is in fact in the knowledge 
dimension. Through a more open and democratic process new categories of 
knowledge based on local realities, are framed and given voice'.
(Gaventa & Cornwall 2008: 179)
However whilst pointing to:
'the importance of knowledge as a power resource both within and outside 
formal decision-making processes' (Gaventa and Cornwall (2008: 186), they 
also highlight 'the need to go beyond participatory research as a strategy for 
voice and participation but also as one for 'cognitive justice' which affirms 
'the right o f different systems of knowledge to exist as part o f dialogue'.
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(Visvanathan 2005 in (Gaventa and Cornwall (2008: 186)
How this is done is seen to pose enduring questions, but Eyben et al (2006) argue that 
linking participation with power provides a way for opening up important questions 
about power and the way that it operates in society and impacts upon different groups. 
As argued below:
'Participatory approaches lead to questions about how different kinds of 
knowledge and values shape the rules of the game and policy choices. What 
are the societal and political processes through which power operates that 
inform whose voice is heard and whose is excluded? This then leads to asking 
what is power? Is it just about someone making other people act against their 
best interests? Or, is it also the glue that keeps society together? What are the 
connections between power and social change?'
(Eyben et al 2006: 1)
Some of these questions are discussed further in the next chapter when looking at my 
research findings and what these findings might mean in terms of developing an 
empowerment agenda in the future in relation to those affected by medical harm. 
However, in terms of my research it is probably fair to say that in terms of the nature 
of empowerment, the production of my PhD research on medical harm can probably 
be seen as forming the basis for empowerment and social change. In this sense 
through a transformation of consciousness and creating the space for alternative 
perspectives in knowledge production, enabling ’otherwise marginalised people to 
exercise greater voice and agency, and work to transform social and power relations 
in the process' (Gaventa and Cornwall 2008: 176).
The Challenges of Undertaking PAR
Lastly, I finish this chapter by looking at some of the main challenges adopting a PAR 
approach raised for me in the field work process. It is certainly my view that the 
challenges of undertaking participatory action research as part of a PhD are 
considerable and throw up a range of issues.
Firstly, I would argue that there is an issue of the practicalities versus idealism of 
undertaking PAR. As stated previously, creating more equal relationships in my 
research with my research subjects was a key goal. However in practice this meant 
juggling and working with the tensions implicit in negotiating different agendas and 
with empowerment as a goal, attempting to shift the balance of power towards those
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affected by harm, perceived in my research as oppressed groups. This situation meant 
constructing a research design that could act as a stage for generating research data, 
but it also required this medium to be a platform that was valued by potential 
participants in meeting their own needs. In order to develop the appropriate design, I 
had to give considerable thought to what I felt were the agendas of the research 
participants and then to build this into the research process. This led me to decide 
upon the idea of building a network to include groups campaigning in the area of 
medical harm. This met the goals of these groups to develop a wider collective agenda 
on medical harm, looking at the issues from a patient and public perspective. It also 
tied in with interests at AvMA to enable greater participation of patients and patient 
organisations in the wider NHS patient safety agenda.
However, whilst the idea of building a network was very well received by the self- 
help groups who became members of it, holding the network together and developing 
it as a vehicle in which to generate research data required considerable skills on my 
part. This meant having the skills and confidence to build trust with the highly 
experienced and politicised groups in order to encourage their participation. I also had 
to be able to hold the network together administratively and to be able to facilitate and 
support meetings in a way that allowed a dialogue to develop and concrete goals 
based on changes to the system to emerge. This process also needed to be constructive 
for the range of groups involved, in order to make involvement in the network seem 
worthwhile. This was certainly not an easy task to manage and was only possible, I 
would argue, because I was an experienced activist in my own right and an 
insider/outsider researcher in understanding issues of medical harm from both a 
personal, political and well informed academic perspective. In reflecting upon my role 
in building the network, I noted after one meeting:
7 feel I  have acted as an important catalyst in bringing the groups together, 
because of the way that I  have established one to one relationships with them 
and got to know them a bit and their story. I  think also because I  am in the 
same position as them, it helps to build trust in communicating with each 
other’.
(PhD Diary 13-5-2004)
An additional factor in this process and a source of stress for me was in ensuring I 
was able to balance the requirements of gaining a PhD, with the political goals and
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needs of the research participants. In this area, Meyer's (1993) has drawn attention to 
the danger of action research directed towards an academic qualification, running the 
risk of becoming manipulative in order to enable the researcher to achieve their 
academic goals.
Both of these issues were in fact something that needed to be managed carefully by 
me in terms of the network building process. Firstly in terms of my academic position, 
it certainly proved challenging in trying not to unduly influence the network, whilst 
trying to ensure I was able to carry out my research. In practice this meant I had to be 
flexible with my research goals. Initially I had decided to try and produce a book of 
some type that allowed me to understand more about the issues of medical harm firom 
a patient's perspective by writing up some personal stories and producing some case- 
studies on some of the organisations in the network. Trying to take this forward was 
both time consuming and worrying for me in terms of whether I could get the support 
of the participants in the network. My PhD diary reflects some of this anxiety when 
first preparing to discuss this work with the network. For example I note on the 21-7- 
2004:
'For first time formally putting my research on the agenda, it was quite 
important to get AvMA and the groups to understand and agree to support me 
at this point, as this was the last meeting before the summer and from 
October, my second year I  want to hit the ground running on my field  
research
I  prepared quite carefully in order that people could understand where I  was 
coming fro m  '
Firstly, I  prepared a short briefing paper on action research methodology and 
how I  wanted to use it with the groups. Then I  agreed to go into AvMA outside 
of my normal schedule to meet with X  and X  [my case supervisor and AvMA 
chief Executive], to talk about the meeting and my research '.
My notes concluded on the meeting regarding the research that.- 'The meeting also 
enthusiastically endorsed the idea of a conference and of the book and agreed to 
collaborate'.
However despite this initial enthusiasm by network members, the shifting attendance 
and priorities of members eventually made it obvious to me that producing a book 
within a desirable timetable for my PhD was not feasible. This situation was also
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compounded by trying to get ethical approval for my research by the University 
Ethics Committee which was leading to the boundaries of the research design shifting 
and being influenced in order that I could hurry up and formally get approval to 
undertake my research. It gradually became clear that in order to take the book 
proposal forward, this would shift the focus of the networks' goals much more 
towards my own research and PhD agenda. This was because I would have to put in a 
lot of time to complete the book, which in many respects would then detract from my 
ability to facilitate and support broader network goals.
I therefore decided it was better to go with the flow of network meetings in generating 
data that could then feed into my PhD research. This meant focusing on identifying 
key themes coming out of the meetings and agreeing to produce a document that 
enabled the groups to put forward their own perspectives for addressing medical harm 
at the conference held in partnership with AvMA on May 9* 2006.
In addition to managing these dynamics with the MHSHN, I also had the challenge of 
managing the process with the Break Through Programme. Gathering data from the 
programme was important because one of the decisions made at the outset by the 
MHSHN was to work mainly with groups rather than with individuals. This posed a 
bit of a problem for me in terms of my research goals in also wanting to capture the 
experiences of those affected by harm who were not involved in groups. Therefore in 
order to broaden the nature of the research data being collected, I also decided to 
explore the idea of holding some events for individuals affected by harm. This meant 
exploring from a PAR approach how this process would not only allow me to collect 
research data, but also give something tangible back to the participants. Developing 
this research was also complicated by the difficulties of getting ethical approval and 
therefore in trying to decide what type of event was possible.
Eventually a decision was taken to run a support event under the auspices of AvMA 
and then to try and generate data at the same time on individual personal stories. 
However, as mentioned previously, the goals of the event in terms of just 
concentrating on the support side were not universally popular. Therefore in order to 
respond to the needs of participants to articulate their concerns more politically, I 
agreed to produce the Break Through Programme newsletter and to circulate it at the 
May 2006 conference. On reflection, whilst I can honestly say I was happy to do this
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in terms of trying to empower Programme participants, equally I have to admit this 
added considerably to the work required in delivering this event.
Overall, in reflecting upon some of these challenges, what is clear to me is that 
undertaking PAR is complex, and time consuming and requires considerable 
resources in holding everything together, particularly if doing it for the first time. This 
is primarily because the research agenda and its benefits are driven by the participants 
in it and do not belong solely to the researcher. However I have no regrets about using 
this methodology and believe it holds great potential for continuing to generate 
research data, because of its collaborative nature with under-researched groups, whilst 
empowering and giving back something to all in the research process.
In Conclusion
Overall in this chapter what I have tried to do is to reflect upon some of the processes 
involved in undertaking a PAR approach in my PhD. In looking at my journey into 
action research, I have tried to illustrate that by the time I came to PAR as a PhD 
student, I had already adopted and acquired an ability to be a participatory action 
researcher. In this sense I had already partly arrived at PAR through an organic 
process of my own, by accident rather than design. This coming to PAR was based 
upon an emotional, spiritual and political journey in which I somehow exercised a 
choice not to remain a 'victim' of medical harm, but to take the long road towards 
survival. This journey led to a way of being in the circumstances I faced in which I 
had in many ways to dispassionately gather and generate information, whilst acting 
upon it. In order to be hstened to and heard, I had to be able to critically reflect upon 
my feelings and to work with my own deeply personal and subjective emotions and 
experiences. At the same time I also had to learn to stand back and be detached 
enough to be an advocate, to campaign and collaborate with others in a process of 
change. These skills provided the context for me to be able to adopt a PAR approach 
in my PhD and in working with the MHSHN and the Break Through Programme.
In reflecting upon the process of PAR, I have tried to illustrate that this methodology 
was both a way of empowering those affected by medical harm, but also a means to 
give voice to user perspectives on harm. The process was also about my own self­
empowerment. In collaborating with others to generate alternative perspectives on
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medical harm to that of the medical profession, I was creating a platform for a broader 
debate in which patients and those affected by harm could be part of, by shaping a 
new safer culture of care. This was the world that most people I worked with in the 
MHSHN and Break Through Programme wanted to create, which would mean that 
what had happened to them could not happen to others again in the future.
In the next chapter, I come on to look at my research findings and the nature of the 
data generated and what these findings may be able to contribute to the debate on 
medical harm and patient empowerment in the future.
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Chapter Nine
Medical Harm: the Research Evidence and Findings 
Introduction
This chapter concludes the thesis by looking at the nature of the evidence gathered 
and the contribution of the research to current understanding and knowledge in the 
area of medical harm. In doing this, consideration will first be given to looking at a 
number of areas. These relate to the nature of the data gathered through the research 
methods and the strengths and limitations of these as evidence. This will include 
exploring the significance of recent policy reviews included as evidence in the thesis, 
alongside the research material and any critiques that can be made of them in a thesis 
critical of expert opinion. Some thought will also be given to looking at how different 
strands of data were combined in the analysis and the process of continual 
engagement between theory and practice. The chapter will then come on to look at the 
specific contribution of the research findings to a better understanding of the nature of 
medical harm and the need for a new patient safety culture in the NHS. This will 
include thinking about the implications of the research findings for the existing 
literature on the medical profession and the context in which medical harm occurs and 
is dealt with. In particular, questions will be explored as to whether the research 
findings provide evidence of the continuing dominance of medicine as a profession as 
described by Freidson, in relation to medical harm. This will include exploring 
whether any additional evidence exists that broadens this debate concerning processes 
linked to a wider political and legal apparatus.
In the light of these arguments, the chapter finishes the thesis by setting out some 
conclusions on the need for a new holistic model for looking at medical harm and 
patient safety based upon patient empowerment.
The Nature of the Data
The research data included in the thesis as mentioned in the previous chapter came 
fi*om three sources and provided a complex and diverse way of attempting to 
capture the experiences of under-researched and marginalised individuals and
336
groups of people affected by medical harm. A mixture of methods and approaches 
were used in the research process. This included participation, participant 
observation in a more detached mode, interviews with victims of medical harm, 
use of a questionnaire, attendance at formal meetings of which I was a member, 
use of storytelling and workshop methodology, considerable use of official 
documentary materials, personal documents written by victims of medical harm 
and their websites. The sensitive nature of the issues being researched influenced 
my decision to use a variety of methods, generated through an action research 
process that would hopefully enable me to capture data in different ways.
A key aim with this approach was to attempt some form of methodological 
triangulation (Mason 2002), using different methods in tandem with others, to see 
how well they corroborated each other or exposed gaps in the data being 
generated. There is a strong emphasis in the evidence presented in the thesis to 
present the world as seen by the under-researched and marginalised groups who 
are often the subjects of medical harm. Less emphasis necessarily has been given 
to the "official" medical perspective. Gaventa and Cornwall argue 'dominant 
knowledge obscures or under-privileges other forms of knowing and the voices of 
other knowers' (2008: 178). Ultimately my aim was therefore to try and generate 
'other forms of knowing' (Gaventa and Cornwall 2008: 178) and new forms of 
understanding from that generated through the dominant positivist research 
tradition that could contribute to the patient safety agenda. Participatory research 
in this sense was intended to emphasise the 'importance of listening to and for 
different versions and voices' (Gaventa and Cornwall 2008: 179).
The importance of identifying wider forms of knowledge and practice than that 
produced through traditional biomedical research and randomised controlled trials 
for addressing medical errors, has also been identified as crucial by important 
'guru's' of the patient safety world such as Leape et al 2002). They argue:
'Policymakers must consider the entire experience with safety practices, 
both in health care and in other industries, when deciding which practices 
should be recommended for widespread use. Evidence from randomized 
trials is important information, but is neither sufficient nor necessary for 
acceptance of a practice'.
(Leape et al 2002: 507)
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In conducting my research at the Brompton, this meant firstly drawing upon data 
collated originally as part of my own campaign and participation in NHS 
complaints procedures and the Evans Inquiry as a parent. Considerable written 
evidence was assembled for and by the Evans Inquiry, and this forms part of the 
evidence presented in chapter four of the thesis. I was then able to go on to draw 
upon my experience as a parent and committee member in the Parents Liaison 
Group (PLG). At the beginning of this process I was able to undertake 
documentary analysis of various minutes and documents associated with this 
process. But once I started my PhD, I was also able to draw upon my observations 
and reflections of the committee process as documented in my PhD diary for the 
last two meetings of the group in 2004.
Later as my role changed at the Brompton, to become chair of the Patients Forum 
and as an observer on the Trust Board, I was able to generate and draw upon 
different types of data as a participant observer in a range of committee processes, 
for example in Forum meetings, as well as meetings of the Brompton Board, 
Audit and Risk, Complaints and Equality and Diversity Committee. Here I made 
direct observations of the ways in which patient safety issues were handled by an 
NHS Trust, participated in discussions of some of the issues involved, and 
collected documents related to these governance processes. These committees also 
generated a range of documents that I was able to analyse, such as reports, 
minutes and wider policy documents, as well as to analyse reflections in my diary 
of these processes and upon the events in which I had participated.
With regards to the data gathering process through the Medical Harm Self-Help 
Network, my role in the process was rather different. This was a piece of 
participatory action research in which I both created the network and moderated 
its activities. This meant that I was both organiser of the meetings, occasional 
chair and minute taker and in relation to conference events was also considerably 
involved in the preparation, as well as generating records of the activities. 
Therefore in this process I was more inextricably linked both to generating the 
data and recording it, although minutes were ultimately agreed and approved by 
the wider meeting. Again, I was both a participant and a participant observer. In 
generating data firom the network, I was also able to draw upon other documents 
to analyse the experiences of group members. This meant carrying out an internet
338
search and analysis of individual web sites and the information they contained of 
groups in the network. I then compared this with information which group 
members had given me, I was also able to interview group members about their 
campaigns and to read legal documents and reports on wider inquiries that some 
groups had achieved through their campaigns. Again, I was using the method of 
triangulation, and combining data from a variety of sources, in order to build up a 
picture of an action research process by those affected by medical harm.
In the Break Through Programme, the emphasis of my research was slightly 
different. The focus was more about looking directly at the personal experiences 
of medical harm of the participants, and then both “telling their story” and 
interacting with the facilitators and participants in the event to learn and move 
forward in relation to the harrowing experiences which the participants had gone 
through. At the outset, through the use of a questionnaire, I was able to gather 
information on the personal stories of individuals and to accept these accounts at 
face value. It was very important to treat these accounts seriously as valid 
accounts from the point of view of the social actor.
However some of the data from the programme was also generated through the 
various group processes that individuals collectively participated in. In these 
processes my role was to act as a presenter and facilitator as well as to listen and 
to observe and to document individual responses. In this context, data was 
generated in small groups with individuals talking and sharing about their 
personal experiences and in wider group sessions with discussions, brainstorming 
and feedback sessions. With regards to recording data, all three presenters did this 
and it was agreed amongst us that it would not be appropriate for me to tape 
sessions, as this was deemed intrusive. Data was therefore recorded through the 
use of flipchart notes and notes discretely recorded by the different facilitators in 
the small group sessions they chaired or in wider group meetings. Again, the 
result was the triangulation of data based upon the subjective views of the 
programme participants, combined with observations made in the course of the 
weekend event, and the dynamics of the interaction between the event leaders and 
the participants.
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Given the variety of methods used in the research process, it is useful to explore 
some of the strengths and limitations of the data produced as research evidence. 
Firstly, the idea of drawing upon a range of methods was seem as important in 
strengthening the data, by identifying a broader range of accounts on the subject 
of medical harm that incorporated both official 'expert' perspectives in reports and 
minutes as well as 'victim' accounts.
In relation to drawing upon public reports, documents and minutes of committee 
meetings, it was recognised that whilst these provided important 'official' 
accounts, about issues to do with the patient safety agenda, these also contained an 
inherent bias. This was because these reports were mainly produced without the 
inclusion of patient and public perspectives and even more importantly of those 
affected by medical harm. For example, whilst the Evans Inquiry Report could be 
viewed as an important independent critique of the Brompton's practice, as 
outlined in chapter four, the findings were also strongly criticised as not going far 
enough by many families and of excluding them firom participating properly in the 
process. Similar criticisms were made in the MHSHN, about the Inquiry reports 
on inquiries participated in by groups such as the Richard Neale Action and 
Support Group and the Leicester Epilepsy Concern Parents and Carers Group. 
Despite these criticisms fi-om the groups, these reports were still viewed as 
providing invaluable data about the experiences of harmed patients.
With regards to the use of data fi-om the official minutes of meetings, these can 
also be viewed as problematic because of the in-built bias they contained. For 
example the minutes of the meetings at the Brompton, (see arguments set out in 
chapters four and eight) illustrate that meetings were dominated and largely 
conducted fi-om a Trust perspective and were criticised for not taking a partnership 
approach to the issues. This meant that the minutes invariably reflected the fact 
that meetings were dominated numerically by Trust members and because of the 
imbalance of power in the process, could not properly reflect the views of lay 
participants like myself and other group members. This imbalance of power was 
exacerbated even further as described in chapter four, when Mrs Fleet-Pahner, a 
full time carer to her disabled daughter and not used to participating in 
professional meetings constantly struggled to get her views across and properly 
recorded in PLG meetings. In contrast these criticisms about bias could of course
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be applied regarding the dangers of bias in my own record keeping with the 
minutes of the MHSHN meetings. This was despite attempts to mitigate this 
situation by keeping a reflective diary and ensuring those attending meetings 
collectively agreed minutes.
Notwithstanding the limitations in drawing upon more official accounts, these 
documents were seen as important in providing evidence about medical harm and 
the patient safety agenda. However, in order to balance out the weaknesses 
inherent in this data, it was also crucial for me to be able to draw upon personal 
accounts and stories firom those directly affected by harm. Given the lack of 
research data of these types of accounts in the sociological literature, it was 
important that my research was able to find appropriate methods for eliciting this 
information and to give them meaning in their own right. In this sense my own 
role was just to act as a tool in enabling individuals and groups to speak out and to 
enable them to state what they saw as 'real' because that was simply how they felt 
they had experienced the situation.
Lastly, in considering the nature of the research data and its strengths and 
weaknesses, it is important to acknowledge my own role in the processes and how 
this may have weakened or strengthened the evidence. In the context of my 
research, this meant being able to observe issues and to contribute to the debate 
fi-om a patient perspective in areas where this would not normally have happened, 
therefore generating new perspectives in this area. Also by working with those 
affected by harm, my very status as a fellow 'victim' of harm was able to act as an 
important catalyst in creating spaces so that data that might not have been 
generated in other ways could emerge. In chapter eight, I reflected upon the 
importance of my being able to generate a critical perspective when looking at the 
issues and to be able to get a balance between subjective involvement and critical 
detachment. This was always seen as vital in my role as action researcher and 
therefore in helping to strengthen the validity of the evidence produced.
The Significance of Policy Reviews as Evidence
In examining the nature of the data and the evidence produced in the previous section, 
it is also important to say something about the significance of the policy reviews set
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out as evidence alongside the research material in the thesis. This begs the question of 
why these reviews might be important in a thesis that has been so critical of expert 
opinion. Many of the reviews rely upon expert medical evidence as the basis for 
investigating the matters being inquired into. Use of evidence from the reviews 
therefore raises the question of how expert medical evidence and patients' views of 
their experiences can be brought together in such inquiries.
This can be answered by looking at the context and background to some of the major 
reviews and inquiries recently conducted with regards to clinical failings in the NHS. 
In chapter three, a number of high profile inquiries are cited which have subsequently 
led to major changes in patient safety and professional regulation. These inquiries 
relate both to the events at the Bristol Royal Infirmary and to Harold Shipman, but 
also to the Ayling, Neale and Kerr/Haslam investigations. The latter investigations, 
whose recommendations were set out in 'Safeguarding Patients' (2007), is currently 
driving major changes to professional regulation alongside the White Paper 'Trust, 
Assurance and Safety - The Regulation of Health Professionals in the 21®^ Century' 
(2007). In chapter six, reference is also made to the Department of Health's Report 
that looked into the concerns raised about Dr Andrew Holton and his diagnosis and 
treatment of epilepsy and in chapter four to the Evans Inquiry.
This thesis argues that what is important to remember with all of these inquiries is that 
they arose out of the personal experiences of harmed patients and that these 
experiences mainly involved groups of families who had fought to get these inquires 
held, often for many years. The inquiry reports can therefore be seen not just as 
representing official expert opinion, but also the issues and concerns of those affected 
by medical harm. The inquiries and the reports produced by them have therefore 
formed part of a process in which families have attempted to challenge the medical 
profession about their care and treatment and to seek wider and more independent 
means for getting their concerns and voices heard.
Whilst it is argued that these inquiries can be seen as part of an expression of protest 
by harmed groups, it must also be acknowledged that some of the groups that had 
fought for these inquiries did not feel that the reports produced had gone far enough. 
In this respect they had raised issues about whether the inquiries had the appropriate 
terms of reference or had properly included them in the process of looking at their
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concerns. Other questions were also raised about the independence of the inquiries 
and how much political influence may have motivated what the inquiry remit was. 
These were issues that were raised by various groups in the MHSHN such as the 
Richard Neale Action and Support Group and the Leicester Epilepsy Concern Parents 
and Carers Group, as well as myself, representing the views of the Brompton and 
Harefield Heart Children's Action Group about the Evans Inquiry.
Given these issues, it is useful to set out in more detail, some of the different types of 
evidence that may be submitted to these inquiries and the difficulties this presents in 
terms of wider legitimacy for different groups. To illustrate these issues I have drawn 
upon the example of the Evans Inquiry which was carried out for and accepted by the 
Royal Brompton and Harefield NHS Trust (RB&HT) whilst also being strongly 
criticised by many of the families involved in the process. In terms of the remit of the 
Inquiry, it was set up by the RB&HT but funded by the Department of Health. The 
Inquiry was taken forward by a panel that was chosen by the Brompton, but consisted 
of a range of people employed independently from the Brompton.
The panel consisted of medical consultants, lay members and a lawyer and drew upon 
a range of specialist information from various experts both academic, lay and medical. 
A key part of the Inquiry was to examine allegations that cardiac care had not been 
adequately provided; this required expert medical assessment by cardiac consultants 
not employed by the hospital. Information was also provided by experts about other 
areas to do with the law, the broader policy context and areas such as complaints. 
With regards to individuals participating in the Inquiry, this consisted both of families 
with concerns about their children's care and two voluntary groups (The Down's Heart 
Group (DHG), and the Down's Syndrome Association (DSA) who specifically 
represented a number of families with children with Down's Syndrome. A number of 
doctors concerned with treating the families also gave evidence.
The Inquiry panel report was tasked with considering the complaints and concerns of 
parents whose children had received paediatric cardiac services at the RB&HT 
between 1987 and 1999, but it had no remit to look at medical negligence in the legal 
sense of the word. In publishing its findings, the report concentrated on a range of 
themes that had emerged in relation to the issues raised by families going to the 
Inquiry and made 120 recommendations for the RB&HT to change its practice. The
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report was accepted in full by the hospital. In terms of acceptance of the Evans 
Inquiry Report from the families going to the Inquiry, there was a more mixed 
reaction. The two groups representing families with Down's Syndrome both accepted 
the report, whilst the BHHCAG did not.
The reasons for these different responses from the families and their representatives 
were varied. With the DHG and the DSA, they had gone to the Inquiry to raise 
concerns more generally about alleged discrimination in the treatment and care of 
children with Down's Syndrome. These groups both felt able to accept the report 
because they felt that it had gone far enough in looking at the issues for them to be 
reasonably satisfied, even if all of their concerns had not been dealt with. With the 
families in the BHHCAG however, they were concerned with a number of issues. 
Firstly, a key issue was that the families had wanted the Inquiry to be able to look at 
issues of negligence in their own personal cases and to publish any concerns in 
relation to this. In this respect, they wanted the report to be able to hold individuals 
and the Trust to account. A further factor concerning families in the Action Group 
was that they questioned the whole way that the Inquiry had been set up and its 
independence as there had been no discussion with the group about its terms of 
reference or membership. Another issue was that it was felt that the time constraints 
allowing families to participate had been set in such a way as to exclude some 
families from being involved. Question marks were also raised about the ability of 
families to be able to put their concerns across without legal support and without 
being able to hear the evidence given from clinicians and to have an opportunity to 
challenge this.
Overall, therefore, whilst it can be argued that the Evans Inquiry Report did represent 
the concerns of some harmed patients, it also raised a number of questions with 
others. Some of these problems arose from trying to bring together the expert medical 
evidence with the concerns or testimonials being expressed by the groups representing 
families. The assessment of the expert evidence took place without input from the 
patient groups who felt excluded from the process. A key issue for many of the 
families in accepting the report, were clearly the questions they had about the 
independence of the Inquiry and its terms of reference. Having said this, I would still 
argue that most of the families including those in the Action Group, did feel that some
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of the issues raised in the report were legitimate and did meet some of their concerns 
regarding wider questions about treatment issues. Clearly for many families, the 
report did not go anywhere near far enough in terms of their own individual cases and 
in examining the extent to which negligence may or may not have occurred.
Having discussed this example, it would be fair to say that with other Inquiries such 
as Bristol and Shipman, these did appear to have more widespread acceptance in 
terms of their findings by the families concerned. This assumption was confirmed to 
some extent by the chair of the Bristol Heart Children's Action Group who had led the 
campaign for the Bristol Inquiry and who attended some network meetings. She 
certainly gave every indication that she was happy with the Inquiry's findings but she 
did also point out that this was not the case for all the families involved with the 
process. With regards to the families involved with the Shipman Inquiry, when 
contacted about membership of the MHSHN, someone in the group representing the 
families who went to the Inquiry indicated that she felt that their issues had been dealt 
with by the Inquiry. She therefore felt that the families concerned wanted to move on 
and therefore declined the invitation to attend network meetings.
This suggests that the way an Inquiry is set up, its perceived independence and terms 
of reference and the way in which expert evidence is put together, are important 
factors in that Inquiry having credibility. Inquiries such as Shipman, where a large 
number of patients had died and which were set up by parliamentary approval, may be 
somewhat different fi-om cases in which substandard care was provided but did not 
always result in death and which were set up locally by a trust. Overall it is difficult to 
say with more certainty with the inquiries mentioned above, how famihes associated 
with them really felt about the findings and how satisfied they were with the outcome. 
More detailed research would be needed to look at this area in any depth. However, 
my research suggests that despite criticisms of some official inquiries into clinical 
failings, that they do have merit as one form of evidence in representing the views of 
those affected by medical harm in a context in which these views have been largely 
excluded. The evidence of families combined with expert medical evidence, examined 
independently by fellow professionals not involved in delivering the treatment is 
important. Although a wider question that still has to be considered is how 
independent such medical peer evaluation can be, particularly if inquiries are set up
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by trusts that are themselves being investigated. Ultimately this situation suggests that 
in order to enable these inquiries to have more credibility with those affected by harm, 
more consideration needs to be given to getting the balance right between involving 
lay and medical experts in an investigation in a way that is completely independent of 
a Trust being investigated.
What is also useful to note in the context of this debate is that many of the formal 
avenues existing for families to get their concerns addressed have been strongly 
criticised for failing to do this properly. As chapter one and three set out, this has been 
the case with legal avenues, which effectively restrict access to many individuals 
affected by harm. They also rely heavily on medical opinion to meet the Bolam test 
(the legal criteria for proving medical negligence and set out in more detail in chapter 
one). Other avenues such as the complaint procedures have also been strongly 
criticised for their lack of independence. Individuals are therefore frequently left with 
official reports or court judgements on their cases that they feel do not provide a full 
picture in terms of the issues involved. Given the context, in which many 
investigations take place and the limitations of these inquiries, those affected by harm 
frequently have to make do with the limited options at hand. Therefore despite the 
limitations of official forums in enabling those affected by harm to get their voices 
properly heard, these avenues have often provided the only way for criticisms to be 
aired about the medical profession.
In relation to the focus on other policy reports in the thesis, it is important to 
recognise in terms of the evidence that they represent that these reports have 
frequently been independently commissioned from the medical profession to gain 
evidence about clinical or other failings in healthcare. For example 'Safety First' 
(2006) was published after a review into patient safety by the chief medical officer, 
that was commissioned because of considerable criticisms of the NPSA by the Select 
Committee on Public Accounts in 2006. These policy reports have therefore been 
treated in the thesis as broader critiques about medical harm, clinical failings and 
patient safety that have originated independently of the medical profession.
346
Combining Different Strands of Data in the Analysis
As discussed in chapter five (page 212) on the methodology for my research, I 
decided to reject a purely quantitative or qualitative approach in favour of carrying 
out participatory action research for the PhD. In practice as discussed in chapter five, 
participatory action research, PAR can involve both the use of qualitative and 
quantitative data, which frequently then includes opportunities for more innovative 
and emergent forms and processes of collaboration to emerge (see Reason's 
discussion about this on pages 208-209 of the thesis). Thus in my own research, 
drawing upon a mixed range of research methods to triangulate the data meant 
combining data both firom questionnaires, interviews and through documentary 
analysis, as well as drawing upon a range of activities such as network meetings, 
storytelling and running a community-based workshop. This process was complex 
because of having to manage the mixed methods involved. It was further complicated 
because it had to allow for the methodology to be driven by the research respondents 
and not just imposed in terms of my own research plan and agenda.
Developing a range of research methods and experimenting with 'novel data 
collection techniques' however, has been seen as important by feminist researchers in 
producing data that challenges dominant epistemological positions (Reid and Frisby 
2008: 96). 'Diaries and journals; dialogic and interactive interview formats; 
participatory workshops; poetry, photography, fihn and art; practices such as co­
writing are just some examples of 'counter-practices being explored' (Reid and Frisby 
2008: 99). Brown et al (2008) in a paper entitled 'An epistemology of patient safety 
research' strongly advocates the advantages of adopting a mixed method design. The 
use of both qualitative and quantitative methods is advocated in helping to explain 
research findings, generate theory and contextualise results. With respect to the 
conclusions drawn fi*om the research, they argue that 'findings of one type are 
reinforced when they are corroborated by findmgs of a different type' (Brown et al 
2008: 180). They further suggest this approach brings added rigour to a research 
design, by pointing out, 'where the results fi*om different methods conflict, 
triangulation may prevent over-hasty inferences that might have been made had 
results been obtained firom measurement of a single end point' (Brown et al 2008: 
180).
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With the MHSHN, at the outset, the initial focus was to concentrate on the 
experiences of the groups in the network. The aim being to generate data through the 
network as well as to adopt a case-study approach with the different groups involved 
and to pull these profiles into a book that could be published on the experiences of the 
groups. The intention with a book, was to adopt an approach that enabled me to get at 
the subjective perceptions and interpretation of reality of the participants in the 
process, rather than to adopt a stance as an external neutral observer. The emphasis 
was therefore on comprehending the experiences of the individuals in the network and 
the meanings attached to these experiences and getting at a more insider perspective 
on medical harm. This contrasted with adopting a more traditional 'explanatory' 
approach to gathering data by seeking to answer the 'what' and 'why' questions in 
research (Reason 1988: 79-81).
However, given the difficulties of the timescales with my PhD and getting ethical 
approval, the focus eventually shifted in terms of data gathering with the MHSHN, to 
allowing the network meetings to form the medium through which the stories from 
the groups could slowly emerge. In this way, through political debate and dialogue 
about the issues, the beginnings of a "bottom-up" set of ideas began to evolve. These 
perspectives slowly formed a starting point in terms of an alternative critique on 
medical harm, but at the same time also began to raise questions about the type and 
specificity of data emerging through this process.
What was becoming clear through a process of dialogue in network meetings was that 
the groups involved represented particular types of experiences of medical harm. 
They were all experienced campaigning groups, who had either formed out of highly 
politicised campaigns or since their group was established, had developed a strong 
political agenda for change. Many of the groups had also formed out of the 
experiences of a cluster of famihes either around a particular doctor or hospital or 
around a particular issue such as MRS A, vaccinations or epilepsy. So what was 
apparent with the perspectives or stance emerging on the issues from the network was 
that they tended to be based more upon a collective experience of medical harm, 
rather than on the experiences of lone individuals not in groups. The groups did 
however throw up strong views about the nature of power in the construction of
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medical harm, which is explored in more detail later in the chapter when discussing 
the research findings.
This situation therefore threw up the value of broadening my research sample in order 
to try and generate different types of data on the experiences of those affected by 
harm. The rationale being that this would then allow me to test out some of the ideas 
emerging through the data firom the network and to discover gaps in the arguments. 
This also meant finding an appropriate research method, which would allow me to 
include individuals not in groups in the research process as a way of gathering 
additional, but different types of data reflecting the perspectives of individuals 
affected by medical harm. This led me to decide to use a questionnaire in relation to 
gathering data with participants on the Break Through Programme (the details of 
which are set out in chapter seven). The aim in this part of the study was to allow me 
to first gather some basic details about the stories of participants. These could then be 
understood in more detail through participants talking about their experiences of harm 
in the small group sessions built into the Programme.
Peter Reason has argued that gathering data through storytelling as a hermeneutic 
method of inquiry, is an important part of the processes of PAR research (as discussed 
in chapter five, pages 212-213). Writers such as Berger (2004) have also argued that 
the value has been recognised of individuals telling their story in order to enable one 
to get a better understanding of the subjective meaning of events. This is particularly 
valuable in looking at the experiences of under-researched groups. In looking at the 
experiences of the immigration of woman as they viewed it, Berger notes in terms of 
the medium of storytelling that:
'Participation in research as informants offers women whose viewpoint is
rarely heard an opportunity to voice their opinions and be acknowledged'.
(Berger and Malkinson 2000 in Berger 2004: 28)
Writers such as Klein & Janoff-Bulman have also seen storytelling as an important 
medium for gathering data from traumatised groups. In looking at the stories of child 
abuse survivors, they noted 'The stories we tell represent who we are and how we 
view ourselves' (1996: 53). They also concluded that whilst a single exploratory 
investigation of narrative construction in their research did not provide any definitive
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answers, they hoped it provided some preliminary insights, into the inner world of the 
child abuse survivor. This is in addition to some support for the utility of narratives 
for better understanding this world (1996: 53). This type of thinking was crucial in 
encouraging me to use the medium of storytelling as a way of giving voice to those 
affected by harm and in allowing me to further understand the meaning of their 
experiences.
This medium was therefore used as another strand of my research to capture data on 
the experiences of lone individuals who had not fought wider campaigns with other 
families and who tended not to be involved with others in a group experience. This 
meant that their perspectives on medical harm tended to be shaped by their own 
individual trajectories, much more in isolation than individuals in the MHSHN. This 
issue about the isolation of individuals not in groups was reinforced on the Break 
Through Programme a number of times when many participants made the point that 
they were meeting others for the first time in a similar situation to their own. This 
sentiment is reflected in the quotes below:
'For the first time being able to share my story and listening to others with 
equally horrendous stories'
'Meeting like minded others. Especially for people in particular who have 
experiences/been victims o f events around birth/death o f a child that enabled 
me to feel my emotions that I  am normal'.
(Feedback form. Break Through Programme)
In analysing the data from the Break Through Programme, what was interesting was 
that many of the themes emerging from the data were similar to those coming from 
the MHSHN. This was particularly the case with regards to feelings about being 
'abused' both by the medical profession through the harm experienced, but then being 
doubly harmed afterwards in trying to get answers to what had caused the harm and 
why. The feeling that there had been a cover-up by a whole range of regulatory bodies 
who were failing 'victims', either by covering up evidence or failing to look at it 
properly or independently, was a very strong view held by many participants. This 
perspective was reinforced on the programme as the participants began to share their 
concerns more collectively in the group sessions and these were written up by me as 
reflected in the Break Through Programme newsletter. Thus a picture continued to
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emerge through the Programme about issues to do with justice and accountability, 
once medical harm had occurred and the inability of harmed patients to be able to put 
across their views about this in mainstream circles on patient safety.
Having said this, it is worth noting about these perspectives, that because many of the 
participants on the Break Through Programme came mainly via AvMA and clinical 
negligence solicitors, this meant that they were also more likely to have grievances 
about their care. In this sense, in looking at the experiences of those affected by harm, 
there was not really a chance to identify individuals who might have experienced 
medical harm but not had a grievance about the way they had been treated afterwards. 
If this opportunity had existed, this may well have produced different types of data 
about the experiences of harmed patients. What was distinct about the evidence from 
the participants on the Break Through Programme, was the harrowing and emotional 
content of many of their stories. This provided crucial evidence about the subjective 
experiences of how individuals had been affected by medical harm in all aspects of 
their life, both personally and professionally.
Lastly, in addition to the Network data and the Break Through Programme data, an 
important strand in this research has been my involvement in activities around the 
Royal Brompton Hospital. In looking at how the evidence was combined in different 
ways in the thesis, it is important to note the uniqueness of the data emerging from the 
RB&HT. This was a strand of the research evidence that was very different from the 
other areas of the research process and provided a distinct way of enabling data to be 
collected for the thesis. This was because it involved data being gathered about the 
process of patient participation in a hospital setting and more specifically in relation 
to the patient safety agenda. This meant that I could make observations about a 
process in patient safety in which it was very unusual for a patient representative to be 
involved, not least one who had personally been directly affected by medical harm. 
Drawing upon formal documents gathered in this process, alongside my own 
involvement in meetings, reinforced the data from observations. Data could also be 
gathered about issues related to working with health care professionals in sensitive 
areas and what this meant in terms of power and a partnership approach in dealing 
with patients and the public.
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What was important in this context was the ability to gain knowledge through being 
involved in areas that would previously have been denied to certain participants such 
as patients and the public and especially those affected by medical harm. As 
highlighted in chapter three (page 123) of the thesis, evidence shows that there has 
still been very little attempt by NHS organisations to involve patients and the public 
in the patient safety agenda. On a number of occasions my involvement in committees 
highlighted the quite different approach of the medical professionals to that of the 
patients. In chapter's four and eight, this was illustrated by describing how difficult it 
was to be able to participate in meetings at the Brompton because of a lack of a 
partnership approach in conducting the business of the meeting.
Overall therefore, in exploring the different ways that data was triangulated in the 
thesis, what gradually began to emerge was a wider picture including evidence from a 
number of different sources, incorporating common themes and patterns about 
medical harm. This data emerged through an iterative process where, through action, 
knowledge was produced and created, which was then analysed, leading to new forms 
of action. This picture gradually began to take shape as an alternative critique on 
medical harm from a patient's perspective, which is explored in more detail below.
The Specific Contribution of the Research Findings
The next section of this chapter comes on to look at the research findings in the thesis 
and the contribution these make to a better understanding of the nature of medical 
harm and the need for a new patient safety culture within the NHS.
An alternative knowledge critique
A starting point in terms of the findings is to argue that the research data 
generated collectively can be seen as an important alternative knowledge critique 
to the dominant viewpoint of the medical profession on the issue of medical harm. 
This finding is seen as important given that the thesis set out to explore some key 
questions. Firstly, arguing that medical harm is a contested phenomenon that is 
difficult to pin down but is widespread in healthcare. Secondly, that in looking at 
this area, it is important to understand how biomedical views and definitions have 
shaped this debate. In order to test out these arguments, the thesis set out to
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explore how those directly affected by medical harm and user groups campaigning 
in this area, saw the issues about medical harm from a patients' perspective. This 
was seen as important given the absence of any major sociological data in this 
area.
At its most basic, this thesis suggests that there is a need for a new and much 
wider debate on the issues connected with medical harm. At the heart of this new 
debate is the need to look at the issues from a patient and public perspective and 
particularly from the perspectives of those directly affected by medical harm. This 
debate is seen as highly important in building a new patient safety agenda in 
healthcare, because of the way that patient and public perspectives have currently 
been excluded and because this thesis argues these views are often very different 
from the dominant medical perspective.
In generating research data in a number of ways about medical harm from a 
patient's perspective, some key themes emerged in terms of the findings that are 
explored further below. These key themes are described as patient and public 
involvement in patient safety; the multiple impact of medical harm on 'victims'; 
issues of justice, transparency and accountability; learning from patient safety 
incidents; medical dominance; and the need for a new holistic model for looking 
at medical harm that addresses a much wider range of issues than a limited 
biomedical model.
These themes are seen as central to the alternative knowledge base emerging from 
the thesis and of providing one way of addressing the imbalance between 
dominant views on medical harm and those affected by the issues. In this sense, an 
alternative critique is viewed as an important tool for empowering those affected 
by harm. This is because it is seen both as providing a tool for countering power 
inequities through producing knowledge that can affect popular awareness and 
therefore challenging the power relations that affect the lives of the powerless. As 
well as contributing to the transformation of consciousness that has contributed 
with many different movements (e.g. the civil rights, women's, gay, disability 
movement etc) to social mobilisation and change (Gaventa and Cornwall 2008: 
174-176).
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In the light of this statement it is usefiil to think about what an empowerment agenda 
might constitute. Then to come on to look at how the themes from my research might 
contribute to this reality in terms of changing the experiences of those affected by 
medical harm.
Defining empowerment
Starkey (2003) in exploring concepts of empowerment argues that the term is 
contested and has its roots in many different traditions and movements (e.g. the civil 
rights, anti-racist, women's and disability movements, mutual aid etc). She concludes 
that 'the liberational model of empowerment, focused upon people's lives and roles 
within society, is likely to be more relevant to people than consumerist definitions 
narrowly focused on having a voice within services' (Starkey 2003: 273). In looking 
at a consumerist approach to empowerment, she locates this approach in the policy 
approaches of the conservatives in the 1980s and 1990s, reflected in legislation such 
as the NHS and Community Care Act 1990 and continuing to be embedded in the 
Labour governments NHS Plan (2000). In the latter document she argues, 
empowerment of patients is seen to be transmitted through 'information provision and 
redress' (Starkey 2003: 276). A consumerist model of empowerment is therefore seen 
as 'defined by service providers and policy makers, and has a narrow, individualised 
focus on people's ability to make choices within predetermined service systems' 
(Mclean, 1995 cited in Starkey 2003: 277).
In contrast, a liberational model defines empowerment as:
'a process of personal growth and development which enables people not only 
to assert their personal needs and to influence the way in which they are met, 
but also to participate as citizens within a community... empowerment implies 
that processes of social and civic life should be designed to support and 
enable the participation of those who have previously been excluded from 
them. This means that change has to take place within social systems as well 
as within individuals and within services'.
(Barnes, 1997a: 71 cited in Starkey 2003: 277)
This model, Starkey argues, provides a more political context for empowerment than 
a Consumerist model, by moving beyond the narrow focus on services to focus on 
people's lives within the wider society. This model of empowerment therefore goes
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beyond the individual and personal to look at how oppression, exclusion and power 
imbalances operate at both a personal and structural level (Starkey 2003: 277).
Rifkin in linking empowerment and health equity argues that whilst the concept of 
empowerment does mean different things to different people, the concept does share 
some common characteristics, which include the following:
'(i) it applies to the individual and collective community; (ii) it addresses the 
issue ofpower and control over resources and the direction of one's own life; 
(Hi) it addresses issues o f capacity and confidence building of both individuals 
and communities; and (iv) it sees active participation as necessary but not 
sujficient contribution'.
(Rifkin 2003: 170)
The latter point about participation as and on its own is particularly important in the 
context of the issues raised in this thesis about wider issues of medical dominance and 
economic and political influences. Rifkin points out, in terms of the issue of 
participation, empowerment aims to explicitly address issues of social and political 
change, which therefore involves looking at liberation, struggle and community 
activism. In this sense, empowerment confronts the issue of power (Rifkin 2003: 170) 
and is also seen to raise questions about whether individuals and communities can be 
empowered or whether the powerless have to take control and exercise power for 
themselves.
On this latter point, Rifkin points to the importance of linking equity and 
empowerment, the former concept referring 'to addressing differences in health 
among groups of people that reflect unfairness and that are avoidable' (Rifkin 2003: 
171). The concept of equity thus defined could easily be applied to looking at the way 
that those affected by medical harm are treated unfairly. Rifkin argues in thinking 
about this concept, writers such as Aday (2000) have written about the importance of 
deliberative justice and how this involves a shift in decision-making and power from 
professionals to lay people, of which there has been little evidence in practice. 
Instead, Rifkin argues, what has been more successful are attempts to develop 
initiatives based upon partnerships between lay people and professionals. However, 
Rifkin argues that:
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'The success of these approaches will depend on seeing; who profits and who 
does not from the partnership; are issues of equity truly addressed?; and how 
does conflict get resolved in the partnership '.
(Rifkin 2003: 171)
Given these arguments about empowerment, the rest of this chapter looks at how this 
concept might relate to the themes identified in my research findings and whether the 
concept of patient empowerment is a valid one when looking at the issues of medical 
harm in the thesis.
Patient and Public Involvement (PPI) in Patient Safety
In setting out key components of a new patient safety culture, the Bristol Report set 
the tone for a new debate in the area of empowerment as mentioned in chapter three. 
In short the report was highly critical of failures in the past to involve patients and the 
public and saw future PPI involvement as essential to addressing performance issues 
in the NHS and in building a new safer context for healthcare (see chapter three, 
pages 94-96). In highlighting the importance of PPI in the performance of the NHS, 
Kennedy argued that to be involved, the public had to be empowered. This meant 'a 
public that is sufficiently informed as to be able to formulate meaningful views about 
quality and direction in the planning and delivery of healthcare; which views are 
listened to and acted on by commissioners and providers of NHS health care at the 
core of their decision making' (The NHS Primary Group Alliance in Bristol Report 
2001: 400).
Yet despite this recommendation in the Bristol Report, my research found that those 
affected by medical harm were not being involved in the safety agenda in the NHS 
and therefore were not able to shape the direction of that agenda in any meaningful 
way as highlighted earlier.
This finding was home out in various ways in different aspects of the research 
process. In chapters four and eight, a number of examples were given about my 
attempts to get involved in the patient safety processes at the RB&HT. These 
highlighted not only the considerable difficulties I faced in getting onto strategic 
committees, but also the way in which I was treated once on those committees. This 
treatment raised considerable issues about the failure to adopt a partnership approach
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that meant I was listened to, allowed to make a meaningful contribution to the issues 
being discussed and which saw issues raised by me acted upon.
With the groups in the MHSHN, what was clear was that despite the fact that these 
groups had strong views on dealing with issues of medical harm and how health 
services could and should be made safer, these groups were not being involved in the 
patient safety agenda. This exclusion appeared to be for a number of reasons. These 
were to do with fears by healthcare professionals about involving these groups and 
their members. As well as a failure to give them accurate information which would 
allow them to make choices about how to get involved and through the creation of 
meaningful opportunities in the safety agenda for patient engagement. This lack of 
involvement seemed particularly stark in the light of the views and knowledge held by 
individuals in the network. These views had been considerably thought through in 
many areas and were based upon the groups gathering information from their 
members as well as identifying other evidence on aspects of medical harm. The 
decision not to involve them therefore seemed to be particularly problematic when 
these groups provided an alternative viewpoint to the debate on medical harm based 
upon the lived experiences of their members. These views also provided a rich and 
diverse source of information for learning about medical harm and for preventing 
harm from occurring in the future.
On a more optimistic note, a slightly more tangible outcome of the network was its 
influence in leading to the setting up of the Patients for Patient Safety (PfPS) Project. 
The project was established in April 2006 and ran until April 2008 and was set up to 
develop greater patient and public involvement in patient safety work generally 
throughout the NHS. The project was run by AvMA and funded by the National 
Patient Safety Agency and was established partially as a result of the work of the 
MHSHN. The network was important in establishing the objectives and goals of the 
PfPS project because of the realisation that network members had developed vital 
knowledge and expertise as a result of the harm they had experienced, which was not 
being utilised within healthcare in creating a new patient safety agenda. I was 
appointed project manger and was able to continue to involve a number of network 
members in the project’s work over its duration. However at the end of the project's 
work and in publishing its findings in a leading sector journal on patient safety and
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risk, I noted, that generally, whilst patients and the public appeared willing to work in 
partnership with NHS organisations they faced substantial barriers to real involvement 
(Ocloo 2008).
In relation to participants on the Break Through Programme, what was noticeable was 
that these individuals had not and were not being involved in the wider patient safety 
agenda in the NHS. Yet the participants made clear on the Programme that they 
wanted the medical profession and wider state organisations to listen to them and to 
take their views into account in addressing safety concerns. In producing some of 
their stories and collective views about change in the Break Through newsletter, my 
intention was to use this as a way of giving the participants a voice, which might act 
as a catalyst for any further involvement in the safety agenda in the future. Evidence 
from the PfPS project suggests however, that achieving the goal of PPI in patient 
safety has some considerable way to go to being achieved.
Overall the research findings in this area illustrate that some eight years after the 
publication of the Bristol Report, much work still needs to be done to address barriers 
to patient and public involvement in the patient safety agenda in the NHS. The lack of 
involvement in this area can also be located within a broader context of trying to 
achieve greater patient and public involvement (PPI) in healthcare, particularly over 
the last ten years. This aspiration has formed part of the current government’s agenda 
to modernise the NHS and to create new services that are ‘Fit for Purpose’ and able to 
fulfil the needs of patients in the 21^ Century (DOH 2000). To fulfil this aspiration a 
number of key policy and legislative documents have been published in recent years. 
These have emphasised the importance of involving patients and the pubhc in 
healthcare as an important way of improving the performance of healthcare services 
and as a drive away from paternalism to patient empowerment (DOH 1999; The 
Health and Social Care Act 2001; DOH 2003; DOH 2004; DOH 2006).
Yet the findings from my research illustrate that current involvement in the patient 
safety agenda in the NHS is inadequate and needs to change to incorporate a new 
approach to building a patient safety culture. This thesis is not able to argue that the 
process of PAR was enough in itself to be able to empower the research participants 
to become involved in the patient safety agenda. But it is argued that the research 
findings offer an alternative perspective on medical harm that makes the case for a
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wider debate on patient and public involvement in this area and the need to look 
seriously at how this can be achieved. At the very least my research findings suggest 
that a new approach is needed in addressing the issues. This needs to deal hoth with 
the ambivalence and fears of health professionals to involving patients and the public 
in the patient safety agenda and to develop a different model of participation that can 
empower users in surmounting the barriers and obstacles that exist to involvement.
The Multiple Impact of Medical Harm
The second theme from my research findings relates to what I have called the multiple 
impact of medical harm on victims and was consistently highlighted in my research 
(see pages 243-248 in chapter six and 266-282 in chapter seven). This issue concerns 
the way in which victims of medical harm find themselves affected by a patient safety 
incident and then experience further multiple harms afterwards as a result of the way 
that various systems treat them. This situation, in particular, was graphically 
illustrated hy the personal stories of the participants on the Break Through 
Programme. With these accounts (as shown in chapter seven), what was clear was that 
the harm caused to individuals was often caused not only by the original adverse 
event, but also by the way that individuals were treated afterwards (as confirmed by 
other studies see chapter two page 76). The stories showed that harm caused to 
individuals was not only physical, but emotional, psychological and financial and 
extended to all areas of a person's life in terms of their personal relationships with 
family and friends, their professional lives and employment situation. With regards to 
their relationships, participants described how the impact of the harm was not just 
confined to the short term, but could often continue for many years after the event. 
These long-term effects were exacerbated because individuals might have to cope 
with long-term and enduring physical injuries and the grief associated with their 
harm, often with no compensation to help them rebuild their lives.
This situation was compounded by the way that many individuals had had to fight for 
answers and explanations as to why their harm had been caused in the first place. This 
battle had often started with the organisation where the adverse incident had taken 
place, but then progressed to individuals having to battle with other organisations 
(sometimes several) dealing with NHS complaints, professional regulation and the
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legal system. These battles had sometimes gone on for many years, which had left a 
deep and enduring legacy in terms of anger and loss of trust of health professionals 
and wider systems responsible for regulating the profession. A further consequence of 
their harm was that individuals described how they were frequently hlamed and 
pathologised for attempting to challenge how they were treated and sometimes denied 
further health treatment that they desperately needed, this further compounded their 
suffering.
These experiences were not just isolated to the participants on the Break Through 
Programme, but were amply reinforced by members of the MHSHN. In the network, 
because many of the individuals had resorted to fighting for justice through 
campaigns, they were able to describe the debilitating process of having to take on 
'the system' seen as very powerful, as well as wider state regulatory organisations. 
These bodies were seen as in the position to both deny individuals explanations about 
how their harm had occurred, to be able to cover-up wrongdoing, as well as to label 
and blame harmed patients as the problem.
In documenting these findings, I was acutely aware of how my own story as someone 
affected by medical harm had continued to unfold over the course of doing the PhD. 
This experience has left in its wake over eleven years, a battle with numerous 
organisations to find out what happened to my daughter and why she died in the way 
that she did. The harm this has caused has been extensive to all areas of my life, 
affecting my academic career, forcing me to incur legal costs over a long period of 
time and to have to put many other areas of my life on hold, whilst fighting for 
justice.
Yet despite the participants in my research describing the multiple experiences of 
harm, they had faced, most people said they had been unable to find support. This 
meant that many years after the harm was caused they were still suffering from its 
often-traumatic effects. This evidence suggests that the lives of those affected by 
medical harm are impacted upon in many different ways and that individuals are 
systematically disempowered in all aspects of their lives. This situation is seen to need 
a concerted response from a range of decision-makers to address the issues involved
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in this process, related both to the after effects of the original adverse incident and the 
way that individuals are treated when the harm has occurred.
In practice my research suggests that this will mean identifying and developing a 
range of support systems that can help individuals in trying to rebuild their lives. 
These systems at the very least relate to the need for access to counselling and 
emotional support. Help for individuals when trying to bring a complaint or take other 
forms of action (This issue has now been acknowledged as a gap that needs to be 
addressed by a DOH working group. This group was set up to implement the 
Government's reforms on regulation arising out of the paper, 'Trust Assurance and 
Safety - The Regulation of Health Professionals in the 21^ Century'. I am currently a 
member of this working group and a recommendation on addressing this issue has 
now been included in the group's draft report). Support to access healthcare where it 
has been denied or withdrawn because an individual has made a complaint. Lastly and 
most importantly, for serious consideration to be given to how wider system changes 
can be made that will allow those affected by harm to get explanations, justice, 
accountability and redress after an adverse incident, without having to battle for many 
years to achieve this.
Getting Justice, Transparency and Accountability
The third theme ftrom my research findings relates to issues to do with justice, 
transparency and accountability. The findings of my research in this area were very 
powerful. They illustrated the many obstacles and barriers that individuals felt they 
had to face in trying to get an open explanation when something had gone wrong with 
their care and in trying to get any justice and accountability in terms of negligence 
and/or wrongdoing. The obstacles identified in my research referred to the way that 
individuals felt about a range of systems with a remit for investigating wrongdoing, 
negligence and concems about treatment. These systems covered NHS complaint 
procedures, NHS-Inquiries, the Coroners Courts and legal system as well as the role 
of professional regulatory bodies such as the NMC and GMC.
The strongest complaint was that these systems did not operate in such a way as to 
provide for an independent investigation when things went wrong. There was a 
feeling by many of the research participants that they were not properly listened to
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and were viewed in a negative way and treated as if their complaints did not have 
merit. This feeling was often expressed both about the organisation being complained 
about, as well as other bodies responsible for investigating complaints and regulation. 
This led to a collective sense hy many of the harmed patients in the research, that 
there was a cover-up culture in the NHS that was reinforced by a range of institutions. 
A further issue that was raised in this area, was the way in which processes operated 
within organisations responsible for investigating concems that subsequently proved 
impossible to negotiate. This had left many of those affected by harm going round and 
round in circles trying to comply with various procedures that were deemed to work 
against them. These individuals were then often left trying to find other bodies that 
could look at their concems, when they were not in a position to comply with the 
eligibility criteria which would allow those organisations to carry out an investigation.
The consequences of this situation meant that many of the participants in my research 
felt that their experiences of medical harm were almost as much to do with the 
difficulties faced in trying to get answers and accountability as to do with the harm 
caused by the original patient safety incident. This point was reflected very strongly in 
the heart- rending stories told by participants on the Break Through Programme, but 
also illustrated in a different way through the campaigning activities of the groups in 
the MHSHN.
Overall in the research, some of the main obstacles cited in trying to get justice, 
accountability and redress was that individuals often did not know who to take their 
concems to and were therefore faced with a myriad of organisations to choose from. 
This could then create a number of problems if the wrong organisation was 
complained to, as time could be lost in bringing a complaint or claim for negligence 
within the requisite timescales. No one body appeared to be able to offer 
comprehensive advice and support about the various options available and how to 
negotiate them. Other considerations related to issues about making a comprehensive 
complaint or legal claim when individuals argued they could not get hold of medical 
records or were required to pay for certain items such as X-rays. A more serious and 
recurring complaint amongst research participants was that they felt either that their 
medical records had been tampered with or that items had been removed from their 
notes, which then made it impossible for them to prove their case. In these situations
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it was often argued, there appeared to be little sanctions for trusts if medical records 
were incomplete.
In terms of bringing a legal claim or using the complaints' procedures, it was argued 
by many participants that these avenues were made more cumbersome because they 
could not be used at the same time. An NHS complaint could not be taken any further 
if any legal action was instituted, however because complaints could take so long to 
be dealt with, this meant that individuals faced missing the legal deadline of three 
years from the date of an adverse incident to bringing a legal claim. The considerable 
costs of bringing a legal claim were also an issue for many people. Most individuals 
had to rely on legal aid to provide them with any chance of bringing a claim, however 
the criteria in existence for gaining funding were seen as daunting. Many participants 
on the Break Through Programme had struggled to meet these criteria and were 
eventually refused legal aid funding.
Some of the thresholds individuals were required to meet in this area, were to have 
income and disposable capital under a certain amount and to be able to demonstrate 
that their case met the criteria of at least a fifty per cent chance of success. Bringing a 
claim also had to be justified in terms of compensation outweighing the costs to bring 
a claim. All of these issues could present considerable problems if for example 
medical records were 'missing'. In my own case, I could not meet the financial criteria 
for getting legal aid, as I was deemed to have too much disposable capital in my 
house. My claim was also rejected because it was argued that the costs of bringing a 
claim could not be justified, as they were outweighed by the low level of damages for 
my daughter's death, then set in law at £7,500 (now £10,000).
For individuals who chose not to or could not meet the legal criteria to bring a claim, 
other avenues were seen as equally challenging to negotiate. For many of the groups 
in the MHSHN, they had turned to political campaigns after they could not get 
regulatory bodies such as the GMC to properly investigate their concems. Their 
stories indicated that bringing complaints to professional regulatory bodies as well as 
fighting for and then going through 'independent' inquiries could present their own 
unique challenges in trying to ensure concems being raised were properly dealt with. 
This situation was illustrated by the very strong criticisms of the GMC in failing to 
investigate concems properly, highlighted in the MHSHN and also highlighted in
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chapter four by the struggle of the BHHCAG the Evans Inquiry to take their concems 
seriously.
In the MHSHN, what stood out strongly was the way in which most of the groups had 
developed a strong campaigning agenda and specifically in relation to the self-help 
groups had a strong focus on helping their members to seek justice and accountability. 
This came through groups giving individuals advice and support in relation to the 
complaints system, legal action or bringing a complaint to a professional regulatory 
body. In addition to this, several of the groups were involved in wider political action 
to achieve changes to the system to make it easier in the future for those affected by 
medical harm to get accountability and redress. In this respect, in terms of devising a 
collective agenda for change, issues to do with the accountability of doctors and NHS 
Tmsts and access to and the ability to get justice, came up as the most pressing 
themes in network meeting discussions.
Therefore in exploring issues about empowerment, victims of medical harm clearly 
expressed through my research the way in which a whole system had disempowered 
them when something went wrong with their healthcare. These concems were 
reinforced by wider evidence set out in chapter one when looking at the data on 
medical harm and how individuals stmggled to get justice and redress. Chapter three 
also provided strong evidence of the way in which systems of investigation and 
regulation had frequently failed victims of medical harm. It is therefore argued that 
this situation has left a legacy not only for harmed patients and their families in 
human terms, but also, because of a failure to learn the lessons, has considerable 
implications for the NHS in developing a safety culture for the future.
This thesis therefore suggests that a different approach is needed to addressing these 
issues that does not concentrate on blaming those affected by harm and pathologising 
them. It is clear that this will require changes to a range of systems at a wider political 
level to empower Victims' of harm to get justice, accountability and any redress due to 
them as well as putting in place systems for prevention, learning and improvement. 
This type of empowerment is clearly seen to need an approach based upon Starkey's 
liberational model mentioned earlier, that requires change 'to take place within social
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systems as well as within individuals and within services' (Barnes, 1997a: 71 cited in 
Starkey 2003: 277).
Learning from Patient Safety Incidents
Exploring the above issues clearly leads on to the fourth identified theme in my 
research findings, to do with learning from patient safety incidents. What was evident 
from all of my research was that much more could be learnt from looking at the 
experiences of those who had been harmed. In the Brompton case study I set out how 
the Evans Inquiry had made 120 recommendations about changes to the system at the 
Brompton and further afield in the NHS. However this learning had only taken place 
because of the way that famihes involved with the Inquiry had fought to get it in the 
first place. A further issue raised in chapter four about learning was in relation to how 
patients, particularly harmed patients and the public could be involved in 
implementing the lessons from inquiries in which they had been involved. However, 
in setting out my experiences in trying to take forward the lessons from the Evans 
Inquiry, I showed how a number of barriers existed at the Brompton to enabling the 
lay members of the PEG to work in partnership with the hospital.
It was also clear when listening to the experiences of individuals on the Break 
Through Programme and in the MHSHN, how much learning could be gleaned both 
from those who had taken some type of action after experiencing medical harm, as 
well as those who had not. With individuals who had had to battle for justice and 
accountability, it was highly unlikely that the 'truth' of the matter, had been able to 
come out. Many of the campaigning groups in the MHSHN, like JABS for example, 
had been prevented from having their say on the issues in court because of a denial of 
legal aid. They felt ultimately that they had been silenced by the power of the state 
and the pharmaceutical industry in being able to put their side of the story. With 
individuals on the Break Through Programme, a number of them had tried to take 
legal and other action and had been unsuccessful. They were very angry about this, 
not only in terms of the denial of justice, but because they felt that they had not been 
heard. This meant that not only had there not been any acknowledgement of 
wrongdoing in these cases, but also because of this denial, it was felt that lessons 
could not have been learned for the future.
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Despite these issues linking justice and accountability to learning, in the Bristol 
Report, Ian Kennedy strongly emphasised that an adversarial legal system would not 
allow learning to take place in relation to medical harm. He argued that a legal 
approach continued to promote a blame culture that was not conducive to the open 
reporting of patient safety incidents. Therefore the recommendation about setting up 
an NHS Redress Scheme in 'Making Amends' (2003) was designed to overcome this 
situation. The intention with the Scheme was to enable those affected by medical 
negligence to gain compensation without having to go to court, and so allow 
investigations to take place into incidents without a fear of blame. This system would 
then allow learning to take place that provided both an explanation of what had gone 
wrong and what action should be taken to prevent a reoccurrence of the incident in the 
future.
However I would argue (as discussed in more detail in chapter three, page 128), that 
the Redress Scheme that was passed by Parliament in 2006, fell considerably short of 
the original intentions set out both in the Bristol Report and 'Making Amends'. These 
reports set out the need to set up a comprehensive no-fault compensation scheme to 
cover medical negligence across the NHS. However, with the Redress Scheme passed 
in Parliament in 2006 this has a much more limited remit. It will only cover the 
hospital sector, deal with claims up to £15,000 and will not be independent, in that it 
will allow the NHS to continue to investigate itself when medical negligence is 
deemed to have occurred.
It is therefore my view that the danger with this Scheme is that it threatens to continue 
the legacy of a 'culture of denial' (see chapter three, page 129), spelt out in Safety 
First (DOH 2006: 30) within the NHS, because it lacks independence. This it is 
argued, will deny the Scheme credibility amongst victims of harm given the findings 
from my research and wider evidence about the failings of the complaints system (see 
chapter three) and the strong importance placed by complainants on being able to get 
an independent investigation. Without being independent, the Redress Scheme will 
continue to deny patients who have been harmed not only the justice they deserve, but 
also prevent the development of a wider learning culture within the health service. 
Despite these limitations, there are now also questions about whether the government
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will go ahead and set up the Scheme given the silence about plans for implementation 
since the legislation was passed.
Therefore in order to break this cycle of blame and cover-up, it is argued that there 
needs to be a new holistic model for developing a patient safety culture within the 
NHS as argued in chapter three and to which I return in concluding this chapter. This 
situation also needs to address the vacuum that prevents those affected by medical 
harm being able to be heard or to get involved in patient safety work. This is seen to 
prevent lessons heing learned by the very people affected by the issues and which 
clearly has implications in terms of building a safer culture of care, in health, in the 
future.
In the next section, I turn to two areas of my research findings in which the issues 
were more inconclusive. These areas nevertheless flag up important issues that both 
highlight gaps in the sociological literature where more research is needed as well as 
fill in some gaps in current sociological thinking. These two areas relate to issues of 
discrimination and inequality and medical dominance.
Discrimination and Inequality
This finding in the research data, whilst viewed as very important, was not located in 
evidence strong enough to come to any firm conclusions in terms of medical harm and 
patient safety. However, in looking at the issues the findings throw up, it is argued 
that there is a need for broader research to be carried out in this area. This research 
needs to make the link between the considerable literature on discrimination affecting 
a range of groups and health inequalities and how this might tie into the various 
debates around medical harm and patient safety.
In my research, the issue of discrimination and inequality manifested itself in various 
ways touching upon the experiences of different groups of patients. In chapter four of 
the thesis (see pages 154-155), I highlighted the way in which I felt that the parents 
that went to the Evans Inquiry might well have been affected in their treatment 
because of their backgrounds in terms of class, race and disability. In the Evans 
Inquiry Report, the issue of how children with Down's Syndrome were treated was 
given particular prominence. I was then able to show how, as I participated in the
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PLG (chapter four, pages 155-181), implementing the findings from the Evans 
Inquiry and eventually as Forum chair, how I continued to raise issues about 
discrimination and the way that the Trust were dealing with issues of equality. It was 
very obvious to me as I became more strategically involved with the Trust, that little 
was being done to promote an equalities agenda and particularly so when it came to 
issues of race discrimination. However, it was also clear to me that other issues of 
discrimination, based upon things such as class, could also be factors that needed to 
be considered in the provision of trust services to its patients.
Given my experiences at the Brompton regarding issues of discrimination, when 
carrying out my field research with the MHSHN and the Break Through Programme, 
I became much more sensitive to this area. What was noticeable in terms of these 
findings was that whilst discrimination was never an overt and exphcit topic of 
discussion, which commanded a high profile, distinct issues did come up in this area 
particularly in relation to the MHSHN (see chapter six, pages 248-251). In this 
context, the way that older people were negatively treated in the health service and 
open to abuse was a particular issue for two groups, SOS-NHS Patients in Danger and 
ALERT. The network member from AIMS also raised a number of issues from her 
own organisation's experience, about the way that Black and minority ethnic women 
could be adversely targeted after childbirth by midwives and social workers. On the 
Break Through Programme the issue of discrimination did not come up in any detail. 
All of the participants were white apart from one man of Asian origin who implied 
that racism was negatively affecting his treatment. However, whilst the participants 
on the programme, were of different ages and gender, issues of discrimination were 
not explicitly brought out.
Overall with my research in relation to the issue of discrimination and equality, it felt 
as if this was an area that was present, but covered up and hidden well beneath the 
surface. In this respect, it felt that without raising it very explicitly and bringing it into 
people's consciousness, it was likely to stay largely hidden as a topic of discussion.
This situation of the hidden nature of discrimination became more of an issue when I 
become involved in the Brompton's Equality and Diversity Committee in 2005 and 
began to raise issues about equality and diversity more generally within the Trust. In
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chapter four, I noted the way in which this work eventually contributed towards the 
Healthcare Commission deciding to carry out an audit of Trusts in March 2006, to 
assess compliance with the Race Relations (Amendment) Act. As a result of the 
findings of the audit, the Commission issued a press release on the 18^  ^August 2006, 
entitled 'Healthcare watchdog puts NHS trusts on notice over compliance with race 
relations law'. The press release warned it suspected 'the NHS of widespread non- 
compliance with legislation on race relations designed to promote equality'.
This situation had gradually started to make me realise that issues of discrimination 
and inequality were widespread in health and yet were not being given sufficiently 
high priority on the NHS agenda. This position was illustrated by a number of policy 
reports and reviews on discrimination against a range of groups that were published 
and received a high profile in media reports in 2005 and 2006. These reports were 
highlighting the types of discrimination in healthcare generally, that were appearing 
subtlety in my research in relation to medical harm.
For example the Healthcare Commission published survey results in 2006 that found 
notable differences between the self-reported experiences of patients from a range of 
different backgrounds and identified a number of recurring themes in relation to the 
experiences of Black and minority ethnic groups, those with disabilities and older 
people. The findings showed that patients from Black and minority ethnic groups 
reported more negative experiences of healthcare services than white patients. 
Patients with a disability or poor health were also more like to have negative 
experiences of healthcare. Only older patients were found to consistently report more 
positive experiences than younger patients (Commission for Healthcare Audit and 
Inspection 2006).
Other policy reports at this time also highlighted discrimination and inequality in the 
experiences of some groups using healthcare services. The report 'Living well in later 
life' (2006), jointly published by the Healthcare Commission, the Audit Commission 
and the Commission for Social Care Inspection pointed to a number of areas where 
older people were subjected to discrimination, ageist attitudes and abuse in healthcare. 
The Disability Rights Commission (DRC) also published the report 'Equal Treatment: 
Closing the Gap' (2006) which highlighted the considerable discrimination faced by 
people with mental health problems and/or learning disabilities using primary care
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services in England and Wales. These groups were found to be less likely to receive 
important evidence based treatments and health checks compared to others with the 
same condition, but without a learning disability or mental health problem. Two 
widely publicised policy reports at this time called 'Access to Health Care for 
Minority Ethnic Groups' (Kings Fund 2006) and 'Indications of Public Health in the 
English Regions' (LHO 2005) also highlighted a number of key issues on health 
inequalities and access affecting Black and minority ethnic communities.
All of these reports showed that people from certain types of groups, older people, 
those with learning disabilities and mental health problems as well as those from 
Black and minority ethnic communities, frequently have worse health needs than the 
general population and yet received poorer and more unequal access to healthcare 
services. These findings about inequality in healthcare are not new and have clearly 
long been highlighted in key sociological studies such as Townsend et al's Black 
Report (1988) and in the more recent major study on health inequalities chaired by Sir 
Donald Acheson published in 1998. What this evidence started to highlight for me 
was the question of how these inequalities in health might link to the area of medical 
harm and whether discrimination made some groups more vulnerable to harm. These 
were not questions that could be answered in any depth either by my research or the 
literature on patient safety incidents.
Perhaps the most significant data showing the different experiences of some groups 
when it comes to adverse events is the Harvard Medical Practice Study (HMPS) 
(Brennan et al (1991) and Leape at al (1991) and the Quality in Australian Health 
Care Study (QAHCS) (1995) discussed in chapter one. These studies stratified their 
data according to age and sex and both highlighted the issue of age as a risk factor in 
experiencing an adverse event. In the HMPS study, this was compounded by the 
susceptibility of the over 65s to negligent injury, whereas in the QAHCS, patient age 
was not only a predictor of more serious disabilities resulting from AEs, but for the 
over-65s also placed them at more risk of preventable AEs causing death. Both 
studies however, found no significant differences between the sexes in terms of AEs. 
The importance of the findings on age highlight the need for more research into why 
older people may be more at risk and how much this is connected to greater illness as 
opposed to mismanagement of their care. These stratified findings also raise questions
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as to whether other groups such as those from BME communities or those with 
disabilities are more at risk of experiencing AEs and negligence, because of their 
experiences of health inequalities.
Overall, what this thesis would like to highlight on the basis of the evidence from my 
research findings is that there is a need for much wider and more systematic studies to 
be carried out which can properly explore any links between discrimination, health 
inequalities and the occurrence of medical harm. It is argued that this link is not being 
made systematically at the moment and the failure to do so may well be disguising the 
experiences of a number of groups with known and documented poorer health care 
experiences, who may well also be more likely to be affected by medical harm. These 
groups may represent a whole other strata of Victims' of harm denied a voice about 
their experiences.
Medical Dominance
The last area from my research findings that I will look at in this section of the 
chapter is on the theme of medical dominance and control. This area has clearly been 
an important theme running throughout the thesis. In looking at this theme in more 
detail, it is argued firstly that the evidence from my research, outlined in this chapter, 
supports the argument of the existence of medical dominance in relation to the 
construction of medical harm. However it is also argued that whilst this finding is 
important, a range of evidence to emerge from the thesis also supports more recent 
arguments post Freidson's work in 1970. These arguments suggest, as outlined in 
chapter two, that whilst the medical profession cannot be seen to have lost its position 
of medical dominance, evidence also suggests that their power is increasingly being 
subjected to and mediated by much wider economic and political influences.
In chapter two, (pages 50-55), some consideration was given to more recent critiques 
about medical dominance. These were based upon concepts to do with 
deprofessionalisation, proletarianisation and corporatisation and whether these 
processes represented wider changes in society that had brought about a 
reconfiguration of professional power in medicine in ways different to Freidson's 
analysis. Whilst writers found little concrete support for the theses cited above or for 
'the impending emasculation of the power of medicine' (Gabe et al (1994), there did
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appear to be some consensus concerning the need for a re-examination and reworking 
of some of the traditional ideas about professional dominance.
This suggestion seems particularly important in the light of recent arguments that 
'Issues of power and conflict in organizations are rarely addressed in safety culture 
research' (Antonsen 2008). Research by Currie et al (2008) also raises the need for 
more research into issues of power and how this might affect safety and quality. They 
argue that despite the strong emphasis on improving quality in public services by the 
effective management of knowledge, they found an organisational learning 
perspective in patient safety revealed 'issues of the nature of knowledge, professional 
cultures, and institutional power and politics that inhibit sharing of knowledge' (2008: 
364). These issues about power and its operation, also reinforce critiques made by 
writers such as Conrad (2005), in making the case for sociologists to adopt a wider 
political economic perspective, to look at processes of médicalisation in society that 
are seen to cause considerable harm to patients. These processes it is argued go well 
beyond the power of the medical profession to incorporate the role of powerful 
commercial and market interests.
Given these arguments, it is useful to look further at what my research findings throw 
up in this area. Firstly in this respect, the research themes set out earlier, are seen to 
provide strong evidence of the way in which the medical profession have been able to 
dominate the agenda in constructing the issues associated with medical harm. The 
findings highlighted how those affected by harm had largely been excluded fiom 
having a voice on the issues, that they had often seen in ways very different to that of 
the medical profession. They had also not been able to become involved in the 
mainstream patient safety agenda in the NHS because of a range of barriers that 
excluded them. This then prevented them both from injecting their perspectives into 
the debate as well as being part of developing new practice and solutions to the 
problems. This exclusion was seen to be aggravated by the denial of legitimacy 
accorded to those affected by harm because of the difficulties in getting at truthful 
explanations and public acknowledgement of negligence and wrongdoing. This meant 
that harmed patients could be constructed and pathologised as the problem by the 
medical profession, which further undermined their credibility and therefore justified 
their exclusion from the debates about medical harm and patient safety.
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Research participants were able to show that this treatment had multiple consequences 
in terms of the harm it caused and ultimately prevented the learning seen as vital by 
most individuals affected by harm. These findings were reinforced in different ways 
by a range of critiques set out in chapters two and three. Sociological evidence in 
chapter two also showed that despite considerable evidence that exists on the 
dominance of the medical profession, little evidence exists on how this relates to 
medical harm and its impact on harmed patients.
However, despite these conclusions on medical harm and their links to the power of 
the medical profession, my research also suggested that the issues arising in terms of 
medical harm could not simply be explained by the dominance of medical 
practitioners. In this respect my research evidence suggested that issues of medical 
harm were also firequently to do with wider factors in society. These were connected 
both to professional dominance of the medical profession but also to the role of the 
state, economic interests connected to health, discrimination and inequality and the 
imbalance of power that this created between organisations, professionals and patients 
and the public.
These factors were illustrated in my research findings in a number of different ways. 
Perhaps the most compelling evidence of wider influence on medical harm came Jfrom 
the issues associated with the failings of healthcare organisations both to have systems 
which protected patients firom harm and which then investigated complaints, 
wrongdoing and negligence. The research findings showed in many ways how 
participants felt let down by a whole range of government bodies and statutory 
procedures responsible for investigating and dealing with complaints in health care.
Some examples of these bodies were the Coroners Courts, NHS Complaints 
Procedures, the legal system and professional regulatory bodies. Complaints about the 
failings of these bodies were echoed through my own experiences of negotiating the 
system as well as by many of the participants on the Break Through Programme and 
in the MHSHN. The most common complaint was that these bodies did not provide 
for open, transparent and independent investigation and were in fact designed to 
prevent those affected by harm getting their concerns addressed. In chapters one and 
three a number of reports were cited which highlighted the issues associated with the
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failure of these bodies and how these issues had in fact been highlighted as concerns 
by a number of official reports often over many years. This therefore throws up key 
questions about why the Government has not addressed these concerns in the past and 
firequently has only been prepared to act after high profile public inquiries fought for 
by harmed patients, such as Bristol and Shipman.
In thinking about other wider influences emerging from my research data, the 
experiences of the group JABS also provided an interesting example of the role that 
big business and the pharmaceutical industry can play in protecting their interests. In 
talking about the families damaged by what they believed was the MMR vaccine (see 
chapter six, pages 247-248) a strong emphasis was put on what they felt was a 
systematic campaign to stop them by the pharmaceutical company involved. The chair 
of JABS also pointed to the role of the Legal Services Commission (a statutory body) 
and the way it operated in what they felt was an unfair denial of legal aid. This was 
perceived as an attempt to stop the families in JABS from establishing liability and 
exposing some of the issues about the side effects of the MMR vaccine in public. The 
issues raised by JABS indicated that the role of big business and the pharmaceutical 
industry could be connected in ways that were detrimental to harmed patients when 
affected by harm. However, whilst it was difficult for a small self-help group to 
establish definitively this connection, this type of evidence has been proved more 
conclusively by more detailed sociological research evidence (see chapter two pages 
84-86). This evidence points to the way in which, when medical harm occurs, drugs 
companies and state sponsored regulatory bodies, frequently act against patients' 
interests and often in ways designed to protect vested interests.
The last point that I want to touch upon in this area relates to the issue of 
discrirnination and inequality. As mentioned previously, there was not enough 
evidence from my research to point to definitive links between discrimination aud 
how it occurs in relation to medical harm. What is therefore important to note is that 
whilst there needs to be further research to make the links between patient safety aud 
the treatment of particular groups, it is clear from the sociological literature on 
discrimination and health inequalities that these issues are not just to do with medical 
dominance. Evidence clearly shows that there are broader societal factors involved 
that need to be addressed.
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Overall the evidence in this section suggests that whilst the issue of medical 
dominance is an important factor when looking at issues of medical harm and how it 
impacts upon patients, it is clearly not the only important factor. Whilst the thesis was 
not able to look at wider and more complex socio-economic and political influences 
in more detail in the construction of medical harm, evidence from the research 
findings certainly suggests that these influences were considerable. Perhaps the 
strongest evidence from my research in this area suggested that the power of the 
medical profession in causing harm to patients was often reinforced and underpinned 
by the role of the state. Further that the state had failed in the past to act to address 
this imbalance of power and therefore failed in its duty to protect patients. Whilst it 
appeared that this situation was now being recognised, with to some extent the 
considerable changes being proposed to professional regulation, this still left 
considerable concerns about how these reforms would be implemented in practice; in 
particular without addressing the need for the proper involvement of patients and the 
public in this process and how a new approach to patient safety can be taken forward 
in partnership.
Conclusion: Developing a Holistic Model for Patient Safety
Finally, I want to end this chapter by discussing one of the main conclusions from my 
research findings in moving forward in building a new patient safety culture within 
the NHS. This finding is concerned with the need for a new holistic model or 
approach to looking at medical harm and patient safety that goes beyond the narrow 
clinical markers and individual agency associated with a medical model. Instead it is 
argued, there is a need to identify the range of social processes associated with 
medical harm that are frequently obscured by a medical model and connected and to 
do with medical dominance and control.
hi setting out these issues, this chapter has attempted to illustrate that the way that 
medical harm occurs, is a complex process that is currently obscured by the way that a 
biomedical perspective dominates the debate. This medical perspective can operate to 
obscure the way in which the power of the medical profession allows them to set the 
agenda in their own interests and which often acts against the interests of those 
affected by harm. This situation however is also seen to obscure the range of social
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processes that are involved in the occurrence of medical harm, which extend further 
than the medical profession to include wider processes of political and economic 
control. In looking at these processes in this chapter, it has been shown how they 
severely impact upon and disempower patients and prevent learning from taking place 
to ensure that harm does not occur to patients again in the future.
The research findings in this thesis have therefore highlighted the need for a wider 
systemic approach to looking at and addressing patient safety concerns that focus both 
on preventing adverse incidents as well as dealing with issues of justice and 
accountability. The social processes and issues associated with developing this 
approach have been highlighted throughout the thesis. However it is argued that these 
issues have not been taken seriously as part of mainstream debates in patient safety 
because of the way that patients and the public and particularly harmed patients have 
had their experiences and perspectives excluded. These experiences have particularly 
focused on the failure of systems and processes to enable those affected by harm to 
find out what has happened when harm has occurred and to hold individuals and 
organisations to account.
Therefore in this context, this thesis argues that a new framework for looking at 
medical harm and patient safety should be based upon a model of patient 
empowerment. An empowerment model is seen as one that tackles the imbalance of 
power that currently exists between patients, healthcare professionals and wider state 
controlled and profit-oriented organisations. This model is viewed as important in 
addressing wider structural issues of power and control that harm patients and then 
exclude them when that harm has occurred. It is also seen to genuinely place patients 
and particularly those who have been harmed by healthcare systems at the centre of 
healthcare.
What is clear, however, is that in order to move towards this approach, this will 
require the political will on the part of government and key decision-makers to make 
it happen. It will also require a genuine willingness by the health profession to look at 
the barriers and obstacles to creating real and equitable partnerships, in building a new 
patient safety culture in the NHS, in the future.
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Medical harm and User Empowerment within the NHS: a participatory action 
research project.
PhD Student: Josephine Ocloo
Supervisor: Professor Martin Bulmer
Department: Sociology
1) Summary of the Project: Aims and Objectives
This research project consists of a sociological investigation into the experiences of a 
range of self-help groups set up as a result of) medical harm. The project will use a 
participatory action research (PAR) design aimed at involving the groups in gathering 
research data about the groups experiences in this area. A PAR approach is seen as 
important in empowering the participants in the research process to have a voice and 
to be co-actors and learners in process of change.
• This research aims to look at different aspects of medical harm from a user 
perspective and specifically to draw upon the experiences of a number of self-help 
groups affected by medical harm.
• Using a participatory research approach, the aim is to empower a number of 
groups to produce case studies on their organisations. The aim of these case 
studies will be: to highhght why the group was set up, what the key issues are in 
terms of medical harm and what changes they would like to see in promoting 
better patient safety and systems of accountability within the NHS.
• As part of my work with AvMA, I have been involved with running support 
workshops for people affected by medical harm. Two residential support 
programmes will take place in October 2005. In order to assess how successful 
these programmes are in meeting the support needs of participants and in order to 
generate longer term funding for these programmes, consent will be sought from 
the participants to gather data about this process in a range of ways. I am seeking 
ethical approval to draw on this secondary data in an anonymised form for my 
PhD research.
• The research material will ultimately be collated to produce a book on Medical 
Harm and User Empowerment published by AvMA. The aim of the book is to 
provide an opportunity for individuals affected by medical harm to share their 
experiences and to give them a voice in articulating the issues from a user 
perspective. It is hoped this will enable policy makers and NHS employees to 
learn more about the issues and how they affect people. Also how systems within 
the NHS and beyond regarding patient safety, regulation and accountability can be 
improved, and to contribute towards some critical ideas for better patient 
involvement and empowerment in this area.
2) Background
This project is being undertaken within the context of a CASE studentship held by the 
Department of Sociology at the University of Surrey tenable from October 2003 to 
September 2006. It is concerned with research with victims of medical harm and is 
examining user empowerment. The partner in the studentship is the voluntary 
association Action against Medical Accidents (AvMA). AvMA is a registered charity 
that promotes better patient safety and justice for people who have been affected by 
medical accidents. Given the sensitive nature of its work, my appointment as a case 
student was welcomed given my considerable experience in the field of medical harm, 
both as a result of personal experience (due to its impact upon a close relative), and 
my involvement in policy work relating to patient safety issues.
This research project is located within the sociology of health and illness and draws 
upon an extensive literature relating to the effects of social processes on health as well 
as a widespread literature on the doctor/patient relationship. Very little research exists 
however relating to users who have been affected by medical harm. Therefore the 
project not only seeks to explore health user perspectives in this area, but also to 
explore how these views can contribute towards the NHS developing its new patient 
safety agenda.
The research will draw upon the current policy context within the NHS, which seeks 
to modernise and change and to create an empowering culture of service provision 
with patients at its centre. An important aspect of this policy agenda is to bring about 
an improvement in the quality of clinical care (The New NHS Modem: Dependable 
1997) through key reforms regarding patient safety and learning from failure within 
the NHS (DOH 2000; DOH 2003).
3) Research Methodology
As part of my work at AvMA I have been taking a lead on the setting up of a national 
network of self-help groups, formed as a result of their experiences of medical harm. 
The network meetings have provided space for the groups to explore key issues 
relating to patient safety and accountability. It is envisaged that some, but not all of 
the groups in the network will participate in the research project, although not all will 
be able to attend on a regular basis.
Evaluation
Stufflebeam and Shinkfield argue 'The most important purpose of evaluation is not to
prove but to improve We cannot be sure that our goals are worthy unless we can
match them to the needs of the people they are intended to serve' (1985:151 ). Also 'to 
inform the thinking of policy makers, practitioners, program participants and the 
public' (Pawson and Tilley 2001).
The Network will provide an important vehicle for collective evaluation and mutual 
exchange of the research project and provide important opportunities for AvMA to 
evaluate and improve their service provision based upon direct feedback about a range 
of issues from the groups.
Action Research
In order to develop the research, the project is seen to require a participatory research 
design. A collaborative research model is seen as an important way of giving the
groups a voice and empowering them to 'tell their stories' of medical harm, whilst 
actively enabling them to be involved in a political process of change. Action research 
also provides the basis for developing new theory and change strategies based upon 
bringing together the differing perspectives of a range of stakeholders. In nursing this 
has led not only to problem solving in practice from a nurses' perspective, but has also 
been 'applicable in addressing individual patients' problems from the patients' 
perspective' ((Holter and Schwartz-Barcott 1993: 299).
Action research has a distinct history going back at least half a century and 
incorporates a range of different approaches and practices. These are grounded in a 
number of research traditions covering social psychology, the natural sciences, 
organisational science and social planning and reflecting various philosophical and 
psychological assumptions as well as political aspirations. However despite the 
diversity of action research approaches, all are seen to have in common on some level, 
a commitment to participatory, collaborative, experiential and action oriented 
methodologies (Hart and Bond 1998; Reason and Bradbury 2003). Over the last 
fifteen years, action research approaches have become increasingly popular in health, 
especially in the field of nursing (Titchen and Binnie 1993; Holter and Schwartz- 
Barcott; Oja and Smulyan 1989). These have developed as a way of dealmg with 
change, closing the theory-practice gap and conductmg research with people in more 
equal partnerships (Webb 1990).
Participatory Action Research (PAR)
Participatory action research represents a particular branch of action research, fitting 
within Hart and Bond's (1998) empowerment model. Probably the most widely 
practised participative approach, its roots are seen to have emerged by some 
practitioners from a form of liberationist inquiry in underprivileged parts of both the 
"Third" world and the developed west (Reason 1994; Pals Borda 2001). Practitioners 
are also seen to have applied the term to their work in Western organisations (Whyte 
1991). As a practice Hall argues PAR has always been in existence, wherever 
different oppressed and marginalised groups have struggled collectively to understand 
and to take action, often to tackle inequalities of power, in their social worlds. In this 
respect, it is seen as a common way for individuals in community-based or social 
movement contexts to work together (200: 174).
The intention with this research project is to use a PAR approach based upon key 
criteria:
• It participatory.
• It is co-operative [engaging community members and researchers in a joint 
process in which both contribute equally].
• It is a coleaming process.
• It involves systems development and [local capacity building].
• It is an empowering process through which participants can increase control over 
their lives.
• It achieves a balance between research and action.
(Israel et al 1998 cited in Minkler et al 2002)
The participatory and collaborative research design for ethical reasons is also intended 
to ensure that nothing ftirther is done to harm the groups by using exploitative 
methods to gather research data. Raymond Lee's (1993) classic book on doing 
research on sensitive topics also provides important suggestions for the project design.
4) Research Methods
The research will consist of a compilation of a number of case studies on the self-help 
groups that will also be published on AvMA's website. This will act as a way of 
publicising the group's aims and enabling them to feed into the wider policy agenda.
The case studies will eventually be collated into book form (edited by myself) initially 
to be published by AvMA with an ISBN number.
Selection Criteria
The research will consist of a community-based sample emerging from AvMA's work 
with the self-help groups. We will not be recruiting participants through hospitals or 
GP's.
Inclusion
• To identify 8-10 diverse groups and to write up case studies on them.
• To identify as broad a cross section of groups as possible, which illustrate 
different types/aspects and experiences of medical harm. This will include where 
possible, identifying groups with users from a diversity of backgrounds 
(race/ethnicity, socio-economic status, disability etc). Also in identifying groups 
involved with different types of issues (complaints, legal, regulatory, in the 
public/private sector) etc.
The aim of drawing up case studies on the groups and working with the leader/chair 
of the group as an action researcher/reflective practitioner, is to take advantage of the 
specialist knowledge accumulated by the groups by virtue of the experiences of their 
members. This group knowledge is seen to go way beyond the individual experience 
of the average person affected by medical harm.
In relation to issues of representation, Blumer points to the value of seeking out 'key 
informants who have a profound and central grasping of a particular cultural world'.
Identifying a small number of individuals with this level and breadth of expertise is 
seen to 'constitute a far better 'representative sample' than a thousand individuals who 
may be involved in the action that is being formed but who are not knowledgeable 
about that information (1979: xxxiii).
The exact approach for gathering the data for the case studies will need to be 
negotiated, with each group. However this will be a collective process, with some 
groups taking a more in-depth role in compiling and writing up their case history, 
whilst others may choose to work with me in providing material that I write up. All 
parties will be actively involved in discussing, analysing and checking the material for 
factual accuracy. It is envisaged that once a group signs the consent form and agrees 
to participate in the project, the group's leader/or nominated lead person will be asked 
to help gather and compile data to produce a case study on the group.
Exclusion
• Groups not set up or concerned with issues related to medical harm.
• Groups who do not sign the consent form
A basic checklist and schedule for planning and preparing for drawing up the case -
studies might include:
Setting up a pre-meeting with group chair or nominated lead person(s) to discuss the
logistics of the research exercise and to discuss the information sheet and consent
form.
• Identify who will do what and whether the group lead will act more independently
as a researcher in drawing up the case-study or work more collectively with
myself.
• Decide on likely number of meetings/interviews that will be needed and times, 
place and length of meeting.
• Identify the nature of the meeting/interview. This will mean discussing with 
research participants the material to be looked at, key themes and/or the kinds of 
questions/issues that need to be discussed in more depth. A research aim is to 
draw not only upon interview transcriptions where necessary, but also other key 
material which might include inquiry reports, letters, extracts from conference 
speeches etc. Therefore how the case studies are drawn will vary somewhat with 
each group.
• In gathering data about the groups, this will be done through a mixture of note- 
taking or tape-recorded interviews. Everything that is said will remain confidential 
and only the material the participant is happy to have published will be used. Once 
any tapes have been transcribed and notes written up, they will be made available 
for the participant to look at and to check for accuracy. This will act as a validity 
check as well as to provide stimulus for any further comment and revision. During 
the project, the tapes will be kept in a safe and secure place known only to myself, 
and once the research is complete, the tapes will be destroyed or returned to the 
participant if this is what they would prefer.
• The data generated and main findings will be discussed collectively with the main 
participants in the project to decide on how it is structured and presented and will 
then be written up as case studies. This discussion will be with the aim of 
producing a book published by AvMA and collated by myself as editor, who 
where necessary, will exercise final editorial control on content, inclusion of and 
length of material. Each group will be able to decide how they are identified or 
whether they would prefer to use a pseudonym. Publication of the material by 
official publishers would be subject to a separate copyright agreement.
• All data will however be anonymised in the writing up of the PhD
Research Questions/Themes
Some broad questions/themes to guide the writing up of the case studies and the 
interviews are:
Case Studies
History of the group - why it was set up 
Nature of medical harm
Nature of membership and and types of background of users 
Campaigning objectives 
Policy Work/Impact: Nature of any Inquiry 
Any issues concerning inequality and discrimination
5) AvMA Network Meetings
The network meetings are seen to provide a critical opportunity for collective 
reflective and reflexive, critical debate about a range of issues and action. All action 
researchers whatever their role, need to recognise the need for reflection/reflexivity 
(Hart and Bond 1995; Reason 1994; Schon 2003) given their immersion in the social 
issues they are studying. The network meetings therefore provide a way of looking at 
data emerging from the subjective experiences of the participants in a critical way, 
taking into account a range of factors that impact upon a situation. The meetings also 
provide a collective opportunity to negotiate the work of the project, identify a 
representative cross-section of research participants, discuss definitions/terminology, 
and develop shared understandings, strategies and shared solutions.
6) Evaluation
The wider network meetings, as well as smaller meetings with some of the groups 
will provide an important opportunity to evaluate the projects work by drawing upon 
a range of information in a 'portfolio' (Beattie 1991) approach. This will relate to the 
broad sweep of the project's work (meetings, notes from discussion groups, reflective 
diaries, conference presentations) and will be regularly reviewed to ensure that it is 
meeting its key objectives.
Mrs Catherine Ashbee 
Secretary
University of Surrey Ethics Committee.
16^  ^March 2005
Dear Mrs Ashbee
Submission from Ms J Ocloo, Ph D student in Sociology
I am writing to provide a supporting letter for the PhD research that Josephine Ocloo is 
carrying out as part of her Case studentship widi Action against Medical Accidents
(AvMA).
As part of her work at AvMA, Josephine has been the lead person in basing with a 
number of self-help groups, who have formed as a result of their experiences of medical 
harm. She has been able to successfully gain access to these groups and to build up trust 
and communication by drawing upon her considerable experience of medical harm on 
both a personal and professional level.
Over the last year a number of meetings have taken place with a small core of these 
groups to discuss ways in which AvMa could work more closely together with them and 
similar organisations. This has resulted in a decision to establish a loose national network 
of voluntary groups, to share information and experiences and to work together on issues 
of common concern, whilst also enabling individual groups to retain their own personal 
autonomy and independence.
Josephine has discussed her PhD research at a number of these meetmgs. This has now 
resulted in a proposal for an action research project to be developed, in which interested 
groups could collaborate in producing research data that could be compiled into a book 
comprising of a range of case studies on the groups. Although the book is likely to 
comprise of groups both within and outside of the network, network meetings and events 
will continue to provide a way of generating data, as well as critically evaluating research
findings.
AvMA is very happy to support this project, both in terms of its support of network 
meetmgs and other events, publishing the book and/or case-studies on the groups on its 
website and highlighting other relevant research findings.
Yours sincerely
Peter Walsh (AvMA Chief Executive)
INFORMATION SHEET 
Medical Harm and User Empowerment within the NHS: a 
participatory action research project
You are being invited to take part in a research project on the  Before you decide if you want to
participate it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. 
Please take the time to read the following information carefully and to discuss it with others if you wish. 
Please ask if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to 
decide whether or not you wish to take part.
What is the purpose of the research?
A number of policy changes are currently taking place within the NHS that relate to patient safety, the 
complaints system and systems of regulation such as the CMC. Many of these changes are taking 
place without the involvement of people who have personal experiences of medical harm or what is 
known as an adverse event.
• This research aims to look at different aspects of medical harm from a user perspective and 
specifically to draw upon the experiences of a number of self-help groups set up as a result of 
medical harm.
• Using a participatory research approach, the aim is to empower these groups to produce case 
studies on their organisations. The aim of these case studies will be: to highlight why the group was 
set up, what the key issues are in terms of medical harm and what changes they would like to see 
in promoting better patient safety and systems of accountability within the NHS.
• The research material will be collated to produce a book on Medical Harm and User Empowerment. 
It is hoped that this will enable policy makers and NHS employees to learn more about the issues 
and how they affect people from a user perspective. A further aim is that the research will help to 
improve systems within the NHS and beyond regarding patient safety, regulation and 
accountability, and to contribute towards some critical ideas for better patient involvement and 
empowerment in this area.
The research will start in  ....2005 and is due to end in  2005.
Why have I been chosen?
You have been invited to take part in the research because of your knowledge and personal experience
of medical harm and because you are (chair/leader of ...xxx group). Your experience and opinions
are really important, and we would like your participation in drawing up the case -study on your group.
Do I have to take part?... No
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you decide to take part you will be asked to sign a 
consent form. If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw from the study at any time 
without any consequences.
What will happen if I take part?
If you decide to participate you will asked as the leader(s) of the group to help gather and compile data 
to produce a case study on your group. How the data is collected, will need to be discussed with you. It 
is envisaged that as lead researcher I will work closely with groups and collectively we will compile the 
case studies. Some groups may take a more in depth role in compiling their own case study whilst 
others, may work with me jointly to collate the material.
What are the possible benefits of taking part?
The valuable information that you provide will be used not only to improve patient safety generally 
within the NHS, but will also be invaluable in helping policymakers and employees within the NHS to 
understand issues about medical harm from a user perspective. These perspectives are currently 
lacking in the debates taking place about patient safety issues. Drawing up a case-study on the 
experiences of your group, will be an important way of showing what some of the key issues are and 
what changes still need to take place in terms of user empowerment and promoting better patient safety 
and accountability.
Will my taking part in the discussion group be kept confidential?
Everything that is said will be kept totally confidential to the researcher and only the parts that you 
wish to have written up will be used for the research. In order for this decision to be made, a transcript 
of the interview will be made available for you to look at. To make the job of the researcher easier, and 
to make sure that what you say is recorded accurately; the conversation will be tape- recorded. No one 
but the researcher will listen to the tape and it will be destroyed or returned to you afterwards.
Role of Network Meetings
Most of the participants involved in this research will already be part of AvMA's network for self-help 
group's set up as a result of medical harm. In order to achieve diverse representation for the research 
some participants may be approached who are not already in the network. They will then be invited to 
attend meetings. It is envisaged that the meetings will provide an important opportunity for reflective 
and critical discussion about the research and the way that the findings are presented. Other material 
emerging out of the discussions within the network may also be used within the research project.
What will happen to the results of the research?
The data generated and main findings will be discussed by the participants in the project to decide how 
it is structured and presented and written up as case studies.. A key aim is to produce a book published 
by AvMA and collated by myself as editor. Where necessary I will exercise final editorial control on 
content, inclusion of and length of material. Each group will be able to decide how the group is identified 
and individual participants will also be able to decide whether their own name is used or whether they 
would prefer to use a pseudonym. Publication of the material by official publishers would be subject to a 
separate copyright agreement. All data will however be anonymised in the writing up of the PhD. The 
case studies will also be written up appropriately for publication on the *AvMA website if participants are 
willing to give their permission.
Who is organising and funding the research
This project arises out of research being undertaken for a PhD by Josephine Ocloo, who will act as the 
main researcher. The research forms part of a CASE studentship held by the Department of Sociology 
at the University of Surrey tenable from October 2003 to September 2006. It is concerned with research 
with victims of medical harm and looking at patient empowerment. The partner in the studentship is the 
voluntary association *Action against Medical Accidents (AvMA).
The University's Research Ethics Committee has granted this research ethical approval.
Should you require any further information please contact Josephine Ocloo on 0208-451-0865 or on 
email: io@ocloo.fsnet.co.uk or
Professor Martin Bulmer PhD research supervisor on 
email: m.bulmer@soc.surrey.ac.uk 
University of Surrey
Guildford, telephone: +44(0)1483 689456 
Surrey GU2 7XH, UK fax: +44(0)1483 689551
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet.
CONSENT FORM
Medical Harm and User Empowerment within the NHS: a 
participatory action research project
Name of lead Researcher: Josephine Ocloo
Please initial box
1. i confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated, 
for the above study and have had any questions answered
2. I understand my participation Is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
at any time without giving any reason.
3. I agree to take part in the above study and to co-operate 
and comply with the terms outlined.
4. I understand that all personal data from this study will be stored and handled 
with the strictest confidence in accordance with the Data Protection Act (1998)
Name of Lead Organisational 
Representative
Date Signature
Name of Individual Member Date Signature
Witness Date Signature
Copies to be kept by each participant and by main researcher
RISK ASSESSMENT IN RESEARCH AGREEMENT
Title: Medical harm and User Empowerment within the NHS: a participatory 
action research project.
Name: Josephine Ocloo
Supervisor: Professor Martin Bulmer
Outline of the research procedure
The research design has been explicitly developed with the aim of minimising the risk 
of any harm to the research participants through exploitation of their situation for 
academic purposes. By developing a participatory design, the aim is to empower the 
groups involved, to play a full part in developing the project in a way that best enables 
tiiem to have a voice and to tell their story from their own perspectives. Also to be 
part of a project that will help to change and improve systems within the health 
service in the friture.
Sources of risks in the research procedure
(E.g. respondents, the setting, travel, other factors etc. - see previous documents)
The main risks identified relate to the sensitive nature of the research subject matter 
and the need to ensure the process is handled in a way that:
• Individuals involved do not find unduly personally upsetting; and
• Where individuals and groups do not feel that tiiey have been exploited or 
misrepresented.
What steps are to be taken to minimise the risk? (continue if necessary).
• In order to limit the possibility of distress I will be working with the chairs or 
leaders of the groups rather than with individual members. The vast majority of 
these individuals (if not all), will already be known to me and to AvMA, through 
their participation in AvMA's self-help network. This is important in that I have 
already been able to establish strong relationships of trust with individuals, 
because of my lead role in setting up the network and encouraging and supporting 
groups to attend.
• The participatory and collaborative nature of the project is designed to build trust, 
allow individuals to be part of shaping the research, whilst enabling and 
empowering individuals to be part of a process of change at the same time.
• The focus of the project is designed to enable the groups to tell their stories, based 
upon the experiences of their members and to highlight what the key issues are 
from the groups perspective, rather than to concentrate on individual personal 
stories. This will make it easier to document information in a less emotional and
personal way. Given that group members have consistently highlighted their 
exclusion from the debate on patient safety, the research project is seen as 
empowering in enabling the groups to articulate what the issues are from their 
own perspectives.
• Developing the research through the self-help network will provide additional 
support for individuals involved in the project.
• My background as someone who has been affected by medical harm, (as a result 
of the death of a close relative) and as part of a self-help group, will also make it 
easier for me to develop a caring, empathetic and trusting basis in which to hold 
meetings and carry out any interviews.
• Discussions with potential research participants will take place on an individual 
basis to discuss the information sheet, make sure the information is understood 
and to answer any questions and to discuss how they would like to proceed in 
terms of the way their group profile is written up and any meetings and/or 
interviews are set up and other documentation used.
Risk to the researcher
No explicit risks are perceived, apart from recognising that the subject matter 
generally may be emotionally challenging given the nature of the material involved. 
However, in this respect I have made arrangements to be able to share with a range of 
individuals to get emotional support, as well as being able to rely on the collaborative 
nature of the project and the individual support of AvMA and the groups in the 
process.
Research student: (signature)
Supervisor: (signature)
Agreed Review date:
Copy to be given to University Research Ethics Committee
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Professor M Bulmer 
Professor of Soeiology 
University of Surrey 
Guildford 
Surrey GU2 7XH
bear Professor Bulmer
Full title of project: Medical harm and Patient Empowerment (Ms Josephine Ocloo)
Thank you for seeking the Committee's advice about the above project..
You provided the following documents for consideration: 
e-mail dated 25 October 2005 form Professor Bulmer
These documents have been considered by the Chairman who has advised that the project 
is not one that is required to be ethically reviewed under the terms of the Governance 
Arrangements for Research Ethics Committees in the UK.
Although review by a Research Ethics Committee is not required, you should check with the 
R&D Department whether management approval is required before the project starts.
Yours sincerely
Jane Martin 
Committee Manager
ii#  iAoi s^nin(@5tmrecfsnet.coAÀ
The Central Office for Research Ethics Committees is responsible for the
■ ■ ■ Ethics Committees
s
Professor M Buliriéf 
Department of Sociology 
S chool of Human Sciences
24 November 2005
of Surrey
Guildford
Surrey GU2 7XH, OK 
Telephone
+44(0)1483 360800  
Facsimile
+44 ( # 4 8 3  % ) # )
vvww.sünrey.àc.uk
Registry
Dear Professor Bulmer
Re: Some general issues reîatüig to ethical approval for Socml Science R es^ r#  
upon health within the Universi#
Thank you for your paper and attachments submitted for consideration by the 
University Ethics Committee at a meeting held on 16^ November. The information 
and points raised in the paper were discussed in full. The Committee remains of the 
opinion that its original advice to submit your research protocol to the NHS Research 
Ethics Committee for their opinion was reasonable. The Committee notes that, 
having eventually taken this advice, the South East Multi-Centre Research Ethics 
Committee has said that, in their view, your research does not need NHS ethical 
opinion. The Committee accepts this opinion in this instance, but wishes it to be 
known that, in view of the wide difference in opinion of NHS RECs, this does not set 
a precedent for future research of this nature.
The University Ethics Committee will, therefore, continue to review all research 
protocols where responsibility for this activity has not been devolved to Schools, 
(undergraduate and postgraduate taught research projects), and will consider each on 
individual merit
The Committee now considers this issue closed.
Yours sincerely
Professor Terry Desombre
Chairman, University Ethics Committee
November 2005
University of Surrey Research Ethics Committee
Some general Issues relating to  ethical approval for social sc ience 
research upon health within the  uhlyersijfy
Martin Bulmer 
Professor of Sociology
Fqrëwprd
This document arises from a submission to the Committee by my Ph D 
student Ms Josephine Ocloo, which has now received a favourable opinion 
[7/11/05]. This paper is however concerned with issues about ethical review of 
health research than are raised by this single case, and cites other cases in 
the Departments of Sociology and Psychology, as well as  wider 
considerations. The issues to be considered are summarised in bullet points 
at the end of the document on page 8.
I originally embarked upon the process of ethicaf review.of her project in 
December 2004. The first submission to this committee was made at the end 
of January 2005 by Ms Ocloo. As a  result of the comments made by the 
Committee, a further submission was made In April 2005, to which a response 
was received In May. A meeting then took placé between myself and 
Professor Desombre and Mr Macfarlane, as  members of this committee, on _ 
July 13*^  2005, at which the possibility of my student and I personally 
presenting the case to the comrfiittee was mooted. In the meantime, a further 
revision was made to the protocol for the research and submitted in late July 
2005. A response to this was received in August, and I was invited to a 
meeting of the committee on 31 August, which I was unable to attend as 1 was 
then in Konstanz in Germany. Since then I have had further discussions with 
colleagues within the School of Human Sciences and other experts and actors 
in the medical ethics world outside of the university. This paper is the result.
The nub of the Issue
Ms Ocloo has now made three submissions over a  six month period, but there 
was until recently still disagreement. As a result of review, quite substantial 
changes have been made by Ms Ocloo to certain aspects of the design of the 
research, which has taken up considerable time. This has finally culminated in 
a letter from the May 2005 round from which it appeared that the Committee 
was now satisfied with the protocol for the research apart from one point, the 
necessity to obtain an opinion about the proposal from an appropriate NHS 
REG. This has been the point of disagreement, and the reason for this paper.
Thepfoject
I s  Josephine Ocloo is a full time Ph D student in the Department of 
Sociology, funded by an ESRC CASE Studentship on the subject of Medical 
fdarin arid User Empowerment. The partner in the CASE studentshipi who 
provides part of the funding,, is the voluntary organisation Action against
Medical Accidents [AvMA] based in Croydon. AvMA is “an independent 
charity which promotes better patient safety and justice for people who have 
been affected by a medical accident. A ‘medical accidentt is where unintended 
harm has been caused as a result of treatment or fallureto treat appropriately. 
This includes where the care has been negligent, but does not necessarily 
mean that it was. AvMA believes that whatever the cause of a medical 
accident, the people affected deserve explanations, support, and where 
appropriate, compensation. Furthermore, we all deserve to know that the 
necessary steps will be taken to prevent similar accidents being repeated.” 
[AVMA web site, URL http://www.avma.orq.uk/index.asp1
A major part of this Ph D project involves liaison between AvMA and a 
number of self-help groups who have formed as a result of their experiences 
of medical harm. Ms Ocloo has been able successfully to help AvMA to 
develop a loose national network of these groups to share information and 
experiences and to work together on issues of common concern, by drawing 
upon her considerable experience of medical harm. Ms Ocloo has then 
chosen to study this process of group formation and mobilisation using action 
research methodology, as part of her Ph D field research.
Ethical Review
It was clear to me as her supervisor that Ms Ocloo’s project should be 
submitted to the University Research Ethics Committee, and she and I began 
to prepare for this in the autumn of 2004, near the beginning of the second 
year of her studentship. The advice on the Ethics Committee web site 
appeared to suggest that health-related research should always be referred 
first to the appropriate NHS REC, and the site quotes the Research 
Governance Framework for Health and Social Care document of 2001.
This document, Governance Arrangem ents for NHS Research Ethics 
Committees, states in section 3.1 that “Ethical advice from the appropriate 
NHS REC is required for any research proposal involving (a) patients and 
users of the NHS. This includes all potential research participants recruited by 
virtue of the patient or user’s past or present treatment by, or use of, the NHS. 
It includes NHS patients treated under contracts with private sector 
institutions, (b) individuals identified as potential research participants 
because of their status as relatives or carers of patients and users of the 
NHS, as defined above.”
Advice from Professor Terry Stacey
In the case of Ms Ocloo’s research, it was not clear to me what “recruited by 
virtue of “ meant, and I therefore sought the advice of Professor Terry Stacey, 
Director of COREC, the Central Office for Research Ethics Committees of the 
Department of Health. I wrote to him on 21 December 2004, and received a 
response by return, in which he stated that “recruitment via voluntary 
organisations - even for health related research - does not require review by 
NHS RECs, as long as there is no intention to obtain information from NHS 
records, etc. It is certainly good practice that research on human subjects 
should have independent ethical review, and your University committee will be 
perfectly competent to do this” [email dated 22.12.04]. This exchange of 
correspondence is included in Annex 1 to this paper.
The course of Ethical Review by the Committee
A. First round
Ms Ocloo then submitted her protocol with ten attachments to the Committee 
on 29 January 2005, one of w h to  was a copy of this email exchange with 
Professor Stacey. The first of the fourteen points in Choi Tsang's reply bn 
behalf of the committee dated 16 February 2005 reads a s  follows:
“1. NHS REC approval must be  obtained. It was not clear whether CORED 
was asked explicitly whether research relating to experiences of “individuals 
that have been affected by medical harm” needed NHS ethics approval. If you 
do not wish to obtain NHS approval, an explicit exclusion clause must be 
placed on participants currently receiving NHS treatment for a  related 
condition”.
B. Second round.
Ms Ocloo then undertook further work on the design of her research while 
preparing for her Departmental mid term Review on her progress as a Ph D 
student, which took place on Friday 11 March. The Review was conducted by 
Dr [now Professor] Hilaiy Thomas, the department’s  most experienced 
medical sociologist, and was chaired by Dr Geoff Cooper, head of 
Department. Considerable attention was paid to the issues raised by the 
University Research Ethics Committee at the end of the review, and concern 
expressed about point 1.
Ms Ocloo then made a second submission to the Committee via Ms Tsang, 
dated April 14^ 2005, responding to all 14 points raised previously, and 
stating in response to point 1 above:
“1. An explicit exclusion clause will be placed on participants currently 
receiving NHS treatment for a  related condition, Who will not be included in 
the study. NHS REC Approval is therefore not required, in accordance with 
the advice by Prof Stacey inbis letter to Prof Bulmer dated 22-12-04.”
In response, Ms Tsang wrote on 25 April 2005 the following:
“Further to the above, 1 have circulated your reply to my letter dated 16 
February to the Members of the Ethics Committee for their consideration. 
Before they can give a favourable ethical opinion, the would like you to 
respond further to the point below:
1. The Committee has been in touch with COREC to seek further advice 
as to whether this protocol requires a submission to an NHS REC. The 
Surrey and Sussex GREC adviser, Sandra Holley, has confirmed that 
as this research involves participants who had been treated for a 
certain condition by the NHS, and that this research is related to their 
experience, then this protocol should be submitted to the appropriate 
NHS REG for review.
To clarify whether Sandra Holley’s  advice conflicts with the email 
(dated 23 December 2004) from Professor Stacey, the Committee
would like you to submit your protocol to the appropriate REC for 
“Chair’s  consideration*, rather than go through the whole application 
process. It is understood that this will take no more than a fortnight,a 
nd does not require any formal application.”
G Third round.
Ms Ocloo and I then undertook further study of the design of her Ph D, and 1 
took advice from others about the stance taken by the Cpmrnittee. This was a  
quite lengthy process, which meant.that the meeting with Professor Desombre 
and Mr .Macintyre did not take place until July 13. Holidays then intervened. 
À third submission was m ade on July 23 2005, and I wrote in my covering 
letter that
“As we understand it, the Committee is satisfied with her responses to their 
earlier questions on various issues related to the design of the study. The 
outstanding issue is whether the proposal requires an opinion from the NHS 
as to whether it falls within the framework of NHS Ethical Review.
[para restating Ms Ocloo’s  status a s  CASE student working with AvMA] Ms 
Ocloo is not therefore seeking access to hospital or GP patients via the NHS.
Ms Ocloo has now reconsidered her research design, and wishes to submit 
the enclosed proposal ‘MEDICAL HARM AND USER EMPOWERMENT IN 
THE NHS’ for approval by the University Committee. This is a  revised version 
of the earlier proposal which she submitted, which has been modified a s  
follows. Medical negligence is not the primary focus of the study, which is a 
study of user empowerment in relation to patient safety with the NHS. AvMA, 
the CASE partner, plays a major role in this area, and the focus of her 
research will be upon the network groups which AvMA has se t up on the 
subject of patient safety. Ms Ocloo’s Ph D will also include a secondary 
analysis of data collected from support workshops being run by AvMA for a  
rangé of people affected by medical harm.
[Final para re changes in the documéntatibn submitted]. “
In response I was asked in early August whether this was a  revised 
submission or a new submission, and I stated that we believed it was a  
revised submission. 1 also indicated my inability to attend the Committee’s 
meeting on 31 August due to béing in Konstanz on that date.
On 31 August Ms Tsang wrote to say that “as this protocol still involves 
potential NHS patients, the Committee’s  position still has not changed, and 
therefore this protocol should be submitted to the appropriate NHS REC for 
review.” No comment was offered on the changes in the design of the study 
nor of the switch to relying upon secondary analysis,
I was also informed that the protocol would be discussed at the next meeting 
of the Committee on W ednesday W November at 2 pm, and I was Jnyited tOr
4
ISSUES FOR THE COMMITTEE
1. The specific issue aboutM s Ocloo’s  research now been resolved and a 
favourable ethical opinion sent to hen In late October 2005, the Chair 
of the NHS South East MREC, having been asked by me for an 
Advisory Opiniori, has stated that the research proposal does not fall 
within the remit of üie NHS REC. This letter is attached a s  Annex 2 .
2. It is our contention that the opinion originally obtained from Professor 
Terry Stacey, the Director of COREC, was correct about the matter^ 
and much time has been wasted in looking for an NHS Review of the 
proposal which was not required, and is now confirmed as  not being 
required. After many conversations with various parties, 1 eventually 
was in touch in turn with the Vice Chair, the Secretary and the Chair of 
the NHS South East MREC, each of whom took the view that a  study 
of persons recruited via a voluntary association did not fall within the 
remit of an NHS REC. Why did the Committee maintain otherwise ?
3. Further support for the view that the words “recruited by virtue o f  in 
the NHS Governance document refer to the mode of recruitment of the 
subjects of research is provided by the recent Economic and Social 
Research Council Research Ethics Framework of July 2005 [URL: 
httD://www.esrc.ac.uk/ESRCInfoCentre/about/CI/CP/Social Sciences/is 
sue61/communitv brieferaspxi. This a new and definitive statement of 
ethical practice to be followed in social science research by our 
Funding Council. In Appendix B of that ESRC document. Flowchart of 
[Ethical] Review Process, one question asked is: “Does it [the 
research project] entail recruitment via NHS (or social services)?”. The 
issue is not whether or not the subjects are NHS patients, as  the 
university committee appears to maintain. A copy of this flowchart is 
attached as Annex 3. The attention of the Committee is directed to the 
existence of this new document relating to the social science field.
4. Ms Ocloo is a research student funded by ESRC and guidance was 
sought from members of the ESRC secretariat concerned with 
research ethics. They directed me for an opinion on this case to 
Professor Andrew Webster, Director of the Science and Technology 
Studies Unit (SATSU), University of York. Professor Webster advised 
ESRC on formulating their Research Ethics Framework and has been 
negotiating on their behalf with the Department of Health on research 
ethics guidance for the social sciences.
Professor Webster’s opinion in attached as Annex 4 of this paper. 
Professor Webster’s  view is that Professor Stacey’s original advice was 
entirely correct, and to quote his email, that ‘tiie reference to 'recruited 
by virtue of means as you pay, through accessing respondents via 
past or present clinical records; which is not what you've done or plan 
t o m ’ p e  Aririex4I.
5. A further issue to be considered if what we also detect as  some 
inconsistency in décisions on the protocols of doctoral students 
involved in health research in our School reviewed by the University 
Committee in the recent p a s t  This is cleariy problematic from the point 
of view of consistency, but also leaves us open to charges of unfairly 
prejudicing the completion bf research of particular students without 
good reason. We cite two examples to illustrate this point which both in 
volved health related research involving access to respondents via the 
voluntary sector. Both applications received a  response from the 
committee contrary to that received by Ms Ocloo until recently.
(a) . part time Ph D student in sociology.
Proposed to study diabetes in the south Asian population, 
recruiting the sample via community Organisations. Proposal 
approved without requirement to refer to NHS REC.
(b) '  ' pursuing the Psych D in Psychotherapeutic
and Counselling Psychology in the Department of 
Psychology. wished to interview mothers of
children who had committed suicide in order to explore the 
impact of this experience upon maternal identity. Her 
intention was tb recruit participants from suicide 
bereavement support groups. had a protracted
discussion with the Ethics Commiuee, which would hot be 
unexpected, given the sensitive nature of her proposed 
research. However^ the Ethics Committee wished to refer her 
for NHS approval. In the end, the Uriiversity Ethics 
Committee changed their mind and - work was 
approved. It was duly conducted and completed on 
schedule. More devils of this case are provided at Annex 5.
6. We draw the attention of the Committee to an important
recommendation in the ESRC Research Ethics Framework which, if 
adopted, would hâve saved much time in this case. Section 15 of the 
ESRC Framework is entitled “Avoiding Duplication of Submission”: 
“1.15.1 Researchers and their employing organisations should avoid 
duplication of ethics review^ especially in regard to research that may 
fall under the rubric of other ethical frameworks such a s  the 
Department of Health’s  Research Governance Framework.
Researchers must submit proposals either to their institution’s  REC or 
to a  Department of Health Local or Multi-Site Research Ethics 
Committee L(M)REC as appropriate. The ESRC does not require both 
bodies to be involved. The appropriate body will be determined by the 
issiies raised by the research, the nature of the data to be obtained 
and the population of respondents to be included in the study. This will 
apply to both single-discipline and interdisciplinary research were 
social and biomedical scientists are working together.” [ESRC 
Research Ethics Framework, p. 17]
7. The experience of this case convinces the School of Human 
Sciences that the review of protocols by Ph D students in the University 
should be forthwith delegated by this Committee to the School Ethics 
Committees which they have established, if the University committee 
agrees. Such cases are always subject to reference on to  the 
University committee if the School committee so decides, and are 
subject to review by the University committee. We recommend that the 
University Committee agrees in future this step for doctoral research 
students.
WIDER ISSUES
8. This case shows the importance of balancing standards of good 
ethical review, which the Committee maintains on behalf of the 
university, with a clear understanding of the boundaries between the 
university’s  sphere and that of the NHS, which has been less than 
perfect in this case. In the social sciences, the ESRC Research Ethics 
Framework now provides clear guidance, and suggests some 
modifications to the Committee’s  approach to the review df social 
science research on health.
9 The situation is clearly currently a changing one, both in terms of 
cases submitted to the Committee and nationally on the research 
ethics scene. The School of Human Sciences detects some 
inconsistencies in past Judgements by the Committee on cases of 
doctoral research students in social science and psychology, in relation 
to the need for health service ethical approval. The Department of 
Health commissioned the Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on 
the Operation of NHS Research Ethics Committees [DoH, 2005: 
httD://www.dh.qov.iik/PolicvAndGuidance/ResearchAndDevelopment/fs 
/enl -  link further down page to PDF]. This report was announced on 
6th June 2005. “Its recommendations are designed to streamline the 
procedures for ethical review and ensure that [NHS] committees work 
more intensively and efficiently, helped by stronger administrative 
support. The report has now been passed to the NPSAto take forward 
consultation work on how best to implement these recommendations.” 
[DoH website]. To date the outcome has not been announced, but it is 
worthy of note that one of their recommendations was that “much 
research, such as surveys, service evaluation and research on NHS 
staff, does not require ethical review.” [Conclusion 6, p. 13] Professor 
Webster also refers to the work of the G’Higgins group in his letter.
10 The cardinal importance of maintaining freedom of inquiry for the 
uriiyersity’s  #  students needs restating. This Is particularly so in 
an area such as the sociaf sciences where research often raises critical 
questibhsahd may ip role. The Committee's
responsibilities in this regard are very important.
SUMMARY OF POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE
COMMITTEE
1. W hat is the Committee’s  stance in relation to health research by 
social scientists where subjects are recruited via voluntary sector 
organisations, not via the NHS, and where no contact, with the NHS 
is involved in recruitment ? Why does.it sometimes insist upon 
NHS review in such cases ?
2. Why does the Committee insist upon such a narrow definiition of the 
words 'by virtue of in the NHS protocol, that almost all cases 
involving patients are  referred for NHS overview, regardless of the 
method of recruitment of the subjects ?
3. Will the Committee take note of Professor Terry Stacey’s advice in 
this matter in relation to social science research ?
4. Will the Committee try to ensure greater consistency in reaching 
decisions on individual cases in this area where patients are 
recruited via the voluntary sector, than has been achieved in the 
recent past ?
5. Will the Committee adopt the recommendations of the ESRC re 
duplication of submission ?
6. Will the Committee consider delegating the review of Ph D 
protocols to School Ethics Committees, as origirially envisaged?
November 7"^  2005 ' I(AAA\^
Professor M Bulmer 
Department of Sociology 
ScttppI pfjïumàn Sciences
24 November 2005,
University 
of Surrey
Guildford
Siirmy GU2 7XH, UK 
Telephone
+44(^ 1483  300800  
Facsimile
+44 (0)1483 300803  
wvw.suirey.ac.uk
Registry
Dear Professor Bulmer
Re; Some general issues relating to ethical approval for| Social Science Res^rch 
upon health within the University.
Thank you for your paper and attachments submitted for consideration by the 
University Ethics Committee at a meeting held on 16^ November. The information 
and points raised in the paper were discussed in full. The Committee remains of the 
opinion that its original advice to submit your research protocol to the NHS Research 
Ethics Committee for their opinion was reasonable. The Committee notes that, 
having eventually taken this advice, the South East Multi-Centre Research Ethics 
Committee has said that, in their view  ^ your research does not need NHS ethical 
opinion. The Committee accepts this opinion in this instance, but wishes it to be 
known that, in view of the wide difference in opinion of NHS RECs, this does not set 
a precedent for future research of this nature.
The University Ethics Committee will, therefore, continue to review all research 
protocols where responsibility for this activity has not been devolved to Schools, 
(undergraduate and postgraduate taught research projects), and will consider each on 
individual merit.
The Committee now considers this issue closed.
Yours sincerely
'—2- 'ïiO W v .
Professor Terry Desombre
Chairman, University Ethics Committee
T he  Q u een 's  
^ n iv e r s s r y  P r i z e s
Patients Perspectives on Change
"The Patients' Agenda for Safety & Justice" organised by AvMA in association with 
the Medical Harm Self-Help Network is taking place on May 9th 2006 at Regents 
Wharf, London. The conference will provide an opportunity for patients and patients' 
organisations to set the agenda through delivering presentations on the issues while 
representatives of the key statutory agencies in the patient safety field will be in the 
audience to listen and feedback to their organisations.
The conference will also see the launch of the “Patients for Patient Safety” project 
which AvMA is managing in partnership with the National Patient Safety Agency 
(NPSA). This initiative will create a network for lay people involved in patient 
safety/clinical governance work to share experiences and good practice, as well as 
provide training to help lay people gain the confidence, knowledge and skills to help 
the NHS improve safety. It is hoped that the Medical Harm Self-Help Network will be 
able to feed into this project.
The Medical Harm Self-Help Network is:
■ A forum for independent voluntary groups to share information and 
experience.
■ Members share a common interest in support and/or justice for people 
harmed by medical treatment or health professionals and improving patient 
safety.
■ Where appropriate members will work together on issues of common 
concern, but each group remains autonomous and independent
■ Action against Medical Accidents (AvMA) provides a secretariat for and 
facilitates the work of the network.
Background to the Network
In December 2003 as part of her research for her PhD on 'Medical Harm and Patient 
Empowerment in the NHS', Josephine Ocloo convened a meeting on behalf of AvMA 
with a number of self-help groups. The members of these groups had all been 
directly affected by medical harm. The meeting was convened for a number of 
reasons to meet the different objectives of a range of stakeholders. Josephine was 
keen to develop contacts with self-help groups as part of her research and as a way 
of exploring issues of medical harm and patient empowerment from the perspectives 
of individuals directly affected by the issues. She was also aware that many of the 
self-help groups whose campaigns had led to major investigations into medical harm, 
appeared to be excluded from many of the current policy debates and changes 
taking place.
Josephine also had an interest in networking with other self-help groups because of 
her own experience of medical harm due to the loss of her daughter whilst under 
NHS care and her experience of setting up a self-help group and campaigning for 
change.
AvMA have been keen to support the goal of building a national network of self-help 
and support groups in order to make it possible for individual patient and patients 
organisations to play a more central role in clinical governance and patient safety 
work at both the local and national level. This is seen as an important way of
enabling experiences to be shared between groups and opportunities to be 
developed for a more co-ordinated national voice on patient safety issues.
The self-help groups at the initial meeting were also keen to come together as a way 
of taking forward their strategic political and policy goals whilst gaining more 
collective support from other groups. Given these objectives, it was eventually 
decided it would be a good idea to form a loose Network, with the objectives as set 
out earlier As the meetings progressed, attendance was also broadened to include 
both self-help and other voluntary groups with an interest in patient safety issues.
Groups feeding into and/or attending Network Meetings since December 2003 are 
set out below:
The Richard Neale Action Group; Jabs; The National Bereavement Partnership; 
MRS A Support; The Erb's Palsy Group; Action for the Proper Regulation of Private 
Hospitals (APROP); Leicester Epilepsy Concern - Parents and Carers Group; 
Sufferers Against Iatrogenic Neglect; The Royal Brompton and Harefield Heart 
Children's Action Group; SOS - NHS Patients in Danger; ALERT; APRIL (Adverse 
Pychiatric Reactions Information Link);WITNESS (formerly POPAN); AIMS (The 
Association for the Improvement of Maternity Services); MIND.
The points below represent the key issues that have come up in network meetings 
that have been collated by Josephine Ocloo as part of her PhD research. She also 
sets out a way forward in developing a new patient safety agenda, highlighting some 
key components of models of good and bad practice.
It was decided in network meetings that a good way of highlighting the issues was to 
collate them as part of an Agenda for Change from Survivors of Medical Harm 
Speaking Out. These points could then be presented at the conference taking place 
on May 9th 2006.
Patient Safety and Empowerment: An Agenda for Change 
Key Issues:
■ The failure of health care organisations to learn from their mistakes which are 
subsequently repeated time and time again to the detriment of victims;
■ The denial and cover up of mistakes and negligence by the medical 
profession and bodies responsible for regulating the profession when a PSI* 
takes place;
■ The labelling and blaming of victims of medical harm as malicious, litigious, 
neurotic and trouble-makers when they are forced into fighting to get open 
and honest answers about how the harm affecting them occurred;
■ The denial and exclusion of patients from treatment after an experience of 
medical harm or patients who feel unable to have treatment they desperately 
need because their faith and trust has been broken;
■ Individuals pushed into legal action as the only way to get some 
accountability, because they cannot get an open explanation, investigation, 
apology, redress or reassurance that action will be taken to prevent a 
repetition of the harm;
A lack of access to justice and redress because individuals find themselves 
up against legal barriers that work against victims. (For example getting legal 
aid, independent medical experts, overcoming the difficult legal threshold 
(The Bolam Test) for medical negligence);
A lack of independence and accountability of systems of investigation (such 
as The NHS Complaints Procedure and by regulatory and professional bodies 
such as the General Medical Council, Nursing and Midwifery Council, 
Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency etc);
The need for proper independent regulation of healthcare services and for 
patients and the public to be properly involved and empowered as part of the 
Annual Health Check;
The need for the Private Sector to be subject to the same standards of 
accountability and regulation as the National Health Service;
The need for a proper and independent NHS Redress Scheme;
The need for a Duty of Candour to be placed on all health care professionals;
The problem of some lawyers not acting professionally and mishandling 
cases of medical negligence;
The use of medical experts who might themselves have been involved in 
causing medical harm;
The difficulties involved in getting hold of medical records and the time and 
money this can cost and the issue of medical records being tampered with or 
with items of information removed;
The role and behaviour of the pharmaceutical companies in causing medical 
harm and covering up its impact and the difficulties of getting redress from the 
Vaccination Damages Payment Scheme;
The withdrawal of food and hydration from vulnerable patients without proper 
consent;
The need for all patients to be treated with dignity and respect and in a non- 
discriminatory way regardless of their background;
The importance of remembering the need to work positively and in 
partnership with the medical profession, with patients and self-help groups 
having much to teach health care professionals;
The need to recognise the pain, isolation and psychological trauma of medical 
harm which affects people not only through the original injury, but is 
compounded by the way that victims have to fight to get an independent 
investigation, justice and redress;
The exclusion of people directly affected by medical harm and wider patient 
and public involvement from the current changes taking place in the patient 
safety field. This is seen to prevent health care professionals from learning 
from the experiences and expertise of victims;
Definitions:
*The National Patient Safety Agency
Defines a Patient Safety Incident (PSI) as:
‘Any unintended or unexpected incident which could have or 
did lead to harm for one or more patients receiving NHS funded 
healthcare’
A PSI also includes near misses:
‘A situation in which an event or omission, or a sequence of 
events or omissions arising during clinical care fails to develop 
further, whether or not as the result of compensating action, 
thus preventing injury to the patient.’
This definition can also be applied to the independent health 
sector
Way forward:
A Medical Model based upon bad practice:
■ Professional Dominance
■ Imbalance of Power between health care professionals 
and patients
■ A closed & Paternalistic Culture
■ Lack of Patient Involvement and Empowerment
A Good Practice Model of Patient Empowerment:
■ Based upon developing a new patient safety culture 
with:
■ An Open Reporting System for PSI's which also gives 
patients who are harmed Open and Honest 
Explanations
■ Independent and Accountable Systems of Investigation
■ Proper Access to systems of Justice and Redress 
based upon fairness and Human Rights
■ Patient and Public Involvement and Empowerment
avma
action a g a in s t  tneàkjâX accidents
The Patients' Agenda for Safety & Justice Conference May 9*'’ 2006 
Post-Conference Update July 2006
User Perspectives on Change
"The Patients' Agenda for Safety & Justice" conference, organised by Action against Medical 
Accidents (AvMA) in association with the Medical Harm Self-Help Network (MHSHN) took 
place on May 9th 2006 at Regents Wharf, London. The conference aimed to provide an 
opportunity for patients and patients' organisations to set the agenda through delivering 
presentations on key issues to do with medical harm and patient safety. Representatives of 
the key statutory agencies in the patient safety field were invited to listen and feedback to 
their organisations. The conference also launched the “Patients for Patient Safety” (PfPS) 
project which AvMA is managing in partnership with the National Patient Safety Agency 
(NPSA). This initiative aims to develop patient and public involvement in patient safety work 
and to create a network for lay people to share experiences and good practice, as well as to 
gain useful training and support.
A Patients Agenda for Patient Safety
The event was a great success and attended by more than a hundred people and very much 
represented an important step in patients and those affected by medical harm setting out 
what their perspectives are on developing a new patient safety culture.
Key speakers at the conference SPOKE OUT on what they saw as An Agenda for 
Change
Josephine Ocloo undertaking a PhD on Medical Harm & Patient Empowerment talked about 
the death of her daughter and 'A Time for Justice and Patient Empowerment' based upon 
a new model of practice
A Medical Model based upon bad practice:
Professional Dominance
Imbalance of Power between health care professionals and patients
A closed & Paternalistic Culture
Lack of Patient Involvement and Empowerment
To be replaced by.
A Good Practice Model of Patient Empowerment:
Based upon developing a new patient safety culture with:
An Open Reporting System for PSI's which also gives patients who are harmed Open and 
Honest Explanations
Independent and Accountable Systems of Investigation
Proper Access to systems of Justice and Redress based upon fairness and Human Rights 
Patient and Public Involvement as Empowerment
Jenny Grey from the NPSA underlined the importance of Patient Safety Work,
Jenny spoke about patients being informed of the risks of treatment. For more information to 
be given to the public in order that they could demand change. That current contracting and 
commissioning system s are required to meet som e of the clinical governance systems 
relating to patient safety
Peter Walsh Chief Executive of AvMA talked about R edress and Complaints.
The Healthcare Commission with great potential, but unable to cope with demand
Trusts to shoulder responsibility for poor complaints handling
To seize opportunities for joined up approaches -  scrap existing catch 22 for people 
wanting compensation
For investment in high calibre complaints staff
Restoration of a high quality Independent Complaints Advocacy Service (ICAS), 
promised when CHCs abolished
Consistent seam less access to medico-legal advice and personal support 
The NHS R edress Bill -  a m issed  opportunity?
Sticking with the ‘Bolam’ test used by the Courts, BUT 
No specialist representation for the patient - the NHS acts as Judge over itself 
No robust requirements about making patient safety improvements
Way forward:
NHS given first crack of the whip -  if case resolved, fine
Safety net: if client disagrees with NHS finding case is put to an independent medical 
expert agreeable to both sides
Client can be represented by a specialist solicitor
If medical expert report favourable, then Redress/ compensation is provided 
NHS required to publish action plan regarding patient safety issues identified in report
Jonathan Coe from WITNESS talked about Professional A buse and Regulation.
The devastating effects of professional abuse
The many Inquiries highlighting abuse (Ayling, Kerr Haslam, Shiman, Foster, 
Donaldson)
The need for:
Detailed regulatory guidance on professional abuse, including definitions of abuse 
and risk behaviours
Guidance on how to respond effectively to patient complaints in this area
Educational standards for pre-registration and training in this area for all health care 
professionals
Review current research to determine profile of perpetrators & predictors of abuse
Millie Kieve from APRIL spoke about Reducing Harm from Medication.
■ The devastating effects of adverse drug reactions and how few are reported
■ The over-prescribing of too many drugs without proper awareness of the
consequences
The need to balance research on harm & benefits of drugs, currently weighted in 
favour of benefits
Inappropriate prescription of medicines by G P's 
The failure of the MHRA to adequately scrutinise data
The medicines regulatory system failing & the need for independent regulation free 
from the pharmaceutical industry
Proper promotion of patient reporting and the Yellow Card Scheme
Tony Field from MRSA Support, spoke about Reducing Hospital Acquired
Infections
The devastating costs of MRSA and how he was effected 
The hidden scale of the problem and the need to properly review the evidence 
Trust literature which is falsely reassuring and misleading 
The need to protect patients as well as staff 
The need for prevention not control 
How we all need to take control of our own health
Joan Atkinson talked movingly about The Right to Life', the way that her husband was
treated and supports the goals of ALERT, an organisation - Defending Vulnerable
People's Right to Live :
■ For a protective statement to be made widely available to patients should they 
become incapacitated.
■ This should make clear their wish that nothing be done to directly and intentionally 
cause their death and to be able to receive appropriate medical treatment and food 
and water unless death is imminent, and if death is imminent to be provided with 
ordinary nursing and medical care including pain relief.
■ This statement should not just to be left in the hands of family members who could 
think that death was in the patient's best interest, although they were not dying, or 
who might be eager to inherit. Therefore the statement should be lodged with a 
solicitor.
■ An organisation should be properly funded in order that they could take up cases if a 
protective statement was ignored.
Jane Hanna from Epilepsy Bereaved spoke about 'Dealing with Large Scale
Medical Errors using epilepsy as an example’:
■ The patient safety issues in epilepsy arising from misdiagnosis, unnecessary labelling 
& side-effects, abrupt withdrawal of medication, seizure related deaths and wrong 
treatment
■ Increased hospitalisation affects emotional well-being, can increase injuries, lead to 
social exclusion
Between 400-1000 deaths a year are potentially avoidable
A need to build an evidence base on causes of epilepsy, risks & prevention strategies 
To develop nationally recognised standards of good practice 
A need for a strong partnership between clinicians & patients
A need for dedicated specialist advocacy resources for individuals & changes to the 
complaints system to facilitate the raising of concerns
An increased recognition of the role of the voluntary sector in patient safety 
(consultation/participation in policy working/training/information support).
Richard Ennals from APROP, spoke about Private Hospitals -  Has The Care 
Standards Act Change Anything?
Despite the introduction of the Care Standards Act 2000 the failure to address a 
number of concerns about standards in the private sector
The level of PSI's in the private sector and the failure to monitor and collect data on 
them
Issues in the private sector relating to the existence of appropriate cover and 
consultant & nursing expertise particularly at night time and weekends; access to the 
range of drugs, equipment & intensive care facilities if complications arise & are 
spotted in time compared to the NHS; appropriate monitoring of consultants 
performance
■ The failure to ensure monitoring and regulation of standards and the operation of a 
complaints system on a comparable level to the NHS
■ The dissembling and cover-up of information when something goes wrong with care
■ Some comments from the floor were:
■ Malcolm Alexander: Commented on the Freedom of Information Act and how 
difficult it was to obtain information from the private sector. Fior Avona: also had 
difficulty in accessing information on stats in relation to medical error. Feels that there 
needs to be more accountability and transparency
■ Dorothy Henley PPI Forum member: looks at complaints and complaints system & 
highlighted the lack of proper support for Patients Forums in relation to the Annual 
Health Check
■ Helen Baldwin: Ms Baldwin questioned why regulatory bodies put in place to monitor 
if they are not prepared to take action
m Gillian Bean (SiN): Referred to a patient who felt that she had been infected by
MRSA during carriage to hospital in ambulance as blanket was put over wound on
legs. Could cleanliness in ambulances be looked at.
. Jean Robinson: highlighted the failure of the NMC to deal adequately with
complaints or prepare statistics. There has been an increase in agency nurses -  
short term staff that are transient and therefore cannot be disciplined. Even when 
surgery is good there are concerns about the after care from the nursing staff and 
midwifery staff
Produced by Josephine Ocioo on behaif of AvMA September 2006
The Break Through Programme
Suppprfing Self . Suppprt[ng Dth.ers
The Break Through Programme is a 
self-management initiative set up 
to empower individuals affected by 
medical harm to work together in 
a supportive group context. The 
Programme is inspired by Josephine 
Ocloo, as a result of the untimely 
death of her daughter Krista which 
she believes occurred as a result of 
the medical negligence of a leading 
London hospital. The Break Through 
Planning team is made up of 
Josephine, as well as Louise Price 
and John McConnell and has been 
supported by AvMA as part of its 
support services.
Key Aims of The Programme
To enable individuals to;
Develop strategies for managing 
the negative emotional and 
psychological effects of medical 
harm;
Identify ways to move forward 
with their lives regardless of any 
action they might be taking, or 
thinking of taking, against a 
healthcare provider;
Meet other people in similar 
circumstances to gain support and 
develop strategies for self- 
emoowerment.
The concept of the Break Through 
Programme came into being following 
the success of a one day event 
'From Pain to Gain' which took place 
In May 2004 at Global Co operation 
House in London. This event was 
organised by what was to become 
the Breakthrough Planning Group and 
supported by AvMA and the Brahma 
Kumaris.
What was overwhelmingly clear 
throughout the course of this day 
and the feedback received from the 
evaluation of the event, was the 
need for a more in depth and 
ongoing programme of support to be 
developed for the future. Therefore 
in October 2005, a two day 
residential programme was held at 
Charney Manor Conference Centre 
near Wantage, Oxford, which was 
attended by twenty one people.
What follows is the collation of the 
material that came out of this 
programme - a combination of the 
participants experiences and their 
valuable contributions for an agenda 
for change -. This forms part of the 
research being carried out by 
Josephine Ocloo as part of her PhD 
on Medical Harm and Patient 
Empowerment within the NHS. The 
research design was constructed as 
a way of also enabling the
The Break Through Programme
programme participants to have a 
voice and tell their stories from 
their own perspectives.
The participants also wanted to see 
the development of a fully funded 
ongoing programme for the future.
Survivors of Medical Harm: 
These are our stories...
"We want our stories to be told 
with all the emotion and injustice 
as well"
Breakthrough participant
her relationships with friends and 
caused difficulties with intimate 
relationships.
Ms A successfully sued for 
negligence which took 6 years.
Agenda for Change
“ The importance of the medical 
profession and systems fo r  
redress being more transparent, 
open and accountable in order to 
facilita te  an individuals 'recovery' 
following an experience of 
medical harm "
Ms A
She was treated by a private 
osteopath with his own practice, who 
was also a registered doctor with 
the CMC. She used private 
healthcare insurance whilst at work 
to pay for treatment. However, the 
osteopath gave her unnecessary 
treatment without providing any 
information or getting consent. He 
incorrectly administered an epidural 
into her lower back, with no 
monitoring equipment or qualified 
staff available. No monitoring was 
provided after the severe 
psychological reaction due to the 
physiological reaction of the 
epidural being injected inadvertently 
and incorrectly.
As a result of this situation Ms A 
has been diagnosed with Post- 
Traumatic Stress disorder and has 
continued to suffer with on-going 
severe mental health and physical 
problems. Her whole quality of life 
has also been affected, she lost her 
job because she could not cope with 
what had happened, it also affected
Charlotte Swain
The medical harm relates to 
Charlotte's mother who died in 
hospital. Charlotte believes that her 
mother's drug administration in 
hospital and general medical care 
were mismanaged. The key concerns 
relate to the way that internal 
bleeding by Mrs Swain was dealt 
with as a result of the 
administration of strong pain-killers 
and how this was addressed once it 
was brought to the attention of 
ward sta ff by Charlotte's family. 
Other concerns about Mrs Swain's 
treatment related to a lack of 
general basic care. Mrs Swain had 
raised concerns about how she was 
being treated before her death and 
a failure to change her dressings. 
Mrs Swain's family were also upset 
that no post-mortem was carried out 
despite a request for one by the 
family and that eventually a false 
death certificate was issued relating 
to the cause of death. Charlotte 
feels terrible pain because her
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family 'entrusted our most 
treasured possession' to the Trust, 
who were then 'highly negligent 
causing suffering and terror to my 
mother'.
Charlotte also feels guilty that she 
didn't try to Intervene more with 
the hospital sta ff to try and get 
something done, but she didn't want 
to make a fuss as she thought the 
sta ff knew what they were doing. At 
one point she felt that she didn't 
want to live, so was urgently 
referred for counselling by her 6P. 
The family has instructed a solicitor 
to represent their interests at an 
inquest and Written a letter of 
complaint to the hospital's chief 
executive and clinical governance 
team. After the inquest they are 
thinking of making a claim under the 
Human Rights Act - regarding Right 
to Life
Agenda for Change
"The importance of the  
Medical Profession admitting 
th a t they do not always get it  
right rather than covering up 
when errors, harm occurs"
Mrs y
Mrs y developed Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder after the birth of 
her son. This illness also induced a 
host of other stress related 
illnesses. She was not treated for 
PTSD because of a refusal by the 
professionals treating her to 
acknowledge what had caused the 
illness In the first place. Eventually
the charity AIMS told her what was 
wrong and were willing to assist her 
to go to court but Mrs y felt unable 
even to consider legal action because 
of how ill she was.
As a result of her situation Mrs Y 
lost her job through ill health. She 
was also unable to have anymore 
children and could not look after the 
one that she had. She says I  was 
'emotionally dead and unable to 
maintain relationships with friends 
as it took all of my energy just to 
stay alive. My body was ruined with 
the side-effects of the drugs I  
eventually had to take and none of 
them worked for the first four 
years anyway'.
Agenda for Change
"A need to change systems 
and the culture of the medical 
profession so th a t people can 
move on "
Stefanie Wywrot
Stefanie had a cataract operation on 
her right eye and the harm took 
place in the 3 month post-operative 
period. She was given eye-drops to 
use but because of inadequate 
advice about aftercare and no 
monitoring, she lost the sight in her 
right eye.
Stefanie is now registered blind, 
cannot go anywhere on her own and 
relies on others to help her. She 
lives on her own and has no family 
support. Losing her sight meant that 
she was unable to continue working 
as a machinist. She had her own 
business. She did attempt to sue for
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compensation, but felt that because 
she did not receive proper support 
from her solicitors, the case was 
dropped, but not before she had 
spent almost every penny that she 
had.
Her lack of income has also affected  
her relationships with family and 
friends. Her telephone was cut off  
because she could not afford it and 
because she Is unable to write or 
read letters, she has become 
isolated.
Stephanie says 'I have been blinded 
as a result of the treatment I  
received. I  will never come to terms 
with it and I  feel bitter that no one 
has listened to my side of the story. 
My eyesight has gone forever; there 
is no treatment, cure or operation. I  
used to cry all the time, everyday I  
get depressed and worry how I  am 
going to cope. I  struggle with 
everyday life and with the 
knowledge that my sight will never 
return'.
Stephanie is interested in making 
contact with other people who have 
been affected in similar ways to 
herself by an adverse event. I f  you 
would like to make contact please
get in touch with AvMA o n  who
will pass on your details?
Agenda for Change
"Treatment should not be 
withheld where corrective 
treatm ent is needed following 
medical harm"
anaesthetic and so was awake during 
the surgical procedure. This led to 
pulmonary oedema, heart failure and 
the death of her daughter at 10 
days old.
She has since been diagnosed with 
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, 
Dilated Cardiomyopathy and 
depression.
Ms X said she feels 'emotionally 
crippled' by her experiences and 
physically hasn't fe lt very well since 
the break down of her relationship 
with the father of her child. She 
constantly re-lives the experience 
(she is sometimes immobilised with 
fear and experiences terrifying 
nightmares). She has been reliant on 
charities since the death of her 
child (which she says she holds the 
NHS responsible for) and the 
private counselling which she sought 
out, she says she found pointless. 
She successfully took legal action 
proving she was given inadequate 
anaesthesia. She now says, 'I have 
no faith in the NHS and do not trust 
the institution at all'.
Agenda for Change
"Medical professionals need 
to be more questioning of 
colleagues practice"
MsX
Ms X had an emergency caesorzon  
section and was given inadequate
Patricia Cooper
Mrs Cooper sustained her injury 
during surgery. Whilst having a 
hysterectomy, her bladder was 
damaged. This led to a number of 
other knock-on serious effects, 
which included the need for 
emergency surgery, and several
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further operations which often  
made the problems worse. She also 
developed peritonitis and other 
infections, developed a DVT, had to 
have her bladder rebuilt, her hernia 
repaired and her left kidney and gall 
bladder removed.
Mrs Cooper now has to self- 
catheterise four times a day, she 
also suffers occasional bladder 
infections and has limited walking 
and standing duration. She also has 
to rest for one hour each day in the 
afternoon. She can only drive for 
short distances with an automatic 
car with power steering. Her 
husband corr\e.s out all of the 
housework, ironing and shopping. 
Financially she has had to stop her 
part-time job and has not been able 
to return to work. I t  has also cost a 
lot of money to have help in the 
home as they did not qualify for 
assistance and to pay for all the 
hospital visits to London.
She fe lt that she had coped well 
considering what she had been 
through, although she was angry at 
first, but now wanted to try and 
move forward. She fe lt however 
that the situation had been 
devastating for her relationship with 
her husband, but that they had 
come through it together. They both 
had counselling and her husband had 
a nervous breakdown. Although they 
successfully sued, it took 8 years 
and was settled out of court.
Agenda for Change 
“The need for medical students 
to have a longer period being 
super-numery in order that that 
they have more time observing 
the practice of more experienced 
medics before being thrown in 
the deep end and learning on the 
job"
Helen Rowe
Helen’s partner had not been feeling 
well and was losing weight. He 
thought he had worms. He went to 
see his GP who did not do any tests  
but told him to take an over the 
counter treatment. A week later he 
began to be sick, which happened up 
to 8 times and felt very weak. When 
he called the doctor he was told to 
rest, but then called the doctor 
later asking for a home visit. The 
doctor called and said he had a virus, 
which would clear up in a few days. 
Although he started to feel worse 
later, he believed he had a virus and 
did nothing more. He died alone the 
next day. I t  was later found by his 
doctor that he had died from a 
complication of unidentified 
diabetes. An independent expert 
found that the doctor had been 
negligent in three ways. Helen said, 
'Adam and I  were a strong couple, 
going through fertility treatment 
and moving home. This event has 
completely damaged my life In terms 
of relationships, children and future 
plans'. She also felt that her trust 
had been badly affected and she 
felt let down by the fact that she 
felt the GP's surgery knew after 
her partner died, that a diabetes 
related illness was involved, but that 
they had lied to her about this.
At the moment an inquest is taking 
place into her partner’s death. She 
has also made a complaint to the 
primary care trust and the GMC. 
She felt it likely that following the 
inquest, she would be taking out a 
civil claim for negligence.
Effects of Medical Harm.....
The pain of being labelled and not 
listened to; “They don’t listen, don’t  
want to listen"
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Effects of Medical Harm-
Being affected on many levels by 
the harm caused: physically,
mentally, financially and in their 
wider relationships;
Shirley Johns
Mrs Johns was prescribed HRT with 
Thyroxine in 1994 for no proven 
reason. She was not given any 
warnings about this medication and 
no monitoring was carried out. Her 
health, described as 'excellent', 
after 30 years of taking thyroid 
replacement (lOOmcg thyroxine) 
then began to deteriorate. With 
the HRT she developed a number of 
adverse symptoms, blotches, a rash 
on her face, aches, pains, dry hair, 
sinus problems etc. Due to these 
symptoms In 1997 she made a 
request to her GP to stop taking 
HRT, which was then stopped 
suddenly without any monitoring. 
Her health continued to deteriorate. 
She requested tests which would 
show her ill-health was connected to 
thyroid dysfunction, but was told 
the test (TFT) was normal. She was 
then prescribed other medication 
which induced worse symptoms. Her 
health continued to deteriorate and 
she visited her GP a number of times 
and was given TFT tests that she 
was told were normal. Her GP 
appeared to ignore symptoms. In 
1999, she was admitted to hospital 
for 3 days but was discharged 
without medical care. In 1999 she 
was again put back on HRT with 
Thyroxine. Eventually she went to a 
private hospital and was found to be 
folate deficient and the HRT was
stopped. In Oct 2000, after a long 
fight Mrs Johns found evidence of 
'grossly abnormal TFT's' in her 
medical records and was informed 
she had a complaint.
She believes that she warned her 
doctors repeatedly of adverse 
effects, but no action was taken and 
that they continued to prescribe 
until it was too late, without any 
monitoring or following guidelines 
and procedures.
Mrs Johns says 'Let my horror story 
of taking HRT together with 
Thyroxine (unmonitored) be a 
warning to other women. I t  may not 
be so evident while HRT is being 
taken but after its sudden 
withdrawal from an unstable patient 
the results can be devastating. My 
health and life has been permanently 
changed for ever, the distressing 
painful symptoms persist although 
the thyroid function has been stable 
for almost two years. The burning of 
my face and mouth and aches and 
pains is almost unbearable and all 
would have been avoided if HRT had 
not been prescribed. I  should have 
been stable for life taking 100 meg 
of Thyroxine'.
Despite taking her complaint 
through the complaints system, 
taking legal action, going to the GMC 
and the Ombudsman's office Mrs 
Johns was unable to get any redress. 
Financially, she is thousands of 
pounds worse off because of private 
medical consultations, dental and 
legal fees. She believes the above 
mentioned systems do not work in 
the interests of patients who have 
been harmed and that there is no 
proper regulation of the medical 
profession. She believes that the
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GMC is well aware of malpractice 
among doctors and that the medical 
profession are not accountable for 
their actions or failures.
Effects of Medical Harm....
The whole family become victims 
not only the person who has 
suffered medical harm
Polly Fleet-Palmer
Polly Fleet - Palmer's daughter Rose 
was operated on at Harefield 
Hospital, now part of the Royal 
Brompton and Harefield NHS Trust, 
at the age of 8, having been born 
with a congenital heart defect. Mrs 
Fleet-Palmer and her husband were 
told that Rose needed corrective 
surgery. One doctor told them that 
the operation was routine, and 
another that it was complex but by 
no means unique. At no time were 
any risks of brain damage discussed 
with them and they consented to the 
operation. As a consequence of the 
operation. Rose suffered severe 
brain damage. No steps were taken 
to counter the neurological damage 
until the 8th post-operative day, 
although in the family's view this 
was evident from the third or 
fourth day. They believe that 
intervention could have taken place 
at this stage which may have 
minimised Rose's neurological 
damage. They first saw the surgeon 
on the 9th post-operative day, who 
claimed that nothing had gone wrong 
during Rose's surgery and that 
there was a definite chance of a full 
recovery. The family has never 
received an acceptable explanation
of what happened to cause the brain 
damage.
Rose is now registered blind, unable 
to speak, cannot feed herself and 
has cerebral palsy. She is entirely 
dependent and attends a school for 
the physically and mentally disabled. 
Her parents were unable to sustain 
legal action because their legal aid 
certificate was withdrawn on the 
basis that they were unlikely to win 
their case because of a similar case 
being dismissed by the courts. 
Missing medical records in their 
case also make it virtually impossible 
to prove exactly what happened to 
Rose. The emotional costs have been 
devastating for Mrs Fleet-Palmer 
and her family. She has suffered 
from depression, guilt and the pain 
of never knowing exactly what 
happened to Rose and why. She feels 
that there has been a cover-up and a 
lack of justice. The family also has 
to face the life-time responsibility 
of caring for Rose without much 
needed compensation and the 
battles which have continued for 
years, to secure for Rose the 
appropriate care that she needs and 
deserves from Social Services.
Effects of Medical Harm.
Being labelled 'neurotic' and not 
believed when questioning or 
challenging the doctor about the 
treatment they have received, 
which has affected future access 
to appropriate healthcare.
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Denise Grimsdell
In 1996 Denise Grimsdell consulted 
her GP about a facial rash. The rash 
and other allergic and bowel 
symptoms including bleeding that 
emerged were mistreated, 
misdiagnosed, missed and were not 
represented in referral letters or 
were misrepresented in records. 
Her observation that she might have 
a mercury allergy after linking the 
onset of the rash to an amalgam 
filling, as well as a malabsorption 
problem, were discounted by her GP. 
Her observations were later proved 
correct by private tests and blood 
tests at the London Homeopathic 
Hospital, the latter also found 
antibodies relating to Immune 
system inflammation that had been 
overlooked. By the summer of 1997, 
Denise felt so ill and weak; she was 
forced to give up sport, had lost a 
lot of weight and had developed 
intolerance to grains and other 
foods. This caused such strain with 
her employer that she left her job. 
The stress and misery of her 
situation caused her to start
thinking about her abusive childhood 
and she was referred to a clinical 
psychologist for 'therapy' under an 
NHS Trust. In November 1997, the 
psychologist, without consent, 
applied hypnosis via a controversial 
induction. She was interrogated 
about her personal life and
relationships, unethical suggestions
were made and no respect was given 
for Denise's childhood, the person 
she was or the people she valued. 
Denise subsequently developed
shingles and was later diagnosed 
with Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder.
Denise's husband then made a 
complaint on her behalf. This was 
denied by the psychologist, whom 
the family maintain, falsified her 
records to cover-up the fact that 
she had used hypnosis. The 
complaint was then referred to the 
Health Service Ombudsman (HSO). 
The Ombudsman's office refused to 
investigate until threatened with 
legal action. As a result of this 
action they found that the family's 
complaint to the Trust had been 
mishandled, although they still failed 
to investigate the substance of the 
complaint. The HSO also refused to 
reimburse the family for the 
£7,000 in legal costs they were 
forced to incur. As a result of her 
experiences Denise has been left 
with the feeling that 'there is bias, 
dishonesty, complacency, secrecy 
and vindictiveness surrounding 
medical harm'. This she says 
'disgusts my sense of morality and 
fair play. The strain of pursuing the 
truth, of Injustice, of character 
assassination without a right of 
reply, of callousness in the face of 
the trauma caused, has damaged our 
lives and it hurts and is impossible 
to forget. I  think It will always hurt 
and will never be forgotten. We do 
not consult UK doctors now.
Instead we consult complementary 
practitioners, who frankly have done 
a fantastic job in cleaning up the 
mess made of me by the medical 
profession'.
Effects of Medical Harm.....
The enormous anger at struggling 
to find the truth;
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David Giles
In 1993 David who has suffered 
with epilepsy since childhood, 
experienced a seizure and was 
admitted to a hospital in Hampshire. 
David was taking an anti convulsant, 
which he felt needed to have the 
dosage increased in order to 
stabilise his fits. However, rather 
than doing this, he was changed to 
three different drugs which 
resulted in him experiencing adverse 
affects. After 8 weeks these drugs 
were stopped and changed back to 
the original medication.
As a result of his situation, David 
has continued to experience long 
term effects both physically and 
financially. He does not feel that he 
has obtained justice for what has 
happened to him.
Effects of Medical Harm....
The abuse of trust that can make you 
no longer want to use the health 
service.
John W illetts
In 1970 John became a blood donor 
aged 18, the youngest age you are 
allowed to give blood and continued 
donating for 25 years until he was 
43 years old. In Feb 1991 John was 
told about a new way to donate blood 
so he changed to this new method. 
This meant that he could donate 
more frequently, without becoming 
anaemic and he could increase the 
benefits to sick patients by donating 
both blood plasma and platelets in 
one sitting. In 1994, John became 
the first person in Birmingham to 
pioneer another blood donation 
method, by agreeing to give blood in
a more concentrated form. This 
method allowed twice as much blood 
to be taken than previously, to gain 
more platelets than plasma whilst 
using fewer donors. This way of 
donating was particularly beneficial 
for sick patients because it allowing 
them to receive more blood from 
one donor, thereby reducing the 
chances of cross-infection. However 
within six months of using this 
method, John's health changed 
dramatically and over a period of 
years he went from someone who as 
a life-long non-smoker and drinker 
had been completely healthy, to 
developing a number of adverse 
symptoms. These included developing 
tinnitus in 1995, diabetes in 2001, 
receiving medication for 
hypertension and raised cholesterol 
in 2002, being diagnosed with 
prostate enlargement and a raised 
PSA in 2004, Dry Eye Syndrome in 
2005 and developing a degenerative 
spine condition. In response to these 
developments, John found his own 
doctors to be 'passive and 
unresponsive'. In 1997 he went to a 
homeopathic centre who found a 
number of serious problems with his 
health which then prompted him to 
consult a solicitor for medical 
negligence. Yet despite being 
granted legal aid, two unsupportive 
expert witness reports led to the 
closure of his case in 1999. In 
response to his situation, John says 
'I have learned to live with these 
conditions for more than ten years. 
You learn a lot about coping 
strategies especially on your own'.
He has had no recourse to public 
support, sick pay or social security.
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but as he runs his own business he 
feels his physical conditions will soon 
force him to look for alternative 
work. Ultimately John says 'If  I  had 
my life all over again, I  would still be 
a blood donor to help benefit 
others'.
Healing the Pain
The need to deal with the anger 
in order to move forward;
Realising the impact of the harm 
upon personal relationships;
The need to stop trying to run 
away from what has happened and 
to take ownership or accept what 
has taken place;
Recognising when you need help;
Courage -  becoming stronger -  
Affirming th a t you have ‘come 
through it' ‘Coming back'
Strategies for Self-Empowerment
Changing the system;
Continue to challenge inappropriate care 
and questioning things more as a 
recipient of healthcare;
Drawing on previous professional skills;
Drawing on professional support from  
family and friends and those who 
understand;
Preparation;
Develop knowledge in order to feel 
confident about questioning;
Become more informed.
Being more challenging -
A Time for Justice
Medical Harm: The Facts:
885,832 patient safety incidents (PSI'S) were recorded in a survey of 256 NHS 
acute, ambulance and mental health trusts in 2003-04 and in a follow-up survey in 
2004-05, around 974,00 PSI's were reported. Hospital acquired infections were 
estimated to Increase PSI figures by around 300,000 incidents.
I t  is estimated that about 50% of these incidents are preventable.
National Audit Office 2005:1)
No actual data is available on the numbers of negligent PSI's. Respected international 
studies (The Harvard Study 1991; The Quality in Australian Health Care Study 1995) 
found between 27-51% of PSI'S in the studies were negligent. Extrapolated to the 
NHS, this may mean that a quarter of PSI's (243, 000) occurring in England may be 
negligent. Yet in 2004-5, there were only 5,609 legal claims for clinical negligence 
(National Health Service Litigation Authority (NHSLA) Website 31-1-06), making up 
only 2% of possible claims.
Supporting Self - Supporting O thers
